Clark v. Staniszewski et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Plaintiff's claim for misconduct related to grandjury testimony is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.In an abundance of caution, the court grants plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint by July 23, 2015. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order by July 23, 2015, the court will enter a judgment dismissing this action. So Ordered by Judge Allyne R. Ross on 6/23/2015. (c/m) (Lee, Tiffeny)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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Jamel CLARK,

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff,
15 CV 2863 (ARR)
-againstIlene STANISZEWSKI, Senior Parole
Officer; Juliette BYRD, Parole Officer
of the New York State Department of Corrections
and Community Services,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendants.

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ROSS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Jamel Clark, currently incarcerated at Ogdensburg Correctional Facility, brings
this prose action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleges that his constitutional rights were
violated by defendants' testimony. Plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915 is granted. For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs complaint is dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Background

On June 17, 2011, defendants entered plaintiffs residence, handcuffed him, and removed
him to a police car. Compl. at 3, ~IV. Defendants, along with New York Police Department
officers, then searched the residence and found drugs and an unspecified weapon. Compl. at 4.
As a result, plaintiff was arrested, defendants initiated parole revocation proceedings against him,
and the NYPD initiated a felony complaint against him. Id.
On July 5, 2011, a parole hearing officer found there was no probable cause for

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revocation, so plaintiff was restored to parole supervision. Compl. at 4. However, plaintiff
remained in custody on the drug and weapon charges. Defendant Juliette Byrd testified before a
grand jury and plaintiff alleges that her testimony "was a clear misrepresentation of the facts of
what took place at the Revocation Probable Cause hearing." Compl. at 5. Moreover, plaintiff
alleges that Byrd's "misleading misrepresentation of facts ... were enough to give the grand jury
the impression that [plaintiff] did something wrong" even though "Parole Hearing Officer
Yolanda Hernandez found no probable cause." Compl. at 5.
Next, plaintiff alleges that defendant Staniszewski provided inaccurate testimony at an
unspecified proceeding on January 2, 2014. 1 Compl. at 5. Staniszewski testified that plaintiff had
"violated a condition of his parole," even though by that time she "was well aware that the
[plaintiff] had done nothing wrong." Id. It is unclear whether plaintiff considers this to be an
independent claim against Staniszewski, or whether he meant to illustrate the continuing harms
of Byrd's misconduct.

Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a district court "shall review, before docketing, if feasible or,
in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee of a governmental entity." 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. A district court shall dismiss a prisoner complaint sua sponte ifthe complaint
is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id.§ 1915A(b); Liner v.
Goord, 196 F.3d 132,134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that sua sponte dismissal of frivolous
prisoner complaints is not only permitted, but mandatory).
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The dates in the complaint are not reliable. For example, plaintiff refers to a parole hearing on July 15,
2015, which at the time of this order, is three weeks in the future.

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At the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the court must assume the truth of"all wellpleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A
complaint must plead sufficient facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell
Atl. Cor_p. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
It is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings

drafted by attorneys and the court is required to read the plaintiffs prose complaint liberally and
interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007);
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).
Discussion
1. Section 1983 Immunity for Grand Jmy Witnesses
To make a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was
"committed by a person acting under color of state law," and (2) that such conduct "deprived [the
plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States." Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d
545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)). "Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a
procedure for redress for the deprivation ofrights established elsewhere." Sykes v. James, 13
F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993).
In Rehberg v. Paulk, --- U.S.----, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1506 (2012), the Supreme Court held
that a grand jury witness, including a law enforcement officer, "has absolute immunity from any
§ 1983 claim based on the witness's testimony," even ifthat testimony is perjurious. See also
Coggins v. Buonara, 776 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2015) ("If a§ 1983 claim against a police officer for
fabrication of evidence or other unlawful conduct is based on the officer's grand jury testimony,

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the officer enjoys absolute immunity"); see also Sykes, 13 F.3d at 519 (parole officer entitled to
absolute immunity as a witness to a judicial proceeding for making allegedly perjurious
statements in affidavit submitted in connection with such judicial proceeding).
Here, because plaintiff's § 1983 claim arises entirely from defendant Byrd's testimony
before the grand jury, Byrd must be afforded absolute immunity.
2. Staniszewski's Testimony
Plaintiff's complaint does not indicate whether Staniszewski testified at the grand jury or
at some other proceeding. If defendant Staniszewski testified at a grand jury or at trial, she is
immune from suit for the same reasons as defendant Byrd. See Rehberg, 132 S.Ct. at 1506.
However, the vagueness of the complaint leaves open the possibility that Stansizewski testified at
some other type of hearing, where her immunity might be in doubt.
3. Leave to Rep lead
Whereas ordinarily the court would allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend his
complaint, it need not afford that opportunity here as to any allegations related to grand jury
testimony, where it is clear that defendants are immune from suit. Any attempt to amend the
complaint to pursue such claims would be futile. See Ashmore v. Prus, 510 Fed. Appx. 47, 49
(2d Cir. 2013) (leave to amend is futile where barriers to relief cannot be surmounted by
reframing the complaint). Thus, plaintiff may amend the complaint, but only to include claims
that are not barred by grandjury immunity.

Conclusion
Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for misconduct related to grandjury testimony is dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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In an abundance of caution, the court grants plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint
by July 23, 2015. Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F .3d 593 (2d Cir. 2000). The amended complaint must
comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and should explain, at minimum,
precisely when and where defendant Staniszewski testified, why her testimony was inaccurate,
and what harm it caused the defenant. Without this information, the court cannot construe any
claim against Staniszewski.
Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint does not simply add to the first complaint.
Once an amended complaint is filed, it completely replaces the original. Therefore, plaintiff must
include in the amended complaint all the necessary information that was contained in the original
complaint. The amended complaint must be captioned as an "Amended Complaint" and should
the same docket number as this order: 15-CV-2863.
If plaintiff fails to comply with this order by July 23, 2015, the court will enter a

judgment dismissing this action. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for
purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 269 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED

s/Allyne R. Ross

Rl

ALLYNE ROSS \j
United States District Judge
Dated: June 23, 2015
Brooklyn, New York