Holt v. AHI et al
Filing
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ORDER: For the reasons stated in the attached Order, all claims against Wendie Hardee and Jeremy Patella are dismissed and Holt is granted leave to amend his complaint against AHI d/b/a Sleep Inn within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Holts request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, and Holt's request to appoint counsel is denied without prejudice to renewal after the filing of the amended complaint. Ordered by Judge John Gleeson on 8/31/2015. (Levin, Sarah)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
SHELTON HOLT,
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
15-CV-3088 (JG)(RLM)
Plaintiff,
- against AHI DBA SLEEP INN; WENDIE HARDIE;
JEREMY PATELLA,
Defendants.
JOHN GLEESON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Shelton Holt, proceeding pro se, brings this action against his former
employer, and two individuals, alleging that he was terminated in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“the ADEA”), New York State Human
Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law. Holt’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis is granted. For the reasons set forth below, all claims against Wendie Hardee and
Jeremy Patella are dismissed and Holt is granted leave to amend his complaint against AHI d/b/a
Sleep Inn (“AHI”) within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), I should dismiss an in forma pauperis action
where I am satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted
by attorneys, and I am required to read Holt’s pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as raising
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the strongest arguments it suggests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed
Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).
At the pleadings stage of a proceeding, I must assume the truth of “all wellpleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009)). A
complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The plausibility standard does not impose an across-the-board, heightened fact
pleading standard. Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008). It does not “require[ ]
a complaint to include specific evidence [or] factual allegations in addition to those required by
Rule 8.” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2010). However, the
standard does impose an obligation to make factual allegations supporting a claim for relief.
BACKGROUND
Holt submits an employment discrimination form complaint in which he brings
claims for unlawful termination of employment and unequal terms and conditions of
employment against his former employer, AHI and two individuals, Hardie and Patella. Compl.,
ECF No. 2, April 7, 2014, at 2-3. 1 Holt checks off “gender” and “color” on the form complaint
to indicate the bases of the discrimination he alleges and also lists that he was born in 1959,
presumably as the basis for the alleged age discrimination. Id. at 4. For factual background, the
substance of the complaint states in its entirety:
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The complaint was transferred to this court from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York by Order dated May 22, 2015. The page numbers referenced are the page numbers assigned
by the Electronic Case Filing System (“ECF”).
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Defendants use[d] deceptive tactics to dismiss me from my
position of employment. Defendants violated New York State
Article 23-A and other tactics and falsehoods. Defendants further
made defamed my character in a public hearing on record.
Defendants conspired to rid me of my employment by violating
Federal, State and Local laws causing me mental anguish, and loss
of monies. Defendants are all accountable for their deceptive and
business practices.
Id. at 5.
Holt was terminated from his position on September 16, 2012, and filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on February 6, 2015. Id. at 4.
Holt attaches a one-page “Dismissal and Notice of Rights” from the EEOC dated February 6,
2015, which states that the file was closed because Holt’s “charge was not timely filed with
EEOC; in other words, you waited too long after the date(s) of the alleged discrimination to file
your charge.” See Dismissal and Notice of Rights, id. at 7.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Individual Defendants
Holt names two individuals as defendants. However, individuals may not be held
liable for claims asserted under Title VII or the ADEA. See Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72,
79-80 (2d Cir. 2010). Therefore, Holt’s claims against Wendie Hardee and Jeremy Patella are
dismissed.
B.
Timeliness
Under Title VII and the ADEA, a New York plaintiff is required to file a charge
of discrimination with the EEOC or state agency and receive a right to sue notice before bringing
a claim in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The administrative claim must be filed with
the EEOC or the state agency within 300 days of the discriminatory conduct. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §
626(d), 633(b); Kassner v. 2d Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007); Flaherty
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v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 133, 136 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000) (“To sustain a claim for unlawful
discrimination under Title VII and/or the ADEA, a plaintiff must file administrative charges with
the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory acts.”). This statutory requirement
effectively acts as a statute of limitations: Title VII claims in federal court are barred by the
failure to file a timely charge. Cherry v. City of New York, 381 F. App’x 57, 58 (2d Cir. 2010)
(stating that timely filing of charge with EEOC and corresponding state agencies is “a condition
precedent to the filing of an action in federal court pursuant to the [ADEA], the [ADA] or Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act” and the “statute of limitations for filing a claim with the EEOC is
300 days” in New York). The statute of limitations for each discriminatory and retaliatory act
begins to run when that act occurs. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
113 (2002).
Here, Holt alleges that the last date of unlawful discrimination occurred on
September 16, 2012, the date that his employment was terminated. He filed a charge with the
EEOC on February 6, 2015, which is more than 300 days from the alleged harm. The EEOC
dismissed his charge as untimely on February 6, 2015.
While Holt’s claims fall outside the timely filing requirement, this deficit does not
necessarily preclude adjudication of this suit if Holt can show that he is entitled to equitable
tolling. “[T]his time period for filing a charge is subject to equitable doctrines such as tolling or
estoppel.” Id., 536 U.S. at 113 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393
(1982)).
In order to apply equitable tolling to the 300-day filing period, Holt has the
burden of showing that exceptional circumstances prevented him from timely filing the
discrimination charge. Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000). “When determining
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whether equitable tolling is applicable, a district court must consider whether the person seeking
application of the equitable tolling doctrine (1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the
time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so
extraordinary that the doctrine should apply.” Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Trans. Auth.,
333 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Holt fails to suggest any reason for the delay in filing his discrimination charge
with the EEOC. Should Holt choose to file an amended complaint, he must submit information
detailing any possible impediments he may have faced in filing the EEOC charge during the 300day filing period.
C.
The Title VII and ADA Claims against AHI
Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must
provide a short, plain statement of the claim against each defendant named so that they have
adequate notice of the claims against them. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (“[Rule 8] demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). Moreover, a
plaintiff must provide facts sufficient to allow each named defendant to have a fair understanding
of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (Rule 8 requires that the plaintiff’s pleading “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Although Holt seeks to bring Title VII and ADEA claims, he fails to make factual
allegations sufficient to support a claim for relief under either statute. Title VII prohibits an
employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to “compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
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or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d
141, 150 (2d Cir. 2012). The ADEA establishes that it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges or employment, because of such individual’s age .
. . .” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
Even under the most liberal interpretation of Holt’s complaint, he provides no
facts that could possibly connect or link any adverse employment action to a protected status.
See Ruston v. Town Bd. of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Under Iqbal, factual
allegations must be sufficient to support necessary legal conclusions,” and must “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief”); see also Arista Records, 604 F.3d at 120-21 (finding that
although Twombly and Iqbal do not impose a heightened pleading standard in employment
discrimination cases, enough facts must still be pleaded to make plaintiff’s claim plausible).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, all claims against Wendie Hardee and Jeremy Patella are dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). No summonses shall issue as to these defendants. The
Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption to reflect the dismissal of these defendants.
In light of Holt’s pro se status, he is granted thirty (30) days’ leave to amend his
complaint against AHI in accordance with this Order. If Holt elects to file an amended
complaint, he must submit any grounds he has that would justify equitable tolling of the 300-day
period following the alleged discriminatory action. Holt is further directed that his amended
complaint must comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He should set
forth the factual allegations on which he bases his federal claims against his former employer
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and provide all relevant dates. Holt should also include a copy of the charge he filed with the
EEOC or any other agency.
The amended complaint must be submitted to the Court within thirty (30) days
from the date of this Order, and it should be captioned as an “Amended Complaint” and bear the
same docket number as this Order. Holt is advised that the amended complaint will replace the
original pleading. All further proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days. If Holt fails to file an
amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, judgment dismissing this
action will be entered.
Holt’s application to appoint counsel (ECF No. 7) is denied without prejudice to
renewal after the filing of his amended complaint.
I certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in
good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge
v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
So ordered.
John Gleeson, U.S.D.J.
Dated: August 31, 2015
Brooklyn, New York
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