Miller v. United States of America

Filing 11

ORDER denying 4 Motion for Recusal; denying 7 Motion for More Definite Statement; denying 8 Motion for More Definite Statement; finding as moot 9 Motion for Emergency Accommodation; finding as moot 10 Motion to Compel; granting 2 Mo tion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis -- For the reasons set forth in the ATTACHED WRITTEN Memorandum and Order, pro se plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted solely for purposes of this Order. Pla intiff's motion for recusal is denied, and Plaintiff's motions to amend the docket sheet and for emergency relief are denied as moot. Plaintiff's additional motions for "Emergency Accommodation" [Docket Entry #9] and Motion to Compel a decision on her requests are denied as moot in light of the dismissal of this Complaint.The Complaint is dismissed, with prejudice, as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U .S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Electronic Order and the Attached Written Memorandum and Order to pro se plaintiff and to close this case. SO ORDERED by Judge Dora Lizette Irizarry on 10/20/2015. (Irizarry, Dora)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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MAUREEN MILLER, pro se,
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Plaintiff,
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-against:
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Defendant.
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DORA L. IRIZARRY, United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
15-CV-4262 (DLI)(LB)

On July 20, 2015, plaintiff Maureen Miller (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant pro se action
against the United States of America (the “United States”). (See Dkt. Entry No. 1.) Thereafter,
on July 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed an application seeking to have this Court and the assigned
magistrate judge recused from this case. (See Dkt. Entry No. 4.) On July 28, 2015, Plaintiff
filed a motion to amend her home address on the docket sheet for this case. (See Dkt. Entry No.
5.) Finally, between October 7, 2015 and October 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed three motions for
emergency relief, seeking funds from the United States Treasury and/or hotel accommodations.
(See Dkt. Entry Nos. 7 and 8.) Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted solely
for purposes of this Order. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s application for recusal is
denied, Plaintiff’s motions to amend the docket sheet and for emergency relief are denied as
moot, and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
I.

The Complaint
Plaintiff’s claims are set forth in a submission consisting of an introductory statement and

an attached complaint originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania. That court denied Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and closed
her case. Plaintiff seeks to re-file that complaint in this district, requesting that this Court
consider the claims asserted therein as well as her additional allegations in the introductory
statement. The Court construes the different components of Plaintiff’s submission as together
constituting an incorporated pleading (the “Complaint”). For convenience, references to that
pleading are made using the page numbers assigned by the Electronic Case Filing System.
Plaintiff purports to file the Complaint pursuant to “11 U.S.C. Suits Against States [ ]
Tort Actions Against State Officials,” (see Compl. at 1, Dkt. Entry No. 1), but does not identify
the nature of her claims or provide any specific factual allegations in support of them. Instead,
the Complaint references a litany of prior court cases, including previous cases Plaintiff filed in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, an eviction proceeding
against her in state court, a criminal case in Queens, and a Family Court case brought by “an
‘unstable’ family member” that resulted in a “fraudulent Temporary Order of Protection.” (Id. at
11-12.) None of the details of those cases are described.
The Complaint includes numerous veiled references to an unspecified incident that
“transpired approximately (27) years ago.” (Id. at 6.) The Complaint also references a bench
warrant for “Aggravated Assault on a Police Officer, dated 1990,” (Id. at 13), and alleges that the
State of New Jersey “tried to ‘cover-up’ what happened in 1989.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff claims that
“she has faced the ‘unthinkable’, such as false imprisonment, fraudulent institutionalization, by
‘state’ officials, who has abused power and authority, who has her listed in the United States
Computer Database as being a ‘criminal’ and ‘crazy’!” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff further claims that

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these records and unspecified actions by state officials have resulted in “‘Economic Sanctions’
against Plaintiff’s Name, Social Security Number, and Credit Report.” (Id. at 8.)
As an overarching theme, the Complaint appears to allege that the States of New Jersey
and New York engaged in some conspiracy to terrorize Plaintiff: “Whereas, [P]laintiff, is a
‘well-educated’ woman, with a ‘Finance’ degree, and an ‘Applied Science Degree’; multilingual, and could ‘not’ get a decent paying job ‘after’ graduating college with the
aforementioned advanced degrees, as a result of government malfeasance at the ‘state’ level, as a
‘direct’ result of a ‘grave’ injustice, and massive ‘cover-up’ by the state of New Jersey officials,
who ‘notified’ their brother state ‘within’ the union, New York to follow suit.” (Id.) After
“[Plaintiff] ‘exposed’ the state of New Jersey, and the state of New York public officials,” she
allegedly was “kept under surveillance” and became a “marked target.” (Id. at 10.) As a result,
Plaintiff allegedly was unable to “get a house, a car, and was ‘declined’ commercial loans from
the banks, to start her ‘own’ business, and as a result, faced eviction, and was coerced into living
with family and friends for ‘many’ years, kept stagnated, without health insurance.” (Id. at 13.)
Plaintiff states that what happened to her was “the ‘worst’ disaster in the History of The
United States, aside from slavery,” and that “The United States stands ‘accused’ of ‘terrorizing’
its ‘own’ citizen.” (Id. at 13-14.) Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of, inter alia, (1)
“Land Acquisition – “to ‘forfeit’ and/or surrender all of the ‘slave’ states,” (2) “Monetary Relief:
Relief and Restitution in the sum of $2.5 billion, and (3) “Government Reform . . . as outlined in
the (37) page Proposal, written by Plaintiff, which is in the possession of the United States
Congress.” (Id. at 16-17.)

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II.

The Recusal Motion
Shortly after filing the Complaint, on July 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed an application

“ask[ing] for the ‘recusal’” of this Court and the magistrate judge assigned to this action. (Dkt.
Entry No. 4, at 1.) The basis for Plaintiff’s recusal request apparently is that both this Court and
the magistrate judge are officials of the same Government that has engaged in “malfeasance” and
“terrorism” directed at her. (See Id.) On or around September 22, 2015, Plaintiff reiterated her
recusal request in a letter addressed to Chief Judge Carol Bagley Amon of this Court. Chief
Judge Amon informed Plaintiff by letter that, as Chief Judge, she has no authority to issue
recusal orders or any other rulings in cases not assigned to her. (See Dkt. Entry No. 6.)
III.

The Motion to Amend the Docket Sheet
On July 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed an “Amended Motion to Correct Docket Sheet,” in

which Plaintiff indicated her desire to use a home address of “98 Georgetown Blvd.” in
connection with this case. (See Dkt Entry No. 5.) Plaintiff did not indicate whether that address
was her residence.
IV.

Emergency Motions
On October 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion, styled as an “emergency motion enbanc,”

requesting “emergency funding and accommodations.” (See Dkt. Entry No. 7.) The motion
papers allude vaguely to “government malfeasance” and constitutional violations, though it is
unclear whether the wrongs alleged are the same as those underpinning the Complaint. (Id. at 1.)
That same day, Plaintiff supplemented her motion papers through another “emergency motion
enbanc,” again seeking funds and hotel accommodations. (See Dkt. Entry No. 8.) Plaintiff’s
supplemental papers indicate that, because of wrongs both past and continuing, the United States

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Treasury should be ordered to distribute funds to Plaintiff so that she may pursue a new job or
launch a business venture. (See Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also seeks hotel accommodations paid for by
the United States, as she evidently is homeless, but states that she will not accept government
subsidies or avail herself of the New York City shelter system. (See Id. at 2, 7.) Plaintiff
requests that these benefits be provided to her until she is issued a new Social Security card, as
she has not been able to obtain one despite prolonged efforts to do so. (See Id. at 2.) Finally,
Plaintiff filed a third motion for emergency relief on October 13, 2015, reiterating her demand
for hotel accommodations, and specifically requesting a reservation at a Marriott Hotel in
Brooklyn, New York. (See Dkt. Entry No. 9.)
DISCUSSION
I.

Plaintiff’s Recusal Motion Is Denied
Although Plaintiff does not cite to any legal authority in the application for recusal she

filed, the Court construes that application as a motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). That
provision states that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
As the Second Circuit has explained, in evaluating a motion for recusal, a court must ask itself:
“Would a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, conclude that the trial judge’s impartiality
could reasonably be questioned? Or, phrased differently, would an objective, disinterested
observer fully informed of the underlying facts, entertain significant doubt that justice would be
done absent recusal?” United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).

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Here, this Court answers that question in the negative. Plaintiff does not provide any
legitimate reason why this Court’s impartiality should be questioned. Indeed, Plaintiff’s request
for recusal rests solely on the fact that this Court and the magistrate judge assigned to this case
are affiliated with the Government that purportedly terrorized her.

Given that allegation,

Plaintiff also does not explain how reassignment to a different district judge and magistrate judge
affiliated with the same Government would remedy the bias she alleges. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
motion for recusal is denied.
II.

The Complaint Is Dismissed
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a
liberal reading of the complaint “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” the
Court must grant leave to amend the complaint. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000).
However, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) requires a
district court to dismiss a case if the court determines that the action: “(i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is
frivolous when “the factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the
product of delusion or fantasy.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d

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Cir. 1998) (internal quotations marks omitted).

“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is

appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,
whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Moreover, a plaintiff seeking to bring a lawsuit in federal court must establish that the
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See, e.g., Rene v. Citibank NA, 32 F. Supp.
2d 539, 541-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). “[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and
may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d
697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000). Federal subject matter jurisdiction is available only when a “federal
question” is presented, or when plaintiff and defendants have complete diversity of citizenship
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. In order to
invoke federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s claim(s) must arise “under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Turning to the instant action, the allegations in the Complaint represent precisely the sort
of hyperbole that “rise[s] to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton, 504
U.S. at 33. Despite alleging that her life was destroyed by “state officials” engaged in a
malicious conspiracy tied to some unspecified incident that occurred in 1989, Plaintiff does not
provide a single concrete detail to indicate the nature of her federal claims. Plaintiff evidently
has endured and continues to endure trying circumstances. Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiff
contends that those circumstances arose because she was a “marked target” of the states of New

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York and New Jersey, Plaintiff’s allegations are frivolous and fall far short of stating a
cognizable claim.
Plaintiff also fails to provide a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. Despite references to
“11 U.S.C. Suits Against States,” the Complaint is void of factual allegations that would support
a cause of action arising in bankruptcy, under Title 11 of the United States Code. The Complaint
mentions “Tort Actions Against State Officials,” but tort claims typically fall under state, not
federal law, while the Federal Tort Claims Act is limited to specific types of claims against
federal government employees, not state officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In fact, the only
allegation in the Complaint against the United States, aside from a passing reference to a “United
States Computer Database,” is that it “stands ‘accused’ of ‘terrorizing’ its ‘own’ citizen.” (See
Compl. at 13-14.)
Furthermore, despite references to alleged constitutional deprivations, the Complaint fails
to state a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). As with actions brought against state officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff’s Bivens claims must be brought against federal officials personally responsible for an
alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, rather than against the federal government. Plaintiff
has neither identified a federal government defendant nor described any specific incident that
would constitute a deprivation of her constitutional rights.
For all the reasons stated, the Complaint is dismissed. While ordinarily the Court would
permit Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the Complaint, see Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 59798 (2d Cir. 2000), it need not afford that opportunity where, as here, “the substance of the claim
pleaded is frivolous on its face.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988); see also

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Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (denying leave to amend a pro se complaint where
amendment would be futile). Accordingly, leave to replead is denied.
III.

Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend the Docket And For Emergency Relief Are Moot
At Plaintiff’s request, the docket sheet in this matter was revised to list her address as 98

Georgetown Blvd. in Barnegat, New Jersey. As it is unclear whether Plaintiff resides at that
address, or if she even has a stable home address, this Court will send all correspondence in this
matter both to the above New Jersey address as well as the New York address Plaintiff originally
provided when she commenced this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to amend the docket
sheet is moot, and it therefore is terminated.
Finally, in light of the dismissal of the Complaint, Plaintiff’s three applications for
emergency relief are denied as moot. In any event, even if considered on the merits, those
motions would be denied because they seek relief that is not cognizable. This Court has no
authority to order the United States Treasury to distribute emergency funds to Plaintiff so that
she may start a business or book a hotel room.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted
solely for purposes of this Order. Plaintiff’s motion for recusal is denied, and Plaintiff’s motions
to amend the docket sheet and for emergency relief are denied as moot. The Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is
denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
October 20, 2015
/s/
DORA L. IRIZARRY
United States District Judge

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