Grief v. Ask-Carlson

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Plaintiff's original and amended complaints are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A(b). No summons shall issue at this time and all further proceedings s hall be stayed for thirty (30) days. If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days as directed by this order, the Court shall enter judgment. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 5/21/2015. (Abdallah, Fida)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------------------------------x NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CHRISTOPHER GRIEF,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
15-CV-2465 (PKC)

Plaintiff,
-againstWARDEN K. ASK-CARLSON
sued in her official capacity,
Defendant.
-----------------------------------------------------------x
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Christopher Grief, currently incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center
(“MDC”) in Brooklyn, New York, alleges that he is being denied freedom of religious
expression, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
(“RFRA”). On April 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint, and on May 7, 2015, he filed
an amended complaint. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915 is granted. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s complaints are dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days from the date
of this order to file a second amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he practices “meditation as part of his quest for spiritual
enlightenment.” (Compl. at ¶ 7; Amended Compl. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff avers that “[i]n order for
[him] to meditate on enlightenment he must do so in the presence of at least two stuffed
animals.” (Compl. at ¶ 10; Amended Compl. at ¶ 10.) Accordingly, on December 24, 2014,
Plaintiff submitted a request to the officials at MDC for permission to have stuffed animals “and

to keep it in his property for his religious practices.” (Amended Compl. at ¶ 11.) To date,
Defendant has not approved Plaintiff’s request. (Compl. at ¶¶ 11-17; Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 1117.) Plaintiff alleges that the failure to receive the stuffed animals places a substantial burden on
the exercise of his religion in violation of the RFRA. (Amended Compl. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief allowing him to purchase two stuffed animals. (Compl. at ¶ 21.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a district court “shall review, before docketing, if feasible or,
in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee of a governmental entity.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Upon review, a district court shall dismiss a prisoner complaint sua sponte if
the complaint is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b);
Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132,134 &
n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that under Prison Litigation Reform Act, sua sponte dismissal of
frivolous prisoner complaints is not only permitted but mandatory).
At the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of “all wellpleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A
complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
It is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and the Court is required to read the plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally
and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89

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(2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d
185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
I.

RFRA

The RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.,1 protects the free exercise of religion. and
provides that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the government “demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–1(a), (b); Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 860; Johnson v. Killian, No. 07 Civ.
6641, 2013 WL 103166, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 9, 2013).
To adjudicate a RFRA claim, the Court applies a burden-shifting analysis. O Centro
Espirita, 546 U.S. at 428-29.

First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the government

substantially burdened his sincere exercise of religion. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a), (c).
Then, if the plaintiff satisfies his prima facie case, the burden of evidence and persuasion shifts
to the defendant to demonstrate that the burden imposed on the plaintiff’s exercise of religion is
“(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that government interest.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–1(b).
The Second Circuit has held that a court’s scrutiny of whether a plaintiff deserves free
exercise protection “extends only to whether a claimant sincerely holds a particular belief and
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The Supreme Court instructs that the RFRA is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to regulate
state and local governments. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The RFRA remains
valid as applied to the federal government, however. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853 (2015);
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (“O Centro Espirita”), 546 U.S. 418 (2006).

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whether the belief is religious in nature.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 476 (2d Cir. 1996)
(discussing this standard in the context of RFRA). In analyzing the sincerity of a plaintiff’s
religious beliefs, courts start with the proposition that “[a] claimant need not be a member of a
particular organized religious denomination to show sincerity of beliefs.” Jackson v. Mann, 196
F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U.S.
829 (1989)). The Court should then “seek[ ] to determine an adherent's good faith in the
expression of his religious belief.” Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that he meditates and “believes that everything has a spiritual
essence to it.” (Compl. at ¶ 8.) He further asserts that he “has a strong spiritual connection with
the spiritual essence of stuffed animals.” (Compl. at ¶ 9; Amended Compl. at ¶ 9.) This
allegation, however, does not plausibly suggest that Plaintiff holds a sincere religious belief or
that his belief is religious in nature. See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834 n.2 (in some cases “an asserted
belief might be so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, so as not to be entitled to
protection.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) (“to have the protection of the
Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief”).
LEAVE TO AMEND
In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will grant him thirty (30) days leave to
submit a second amended complaint in order to cure the deficiencies noted above. Cruz v.
Gomez, 202 F.3d 593 (2d Cir. 2000). Should Plaintiff elect to file a second amended complaint,
he should provide the court with information about his religious beliefs and allege facts that
show that he is required to possess stuffed animals in order to pursue his religious beliefs.
Plaintiff is informed that an amended complaint does not simply add to the first complaint. Once

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an amended complaint is filed, it completely replaces the original. Therefore, it is important that
Plaintiff includes in the second amended complaint all of the necessary information that was
contained in the original and amended complaints. The second amended complaint must be
captioned as a “Second Amended Complaint,” and bear the same docket number as this Order.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints are dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A(b). No summons shall
issue at this time and all further proceedings shall be stayed for thirty (30) days. If Plaintiff fails
to file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days as directed by this order, the Court
shall enter judgment. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3) that any appeal
from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied
for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED:

/s/ Pamela K. Chen
PAMELA K. CHEN
United States District Judge
Dated: May 21, 2015
Brooklyn, New York

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