Ralin v. The City of New York et al
Filing
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Memorandum and Order. ORDER denying 29 Motion for Recusal. For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum, plaintiff's motion for recusal is denied. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to serve a copy of this order on the pro se plaintiff and note service on the docket. Ordered by Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto on 5/25/2016. (Fletcher, Camille)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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BRAD RALIN,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
15-CV-02978 (KAM)(ST)
-againstTHE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al
Defendants.
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MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Pro se plaintiff Brad Ralin (“plaintiff”) commenced this
action against the City of New York, the New York City Department
of Finance, the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), Michael
Sileo, J.A. Hunte, Rosemary Simmons and John and Jane Doe,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging, among other things,
constitutional violations arising out of the issuance of multiple
parking citations.
recusal.
Presently, before the court is a motion for
For the reasons stated herein, the motion for recusal is
denied.
Plaintiff filed the complaint on May 21, 2015.
No. 1.
See ECF
On September 24, 2015, a pre-motion conference was held to
discuss defendants’ proposed motion to dismiss.
At that
conference, the court, at plaintiff’s request, ordered defendants
to instruct the NYPD to preserve all documents related to the
action; the court also found that plaintiff’s requests for
discovery and injunctive relief were premature.
Entry, dated 9/24/2015.
See ECF Minute
Plaintiff was given twenty days to file a
second amended complaint and defendants were ordered to file a
status letter, a week after the second amended complaint was due,
if they intended to move to dismiss the second amended complaint;
the parties were instructed to include a mutually agreeable
briefing schedule for the motion to dismiss.
Id.
Plaintiff filed
his second amended complaint on October 13, 2015.
See ECF No. 23.
Defendants submitted a briefing schedule for the motion to dismiss
on October 20, 2015, 1 which the court adopted on October 21, 2015.
See ECF No. 24 and Scheduling Order, dated 10/21/2015.
Plaintiff
filed the present motion to recuse the court and Chief Magistrate
Judge Gold on January 19, 2016, alleging primarily that the court
and Magistrate Judge Gold were prejudiced and biased against
plaintiff in their case administration decisions.
“Mot. for Recusal”.
See ECF No. 29,
Defendants did not oppose, or otherwise
respond, to plaintiff’s motion for recusal.
A district court judge must recuse herself “in any
1
Defendants indicated that, prior to filing their status letter, they made
two attempts to contact plaintiff for consent as to the briefing schedule but
plaintiff did not respond.
2
proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or where “[she] has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1);
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 547 (1994).
Under §
455(a), the moving party must demonstrate an “objectively
reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality.”
I.B.M. Corp., 45 F.3d 641, 644 (2d Cir. 1995).
In re
“[A] judge
should be disqualified only if it appears that he or she harbors
an aversion, hostility or disposition of a kind that a fairminded person could not set aside when judging the dispute.”
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 558; ISC Holding AG v. Nobel Biocare Fin.
AG, 688 F.3d 98, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The question, as we
have put it, is whether ‘an objective, disinterested observer
fully informed of the underlying facts, [would] entertain
significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal.’”
(quoting United States v. Carlton, 534 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir.
2008)).
Under § 455(b)(1), recusal is mandated only where the
district court harbors actual prejudice or bias against a party.
See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 547.
Plaintiff has not provided a single fact that suggests
that an objective, disinterested observer would question either
this court’s or Judge Gold’s impartiality.
3
Further, all of
plaintiff’s allegations of bias and prejudice are based on
judicial rulings and routine case administration efforts.
The
Second Circuit has made clear that “[r]ecusal is not warranted
where the only challenged conduct ‘consist[s] of judicial
rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary
admonishments . . . to counsel and to witnesses,’ where the
conduct occurs during judicial proceedings, and where the judge
‘neither (1) relie[s] upon knowledge acquired outside such
proceedings nor (2) display[s] deep-seated and unequivocal
antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.’”
S.E.C.
v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2013), as amended
(Nov. 26, 2013) (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556).
Plaintiff alleges that the court showed bias when it
allowed defendants to file a motion to dismiss rather than
having the case proceed to discovery and then to trial.
Recuse at ¶ 6.
Mot. to
Plaintiff also contends that the court only
provided him with twenty days to amend his complaint while
giving defendants sixty days to file their answer.
Recuse at ¶ 5.
Mot. to
First, defendants are entitled to file a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b).
Thus, that the court permitted defendants to file a motion to
dismiss by itself shows no bias or prejudice.
4
Further, that
plaintiff was unhappy with the court’s case management decisions
is not a basis for recusal.
See Razmilovic, 738 F.3d at 29-30
(“[r]ecusal is not warranted where the only challenged conduct
‘consist[s] of judicial rulings, routine trial administration
efforts, and ordinary admonishments . . . to counsel and to
witnesses’”) (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556).
Plaintiff was
free to seek an extension of time to file his second amended
complaint if the twenty days allotted was insufficient, but he
chose not to do so.
Plaintiff apparently did not need extra
time to prepare his second amended complaint as it was timely
filed.
Plaintiff further alleges that the court threatened
him with sanctions “if there was no irreparable harm” relating
to his request for injunctive relief and “for any attempt to
stop the ticket quota criminal enterprise.”
¶¶ 4, 8.
These allegations are baseless.
Mot. for Recusal at
The court found at
the September 24, 2015 pre-motion conference, that plaintiff’s
requests for discovery and injunctive relief relating to the
NYPD’s alleged quota system were premature.
September 24, 2015.
See ECF Entry dated
Further, the court directed the City of New
York to instruct the NYPD to preserve all documents related to
plaintiff’s claims and defendants’ defenses.
5
Id.
Even assuming
the court had “threatened” plaintiff with sanctions, both
represented and pro se parties may be sanctioned for baseless
submissions.
Plaintiff has not identified any pattern of actions by
the court that would contribute to an appearance of partiality.
See In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 955 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming
denial of motion for recusal where party did not “identify any
pattern of actions . . . that would contribute to an appearance
of an absence of impartiality”).
Nothing in the record suggests
that an objective, disinterested observer would question either
this court’s or Magistrate Judge Gold’s 2 impartiality.
Since
plaintiff has failed to identify a single fact that would cause
one to reasonably question the court’s impartiality under
§455(a), he also fails to satisfy § 455(b)(1)’s requirement that
he present evidence showing that the court has actual prejudice
or bias against him.
See United States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645,
2 Plaintiff’s sole allegation against Chief Magistrate Judge Gold is Judge
Gold’s failure to respond to a request that the court “issue an order that
the NYPD cease and desist from the destruction of all ticket quota
documentary and evidence.” See ECF No. 12 and Mot. to Recuse at ¶ 7. As
discussed, this court addressed plaintiff’s request as to evidence
preservation at the September 24, 2015 pre-motion conference. Thus, the
allegation that the court showed bias by failing to address plaintiff’s
evidence preservation concerns, like all the other allegations, is void of
any indicia of bias. In any event, this case was reassigned from Magistrate
Judge Gold to Magistrate Judge Tiscione for administrative reasons on March
28, 2016 and therefore plaintiff’s motion to recuse Magistrate Judge Gold is
moot. See ECF Entry dated March 28, 2016.
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651 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that § 455(b)(1) was not satisfied
where [t]here was no showing or even suggestion that [the court]
had [] “personal bias”).
Consequently, for the reasons stated herein,
plaintiff’s motion to recuse this court and Magistrate Judge
Gold is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
May 25, 2016
Brooklyn, New York
_______ ___/s/
Kiyo A. Matsumoto
United States District Judge
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