Rizk et al v. City of New York et al

Filing 123

ORDER: For the reasons in the attached Memorandum & Order, Defendants' 104 Motion in Limine to preclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' proposed expert, Walter Signorelli, is granted in part and denied in part. If his expert qualifica tions are established, Signorelli may testify within the limited scope discussed in the Memorandum & Order. Although Plaintiffs must adhere to these limits at trial, the Court will rule on specific objections if they arise during Signorelli's testimony and will give a limiting instruction if necessary. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 3/28/2022. (Sharon, William)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JACQUELINE RIZK and SAMIR
GONSALVES,
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
14-CV-6434 (PKC) (RER)

- against CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
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PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Defendants City of New York, New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), Officer
Firadaus Mehirdel, Officer Danny Lee, Sergeant Joel Rosenthal, and Lieutenant George Howley
(collectively, “Defendants”) move in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs Jacqueline Rizk
and Samir Gonsalves’s proposed expert, Walter Signorelli, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.1
Alternatively, Defendants ask the Court to limit Signorelli’s testimony.

Plaintiffs oppose

Defendants’ motion. For the reasons below, Signorelli is permitted to testify, but with certain
restrictions.
BACKGROUND
On October 31, 2014, Plaintiffs sued Defendants for false arrest, excessive force, failure to
intervene, and denial of fair trial, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for state law violations,
stemming from Plaintiffs’ arrests on August 3, 2013. (See generally Dkt. 1.) Trial in the case is
scheduled to begin with jury selection on June 21, 2022. (See 1/24/2022 Trial Scheduling Order.)
On November 23, 2020, Defendants moved under Rule 702 to exclude testimony of Plaintiffs’

1

Although styled as a generic motion in limine, it is in fact a Daubert motion. See Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
1

proffered police practices expert, Walter Signorelli.2 (See Dkt. 104.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition
(see Dkt. 107), and Defendants filed a reply (see Dkt. 108).
LEGAL STANDARD
“When parties seek to introduce expert testimony in accordance with Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial judge has ‘the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.’” United States v. Willis, 14 F.4th
170, 185 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597
(1993)).3 The judge must consider whether (1) “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;” (2) “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;” (3) “the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods;” and (4) “the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. “In addition to these factors, the district court
may consider those enumerated in Daubert, ‘some or all of which might prove helpful in
determining the reliability of a particular scientific theory or technique.’” Clerveaux v. E. Ramapo
Cent. Sch. Dist., 984 F.3d 213, 233 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999)). “These factors are: (1) whether the methodology or theory has been
or can be tested; (2) whether the methodology or theory has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) the methodology’s error rate; and (4) whether the methodology or technique has
gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S.

2

Although the parties will have the opportunity to file other in limine motions closer to
trial (see 1/24/2022 Trial Scheduling Order), the Court resolves the instant motion now because,
as a Daubert motion, it will likely affect trial preparation, as well the parties’ other in limine
motions.
3

Unless otherwise noted, all legal citations in this Memorandum and Order omit any
internal quotation marks, citations, brackets, and ellipses.
2

at 593–94). “Expert testimony that usurps the role of the factfinder or that serves principally to
advance legal arguments should be excluded.” Choi v. Tower Rsch. Cap. LLC, 2 F.4th 10, 20
(2d Cir. 2021).

“The proponent of expert testimony carries the burden of establishing its

admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .” Id.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs offer Signorelli’s testimony on, among other things, police practices and
procedures. (See Dkt. 97-2, at 4.) Defendants ask the Court to preclude Signorelli from testifying
or to limit the scope of his testimony. (See Dkt. 108, at 4.)
District courts in this Circuit have considered Signorelli’s proposed testimony before. In
Vazquez v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-6277 (JMF), 2014 WL 4388497, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 5, 2014), a malicious prosecution, due process, and fair trial case, the court allowed Signorelli
to testify as an expert on police standards, and found his methods sufficiently reliable. It concluded
that “although Signorelli’s opinions may not rest on statistical studies or traditional scientific
methods, they are, nevertheless, based on data—including personal experience, interviews, review
of police manuals and other primary sources, and review of academic literature—of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in various disciplines of social science.” Id. The court
determined that Signorelli’s testimony would aid the trier of fact, because “[p]olice training,
policies, and procedures—the subjects of Signorelli’s testimony—are clearly complex areas
outside common experience.” Id. at *13. To the extent Signorelli’s report “touch[ed] on
[impermissible] subjects” such as the “credibility of other witnesses” or “ultimate legal
conclusions,” the court noted that it could “address those defects at trial by ruling on objections to
particular questions and testimony.” Id.
In Stern v. Shammas, No. 12-CV-5210 (NGG) (RER), 2015 WL 4530473, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
July 27, 2015), an excessive force and false arrest case, the plaintiff “argue[d] that [Signorelli’s
3

testimony would] help the jury to understand how Defendants violated police procedures, which
[would] in turn inform the jury’s analysis of the ultimate issues—whether Defendants had probable
cause to arrest Plaintiff, and whether they used excessive force.” “Defendants counter[ed] that
Mr. Signorelli’s opinions [would] invade the fact-finding province of the jury; Mr. Signorelli failed
to use a reliable methodology to reach his conclusions; and, in any event, Mr. Signorelli’s
testimony [was] irrelevant, prejudicial to Defendants, and likely to confuse the jury.” Id.
The court granted the motion to exclude in part and denied it in part. Id. at *3. First, it
“reject[ed] Defendants’ argument that Mr. Signorelli’s opinions lack[ed] a reliable methodology,
and that he fail[ed] to support his conclusions with a traceable analysis.” Id. It explained “that an
expert’s opinions may be properly based on personal experience rather than traditional scientific
methods,” and that “[i]f Defendants view[ed] Mr. Signorelli’s qualifications or methodology as
weak, they [could] question him on these issues during cross-examination.” Id. Second, the court
precluded Signorelli from testifying about (1) legal conclusions (“includ[ing] any opinions that the
force used by Defendants was ‘unreasonable’ or that Defendants lacked probable cause”); (2)
credibility determinations; and (3) motives, intent, or state of mind. Id. at *3–4. And although
“Signorelli [could] offer his opinions regarding generally accepted police standards and whether
Defendants deviated from such standards,” he was required to “explain that his opinions assume[d]
certain facts to be true.” Id. at *5. Finally, “the court determine[d] that the narrow set of opinions
discussed [were] likely to aid the jury, and their probative value [was] not substantially outweighed
by any potential unfair prejudice to Defendants, particularly in tandem with an appropriate limiting
instruction.” Id.4

4

In their Reply (Dkt. 108, at 2–3), Defendants cite Antic v. City of New York, No. 16-CV2425 (JMF), 2017 WL 3491967, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2017), in which the court explained in
4

In accordance with Rule 702, and in light of the district court decisions considering
Signorelli’s proposed testimony, the Court concludes as follows: First, Signorelli may testify,
assuming his qualifications are established at trial. Like the courts in Vazquez and Stern, this Court
finds that, “although Signorelli’s opinions may not rest on statistical studies or traditional scientific
methods, they are, nevertheless, based on data—including personal experience, interviews, review
of police manuals and other primary sources, and review of academic literature—of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in various disciplines of social science.” Vazquez, 2014 WL
4388497, at *12. The Court similarly agrees with these courts that “[p]olice training, policies, and
procedures—the subjects of Signorelli’s testimony—are clearly complex areas outside common
experience.” Id. at *13. Thus, here too, the Court will permit Signorelli to “offer his opinions
regarding generally accepted police standards.” Stern, 2015 WL 4530473, at *5. However, as in
those cases, Signorelli may not offer (1) legal conclusions, “includ[ing] any opinions that the force
used by Defendants was ‘unreasonable’ or that Defendants lacked probable cause;” (2) credibility
determinations; or (3) opinions about Defendants’ motives, intent, or state of mind. Id. at *3–4.
Third, Signorelli “must explain that his opinions assume certain facts to be true.” Id. at *5.
Although the Court will address specific objections to Signorelli’s testimony at trial, see
Vazquez, 2014 WL 4388497, at *13, the Court holds, in advance and non-exhaustively, that
Signorelli will not be permitted to opine that Defendants “arrest[ed] the plaintiffs without
reasonable grounds to do so and by using excessive force to handcuff Detective Gonsalves and
a single sentence “that a purported expert such as Signorelli may not offer legal conclusions or
advance opinions with respect to officers’ compliance with constitutional standards (including
whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity).” Id. (collecting cases). As discussed
below, the Court will not allow Signorelli to offer “legal conclusions” and “opinions” about
whether the defendant-officers “compli[ed] with constitutional standards.” Id.
5

ADA Rizk” (Dkt. 97-2, at 4–5). Nor may he testify that Defendants “have not alleged facts that
would meet [the probable cause] standard.” (Dkt. 97-2, at 5.) He also may not testify as to what
the evidence “clearly show[s].” (Id. at 5.) That is, although he may testify that certain facts, if
found by the jury, would violate police procedures, he may not opine on whether the evidence
shows those facts. Thus, in contrast to Stern, although Signorelli may testify about what
constitutes accepted police standards, he will not be permitted to opine on “whether Defendants
deviated from such standards,” Stern, 2015 WL 4530473, at *5; that will be for the jury to decide.5
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to preclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ proposed expert, Walter
Signorelli, is granted in part and denied in part. If his expert qualifications are established,
Signorelli may testify within the limited scope discussed in this Memorandum and Order.
Although Plaintiffs must adhere to these limits at trial, the Court will rule on specific objections if
they arise during Signorelli’s testimony and will give a limiting instruction if necessary.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Pamela K. Chen
Pamela K. Chen
United States District Judge
Dated: March 28, 2022
Brooklyn, New York

5

The Court also notes that the parties may propose limiting instructions closer to trial
regarding the jury’s consideration of Signorelli’s testimony as it relates to certain findings the jury
must make, such as “reasonableness” or “probable cause.”
6