Chen v. Rite Aid of New York, Inc. et al
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, denying 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. In light of the foregoing, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 USC sec. 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. (Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 2/03/2015) c/m Fwd. for Judgment. (Galeano, Sonia)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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14 CV 6325 (ENV)
CHING-YU A CHEN,
-againstRITE AID OF NEW YORK INC.;
ROSA TORRES; VINNIE DAM,1
VITALIANO, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, Ching-Yau Chen, brings this prose complaint, which purports
to allege violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §
621 et seq. ("ADEA"). Plaintiff makes application to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff's
claim is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff names as defendants Rosa Torres and Vinnie Dam. However, there
is no individual liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
See Cherry v. Toussaint, 50 Fed. Appx. 476, 477 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[T)he ADEA
precludes individual liability."); McMahon v. Napolitano, No. 13 CV 1404,
2013 WL 1410382, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2013) (noting that neither Title VII
nor the ADEA provides for individual liability).
ADEA establishes that it is "unlawful for an employer ... to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's age.'' 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l). To establish a primafacie case
of age discrimination in violation of ADEA, plaintiff must show: (1) that he
was within the protected age group (more than 40 years old); (2) that he was
qualified for his position; (3) that he experienced adverse employment action;
and (4) that such action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. See Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d
93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Carlton v. Mystic Transp. Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 134
(2d Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiff avers that his employment with Rite Aid was terminated on
August 8, 2010. Compl.
8. Chen alleges that he filed an employment
discrimination action against his employer following his termination, and that
he received a settlement in the amount of $15,000 along with an agreement
that his termination would be reflected as voluntary retirement. Id. He now
claims that when his wife's employment with the same employer was recently
terminated, the Human Resources ("H.R.'') manager mentioned plaintiff's
prior negative employment history with the company to his wife.
Specifically, Chen says that the H.R. manager accused his wife of committing
the same type of offenses that led to his termination. Id. Chen contends that
this disclosure to his wife violated his right to privacy as well as the terms of
his settlement agreement. Id.
Even under the most liberal construction of plaintiff's allegations, he
has failed to connect any adverse employment action to a protected status
under ADEA. In fact, his pleadings establish that at the time of the alleged
wrongful discrimination against his wife, he was no longer an employee of
defendant. Certainly, Chen may not rely on his wife's pending claim for
discrimination or her employee relationship as a basis to assert his own claim
under ADEA. See Ruston v. Town Bd. of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.
2010). In any event, "[u]nder Igbal, factual allegations must be sufficient to
support necessary legal conclusions," and must "plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief."
Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110,
120-21 (2d Cir. 2010) (although Twombly and Igbal did not impose a
heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases, enough
facts must still be pleaded to make plaintifrs claim plausible). Given the
On the same day that plaintiff filed the instant action, his wife filed a
complaint against Rite Aid alleging violations of ADEA. See Chen v. Rite Aid
et al., 14 CV 6324 (ENV).
settlement Chen pleads he negotiated with Rite Aid, Chen has no viable
ADEA claim against it now. Indeed, if he ever had one, he settled it according
to his own allegations. Amendment in this circumstance would be futile. 1
In light of the foregoing, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is
denied for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 44445 (1962).
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Brooklyn, New York
February 3, 2015
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United States District Judge
Given that the complaint fails to state a claim, plaintiff's request to proceed
IFP is denied. Even if the complaint could have passed threshold muster, the
financial declaration form that plaintiff has submitted ("Deel.") does not
satisfy the Court that he is unable to pay the Court's filing fee to commence
this action. Plaintiff states that his gross pay is $2,400 per week. Deel., 2.
Moreover, plaintiff states that he has $3,000 in a checking or savings account.
Deel. , 4. Plaintifrs declaration establishes that he has sufficient resources to
pay the $400 filing fee to commence this action, and his request to proceed IFP
would have been denied on that basis.
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