Johnson v. New York City D.O.C. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER: Johnson requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Johnson's request is granted. The Court construes the Complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York rather th an the AMKC or the Department-and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption accordingly. Johnson's federal and state claims against Captain Otukoya and his state claims against the City of New York may proceed, but his Section 1983 clai m against the City of New York and all of his claims against the C-95 Officers are dismissed with leave to amend. No summons shall issue and all proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days or until Johnson has complied with this Order. Should Johnso n wish to pursue the dismissed claims, he must file an amended complaint within 30 days of this Order. The amended complaint must be captioned "Amended Complaint" and bear the docket number 15-CV-640 (CBA) (LB). If Johnson fails to file an amended complaint, this action will proceed solely as a Section 1983 claim against Captain Otukoya and state law claims against Otukoya and the City. ORDERED by Chief Judge Carol Bagley Amon, on 8/13/2015. C/mailed to pro se Plaintiff. (Latka-Mucha, Wieslawa)
FlLED
\N CL&RK'• OFFIC!
U.S. DISTRICT COURT E.O.N.V.,
*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
AUG 1~ 2015
*
BROOKLYN OFFICE
---------------------------------------------------------)(
JERMAINE JOHNSON,
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
15-CV-640 (CBA) (LB)
Plaintiff,
-againstNEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF CORRECTION;
RIKERS ISLAND AMKC; C-95 OFFICERS;
CAPTAIN OTUKOY A, 0 # 64,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------)(
AMON, Chief United States District Judge:
On February 6, 2015, plaintiff Jermaine Johnson, who is incarcerated at Rikers Island,
filed this prose complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was assaulted by a
correctional officer. (DE# 1.) Rather than pay the standard filing fee, Johnson requests leave to
proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (DE# 6-7.) For the reasons stated
below, Johnson's request is granted.
BACKGROUND 1
Johnson is housed at the Anna M. Kross Center ("AMKC") on Rikers Island. (DE# 1, at
5.) He alleges that on the morning of January 21, 2015, correctional officers conducted a
"special search" of the building. (See id. at 7.) As part of that exercise, officers searched both
Johnson's cell and subjected him to a strip search.
(MJ
Neither contraband nor weapons were
revealed in those searches. (Id.)
After the officers completed their searches, Johnson was told to re-enter his cell. (Id.)
As he began to clean-up, Johnson heard an unidentified female officer ask whether inmates were
1
The Court summarizes the facts as presented by Johnson in the Complaint. (DE# 1.) At this early stage of the
litigation, the Court must assume the truth of"all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations" contained in the
pleadings. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
permitted to wear blue shirts. (Id.) An unidentified male officer then asked Johnson what he
was wearing; Johnson replied he was indeed wearing a blue shirt. (Id.) Presumably based on
rules governing the prison uniform, the officer told Johnson that blue shirts were unacceptable
and ordered Johnson to give him the shirt. (kl) In response, Johnson took off the shirt and
"threw [it] towards the slot in the [cell] door." (Id. at 6.) The officer then opened the cell door.
(Id.) At that point, Captain Otukoya reprimanded Johnson for throwing the shirt at the other
officer, instead of handing it to him. (Id.) Otukoya then instructed Johnson to exit the cell and
pick-up the shirt. (Id.) When Johnson refused, Otukoya punched him in the face, knocking out a
cap on one of Johnson's teeth. (kl)
DISCUSSION
As a result, Johnson initiated this action against the New York City Department of
Corrections (the "Department"), AMKC, C-95 Officers and Captain Otukoya seeking damages
related to his injuries and compensation for the pain and suffering he endured. (See id. at
~~
I.
IV.A-V.)
Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 191 SA, a district court "shall review, before docketing, if feasible or,
in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Upon review, a district court shall dismiss a prisoner's complaint
sua sponte if the complaint is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief."
Id.; Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.l (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that, under the PLRA,
frivolous prisoner complaints must be dismissed sua sponte).
2
To avoid dismissal, a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Igbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, the Court assumes all
factual allegations are true, but gives no weight to legal conclusions. Id.
When dealing with pro se submissions, the Court adopts a "permissive application of the
rules governing the form of pleadings." Sealed Plaintiffv. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185,
191-93 (2d Cir. 2008). And because "prose litigants ... cannot be expected to know all of the
legal theories on which they might ultimately recover," the Court reviews the factual allegations
made, rather than focusing on the legal labels assigned to them. Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d
124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court construes such submissions as raising any legal
claim reasonably supported by the facts. Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475
(2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see also Sanders-Peay v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 14-CV-4534
(CBA) (MDG), 2014 WL 6473507, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2014) (construing factual
allegations in a Title VII form complaint as raising state law tort claims). 2
II.
Section 1983 Claims
Section 1983 of Title 42 bars any person from depriving another of "rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution" while acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Although Section 1983 "does not [itself] create a federal right or benefit," Morris-Hayes v. Bd.
of Educ. of Chester Union Free Sch. Dist., 423 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2005), the U.S.
Constitution bars correctional officers from using excessive force against the inmates they
oversee. See United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that excessive force
2
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to send plaintiff copies of all unreported cases cited herein.
3
claims raised by pre-trial detainees arise under the Fourteenth Amendment, whereas those raised
by convicts are governed by the Eighth Amendment). 3
Here, Johnson raises an excessive force claim against the officers involved-presumably,
Captain Otukoya and the C-95 Officers-as well as claims against the certain municipal
agencies-AMKC and the Department. The Court considers first the claims against the
individual defendants before analyzing the claims raised against the municipal agencies.
A.
Individual Defendants
The allegations in the complaint sufficiently plead a claim of excessive force against
Captain Otukoya. That claim may therefore proceed.
On the other hand, the C-95 Officers are mentioned nowhere in the Complaint. Because
Johnson fails to allege that other officers were personally involved in the assault against him or
failed to intervene to prevent it, those defendants must be dismissed. See Piper v. City of Elmira,
12 F. Supp. 577, 596 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). In light of Johnson's prose status, the Court provides
him with 30 days to amend the Complaint. If he decides to continue a claim against those
officers, he must provide sufficient factual allegations to render claims against them plausible.
He should also list those officers as John or Jane Doe, as appropriate, and provide any
identifying information known to him.
B.
Entity Defendants
The claims against AMKC and the Department are barred by the New York City Charter.
Specifically, Section 396 of the Charter requires that "[a]ll actions and proceedings for the
recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the City of New
York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law." N.Y. City Charter
3
It is not clear from the record whether Johnson was detained pending trial or had been convicted of a crime. The
Court need not determine Johnson's conviction status at this juncture because "the precise source of rights he asserts
does not affect [the] analysis." Toliver v. City of New York, 530 F. App'x 90, 92 n.l (2d Cir. 2013).
4
ch. 16 § 396. Because AMKC is a division of the Department, which is in tum a City agency,
neither are suable entities. See Campbell v. New York City, No. 12-CV-2179 (CBA), 2012 WL
3027925, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013) (finding the Department is a non-suable City agency);
Farray v. Rikers Island Corr. Facility, No. 12-CV-4717 (ARR), 2012 WL 5289608,at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2012) (dismissing claims against Rikers Island because it is a part of the
Department).
Given Johnson's prose status, the Court construes the Complaint as raising a claim
directly against New York City. See Pooler v. Hempstead Police Dep't, 897 F. Supp. 2d 12, 21
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (liberally construing a complaint naming the Hempstead Police Department as a
complaint against the Village of Hempstead). But that claim must also be dismissed because a
municipal entity can be liable under Section 1983 only where a plaintiff demonstrates that the
constitutional violation complained of was caused by a municipal "policy or custom." Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Connick v. Thompson, --- U.S.----,---,
131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) ("Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments
under Section 1983 must prove that 'action pursuant to official municipal policy' caused their
injury.") (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.).
Because Johnson fails to allege facts suggesting that his assault resulted from a municipal
policy or custom, his claim against the City must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
See, e.g., White v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 369 F. App'x. 225, 226 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming sua
sponte dismissal of Section 1983 claim for the plaintiffs failure "to allege that any of the
allegedly unconstitutional actions were taken pursuant to an official policy or custom, as is
required to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality"). Again, the Court provides Johnson
with 30 days to amend his complaint to include such factual allegations.
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III.
State Law Claims
Liberally read, the allegations in the Complaint also support a state law claims for assault
and battery against certain defendants. See Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475; Sanders-Peay, 2014 WL
6473507, at *2 n.2. The pleading standard for those tort claims mirrors the one governing
Johnson's federal excessive force claim. See Posr v. Doherty. 944 F.2d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1991)
(finding that "the essential elements of [excessive force and state law assault and battery claims
are] substantially identical"). The primary difference is that, under state law, the City may be
held vicariously liable for the torts of its employees-like Captain Otukoya-regardless of
whether those actions resulted from a municipal policy or practice. See Webster v. City of New
York, 333 F. Supp. 2d 184, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that even where plaintiff fails to
establish a municipal policy or procedure, "common-law causes of action against the City
proceeding on a theory of respondeat superior may proceed") (collecting cases). Therefore, the
Court concludes that the state tort claims against Captain Otukoya and the City are sufficiently
pl ed.
But since Johnson makes no allegations regarding the actions of the C-95 Officers, his
state law claims against those defendants must be dismissed. To the extent he wishes to pursue
state tort claims against those officers, he must include factual allegations regarding their
conduct in his amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court construes the Complaint as asserting claims against the City of New Yorkrather than the AMKC or the Department-and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption
accordingly.
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Johnson's federal and state claims against Captain Otukoya and his state claims against
the City of New York may proceed, but his Section 1983 claim against the City of New York
and all of his claims against the C-95 Officers are dismissed with leave to amend.
No summons shall issue and all proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days or until Johnson
has complied with this Order. Should Johnson wish to pursue the dismissed claims, he must file
an amended complaint within 30 days of this Order. 4 The amended complaint must be captioned
"Amended Complaint" and bear the docket number 15-CV-640 (CBA) (LB). The amended
complaint will completely replace the original complaint and therefore must contain all facts
alleged in the original complaint. If Johnson fails to file an amended complaint, this action will
proceed solely as a Section 1983 claim against Captain Otukoya and state law claims against
Otukoya and the City.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 1'1 , 2015
Brooklyn, New York
/S/ Chief Judge Carol Bagley Amon
Carol Bag ey
Chief United
4
on
tes District Judge
For Johnson's Section 1983 claim against the City to survive dismissal, the amended complaint must show that his
assault resulted from a municipal policy or practice. For his claims against the C-95 Officers to proceed, he must
explain how they were personally involved in the assault or failed to intervene despite having an opportunity to do
so. See Piper, 12 F. Supp. at 596.
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