Allstate Insurance Company et al v. A & F Medical P.C. et al
Filing
340
ORDER denying (334) Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash; granting (339) Motion to Compel in case 1:14-cv-06756-JBW-RLM; denying (278) Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash; granting (279) Motion to Compel in case 1:15-cv-036 39-JBW-RLM. Counsel for both sides are directed forthwith to (a) advise Dr. Kogos of this Memorandum and Order and (b) transmit a copy of it to him via email and overnight delivery, with proof of service to be filed in the Court. The Court directs Dr. Kogos, on pain of sanctions, to appear for his deposition at 10:00 a.m. on December 9, 2016, at the offices of LH Reporting Services, Inc., One Pierrepont Plaza West, 12th Floor, Brooklyn, NY 11201, and to produce documents within his custody, po ssession or control that are responsive to the subpoena dated November 10, 2016. Any objections to the Memorandum and Order must be filed with the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein by December 20, 2016, or will be deemed waived. The filing of an objection, without more, will not operate as a stay of this order. See attached M&O. Ordered by Chief Mag. Judge Roanne L. Mann on 12/6/2016. Associated Cases: 1:14-cv-06756-JBW-RLM, 1:15-cv-03639-JBW-RLM (Proujansky, Josh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------------x
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
-against14-CV-6756 (JBW)
A & F MEDICAL P.C. , et al.,
Defendants.
------------------------------------------------------------x
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
15-CV-3639 (JBW)
-againstART OF HEALING MEDICINE, P.C., et al.,
Defendants.
------------------------------------------------------------x
ROANNE L. MANN, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
Plaintiffs Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate Indemnity Company, Allstate Property
& Casualty Insurance Company and Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (“plaintiffs”)
bring this action alleging that defendants fraudulently billed plaintiffs for reimbursement for
Voltage Actuated Sensory Nerve Conduction Threshold Testing (“VsNCT Testing”) that was
purportedly performed on individuals who were involved in automobile accidents and covered
by plaintiffs' insurance policies. Currently pending before the Court is a motion filed by
defendants Art of Healing, P.C., Svetlana Pinkusovich, M.D. and Alexander Pinkusovich,
M.D. (collectively the “AOH defendants” or “defendants”), for a protective order and to
quash a subpoena served upon non-party Dr. Alexander Kogos, M.D. (the “deponent” or “Dr.
Kogos”), who defendants now claim is a current employee of Art of Healing, P.C. (“Art of
Healing”). See [AOH Defendants’] Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash (Nov.
29, 2016) (“Mot. for Protective Order”), Electronic Case Filing Docket Entry (“DE”) #278.1
In their opposition to the AOH defendants' motion, plaintiffs cross-move to compel Dr. Kogos
to appear for a deposition on or before December 9, 2016. See [Plaintiffs’] Motion to
Compel/Opposition to Quash Deposition of Alexander Kogos (Dec. 1, 2016) (“Pl. Opp.”), DE
#279.
For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion for a protective order is denied and
plaintiffs’ cross-motion to compel is granted.
BACKGROUND
For the first time in their July 9, 2016 Amended Response to Plaintiffs’ First Request
for Interrogatories, the AOH defendants identified Dr. Kogos as “a former W-2 employee of
Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. and a treating physician who provided VsNCT testing at AOH
from June 21, 2010 through October 6, 2010." See Defendants’ Amended Response to
Plaintiffs’ First Request for Interrogatories (attached as Ex. A to Pl. Opp.), Response to
Interrogatory No. 1, DE #279; see also id., Response to Interrogatory No. 3 (Dr. Kogos “was
a W-2 employee of Art of Healing Medicine, PC from 6/21/2010 through 10/6/2010”); id.,
Declaration (identifying one declarant as “ALEXANDER KOGOS, MD June-October 2010
ART OF HEALING MEDICINE’S W-2 Employee”).2 On November 9, 2016, plaintiffs
1
Docket entry numbers refer to those in the member case, 15-CV-3639.
2
The more recent pronouncements by defendants and Dr. Kogos regarding the dates of Dr.
(continued...)
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caused Dr. Kogos to be served with a subpoena requiring him to appear for a deposition and
produce documents on November 16, 2016. See 11/13/16 Kogos Email; Mot. for Protective
Order at 2. Due to plaintiffs’ counsel’s uncertainty as to whether the subpoena had been
properly served on Dr. Kogos, counsel withdrew the subpoena and issued another subpoena
for Dr. Kogos to appear and produce documents on November 30, 2016. See 11/13/16 Kogos
Email; Mot. For Protective Order at 1 n.1; Letter from Daniel Marvin, Esq. to Wesley Mead,
Esq. dated November 10, 2016, DE #278-1.
Although counsel for the AOH defendants and counsel for plaintiffs exchanged emails
concerning the subpoena on November 13, 2016 and November 14, 2016, the AOH defendants
waited until after 5:00 p.m. on November 29, 2016 -- the evening before the deposition was to
be held -- to file the instant motion. See Emails sent between Daniel Marvin and Wesley
Mead, DE #278-5. In conjunction with their motion for a protective order and motion to
quash, the AOH defendants also requested “a temporary stay of compliance as to the subject
subpoena . . . pending the instant motion for a protective order and quashing the subject
subpoena.” Mot. for Protective Order at 1. By electronic order docketed at 9:08 a.m. on
November 30, 2016, this Court noted that the filing of the instant motion “does not operate to
2
(...continued)
Kogos’ employment at AOH are, at best, confusing and inconsistent. Compare Reply in
Support (Dec. 3, 2016) (“Reply”) at 2, DE #335 (“Dr. Kogos was an employee of AOH until
AOH’s no-fault department closed in 2010[.] . . . At the end of October 2016 Dr. Kogos
joined AOH again as an employee . . . .”); Motion for Protective Order at 1 & n.3 (referring
to Dr. Kogos as a “current employee of AOH” and citing a 2015 AOH W-2); id. at 2 & n.6,
with Email from Alexander Kogos M.D. to Daniel Marvin dated November 13, 2016
(“11/13/16 Kogos Email”), DE #278-5 (Dr. Kogos states that he is “an Art of Healing
employee since October 2015”).
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stay the deposition.” See Electronic Order dated November 30, 2016.
Despite the Court’s order, Dr. Kogos failed to appear for his deposition on November
30, 2016. See generally Pl. Opp. Meanwhile, on November 29, 2016, the AOH defendants
“and non-party Alexander Kogos, M.D., as an employee of AOH,” served responses to the
document demands in plaintiffs’ subpoena. See Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Requests
for Document Production (“Subpoena Response”), DE #278-4. To each of the twenty
document requests, the AOH defendants “and non-party Alexander Kogos, M.D., as an
employee of AOH,” responded that “Dr. Kogos is not in possession of the requested
documentation,” “with the exception of his W-2 Form.” See id. & Response to Interrogatory
No. 2.
The AOH defendants now argue that it would be unduly burdensome for Dr. Kogos to
respond to the document requests, which they assert are more appropriately directed at a party.
See Mot. for Protective Order at 2, 3. Further, the AOH defendants contend that the
documents sought by plaintiffs should not be disclosed because they contain privileged and/or
confidential and/or commercial information of Art of Healing. See id. at 3. And, in their
reply, they oppose the deposition on the grounds that defendants’ motion to disqualify
plaintiffs’ counsel is still pending before Judge Weinstein and that Dr. Kogos was never
properly served with the subpoena. See Reply at 1-2.
DISCUSSION
I.
The AOH Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order and to Quash
A. Standing
A preliminary issue implicated by the motion for a protective order is whether the
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movants have standing to challenge the subpoena addressed to Dr. Kogos. While portions of
the letter-motion tend to blur the distinction between the AOH defendants and Dr. Kogos, see,
e.g., Mot. for Protective Order at 3 (“Defendants and Dr. Kogos as an employee of AOH,
request . . . a protective order . . .”), it appears that it is the defendants who are seeking to
quash the subpoena, see id. at 1 (“The Defendants submit the instant letter motion . . . ”)
(emphasis added); see also id. (“This firm represents Defendants, Art of Healing, P.C. [],
Svetlana Pinkusovich, M.D., and Alexander Pinkusovich, M.D.”).
Ordinarily, a party lacks standing to challenge a subpoena served on a non-party unless
the party asserts or establishes a personal right or privilege with regard to the subpoenaed
information. See Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 332 F.App’x 643, 645 (2d Cir. 2009)
(collecting authorities); Harris v. Jamaica Auto Repair Inc., No. 03-CV-417 (ERK), 2009 WL
2242355, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009). Here, the AOH defendants contend that plaintiffs
“seek to discover a great deal of personal financial and commercial information of AOH.” See
Mot. for Protective Order at 3. For the reasons stated herein, even if those perfunctory
allegations are deemed sufficient to confer standing on the AOH defendants as to certain
aspects of the subpoena, and/or assuming that Dr. Kogos is represented by defense counsel and
is joining the motion, the movants are not entitled to an order quashing the subpoena.
B. Defendants’ Challenges to the Subpoena
1. General Legal Principles
Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iv) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protects against subpoenas
that “subject[] a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv); see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i) (“[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise
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allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines . . . the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive . . . .”). On a motion to enforce or
quash a subpoena, the issuing party “bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the
information sought is relevant and material to the allegations and claims at issue in the
proceedings.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 14-CV-4808 (JS)(SIL), 2016 WL 4574677, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Once relevance is
established, the party seeking to quash a subpoena bears the burden of demonstrating that the
subpoena is over-broad, duplicative, or unduly burdensome.” Vale v. Great Neck Water
Pollution Control Dist., 14-CV-4229 (ADS)(AYS), 2016 WL 1072639, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
8, 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Malibu Media, 2016 WL
4574677, at *2. “Decisions to limit discovery as overbroad, duplicative, or unduly
burdensome are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Corbett v. eHome Credit
Corp., No. 10-CV-26 (JG)(RLM), 2010 WL 3023870, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010); accord
Malibu Media, 2016 WL 4574677, at *2; Vale, 2016 WL 1072639, at *3.
Consistent with precedent from within this Circuit, the deponent is not excused from
responding to the subpoena on the ground that the party issuing the subpoena must seek the
documents through party discovery. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Accurate Med.,
P.C., No. CV 2007-51 (ENV)(MDG), 2007 WL 2993840, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2007)
(“[N]othing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a litigant to rely solely on
discovery obtained from an adversary instead of utilizing subpoenas.”). Nor is it improper for
a party to seek discovery from an employee of an adverse party through a Rule 45 subpoena.
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See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 06 Civ. 5377 (CM)(THK), 2007 WL
1771509, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2007) (“A corporate employee or agent who does not
qualify as an officer, director, or managing agent . . . is treated as any other non-party
witness, and must be subpoenaed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
. . . .”); Ruinsky v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., No. CV03-4781 (RJD)(VVP), 2006 WL 681200,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2006) (same).
2. Application of the Law to the Facts of This Case
As an initial matter, the AOH defendants acknowledge that Dr. Kogos is not a
corporate officer, owner or director of Art of Healing. See Mot. for Protective Order at 2.
Therefore, their unsupported assertion that Dr. Kogos may not be subpoenaed is swiftly
rejected.
As for the substance of their challenges, critically, the AOH defendants have not
disputed the relevance of the information sought. Nor have they demonstrated that the
subpoena is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or that discovery is more readily obtainable
from another source. Although defendants imply that at least some of the documents
subpoenaed from Dr. Kogos were or could have been sought by plaintiffs through party
discovery, see id. at 2, defendants fail to particularize any such party requests. Even assuming
arguendo that the subpoenaed documents were sought by plaintiffs through party discovery but
that plaintiffs failed to move to compel responses over defendants’ objections – or, in the
alternative, that plaintiffs failed to demand the documents through party discovery – plaintiffs
are nevertheless within their rights to seek the discovery from a non-party absent the
imposition of an undue burden on the subpoenaed non-party. See Certain Underwriters at
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Lloyd’s v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 16-MC-2778 (FB), 2016 WL 6902140, at *4, *6
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2016).
Turning to defendants’ assertion of burdensomeness, a party does not have standing to
complain that a subpoena would subject a non-party to an undue burden. See KGK Jewelry
LLC v. ESDNetwork, No. 11 Civ. 9326 (LTS)(RLE), 2014 WL 1199326, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 21, 2014) (“[a]lleging that a subpoena is ‘harassing and serve[s] no purpose’ . . . does
not confer standing” on the objecting party); Samad Bros., Inc. v. Bokara Rug Co. Inc., No.
09 Civ. 5843 (JFK)(KNF), 2010 WL 5094344, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010). In any
event, even if the AOH defendants did have standing to challenge the subject subpoena on this
ground, they have failed to demonstrate that complying with the subpoena would be unduly
burdensome to Dr. Kogos, as they offer only vague and conclusory assertions. Notably, in the
email from Dr. Kogos to counsel for plaintiffs, Dr. Kogos himself does not claim that he
would be burdened by responding to the subpoena. See 11/13/16 Email. Nor does
defendants’ motion contain any evidentiary materials from Dr. Kogos regarding the subpoena’s
alleged burden. In fact, notwithstanding their objections, the AOH defendants, and the
deponent “as an employee,” served a response to the subpoena, claiming that Dr. Kogos is not
in possession of the documents requested. See Subpoena Response; see also 11/13/16 Email
(“The subpoena requested me to produce documents that I don’t have, and never had in my
possession.”). To the extent that the subpoenaed documents are not within his possession,
custody, or control,3 Dr. Kogos will not be burdened by responding to the document requests.
3
As plaintiffs note, Dr. Kogos repeatedly denies having responsive documents in his
(continued...)
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The cases cited by the AOH defendants are inapposite. For example, in Chytka v.
Wright Tree Service, Inc., 11-cv-968 (REB)(KMT) (D. Colo. Jan. 30, 2012),4 where the pro
se plaintiff served document subpoenas on the defendant, the court held that it was improper to
subpoena documents from a party rather than seek them through a Rule 34 discovery request.
See Order dated January 30, 2012 at 2, DE #52 in 11-CV-968 (D. Colo.). In Travelers
Indemnity Co. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 228 F.R.D. 111 (D. Conn. 2005), the
subpoenas at issue would have required the non-party to search hundreds of boxes stored in
several states even though the information sought was publicly available in a bankruptcy
proceeding. See id. at 114. Here, in contrast, the AOH defendants have not made a
comparable showing that responding to the subpoena would be unduly burdensome. The facts
in Stephens v. GEICO, 04-cv-1168 (MCA)(RHS) (D.N.M. 2005), are likewise a far cry from
those in the instant case: There, the defendant argued that a subpoena served on its attorney
was unduly burdensome because every document sought was in the defendants’ possession.
See Order dated March 30, 2005 at 3, DE #46. Here, on the other hand, the subpoenaed
individual was not the defendants’ attorney, and defendants do not purport to have produced
any of the documents sought by the subpoena.
Similarly unavailing is defendants’ complaint that plaintiffs failed to identify Dr. Kogos
3
(...continued)
possession, but is silent as to what is in his “possession, custody, or control,” the relevant
standard under Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). See Pl. Opp. at 2.
4
As defendants cited only the title and docket number of that case, the Court had to ascertain
the district in which the case was pending and to locate the unreported order in the docket
sheet. See Mot. for Protective Order at 2.
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in their initial disclosures. See Mot. for Protective Order at 1; Reply at 2-3. Defendants
ignore the plain language of Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
requires that parties disclose the name and contact information of each person “likely to have
discoverable information . . . that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses
. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. 26(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Inasmuch as defendants have been
treating Dr. Kogos as a defense witness (at least in connection with their discovery responses),
it cannot credibly be argued at this stage of the proceeding that plaintiffs likely will be using
Dr. Kogos to support their claims; rather, it may reasonably be inferred that they subpoenaed
him in order to discover how he will support defendants’ defenses. Plaintiffs therefore have
not violated Rule 26(a)(1)(A) and, in any event, defendants have suffered no prejudice from
plaintiffs’ alleged failure to identify an individual well known to them.5
For the first time in their reply, the AOH defendants argue that plaintiffs should be
precluded from taking depositions – of defendants or Dr. Kogos – while defendants’ motion to
disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel is still pending before Judge Weinstein. See Reply at 1-2; see
also First Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Nov. 14, 2016), DE #275. Even if the pendency of
that motion warranted a stay of plaintiffs’ deposition discovery – and it does not – the Court
need not and will not consider new arguments raised for the first time in their reply. See, e.g.,
Colon v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-0173 (MKB), 2014 WL 1338730, at *9 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 2, 2014) (“The Second Circuit has clearly stated that arguments raised for the first time in
5
Indeed, there is considerable force to plaintiffs’ argument that it is defendants who violated
Rule 26, by not disclosing Dr. Kogos as their potential witness until July 2016. See Pl. Opp.
at 3 n.2.
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reply papers or thereafter are properly ignored.”) (collecting cases).
Similarly makeweight is the belated argument, likewise raised for the first time in the
AOH defendants’ reply, that plaintiffs have not properly served Dr. Kogos. See Reply at 2.6
Again, this argument should have been presented in the motion for a protective order and to
quash the subpoena and, as it was not, it has not been preserved. See Colon, 2014 WL
1338730, at *9. In any event, as defendants “and non-party Alexander Kogos, M.D.” have
purported to “respond[] to Plaintiffs’ Requests for the Production of Documents within their
Non-Party Subpoena of Dr. Alexander Kogos,” see Subpoena Response at 1, they have
thereby waived any arguable defect in service, see e.g., Mercexchange, L.LC. v. eBay, Inc.,
No. M8-85, 2007 WL 582729, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2007).
The AOH defendants also contend that the non-party witness should not be required to
disclose AOH’s "privileged and/or confidential and/or commercial information[.]" See Mot.
for Protective Order at 3. Any concerns regarding confidentiality will be adequately addressed
by designating as confidential appropriate documents pursuant to the protective order in effect,
which restricts the dissemination of certain documents produced or created by a non-party.
See Protective Order (Oct. 16, 2015) at 2-3, DE #181-1; see also Coen v. Americare Certified
Special Servs., Inc., No. 13-CV-5522 (KAM), 2014 WL 1237258, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,
2014). As for any documents withheld under claims of privilege, they were required to be
specified on a privilege log, see Fed. R.Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A); S.D.N.Y./E.D.N.Y. Local Civ.
R. 26.2, and, as it appears that none has been served in response to the subpoena within a
6
The defective-service argument is addressed in a single paragraph devoid of any supporting
case law.
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reasonable time, any claim of privilege has been waived, see Micillo v. Liddle & Robinson
LLP, 15-CV-6141 (JMF), 2016 WL 2997507, at *1, *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2016); see
also In re DG Acquisition Corp., 151 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998).
Finally, this Court is constrained to note the apparent strategic nature of the timing of
the filing of the AOH defendants' motion: Although the parties exchanged emails regarding the
deposition weeks before it was scheduled to occur, defendants waited to file their motion until
after business hours on the night before the scheduled deposition. Such dilatory tactics will not
be tolerated. Inasmuch as the AOH defendants' motion is focused primarily on the documents
sought, which Dr. Kogos claims he does not have, the deposition could have – and indeed
should have – gone forward on November 30th, notwithstanding any dispute over documents.
II.
Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion to Compel
Plaintiffs cross-move to compel Dr. Kogos to appear for deposition on or before
December 9, 2016. Having determined that the subpoena should not be quashed, the Court
directs Dr. Kogos, on pain of sanctions, to appear for his deposition at 10:00 a.m. on
December 9, 2016, at the offices of LH Reporting Services, Inc., One Pierrepont Plaza West,
12th Floor, Brooklyn, NY 11201, and to produce documents within his custody, possession or
control that are responsive to the subpoena dated November 10, 2016. Dr. Kogos is warned
that his failure to comply with the court-ordered subpoena may be deemed a contempt of the
court from which the subpoena issued. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e); see also Daval Steel Prods.
v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1364 (2d Cir. 1991); Leser v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No.
09-CV-2362 (KAM)(ALC), 2011 WL 1004708, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2011); Hunter
TBA v. Triple Sales, 250 F.R.D. 116, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Moreover, Dr. Kogos is
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advised that plaintiffs’ document requests seek documents in his “possession, custody, or
control,” rather than simply in his “possession.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii).
“Control” is construed broadly and includes documents that a non-party does not actually
possess “but has the legal right or practical ability to obtain [] from another source on
demand.” Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., No. 90
Civ. 7811 (AGS), 1994 WL 510043, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1994); accord Raimey v.
Wright Nat’l Flood Ins. Co., 76 F.Supp.3d 452, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); see Linde v. Arab
Bank, PLC, 262 F.R.D. 136, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Even if Dr. Kogos controls but does not
possesses a responsive document, he must produce it.7
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for a protective order and to quash is
denied, and plaintiffs’ motion to compel is granted. Counsel for both sides are directed
forthwith to (a) advise Dr. Kogos of this Memorandum and Order and (b) transmit a copy of it
to him via email and overnight delivery, with proof of service to be filed in the Court. The
Court directs Dr. Kogos, on pain of sanctions, to appear for his deposition at 10:00 a.m. on
December 9, 2016, at the offices of LH Reporting Services, Inc., One Pierrepont Plaza West,
12th Floor, Brooklyn, NY 11201, and to produce documents within his custody, possession or
control that are responsive to the subpoena dated November 10, 2016.
Any objections to the Memorandum and Order must be filed with the Honorable Jack
7
For example, Dr. Kogos may have access to copies of his W-2 forms, payroll checks, work
schedules and employment agreement. See Requests No. 1 (employment agreements); No. 2
(W-2s, 1099s, payroll checks, and/or work schedules).
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B. Weinstein by December 20, 2016, or will be deemed waived. The filing of an objection,
without more, will not operate as a stay of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
Brooklyn, New York
December 6, 2016
/s/
Roanne L. Mann
ROANNE L. MANN
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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