Blouin v. Bank Of America

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, In line with the reasons stated above, deft's 18 Motion to Dismiss is granted. The complaint is dismissed, with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and to close the case for administrative purposes. (Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 6/13/2016) c/m Fwd. for Judgment. (Galeano, Sonia)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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SYLVIANE EVE BLOUIN,

Plaintiff,
-againstBANK OF AMERICA, National Association,
Defendant.

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Vitaliano, DJ.

On September 12, 2014, plaintiff Sylviane Eve Blouin filed this action against defendant
Bank of America, National Association ("Bank of America"), alleging fraud in conjunction with
a Florida state court foreclosure proceeding. On January 19, 2015, Bank of America filed its
motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
Background
The facts of this case closely mirror those of an action filed by

Blouin,~

Blouin v.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, 14-cv-5143 (E.D.N.Y. March 29, 2016) ("Blouin
I"), and, as further discussed below, must be dismissed for the same reasons. With near
symmetry to Blouin I, plaintiff, claiming to be the record owner of real property located in
Florida, targets a foreclosure action brought by Bank of America in a Florida state court two
years before this action was commenced. Compl., Dkt. No. 1, ~~ 9-10. 1 Once again, in a series

Just as in Blouin I, the subject events appear to have occurred entirely within Florida, and
so it is again unclear that venue is properly laid in this district. In fact, in support of her choice
of venue, Blouin reprises her conclusory representations that "[v]enue in this District arises for
multiple reasons within the scope and meaning of28 USC §1391(b)" and "the acts alleged herein
occur[ed] within this District." Compl. ~ 2. No further basis is provided. Nevertheless, Bank of
America accedes to venue here for the purpose of its motion to dismiss. In the absence of
objection, the Court will decide the motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1014.

of conclusory allegations and facts pleaded on "infonnation and belief," Blouin asserts, in
language identical to that used in Blouin I, that Bank of America "manufactured and used a false
complaint and other fake and counterfeit records to enable it to induce" the Florida state court to
issue the judgment of foreclosure. Id. ~ 9. Indeed, the only differences between this case and
Blouin I are not substantive.
Here, per the custom of the times, Blouin's mortgage with WaMu was pooled with other
mortgages into a securitized trust, known as WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2005-AR19 (the "Trust"). Id.~~ 11-15.2 In that fonn, it was ultimately assigned to Bank of
America, as trustee to the Trust. Id.~~ 24; Def. Br., Dkt. No. 20, at 3. This conveyance trail
sparked for Blouin several new, trust-based causes of action, but it did not change the
fundamental fact that she again seeks to challenge a state-court foreclosure proceeding resulting
in an adverse judgment in federal district court. As in Blouin I, Blouin demands declaratory
relief in the form of a finding that Bank of America lacked the right to bring the foreclosure
action. She also prays for an injunction against Bank of America bringing any further actions
against her, and costs and attorney's fees.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This rule does not command a litigant to supply
"detailed factual allegations" in support of her claims, Bell Atlantic Coro. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007), "but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "A

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The mortgage agreement explicitly provided that the mortgage and note could be
assigned or sold without notice to Blouin. See Mortgage Agreement, Dkt. No. 19-2, ~ 20.
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pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' ... will not do." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555); see also In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007). "Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of'further factual enhancement."'
Igbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
To survive a Rule 12(b) motion, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.,,, Igbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This "plausibility standard is not akin to a probability
requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."
Id. (internal quotations omitted); see Igbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007)
(interpreting Twombly to require a "plausibility standard" that "obliges a pleader to amplify a
claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to
render the claim plausible") (emphasis omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 193 7 (2009).
On a Rule l 2(b)(6) motion, of course, the district court must accept as true all factual statements
alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir.
2008).
Equally significant, Rule 9{b) requires that "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Given that Blouin alleges fraudulent conduct by Bank of America, her complaint must meet Rule
9(b)'s heightened pleading standards to survive dismissal.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, moreover, the motion court may consider the pleading
itself, documents that are referenced in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in
bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff's possession or that the plaintiff knew of when

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bringing suit, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. See Chambers v. Time Warner.
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002); Int'l Audiotext Network. Inc. v. Am. Tel.& Tel. Co., 62
F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995).
Discussion
As in Blouin I, there is no factual material in plaintiffs complaint to substantiate her
claim that Bank of America, as assignee of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., successor in interest to
WaMu, did not obtain a mortgage lien interest in her Florida property. Once again, other than
Blouin's conclusory statements, nothing in the record properly before the Court supports the
claim that Bank of America committed fraud or that the state court that entered the judgment of
foreclosure was misled of any facts upon which the complaint lies. See Dkt. No. 19-7.
Powerfully, to the extent there has been any evidentiary showing, it has been by Bank of
America, which has provided its original foreclosure complaint and a sworn copy ofBlouin's
mortgage agreement with WaMu. See Dkt. Nos. 19-2, 19-4. Bank ~f America's disclosure of
the mortgage documents plainly undermines Blouin's claim that "there is no evidence
whatsoever that [Bank of America] owns and hold[s] the mortgage." Compl. at 4. Thus,
plaintiffs conclusory statements, devoid of even a scintilla of factual support, cannot survive the
ordinary pleading standards pronounced in Twombly and Igbal, let alone the heightened pleading
standards for fraud claims under Rule 9(b). See Igbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570; Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).
Additionally, Blouin's attempt to circumvent the state court foreclosure judgment is
plainly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Webster v. Wells Fargo Bank. N.A., No. 08
CIV. 10145, 2009 WL 5178654 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009) affd sub nom. Webster v. Penzetta,
458 F. App'x 23 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Jan. 24, 2012); see also In re Wilson, 410 F. App'x

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409, 411 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal on Rooker-Feldman grounds where plaintiff
complained defendant bank lacked standing to foreclose). Dispositively, plaintiffs claims of
fraud do nothing to overcome this jurisdictional impediment. See Parra v. Greenpoint Mortgage,
No. CIV.A. 01-CV-02010, 2002 WL 32442231, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002), affd sub nom.
Parra v. Wilshire Credit Cor:p., 53 F. App'x 164 (2d Cir. 2002) ("The fact that [a] plaintiff alleges
that the state court judgment was procured by fraud does not remove [her] claims from the ambit
of Rooker-Feldman"); see also Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S. Ct. 149,
150, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923) ("If the [state court] decision was wrong, that did not make the
judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely
appellate proceeding ... Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other
than [the Supreme Court] could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for
errors of that character."). Thus, even if Blouin's challenges to the Florida foreclosure
proceeding had merit, this Court would still lack jurisdiction to entertain them. Just as in Blouin

l, this fundamental defect is, plainly, incurable by amendment.
Conclusion
In line with the reasons stated above, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. The
complaint is dismissed, with prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and to close the case for
administrative purposes.
So Ordered.

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Dated: Brooklyn, New York
June 13, 2016

/s/ USDJ ERIC N. VITALIANO
ERICN. VITALIANO
United States District Judge

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