Santiago v. City of New York et al

Filing 29

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: For the foregoing reasons, the court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections, ADOPTS IN FULL the 27 R&R, GRANTS the 16 City's Motion to Dismiss, DENIES Plaintiff's 23 Motion to Amend, and DISMISSES the Complaint WITH PREJUDICE. So Ordered by Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis on 9/26/2016. (Lee, Tiffeny)

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UNITED STATES DISTRJCT COURT
EASTERN DISTRJCT OF NEW YORK

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JESUS SANTIAGO,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
15-CV-517 (NGG) (RER)

-againstCITY OF NEW YORK and JOHN DOES "1-20,"
being the fictitious names of New York City

Police Officers whose names are not known to
Plaintiff, individually and in their official
capacities.
Defendants.

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NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.
On February 3, 2015, Plaintiff Jesus Santiago initiated this action against the City of New

York (the ..City") and certain unnamed New York City police officers (the "John Doe
Defendants" or the "Officers") (collectively, the "Defendants") for violations of his civil rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, and related state tort law. (Comp!. (Dkt. !).)
The City moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 16)), and Plaintiff opposed the motion (Mem. in Opp'n ("Pl.
Br.") (Dkt. 24)) and moved to amend the Complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (Mot. to Amend Comp!. (Dkt. 23); Mem. in Supp. ("Pl. Amend. Br.") (Dkt. 21)).

By Order dated April S, 2016, the court referred the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Amend
to Magistrate Judge Ramon E. Reyes, Jr. for a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(l). (See Apr. 5, 2014,
Order.)

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On September 6, 2016, Judge Reyes issued an R&R recommending that the court grant
the City's Motion to Dismiss, deny Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, and dismiss the Complaint.
(R&R (Dkt. 27) at I.) Judge Reyes determined that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, Plaintiff's state claims are time barred, and amendment of the
Complaint would be futile because the statues of limitations governing Plaintiff's claims has
expired and the amended pleading ..does not related back to the original filing either under
federal or state law." (Id. at 3-6.) Judge Reyes also found that amendment would be futile
because the proposed Amended Complaint "does not allege any new facts or in any way seek to
address the pleading defects in his original complaint." (!!l at 8.) Plaintiff subsequently filed
objections to the R&R. (See R&R Obj. ("Pl. Obj.") (Dkt. 28).) Fortbe reasons set forth below,
the court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections, ADOPTS IN FULL the R&R, GRANTS the
City's Motion to Dismiss, DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, and DISMISSES the
Complaint W1IB PREJUDICE. 1

I.

LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing a magistrate judge's R&R, the district court "may accept, reject, or modify,

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(l). The court must make "a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Id. To obtain this

de novo review, an objecting party "must point out the specific portions of the report and
recommendation to which [that party] object[s]." U.S. Flour Corp. v. Cer6fied Bakery, Inc.,
No. 10-CV-2522 (JS) (WDW), 2012 WL 728227, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012); see also Fed.

1 Because the court overrules Plaintiff's objections, it need not wait for Defendants' responses to those objections
before adopting the R&R in full.

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R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) ("(A] party may serve and file specific written objections to the [R&R)."). If
a party "makes only conclusoiy or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments,

the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error." Pall Com. v. Entegris,
Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Mario v. P&C Food Mkts., Inc., 313
F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002). Portions of an R&R to which a party makes no objection are also

reviewed for clear error. U.S. Flour, 2012 WL 728227, at •2. "A decision is 'clearly erroneous'
when the Court is, •upon review of the entire record, left with the defulite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed."' DiPilato v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 333, 339-40
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 72 (2d Cir. 2006)). Finally,
courts "ordinarily refuse to consider arguments, case law and/or evidentiary material which
could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance." Kennedy

v. Adamo, No. 02-CV-1776 (ENV) (RML), 2006 WL 3704784, at *l (E.D.N.Y. Sept. I, 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd, 323 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary
order); see also Allen v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 293, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

II.

DISCUSSION

A.

Those Portions of the R&R to Which No Objections Were Made

In recomniending that the City's 12(c) Motion be granted, Judge Reyes found inter alia
that Plaintiff failed to adequately allege municipal liability against the City under
Sections 1983, 1985(3) or 1986. (See R&R at 4.) Plaintiff has not objected to this portion of the
R&R, and the time to do so has passed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). (See also R&R at 8 ("Any

objections to the recommendations made in this Report must be filed ... within fourteen (14)
days of receipt hereof.").) Therefore, the court reviews this portion of the R&R for clear error.
See Gesualdi v. Mack Excavation & Trailer Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-2502 (KAM) (JO), 2010
WL 985294, at *I (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010); La Torres v. Walker, 216 F. Supp. 2d 157, 159

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(S.D.N.Y. 2000); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Finding no clear error, the court adopts this portion
of the R&R. See Porter v. Potter, 219 F. App'x 112 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order).

B.

Plaintiff's Objections to the R&R

In support of his objections to the R&R, Plaintiff largely repeats the same arguments-in
some instances, verbatim-that he originally made in opposition to the City's Motion to Dismiss
and in support of his Motion to Amend the Complaint. First, he argues that his claims of injuries
are sufficient to demonstrate that he was deprived of his civil rights: "Plaintiff's claims of

injuries requiring extensive medical attention, especially in light of the fact that no crime was
committed, evidence th[ e] malicious and sadistic use of force. Tbis level of injury indicates a
Constitutional issue that shows a deprivation of Plaintiffs fundamental civil rights." (Pl. Obj.
at 4; Pl. Br. at 2). Judge Reyes found, however, that "Santiago's conclusory statements fail to
satisfy the pleading standard for claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1986."
(R&R at 4.) Second, Plaintiff argues that his state law claims are timely because .. courts
considering 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal
injury actions." (Pl. Obj. at 5; PI. Br. at 3). Judge Reyes directed addressed and rejected this
argument in the R&R; "Santiago is wrong. While federal civil rights claims are governed by a
state's general statues of limitations, where a complaint also alleges violations of state law, the
state claims must meet their specific statutory requirements .... Santiago has failed to comply

with N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. §§50-e and SOi, and therefore his state law claims must be dismissed."
(R&R at 6 (citing Stewart v. Shiro, No. 13-CV-3613 (NGG) (VMS), 2015 WL 1854198 at *17
(E.D.N. Y. Apr. 22, 2015)).) Finally, Plaintiff avers that the facts alleged in the Complaint
provide sufficient notice to the John Doe Defendants so as to allow the proposed amended
complaint to ''relate back" to the original Complaint: "John Doe defendants in 1983 matters are
considered to be properly on notice .... The Defendant officers involved in the assault would
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certainly have known that they were likely to become defendants in this suit" (Pl. Obj. at 5; Pl.
Br. at 3; Pl. Amend. Br. at 3; see also PL Obj. at 3-4 (reasoning that the detailed nature of the
Complaint provided notice of the identity of the John Doe officers: "On February 8, 2012, there
realistically could not have been many people named Jesus Santiago tl1at were arrested and
detained in Brooklyn, New York; there was probably only the Plaintift: The 77th Precinct
comprises a specific geographic region within Brooklyn, and it is a near certainty that thete was
only one Jesus Santiago arrested in that precinct. Furthermore, of those, only one could have
also been detained, beaten, and then released.").) Judge Reyes specifically found that the
Complaint did not provide sufficient notice to the John Doe Defendants to meet the requirements
for relation back underN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024 or Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
because the Complaint "only indicates that a group of twenty officers engaged in unspecified
actions, somewhere in Brooklyn, at some time on February 8, 2012" and "[n]o description of the
Officers is provided, let alone a sufficient one, nor is any indication given of why Santiago was
arrested." (R&R at 7.) The court considers these arguments, which Plaintiff made in front of
Judge Reyes and which he repeats now in objection to the R&R, and reviews these portions of
the R&R for clear error, and finds none. See Pall Corp.• 249 F .R.D. at 51 (holding that when a
party "simply reiterates his original arguments," the court reviews a magistrate judge's report
and recommendation for clear error rather than conducting a de novo review).
Plaintiff also states in his objections that "a complaint attacked by a Rule I 2(b)(6) motion
to dismiss does not need detailed factual ailegations." (PL Obj. at 4 (citing Bell Atl. Com. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).) It is unclear whether Plaintiff made this same argument

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in opposition to the City's Motion to Disrniss,2 requiring clear error review,~ Pall Coro., 249
F.R.D. at 51, or whether this constitutes a new argument that Plaintiff could have raised before
Judge Reyes but chose not to, in which case the court need not consider it, see Kennedy, 2006
WL 3704784, at *l. Out of an abundance of caution, the court cotisiders this argument, and
reviews this portion of the R&R for clear error, and finds none.
Even under a more probing de novo review, the court fmds Plaintiffs argument to be
without merit. While it is true that detailed factual allegations are not required at the pleading
stage, a plaintiff is required to plead "sufficient factual matter" which, when accepted as true,
"state[s] a claim to relief that it plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citiog Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plaintiff's claims
do not state civil rights claims that are "plausible on [their] face." Id. Plausibility "is not akin to
a 'probability requirement,'" but requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted lll1lawfully." Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "[M]ere 'labels and
conclusions' or 'formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action will not do'; rather,
the complaint's 'ff] actual allegations must be enough to raise a right tc> relief above the
speculative level."' Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d llO, 120 (2d Cir. 2010)(emphasis
in original) (quotiog Twombly, 550 U.S at 555). Plaintiff alleges that the Officers assaulted him
(see Compl. ~ 9), but assault is a legal conclusion. He has failed to plead facts describing the
Officers' actions in support of this legal conclusion. Plaintiff also claims the Officers arrested

2 (See Pl. Br. at 2 ("Defendants state that the claims made by Plaintiff that he was falsely arrested, imprisoned, and
assaulted are 'conclusory allegations' .... In a sense, this can be conceded, as allegations of deprivation of rights
are sufficient.").)

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and detained him (see id.), but arrest and detention, absent additional facts, do not constitute
constitutional violations. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plead "factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
Finally, Plaintiff adds a new argument in support of his claim that the court should
overrule the R&R and grant his Motion to Amend the Complaint. He asserts that his efforts to
identify and name the John Doe Defendants in the Complaint were "stymied by the late retaining
of counsel in this matter and a lack of cooperation by the Defendants prior to the filing of the
lawsuit." (Pl. Obj. at 6.) Because Plaintiff could have made this argument to Judge Reyes, and
chose not to, the court need not consider it. See Kennedy, 2006 WL 3704784, at *I; Wesley v.
Alexander, No. 99-CV-2168 (LAK) (MHD), 2005 WL 1352593, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2005)
("(T]he law is clear that when a dispositive motion is heard before a magistrate judge, the
movant must make all ... [its] arguments then and there, and cannot later add new arguments at
subsequent stages of the proceedings."). Nonetheless, the court notes that even if it were obliged
to consider Plaintiff's new argument, it would find it is without merit. Nothing in the briefing
papers suggests that Plaintiff or his counsel attempted to ascertain the identities of the John Doe
Defendants prior to the running of the statute oflimitations. 3 (See also R&R at 7 ("Nothing in
the record suggests that counsel ever sought the Officers' identities prior to the expiration of the
limitations period or sought an extension of time to do so."); id. (noting Plaintiff's reliance on
Bvrd v. Abate, 964 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), was "misplaced" given "the plaintiff there
demonstrated that his attempts to identify the John Doe defendant prior to the running of the

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Plaintiff noted in his Motion to Amend that he filed the Complaint "shortly after secnring counsel." (Pl. Amend.
Br. at I.) He does not, however, explain why his counsel failed to request an extension of time to name the proper
defendants prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

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statute of limitations were frustrated by the defendants").) The court tbus rejects Plaintiff's new
and conclusory argument.

ill.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections, ADOPTS IN

FULL the R&R, GRANTS the City's Motion to Dismiss, DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Amend,
and DISMISSES the Complaint WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.

,-=>/f.!tu,o/CL~,~' ~ff~
l'fi:CHOLAS G. GARAUFIS
United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September
2016

:l.Jo

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