Holt v. AHI et al
ORDER DISMISSING CASE: For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order, the amended complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Ordered by Judge John Gleeson on 11/10/2015. (Fallon, Ethan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
- against AHI DBA SLEEP INN; WENDIE HARDIE;
JOHN GLEESON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Shelton Holt, proceeding pro se, filed this action against his former
employer, and two individuals, alleging that he was terminated in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“the ADEA”), New York State Human
Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297 and New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y. City
Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131. By Memorandum and Order dated August 31, 2015, I dismissed
all claims against the individual defendants, Wendie Hardee and Jeremy Patella, and granted
leave for plaintiff to amend his complaint against AHI d/b/a Sleep Inn (“AHI”) within thirty (30)
days of the date of my Order. I directed plaintiff to state any grounds he has for tolling the 300day period following the alleged discriminatory action and to set forth the factual allegations on
which he bases his federal claims against his former employer. On September 9, 2015, plaintiff
submitted an amended complaint alleging that he was terminated in violation of Title VII and the
For the reasons stated below, I dismiss this action without prejudice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), I shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action
where I am satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted
by attorneys and I am required to read the plaintiff's pro se complaint liberally and interpret it
raising the strongest arguments it suggests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d
Cir. 2008). At the pleadings stage of the proceeding, I must also assume the truth of “all wellpleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A
complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (citations omitted). The
plausibility standard does not impose an across-the-board, heightened fact pleading standard.
Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008). The plausibility standard does not
“require[ ] a complaint to include specific evidence [or] factual allegations in addition to those
required by Rule 8.” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2010). However,
the plausibility standard does impose some burden to make factual allegations supporting a claim
Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to correct the deficiencies I discussed in my
August 31, 2015 Order. Instead, plaintiff submits the identical factual background as in his
original complaint, stating that:
Defendants use deceptive tactics to dismiss me from my position
of employment. Defendants violated New York State Article 23-A
and other tactics and falsehoods. Defendants further made
defamed my character in a public hearing on record. Defendants
conspired to rid me of my employment by violating Federal, State
and Local laws causing me mental anguish, and loss of monies.
Defendants are all accountable for their deceptive and business
Amend. Compl. at 5. Even under the most liberal construction of plaintiff’s allegations, he does
not provide any facts that could possibly connect any adverse employment action to a protected
status. See Ruston v. Town Bd. of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Under Iqbal,
factual allegations must be sufficient to support necessary legal conclusions,” and must
“plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief”); see also Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d
110, 120-21 (2d Cir. 2010) (although Twombly and Iqbal do not impose a heightened pleading
standard in employment discrimination cases, enough facts must still be pleaded to make
plaintiff’s claim plausible). Plaintiff also fails to submit any grounds for tolling the 300-day
period following the alleged discriminatory action to render his claims timely.
Accordingly, the amended complaint is dismissed without prejudice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). I certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be
taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any
appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
JOHN GLEESON, U.S.D.J.
Dated: November 9, 2015
Brooklyn, New York
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