Greenidge v. State Processing Center

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Plaintiff's 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is granted. For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff's 1 complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be gran ted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This dismissal is without prejudice to pursuing whatever remedies plaintiff may have in State court. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, informa pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). Ordered by Judge Sandra L. Townes on 1/30/2015. C/M by Chambers. (Barrett, C)

ULLK. Ci:FL;
U.s. DSTRCTQJ ED N.Y

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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FIONA GREENIDGE,
Plaintiff,
-against-

* FEB 052015 *
BROOKLYN OFFICE
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

14-CV-7361 (SLT)

STATE PROCESSING CENTER,
Defendant.
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TOWNES, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Fiona Greenidge, proceeding pro se, brings this action against defendant State
Processing Center, alleging conspiracy, discrimination, and fraud in connection with the
processing of her State tax returns and principally seeking monetary damages. Although plaintiff
alleges that this Court has jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, plaintiff's
pleading does not suggest that defendant was ever employed by defendants. Accordingly, while
plaintiff's request to proceed informapauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is granted, this
action is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs pleading in this case consists of three pages. The first page—hereafter, the
"Complaint"—is a one-page document which lists the parties and their addresses, invokes
jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, states that the only remedy
plaintiff is seeking is "Monetary Damages," and notes that plaintiff's "Statement of Claim" is set
forth in an attachment. The remaining two pages—the "Attachment" —consist of a two-page
letter addressed to an unnamed "Representative" but titled, "Complaint/Statement of Claim."
For purposes of this memorandum and order, the allegations in the Attachment are assumed to be
true.

The Attachment principally relates to defendant's handling of various income tax filings
made in 2013 and 2014. The first of these filings was made on May 16, 2013, by plaintiff's son
or by a "tax preparer" working on his behalf. Attachment, p. 1. The tax preparer erroneously
determined that plaintiff's son owed the State $387.00, which plaintiff paid on her son's behalf.
Id. Defendant did not correct the error, but debited the money from plaintiff's checking account.
Id.

Subsequently, in the course of preparing her own taxes, plaintiff realized that her son had
not actually owed the $387.00. Id. Rather than filing an amended tax return on Form IT-201-X,
plaintiff simply "mailed a letter to the NYS Department of Taxation and Finance," which was
signed by both plaintiff and her son. Id. Plaintiff and her son did not receive a refund. Id.
The only other tax filings discussed in the Attachment are plaintiff's own filings for Tax
Year 2013. The Attachment alleges that plaintiff mailed her State tax forms on May 19, 2014,
expecting to receive a tax refund from the State. However, she did not receive a tax refund from
either the State or the Internal Revenue Service within six weeks. On September 8, 2014, the
Internal Revenue Service mailed her a refund, but the "monetary amount" of the refund was
"inaccurate" in some unspecified way. When she called to inquire about the status of her State
refund, she was allegedly "told that NYS HESC requested [her] Tax Refund from the State." Id.,
p.2.
Since payments for plaintiff's student loans were automatically debited from her account
on a monthly basis in 2011, 2012, and 2013, id., the New York State Higher Education Service
Corporation would have had no legal basis for requesting her refund. Plaintiff nonetheless called
HESC to verify that they had not done so. Id. Plaintiff was "told by their representatives that
HESC ... did not request" her refund and did not have her money. Id.
2

On January 15, 2015, plaintiff commenced this action. Although plaintiff's complaint
does not allege that plaintiff was ever employed by, or applied for employment with, defendant
State Processing Center, it nonetheless alleges this Court has jurisdiction over this action
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964. The pleading does not allege plaintiff's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but asserts that the "financial problems" alleged in
the complaint occurred as a result of a conspiracy and discrimination on account of plaintiff's
surname and heritage. Attachment, pp. 1-2. In addition, plaintiff's pleading specifically alleges
that the person who falsely claimed that HESC was responsible for seizing her tax refund
committed fraud. The Complaint lists "Monetary Damages" as the only remedy plaintiff seeks,
but the Attachment states, "I want the parties involved prosecuted." Attachment, p. 2.
DISCUSSION
Legal Standard
Title 28, Section 1915(e)(2)(B), of the United States Code provides that,
"[n]otwithstanding any filing fee ... that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at
any time if the court determines that ... (B) the action (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (brackets and ellipsis added). In
addition, federal courts have an independent obligation to examine the basis of their jurisdiction.
See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). If a court "determines at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).
A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and "a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
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lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). A court must "read the pleadings of apro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them
'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280
(2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 878, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)). If a liberal reading
of the complaint "gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated," the court must grant
leave to amend the complaint. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); Gomez

v. USAA Fed. Say. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999).
Failure to State a Claim
In this case, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a federal claim on which relief may be
granted. Although plaintiff alleges that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is clear from the facts alleged by plaintiff that she does not have a
Title VII claim. Title VII relates to "unlawful employment practices," and prohibits employers,
employment agencies, labor organizations, and their training programs from discriminating on
the basis of an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2. However, plaintiff does not allege that defendant was ever her employer, and
defendant does not meet the definitions of an employment agency or labor organization. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(c) and (d). Moreover, the complaint does not allege that plaintiff is a member of
a protected class.
Even if plaintiff's pleading could be construed as alleging a violation of some other
federal statute or the United States Constitution, this Court could not grant any of the relief
plaintiff seeks. First, the Eleventh Amendment of the United States prohibits this Court from
awarding monetary damages against the State of New York or its agencies. The Eleventh
Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although the express language of this Amendment does not prohibit a
state's own citizens from maintaining an action against the state in federal court, the Supreme
Court has "extended a State's protection from suit to suits brought by the State's own citizens."
Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890)). In addition, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state agencies and state
officials when "the state is the real, substantial party in interest." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 101 (l984) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323
U.S. 459 5 464 (1945)).
The State Processing Center which plaintiff names as the defendant in this action is
operated by the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance. See http://www.tax.ny .
gov/pit/file/return_ assembly_mail.htm. The Department of Taxation and Finance is "a state
agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity." Temple v. N. YS. Dept. of Taxation &
Finance, No. 11-CV-0759 (JFB)(ETB), 2012 WL 503618, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012) (citing
Walker v. New York, 150 F. App'x 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2005) (summary order) and Johnson v. New
York, 21 F. App'x 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary order). Accordingly, the Eleventh
Amendment bars plaintiff's claim for monetary damages.'

"Despite this general bar to suits against states created by the Eleventh Amendment,
there are two well-established ways to provide judicial power over such cases: abrogation of
immunity by Congress and waiver of immunity by a state." In re 995 Fifth Ave. Associates, L.P.,
963 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 99).
However, Congress has not abrogated the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to
suits regarding tax liabilities, and the State has not waived its immunity.
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This Court also cannot prosecute any of the parties involved the wrongdoing alleged in
plaintiff's complaint. This is a civil action, not a criminal one, and the Court lacks the power to
initiate a prosecution. "[C]riminal prosecutions are within the exclusive province of the public
prosecutor, who has complete discretion over the decision to initiate, continue or cease
prosecution." Solomon v. H.P. Action Center, HP.D., No. 99 Civ. 10352 (JSR), 1999 WL
1051092, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1999). "A private citizen does not have a constitutional right
to ... compel the initiation of criminal proceedings." Lis v. Leahy, No. CIV-90-834E, 1991 WL
99060 at *1 (W.D.N.Y. June 3, 1991); see also Linda R.S. v. RichardD., 410 U.S. 614,619
(1973) ("a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another").
This Court notes that plaintiff's pleading contains a single sentence which alleges that a
"Federal Refund" mailed to plaintiff on September 8, 2014, was for an "inaccurate" "monetary
amount." Attachment, p. 2. The Court has jurisdiction over a "civil action against the United
States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum
alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue
laws ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). However, plaintiff has not named the United States as a party
to this action and does not allege facts suggesting that plaintiff seeks to litigate any tax dispute
she may have with the Internal Revenue Service. In light of the options available for
expeditiously resolving such disputes without litigation, see Internal Revenue Service Publication
556, "Examination of Returns, Appeal Rights, and Claims for Refund," pp. 8-9 (Rev. Sept.

2013), this Court declines to construe plaintiff's pleading as raising as a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(1).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This dismissal is
without prejudice to pursuing whatever remedies plaintiff may have in State court. The Court
certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and,
therefore, informa pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sandra L. Townes
/cRALTOWNES
United States District Judge

10

2015
Dated: January
Brooklyn, New York

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