Meyer, M.D. v. McDonald

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Defendant's 21 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The case is dismissed. No costs or disbursements are granted. Ordered by Judge Jack B. Weinstein on 3/17/2017. (Barrett, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________x
JILL S. MEYER, M.D.,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER
15-CV-1496

-againstROBERT McDONALD, Secretary,
Department of Veteran Affairs,
Defendant.
___________________________________x
Appearances
Plaintiff

Alan E. Wolin
Wolin & Wolin, Esqs.
420 Jericho Turnpike
Suite 215
Jericho, NY 11753

Defendant
Rukhsanah L. Singh
United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern
District
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201

JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior United States District Judge:
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 3

I.

II. Board Certification ............................................................................................................... 3
A.

Definition ......................................................................................................................... 3

B.

Obtaining Board Certification ...................................................................................... 4

C.

Benefits to Patients ......................................................................................................... 6

D.

Benefits to Doctors ......................................................................................................... 6

E.

Benefits to Employers .................................................................................................... 7

F.

Debate within Profession ............................................................................................... 7

III.

Facts .................................................................................................................................... 8

A.

Plaintiff’s Background ................................................................................................... 8

B.

Plaintiff’s Prior Employment and Prior Protected Activity ...................................... 8
1.

Initial Employment ..................................................................................................... 8

2.

NJ-VA Employment ................................................................................................... 8

3.

Plaintiff’s NY-VA Application .................................................................................. 9

C.

NJ-VA Vacancy Announcements and Plaintiff’s Instant Suit ................................. 10

D.

Procedural History ....................................................................................................... 11

IV.

Law .................................................................................................................................... 13

A.

Standard of Review ...................................................................................................... 13

B.

Discrimination and Retaliation Claims under the ADEA ........................................ 13
1.
2.

Defendant’s Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason .......................................... 15

3.
V.

Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Claim .................................................................................. 14

Pretext ........................................................................................................................ 15

Application of Law to Facts ............................................................................................... 15
A.

Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Claim ...................................................................................... 15
1.

Age Discrimination ................................................................................................... 15

2.

Retaliation ................................................................................................................. 19

B.

Defendant’s Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason .............................................. 26

C.

Pretext ........................................................................................................................... 28

VI.

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 29

2

I.

Introduction
This decision holds that without violating age discrimination protections, an employer

may give substantial weight in hiring to board certifications of medical candidates, or in
advertising job openings.
Plaintiff Jill S. Meyer brings this action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”). Alleged are age discrimination and retaliation. She is a
psychiatrist formerly employed by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“agency”
or “VA”). Defendant is the United States Secretary of the VA, David Shulkin. Formerly the VA
head was the named plaintiff, Robert McDonald. Plaintiff’s claims arise from her non-selection
for a position of staff psychiatrist at the VA New Jersey Health Care System (“NJ-VA”).
Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) plaintiff cannot establish a
prima facie claim of age discrimination or retaliation; and (2) defendant had a legitimate nondiscriminatory and non-retaliatory reason for not selecting plaintiff for the position of staff
psychiatrist at the NJ-VA – she was not board certified, but the persons selected were.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
II.

Board Certification
A.

Definition

Board certification is regulated by numerous board certifying bodies in the United States,
including the American Board of Medical Specialties (“ABMS”) and the American Board of
Physician Specialties (“ABPS”). “Obtaining a medical license sets the minimum competency
requirements to diagnose and treat patients, it is not specialty specific. Board Certification
demonstrates a physician’s exceptional expertise in a particular specialty and/or subspecialty of
medical practice.” See Board Certification and Maintenance of Certification, ABMS,

3

http://www.abms.org/board-certification/. “Patients, physicians, health care providers, insurers,
and quality organizations look for these markers as the best measure of a physician’s knowledge,
experience and skills to provide quality health care within a given specialty.” Id. See also Board
Certification and Maintenance of Certification, ABMS, http://www.abms.org/boardcertification/; Physician Board Certification Defined, ABPS, http://www.abpsus.org/physicianboard-certification-defined.
B.

Obtaining Board Certification

The process for obtaining board certification for a specific area of medicine “involves a
rigorous process of testing and peer evaluation that is designed and administered by specialists in
the specific area of medicine.” Id. Dr. Maureen Kaune, an employee of defendant in the instant
case, testified that board certification through the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology,
Inc. (“ABPN”), which is a Member Board of the ABMS, is “a very rigorous process,” which
allows a board certified doctor to be “recognized as one of those experts in [his or her] field.”
See Decl. of Rukhsanah L. Singh in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., August 3, 2016, ECF No.
26 (“Singh Decl.”), at Ex. P, ECF No. 26-2 at 98:8-99:13.
The minimum eligibility requirements for board certification differ among various
member boards. The ABMS requires that doctors – after completing their college premedical
education, medical school education, and three to five year residency training program –
“[p]rovide letters of attestation from their program director and/or faculty” and “[p]ass a written
and, in some cases, an oral examination created and administered by an ABMS Member Board.”
Steps Toward Initial Certification and MOC, ABMS, http://www.abms.org/boardcertification/steps-toward-initial-certification-and-moc/. See also Pl.’s Statement on the Issue of

4

Board Certification, Dec. 14, 2016, ECF No. 41 (“Pl.’s Suppl. Mem.”); Suppl. Mem. of Law in
Further Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Dec 23, 2016, ECF No. 42 (“Def.’s Suppl. Mem.”).
Doctors who wish to obtain board certification in psychiatry through the ABPS must take
a written and an oral exam. Board of Certification in Psychiatry, ABPS,
http://www.abpsus.org/psychiatry. In order to be eligible for these tests, a doctor must, among
other requirements, be in compliance with the ABPS’s Code of Ethics, have completed an
accredited residency in psychiatry, submit letters of recommendation, provide a document report
of a minimum of 10 psychiatry cases which the applicant had the lead role in managing, consent
to a background check, and pay relevant fees. Psychiatry Eligibility, ABPS,
http://www.abpsus.org/psychiatry-eligibility.
In addition to obtaining board certification for an area of medical specialty like
psychiatry, doctors can also take subspecialty exams, which are subject to their own eligibility
requirements. Taking a Subspecialty Exam, ABPN, https://www.abpn.com/becomecertified/taking-a-subspecialty-exam/.
Once a doctor has obtained a board certification, she must periodically recertify “by
participating in a robust continuous professional development program.” Steps Toward Initial
Certification and MOC, ABMS, http://www.abms.org/board-certification/steps-toward-initialcertification-and-moc/. Doctors board certified in psychiatry through the ABPS must complete
Continuing Medical Education hours to maintain certification. Psychiatry Recertification,
ABPS, http://www.abpsus.org/psychiatry-recertification. The ABPN requires a recertification
examination “at least once every 10 years for each certification.” Program Requirements,
ABPN, https://www.abpn.com/maintain-certification/maintenance-of-certificationprogram/program-requirements/.

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C.

Benefits to Patients

Board certification can benefit patients because it provides strong evidence that a doctor
has stayed up-to-date with medical standards, patient care, and medical ethics. See, e.g., About
Board Certification, ABMS, http://www.certificationmatters.org/about-board-certifieddoctors/about-board-certification.aspx; Physician Board Certification Defined, ABPS,
http://www.abpsus.org/physician-board-certification-defined.
Board certified physicians must have demonstrated their ability to offer reasonable and
safe treatment plans that comply with current clinical standards. This allows patients to make
more informed choices when selecting healthcare providers. Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 4; see Decl.
of Saila B. Donepudi, M.D. in Supp. of Def.’s Suppl. Mem., Dec. 7, 2016, ECF No. 42-2
(“Donepudi Decl. 2”), at ¶ 10. The required Maintenance of Certification program ensures that
doctors keep up with ever-changing industry standards. Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 3-4.
Because board certified doctors are also evaluated on grounds of professionalism, they
instill confidence about their ethical values in their patients. Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 4-5;
Donepudi Decl. 2, at ¶ 10. Having physicians known to be highly trained may put a patient at
ease during a time of stress, and help cultivate a stronger physician-patient relationship.
D.

Benefits to Doctors

Doctors may benefit from board certification because the classification indicates that a
doctor has qualified knowledge in a particular field. Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 5; Donepudi Decl. 2
¶ 9. This may increase a physician’s value; certification signals to a patient and employer that a
doctor has the requisite knowledge to successfully complete the certification testing process.
Rebecca Clay, Gaining Specialty Certification, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY ASSOCIATION,
http://www.apa.org/gradpsych/2010/03/specialty-certification.aspx.

6

The requirements doctors must meet to maintain certification can safeguard against
outdated treatment methods. Mission and History, ABPN,
https://www.abpn.com/about/mission-and-history/. This creates a unified standard and measure
of evaluating peer competency. Rebecca Clay, Gaining Specialty Certification, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGY ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/gradpsych/2010/03/specialty-certification.aspx.
Board certified physicians may earn a higher salary based on their qualifications.
Employers such as the NJ-VA offer higher compensation for board certified physicians as
compared to non-board certified physicians. Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 5; 38 U.S.C. § 7431(c)(4)(D)
(requiring the determination of the amount of market pay of a physician employed by the VA to
consider board certification).
E.

Benefits to Employers

Because board certification is based on nationally recognized standards of competent
medical treatment, employers can benefit from hiring board certified doctors. Def.’s Suppl.
Mem. at 6. Certification indicates to patients that the employer will provide treatment by highly
qualified physicians who maintain current medical knowledge. Some employers require board
certification for employment. Id.
F.

Debate within Profession

Plaintiff correctly points out that it is “debatable whether board certification is related to
better care.” Pl.’s Suppl. Mem. at 2. But the court is not determining whether board certification
is in fact preferable for patients, doctors, and employers. It is deciding whether an employer may
reasonably conclude that retaining a board certified physician provides substantial benefits to
itself and its patients.

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III.

Facts
A.

Plaintiff’s Background

Plaintiff was born in February 1953. Am. Compl., June 25, 2015, ECF No. 8 (“Am.
Compl.”), at ¶ 17; Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule
56.1, July 29, 2016, ECF No. 21-2 (“Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement”), at ¶ 1. She was 59 years old,
protected by the ADEA, when the VA chose not to hire her.
In 1981, plaintiff received a medical doctor degree from the University of Dominica.
Def.’s Rule 56.1, at ¶ 3. She is licensed to practice medicine in New York, New Jersey,
Maryland, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania. Def.’s Rule 56.1, at ¶ 4. She is not board certified in
any area of medicine. Id. at ¶ 5; Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Fact Pursuant to Local
Civil Rule 56.1, Sept. 21, 2016, ECF No. 31 (“Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement”), at ¶ 5.
B.

Plaintiff’s Prior Employment and Prior Protected Activity
1.

Initial Employment

Plaintiff has been employed as a psychiatrist by the VA for many years in a number of
states. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 18-20. She worked at the VA Medical Center in Minnesota from July
1992 to June 1993, the VA Medical Center in Ohio from June 1994 to December 1994, and the
NJ-VA from December 1994 to February 2004. Id.; Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶¶ 6-10.
2.

NJ-VA Employment

During her employment at the NJ-VA, plaintiff submitted multiple complaints against the
NJ-VA to her employer and to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
including allegations of equal pay violations, hostile work environment, unfair disciplinary
actions, and discrimination based on disability, race, religion, sex, and reprisal. Am. Compl. at
¶¶ 22-31; Singh Decl. at Ex. T, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3. One of her former official

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complaints to the EEOC included a claim of age discrimination. Singh Decl. at Ex. T, Aug. 3,
2016, ECF No. 26-3.
In several of these complaints, she named two of her supervisors who later made the
hiring decisions that form the basis of the instant case – Associate Chief Miklos Losonczy, M.H.,
B.S. and Supervising Psychiatrist Maureen Kaune, M.D. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 22-31; Singh Decl.
at Ex. T, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3; Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶¶ 11-13; Decl. of Alan E.
Wolin in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Sept. 21, 2016, ECF No. 32 (“Wolin Decl.”), at Ex.
3. In one complaint, plaintiff charged that the agency was “out to get” her. Am. Compl. at ¶¶
25-27; Wolin Decl. at Ex. 12, Sept. 21, 2016, ECF No. 32-12. Three of the five formal claims
plaintiff filed with the EEOC led to a settlement under which plaintiff resigned from her position
with the NJ-VA. Singh Decl. at Ex. T, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3.
3.

Plaintiff’s NY-VA Application

In January 2009, plaintiff applied for and was offered a psychiatrist position at the VA
Medical Center in Syracuse, New York (“NY-VA”). Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 14; Am.
Compl. at ¶ 40. When her offer for the position was rescinded, she filed an equal employment
opportunity (“EEO”) complaint and alleged that her non-selection for the vacancy was the result
of discrimination based on her age, national origin, religion, and prior protected activity. Pl.’s
Rule 56.1 at ¶¶ 14-15; Singh Decl. at Ex. T, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3. The complaint was
decided in favor of the NY-VA: the VA issued a decision, which was affirmed by the EEOC,
that plaintiff had failed to state a prima facie case and that the agency had proffered a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its decision. Singh Decl. at Ex. T, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3;
Singh Decl. at Ex. CC, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-5; Pl.’s Rule 56.1 at ¶¶ 16-17.

9

In December 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Eastern District of New York against
the agency regarding her non‐selection for the employment position, alleging that defendant’s
retraction of the job offer was motivated by employment discrimination based upon age, religion,
and retaliation for prior protected activities. The court concluded that she had failed to state a
prima facie case of discrimination and granted defendant’s summary judgment motion
dismissing the action. Meyer v. Shinseki, No. 12‐CV‐6337, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100528
(E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138418
(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2016).
C.

NJ-VA Vacancy Announcements and Plaintiff’s Instant Suit

In 2011 and 2012, the NJ-VA had a vacancy for a staff psychiatrist, which was listed
under Vacancy ID No. 517141. Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 19. The vacancy was posted
under two vacancy announcements: first, Vacancy Announcement JL-11-3559, and later,
Vacancy Announcement JL-12-3559 (later renamed as BH-12-JLI-517141-MHC), which
included a second vacancy for a staff psychiatrist position. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. The NJ-VA sought
to hire two staff psychiatrists to fill Vacancy ID No. 517141. Id. at ¶ 22.
Plaintiff applied for both positions under the two separate vacancy announcements. Id. at
¶¶ 31-32. She submitted her first application to Vacancy Announcement JL-11-3559 in
September 2011. Id. Because this position did not need to be filled from applications sent for a
specific vacancy announcement, plaintiff’s initial application “rolled over” into the selection
process for the two vacancies announced in Vacancy Announcement JL-12-3559, for which
plaintiff submitted additional information in 2012. Id. Plaintiff was not selected for either
position. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 39, 44; Def.’s Rule Statement 56.1 at ¶ 33; Singh Decl. at Exs. F-G,
Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-1.

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Dr. Losonczy was the selecting official for NJ-VA staff psychiatrist vacancies. Def.’s
Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 24. He directed Dr. Kaune and Dr. Saila Donepudi, M.D., to form a
selection panel to review and interview candidates for the Vacancy ID No. 517141. Id. at ¶¶ 2425, 33. The panel, consisting of Drs. Kaune and Donepudi, decided not to select plaintiff for an
interview and instead interviewed three candidates who were board certified, and who were born
in 1972, 1957, and 1964, respectively, all younger than plaintiff, who was born in 1953. Id. at ¶¶
33, 36. The panel ultimately recommended, and Dr. Losonczy chose, the youngest candidate,
who was board certified and 39 years of age at the time of the offer. Id. at ¶ 37; Hr’g Tr., Feb.
16, 2017 (“Hr’g Tr.”), at 7:23-8:2. That candidate declined the offer shortly before she was to
begin working at the NJ-VA. Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 38.
After the candidate declined, Dr. Kaune and Dr. Donepudi were no longer involved in the
selection process. In 2012, Dr. Losonczy independently selected two board certified
psychiatrists to fill the two vacancies at the NJ-VA, who were 31 and 38 years of age at the time
of their selection, when plaintiff was almost 60. Id. at ¶¶ 39-41. Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶
41; Singh Decl. at Exs. I-K, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-1.
Throughout the hiring process, the responsible managing officials were over the age of
40: Dr. Kaune was born in 1961, Dr. Donepudi was born in 1966, and Dr. Losonczy was born in
1946. Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶¶ 43-45.
D.

Procedural History

On May 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a formal written EEO complaint with the VA when the
NJ-VA failed to appoint her to the position of psychiatrist under Vacancy Announcement JL-123559. Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 46; Singh Decl. at Ex. U, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3.
On June 5, 2012, Plaintiff sought to amend her EEO complaint to include her non-selection for

11

the position of psychiatrist under Vacancy Announcement BH-12-JLI-517141-MHC (the
renamed Vacancy Announcement JL-12-3559). Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 47; Singh Decl.
at Ex. V, Aug. 3, 2017, ECF No. 26-3.
In July 2012, the agency accepted plaintiff’s claims and commenced an investigation.
Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 48. In February 2014, the VA EEO issued an Order Entering
Judgment in favor of the VA, finding that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie claim of
retaliation and that the agency had offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to rebut
plaintiff’s discrimination claims. Id. at ¶ 49; Singh Decl. at Ex. X, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3.
Plaintiff appealed the decision, which the agency affirmed on December 24, 2014. Def.’s Rule
56.1 Statement at ¶ 51; Singh Decl. at Ex. Z, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3. The decision
informed plaintiff of her right to file a civil action within 90 days from the date of its receipt.
Singh Decl. at Ex. Z, ECF No. 26-3.
On March 23, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint initiating the instant action. Compl.,
March 20, 2015, ECF No. 1. She alleges that the hiring panel discriminated against her on the
basis of her age in violation of the ADEA: the agency generally prefers to hire younger
applicants and hired an individual younger than she was for each available position. See Am.
Compl. She also alleges that Dr. Losonczy and Dr. Kaune retaliated against plaintiff when they
did not select her for the positions, because plaintiff had filed several formal complaints against
the VA – naming Dr. Losonczy and Dr. Kaune – prior to submitting her applications. Id.
Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that (1) plaintiff has failed to state a
prima facie case of circumstances that would give rise to an inference of age discrimination or
discriminatory retaliation; (2) the agency did not discriminate against plaintiff based on her age
and had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring plaintiff – her lack of board

12

certification; and (3) hiring candidates with a superior qualification was not pretext for
discrimination.
IV.

Law
A.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, resolving all ambiguities and
drawing all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Hernandez v. Int’l Shoppes, LLC, 100 F.
Supp. 3d 232, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal dismissed (June 18, 2015). The substantive law
governing the case will identify those facts that are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
No genuinely triable factual issue exists “if, on the basis of all the pleadings, affidavits
and other papers on file, and after drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in favor of
the non-movant, it appears that the evidence supporting the non-movant’s case is so scant that a
rational jury could not find in its favor.” Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86
(2d Cir. 1996). If the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party must provide “specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
B.

Discrimination and Retaliation Claims under the ADEA

Under the ADEA, an employer shall not “fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

13

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age” and shall not
discriminate against an applicant for employment because that applicant “has opposed any
practice made unlawful by this section, or because such . . . applicant for membership has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
litigation under this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(d).
ADEA discrimination and retaliation claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Jetter v. Knothe Corp.,
324 F.3d 73, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Chan v. Donahoe, 63 F. Supp. 3d 271, 294-95.
“Under this framework, the evidentiary burden shifts between the parties, but the ultimate burden
of proving discrimination remains with the plaintiff.” Farulla v. New York Sch. Const. Auth.,
277 F. Supp. 2d 140, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
1.

Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Claim

First, plaintiff must prove a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
The burden of establishing a prima facie case under the ADEA is “minimal,” Roge v. NYP
Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2001) (regarding employment discrimination) and “de
minimis,” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) (regarding retaliation).
a)

Age discrimination

An age discrimination claim requires a showing that: (1) plaintiff belonged to a protected
class; (2) she was qualified for the employment position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) this adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. Chan, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 293; Hall v. N. Bellmore Sch. Dist., 55 F.
Supp. 3d 286, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (these elements apply when a defendant employer is
assessing applicants for hire).

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b)

Retaliation

Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: (1) participation in a
protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse
employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Chan, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 295 (quoting Hicks, 593 F.3d at 164-65).
2.

Defendant’s Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason

Once plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination or retaliation, the
burden of proof shifts to defendants to offer, by a preponderance of the evidence, a “legitimate
non-discriminatory reason” for the employment decision “through the introduction of admissible
evidence.” Hernandez, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 255 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
see also Chan, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 294 (“It is a burden of production, not persuasion; it can involve
no credibility assessment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
3.

Pretext

If defendant is able to meet this burden, plaintiff must produce evidence that defendant’s
proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Hernandez, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 255; see also
U.S.P.S. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (“In short, the district court must
decide which party’s explanation of the employee’s motivation it believes.”).
V.

Application of Law to Facts
A.

Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Claim
1.

Age Discrimination

Plaintiff meets the first three requirements of the four-prong test to establish a prima facie
age discrimination claim.

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a)

Protected Class

As a 59-year-old applicant, she falls within the class of people protected by the ADEA,
which is individuals who are at least 40 years of age. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
b)

Qualifications

Plaintiff has provided evidence demonstrating that she was qualified for the position.
The second vacancy posting, Vacancy Announcement JL-12-3559, called for applicants who are
United States citizens, hold the degree of doctor of medicine or an equivalent degree, and have a
license to practice medicine or surgery. Wolin Decl. at Ex. 18, Sept. 21, 2016, ECF No. 32-18.
She met these requirements: in her application, she truthfully stated that she is a United States
citizen, holds a doctoral degree in medicine as a psychiatrist, and is licensed to practice
medicine. Wolin Decl. at Ex. 17, Sept. 21, 2016, ECF No. 32-17. Her resume demonstrates that
she has significant experience, both as a staff psychiatrist for various state branches of the
agency and in other clinic settings. Singh Decl. at Exs. D-E, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-1. See
Farulla, 277 F. Supp. at 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (evidence including plaintiff’s resume and five
letters of recommendation from colleagues and supervisors were sufficient to demonstrate her
qualifications); Owens v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 934 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[Plaintiff] only
needs to demonstrate that she possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job.”)
(internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).
c)

Adverse Employment Action

Plaintiff established that she suffered an adverse employment action. She applied for two
positions for which she was qualified and was rejected for both. Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶
42. Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (“A plaintiff
sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a materially adverse change in the

16

terms and conditions of employment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); LovejoyWilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 2001) (defining adverse
employment action broadly to include “discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, demotion,
reduction in pay, and reprimand.” (internal citation omitted)).
d)

Inference of Discrimination

Plaintiff has not established that this adverse employment action occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of illegal discrimination. That inference can be drawn
from “the employer’s criticism of the plaintiff’s performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its
invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group; or the more favorable
treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the
plaintiff’s [adverse employment action].” Abdu–Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456,
468 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Meyer v. State of
N.Y. Office of Mental Health, 174 F. Supp. 3d 673, 687 (E.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d, 16-CV-1163 (2d
Cir. Mar. 10, 2017). Plaintiff has not offered any evidence from which a rational factfinder
could determine that defendant’s failure to hire plaintiff was based on age discrimination.
When the person who allegedly discriminated against plaintiff is a member of the same
protected class as plaintiff, the court applies an inference against discrimination. Palak v. St.
Francis Hosp., No. 14–CV–4383, 2015 WL 3682805, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2015) (“[A]n
inference against discrimination exists where the person who participated in the allegedly
adverse decision is also a member of the same protected class. . . . In other words, if a decision
maker is in the same protected class as plaintiff, claims of discrimination become less plausible.”
(internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)), appeal dismissed (Dec. 23, 2015);
see also Williams v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 819 F. Supp. 214, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)

17

(dismissing age discrimination claims where the employees responsible for plaintiff's termination
were the same age as or older than plaintiff); Drummond v. IPC Int’l., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 521,
532 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (same). That inference is not dispositive, since members of a protected
class can discriminate against other members of that class, but it creates an additional hurdle that
plaintiff must overcome. Palak, 2015 WL 3682805, at *8. In the instant case, hiring decisions
were made by Dr. Losonczy, who was born in 1946, Dr. Donepudi, who was born in 1966, and
Dr. Kaune, who was born in 1961. Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶¶ 43-45. All three employers
were over the age of 40 – and therefore members of the same protected class as plaintiff – when
they made the decision not to hire her.
An inference against discrimination is appropriate when the individual hired to replace
plaintiff alleging discrimination is within the same protected class as plaintiff. Fleming v.
MaxMara USA, Inc., 371 F. App’x. 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment in
favor of defendant employer and finding no inference of discrimination where an African
American female plaintiff who alleged termination based on race was replaced by another
African American female); Rodriguez v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 14-CV-4960, 2015
WL 5229850, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2015) (“It is extremely difficult, if not practically
impossible to establish discrimination where, as here, plaintiff was passed over so an employer
can hire another member of plaintiff’s same protected class.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). The inference is not dispositive, but plaintiff must overcome it in order to
establish an inference of discrimination.
In the instant case, two of the candidates defendant interviewed to fill the first vacancy
were in plaintiff’s protected class, but the three individuals who were offered the position – two
of whom accepted – were under the age of 40 at the time of selection. Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement

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at ¶¶ 36-41. Because the candidates who were ultimately hired are not in plaintiff’s protected
class, defendant is not entitled to this inference against discrimination. But the mere fact that
defendant filled the position with two individuals outside of plaintiff’s protected class is itself
insufficient for plaintiff to meet her burden.
There is no other evidence in the record that defendants did not interview and hire
plaintiff because of her age. Plaintiff’s allegation that “Dr. Losonczy was aware of Plaintiff’s
age” and that “[t]he agency preferred to hire younger applicants,” even when taken together with
the fact that two candidates under the age of 40 were ultimately hired, is insufficient evidence for
the decision to give rise to an inference of discrimination. Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶¶ 95, 97;
Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 689 (“Plaintiff's mere subjective belief that she was discriminated
against does not sustain a discrimination claim.” (internal quotations marks and citation
omitted)). Considering the totality of the evidence, plaintiff has not met her burden of
establishing a prima facie claim of age discrimination and has not offered any evidence that
raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant’s failure to hire her gave rise to an
inference of age discrimination.
2.

Retaliation

Plaintiff meets the first three requirements of the four-element test to establish a prima
facie retaliation claim.
a)

Protected Activity

She participated in protected activity on numerous occasions: as of the date of plaintiff’s
original complaint, she had previously filed at least eight EEO complaints against various
branches of the VA and named Dr. Kaune and Dr. Losonczy specifically in several of these
complaints. Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 67; Singh Decl. at Ex. T, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-

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3. Because a retaliation claim under the ADEA is limited to retaliation for an employee’s prior
claims of age discrimination, the court will consider plaintiff’s previous protected activity in
which she specifically complained of age discrimination as relevant. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)
(prohibiting retaliating against an applicant who has “made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.”
(emphasis added)); Gomez–Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008) (permitting actions under the
ADEA based on prior complaints of age discrimination); Gavurnik v. Home Properties, L.P., No.
16-CV-633, 2017 WL 25378, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2017) (“In order to satisfy prong one of an
ADEA retaliation claim, [plaintiff’s] protected activity must reference age.”); see also Hr’g Tr. at
17:18-18:8. Even if the court were to consider all of plaintiff’s prior complaints asserted on
bases other than age discrimination, plaintiff would not meet her burden of establishing a prima
facie claim of retaliation. All of her other non-age discrimination based EEO complaints
preceded the two complaints that alleged age discrimination, and as is discussed below, her two
latest EEO complaints lack a temporal nexus with the adverse action now complained of.
Twice before filing the instant complaint, plaintiff complained of age discrimination by
the VA. In October 2003, she filed an EEO complaint, alleging harassment and a hostile work
environment during her employment with the NJ-VA based on gender, religion, equal pay, and
age. Def.’s Rule 56.1 at ¶ 11; Singh Decl. at Ex. T, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3. The matter
was settled and closed in February 2004. Singh Decl. at Ex. T, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3. In
June 2009, she filed another EEO complaint, alleging that the NY-VA discriminated against her
by retracting an offer of employment based on her religion, age, and prior protected activity. Id.
The matter was eventually litigated in this district and dismissed in September 2016. See Meyer,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138418 (granting summary judgment for defendant). See also Def.’s

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Summ. J. Mot. at 8 (“Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff engaged in prior protected activity
under the ADEA.”).
b)

Knowledge of Protected Activity

Plaintiff has established that defendant was generally aware of plaintiff’s protected prior
activity. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has confirmed that to satisfy the
knowledge requirement of a prima facie retaliation claim, nothing more “than general corporate
knowledge that the plaintiff has engaged in a protected activity” is necessary. Kessler v.
Westchester Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 210 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Plaintiff has met that requirement: she previously initiated two EEO
complaints against the VA on the basis of age discrimination, one of which was against the
employer in the instant case, the VA-NJ. Singh Decl. at Ex. T, ECF No. 26-3; Chan, 63 F. Supp.
3d at 295 (“To constitute protected activity, the plaintiff's conduct must have put the employer
on notice that the plaintiff believed that discrimination was occurring. . . . A defendant will be
considered to have been put on notice in circumstances where the plaintiff filed a formal
complaint with an administrative agency.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Defendant was aware of plaintiff’s prior protected activity, even if the members of the hiring
panel did not have personal knowledge of these proceedings.
c)

Adverse Employment Action

As discussed supra, in section V.A.1, defendant took an adverse employment action
against plaintiff in failing to hire her. See Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640.
d)

Causal Connection

Plaintiff fails to establish causation between her prior protected activity and defendant’s
failure to hire her. Proof of causation can be established either “(1) indirectly, by showing that

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the protected activity was followed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other
circumstantial evidence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar
conduct; or (2) directly, through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against the plaintiff by
the defendant.” Hicks, 593 F.3d at 170 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to provide direct evidence of defendant’s retaliatory animus, and she
does not show through indirect evidence that employees who were similarly situated were
disparately treated. The most plaintiff offers is that two employees under the age of 40 filled the
vacancies, but both of those doctors – in addition to all of the candidates interviewed – were
board certified. To show the disparate treatment of a “purportedly similarly situated employee . .
. such an employee must be similarly situated in all material respects—not in all respects. . . .
[T]hose [other] employees must have a situation sufficiently similar to plaintiff’s to support at
least a minimal inference that the difference of treatment may be attributable to discrimination.”
McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Defendant preferred to fill the position with
doctors who have a significant qualification that plaintiff lacks; thus plaintiff was not similarly
situated to the board certified candidates hired in all material ways. See, e.g., Jackson v. Buffalo
Mun. Hous. Auth., 916 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (taking into account an
individual’s qualifications for a position when determining whether she was similarly situated to
plaintiffs for the purposes of an employment discrimination claim); Chan v. NYU Downtown
Hosp., No. 03-CV-3003, 2006 WL 345853, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (considering
“similarly situated” to include a comparison of “responsibilities, tenure, experience, background,
qualifications, education, etc.”); see also supra, section II (discussing the benefits board
certification can provide to patients, doctors, and employers); Hr’g Tr. at 8:8-9:20.

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Nor is plaintiff able to rely on the timing of the adverse employment action in relation to
her protected activity to indirectly show causation. When a retaliatory claim is asserted against
plaintiff’s current employer, courts “generally analyze the time period between a plaintiff’s
protected activity and the adverse employment action because in the vast majority of cases, that
is the operative time period for ascertaining retaliatory intent and causation.” Meyer, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 100528, at *24. But in “a case where the protected activity was directed against a
former employer . . . the operative time period for purposes of divining intent and circumstantial
evidence of causation is the time that elapsed between the new employer (or prospective
employer) learning about the plaintiff’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.”
Id. at *25 (emphasis in original). The two previous complaints of age discrimination plaintiff
made that form the basis of her instant retaliation claim must be analyzed under these two
standards.
Relevant for her October 2003 complaint against the NJ-VA is the time that elapsed
between the filing of the complaint and the adverse employment action: while the NJ-VA is
technically plaintiff’s former employer (plaintiff left in 2004), it is treated as a current employer
for the causation test. The past complaint and instant complaint are asserted against the same
employer. Considering the NJ-VA as a former employer would belie the rationale underlying
the “former employer” standard, which is that unlike a former employer, a current employer
“presumably receives notice of the protected activity contemporaneous with the activity itself.”
Id. at *24. In the instant case, if the NJ-VA hiring panel was aware of plaintiff’s prior protected
activity when making its hiring decisions, the members of the panel would have learned of the
prior protected activity in October 2003, contemporaneously with the EEO filing against that
employer.

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The time elapsed between the filing of the EEO complaint against the NJ-VA (October
2003) and the failure to hire in the instant case (early 2012) was at least eight years. Singh Decl.
at Ex. T, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3; Singh Decl. at Ex. F, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-1; Def.’s
Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 40. To constitute causation, the protected activity must be “closely
followed in time by the adverse action.” Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 127-28 (2d Cir.
2013) (emphasis added).
There is no “bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is
too attenuated to establish a causal relationship.” Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d
Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Each temporal analysis must be made
within the context of a case, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has determined that
seven months is not too long to establish a causal relationship, while fifteen months or two years
is too long. Summa, 708 F.3d at 127-29 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added); Bowen-Hooks v. City
of N.Y., 13 F. Supp. 3d 179, 229-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citations omitted). A gap of eight years is
too great “to establish causation based on the temporal proximity of the protected activity and the
adverse action.” Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100528, at *23-24 (citing Chang v. Safe
Horizons, 254 F. App’x 838, 839 (2d Cir. 2007) (plaintiff’s termination “occurred almost one
year after her complaint of discrimination, thus undermining any causal nexus based on temporal
proximity” (citation omitted)) and John v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr./Rutland Nursing Home,
No. 11-CV-3624, 2014 WL 1236804, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2014) (plaintiff’s suspension
and termination two years after initial complaint and ten months after last complaint were “too
attenuated in this instance to establish that her termination was in retaliation for any protected
activity” (citations omitted))); Bohnet v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist. 13, 30 F. Supp. 3d
174, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Here, the passage of approximately six months between plaintiff’s

24

complaint and the alleged adverse action does not allow for an inference of causation, especially
where plaintiff has not alleged any other facts from which retaliation can be inferred. As a
result, plaintiff has not alleged a plausible ADEA retaliation claim.”), aff’d, 594 F. App’x 53 (2d
Cir. 2015).
The age discrimination complaint plaintiff filed in June 2009 against the NY-VA must be
analyzed under the other causation standard. Because that complaint was against an employer
other than the one named in the instant matter, the “former employer” standard must be used to
determine the time that elapsed between the NJ-VA learning about the plaintiff's protected
activity against the NY-VA and the adverse employment action. Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100528, at *24. It is not clear from the record what this time period was; plaintiff has failed to
offer any concrete evidence that the reviewing panel and Dr. Losonczy were aware of plaintiff’s
2009 age discrimination claim against the NY-VA.
Unlike the second knowledge prong of the prima facie analysis, a plaintiff cannot rely on
“mere corporate knowledge” to establish the fourth causation prong of the four-part test. Kwan
v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F. 3d 834, 844 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013). Dr. Kaune stated in her EEOC
declaration for the instant case that she was “aware of some of the complainant’s prior EEO
filings. She actually named me as a responsible management official on a couple of occasions.”
Singh Decl. at Ex. R, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3. Dr. Losonczy recalled that plaintiff had
addressed some of her previous complaints directly to him, either orally or through letters. See,
e.g., Wolin Decl. at Ex. 10, Sept. 21, 2016, ECF No. 32-10 (September 2000 letter addressed to
Dr. Losonczy); Wolin Decl. at Ex. 12, Sept. 21, 2016, ECF No. 32-12 (June 2002 letter
addressed to Dr. Losonczy); Wolin Decl. at Ex. 15, Sept. 21, 2016, ECF No. 32-15 at 83:284:22. Neither Dr. Kaune nor Dr. Loszonzcy were named or involved in the 2009 complaint

25

against the NY-VA, and neither indicated that they were aware of that specific complaint. Their
recollections about plaintiff’s general past activity is insufficient to show awareness of the
protected prior activity involving allegations of age discrimination.
Plaintiff has failed to establish through indirect or direct evidence that defendant failed to
hire her due to her past complaints of age discrimination, and has therefore failed to meet her
burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to plaintiff, the record does not support any indication that defendant failed to hire
plaintiff for reasons motivated by age discrimination or retaliation for plaintiff’s prior protected
activity.
B.

Defendant’s Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason

Even assuming that plaintiff met her burden of establishing a prima facie inference of
discrimination or retaliation, which she did not, defendant was able to “articulate a legitimate,
non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Hicks, 593 F.3d at 164 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). This “is not a particularly steep hurdle” because “[i]t is
not a court’s role to second-guess an employer’s personnel decisions, even if foolish, so long as
they are non-discriminatory.” Brierly v. Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist., 359 F. Supp. 2d 275,
291 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
“[E]mployers ‘ha[ve] discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided
the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.’” Meyer, 174 F. Supp. at 692 (quoting Texas
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 249 (1981)). “[T]he court must respect the
employer’s unfettered discretion to choose among qualified candidates.” Fischbach v. D.C.
Dep’t of Corrs., 86 F.3d 1180, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Brierly, 359 F. Supp. at 291
(“Federal courts do not have a roving commission to review business judgments . . . and may not

26

sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits—or even the rationality—of employers’
non-discriminatory business decisions.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Interviewing and hiring a candidate with superior qualifications to plaintiff is a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for failing to hire plaintiff. See Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d at
692 (finding that defendant had met its burden of establishing a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for not hiring plaintiff where defendant established that the individuals hired had superior
qualifications); see also Ellis v. Century 21 Dep’t Stores, 975 F. Supp. 2d 244, 271-72 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (finding that “superior qualifications” of one candidate are a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to hire plaintiff); Andretta v. Napolitano, 922 F. Supp. 2d 411,
418 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“By presenting evidence of a legitimate, merit-based review process,
which resulted in the selection of three well qualified candidates, Defendant has satisfied its
burden in the second phase of the McDonnell test.”); Antunes v. Putnam/N. Westchester Bd. of
Coop. Educ. Servs., No. 09-CV-3063, 2011 WL 1990872, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2011)
(finding that in hiring individuals with “superior qualifications,” defendants had established a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring plaintiff). Board certification has
specifically been recognized as a “superior qualification.” See Meyer, 174 F. Supp. at 692; see
also Paul v. Theda Med. Ctr., Inc., 465 F.3d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[Defendant’s]
requirement that a neurosurgeon with active staff membership be board certified is a legitimate
and non-discriminatory reason for denying [plaintiff] active status.”).
When reviewing applications for the vacant position, the individuals involved in the
hiring decision here determined that they preferred a board certified psychiatrist to fill the
vacancy. See Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶¶ 26-28; Hr’g Tr. at 5:23-9:19. The record reflects
that defendant preferred to hire board certified candidates because they have passed a rigorous

27

examination process, are recognized as experts in their field, and are generally considered to
have superior qualifications. All of the psychiatrists defendants interviewed and who received
offers of employment were board certified. Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶¶ 28, 36-37, 40-41;
Hr’g Tr. at 5:23-9:19; see also supra, section II. This superior qualification of the candidates
interviewed and selected for the vacancy is sufficient to establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for defendant’s failure to hire plaintiff.
C.

Pretext

Assuming that plaintiff stated a prima facie claim, she would not be able to demonstrate
that defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for its hiring decision was a pretext.
To establish pretext, plaintiff must produce evidence showing that “evidence that would
permit a rational factfinder to infer that the adverse employment action was actually motivated,
in whole or in part, by discrimination.” Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 692-93 (internal quotation
marks, alterations, and citation omitted). “The plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion,
but summary judgment is appropriate only if the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason is
dispositive and forecloses any issue of material fact.” Hernandez, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 264
(internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).
Nothing in the record would allow a rational factfinder to determine that defendant’s
explanation for hiring board certified candidates instead of plaintiff was a pretext for a
discriminatory motive. Other than the issue of board certification, plaintiff has been unable to
point to any evidence in the record that, but for plaintiff’s age and prior protected activity,
plaintiff would have been selected for the position. Dr. Kaune even stated in her EEOC hearing
declaration for the instant case that “had [plaintiff] been board certified, I would not have been
receptive to her returning to the [NJ-VA] as a psychiatrist and would not have recommended

28

her,” because plaintiff had previously made threatening remarks to her and had consistently low
performance ratings while at the NJ-VA. Singh Decl. at Ex. R, Aug. 3, 2016, ECF No. 26-3.
Defendants were within their right to determine that they preferred a board certified
candidate for the position, and then interviewed and hired only applicants who possessed that
qualification. Choosing only board certified applicants is consistent with defendant’s assertion
that a board certified psychiatrist was preferred for the position, even if the qualification was not
listed as a requirement. Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 693 (“[T]he fact that Board Certification
might not have been a requirement for the positions for which Plaintiff applied . . . does not
undercut Defendant[’]s valuation of such certification as demonstrating superior qualifications,
nor does it permit an inference of discrimination, as Plaintiff has provided no nexus between
Board Certification and [her protected characteristic].”).
There is no material issue of fact as to whether defendant’s asserted reason for its failure
to hire plaintiff is pretext, and whether defendant was motivated by plaintiff’s age and prior
protected activity. Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that defendant did anything other
than exercise its appropriate business judgment to hire candidates with an objectively superior
qualification. Crawford v. Dep’t of Investigation, 324 F. App’x 139, 142 (2d Cir. 2009) (“If the
record conclusively reveals a nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the
plaintiff creates only a weak issue of fact as to pretext and there is abundant and uncontroverted
independent evidence that no discrimination has occurred, then the employer is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)).
VI.

Conclusion
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The case is dismissed. No costs

or disbursements are granted.

29

ack B. Weinstein
Senior United States District Judge
Date: March 17, 2017
Brooklyn, New York

30