Daniels v. US Bank National Association et al
Filing
27
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 22 Motion to Dismiss; granting 25 Motion to Dismiss: For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted. Because of her pro se status, Daniels is granted thirty (30) days leave to amend her complaint. Should Daniels fail to amend her complaint as directed by this Order, judgment shall be entered dismissing this action. The Clerk of Court is directed to send Daniels a copy of this Order and note the mailing on the docket. Ordered by Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf on 9/28/2016. (Mauskopf, Roslynn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------x
EUGENNIE DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
15-CV-5163 (RRM) (LB)
-againstUS BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
AS TRUSTEE FOR CFSB HEAT 2007;
FRANKEL LAMBERT WEISS WEISMAN
& GORDON LLP,
Defendants.
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ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, United States District Judge.
Pro se plaintiff Eugennie Daniels, brings this action pursuant to the Federal Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 and the New York General Business
Law § 349 (“Section 349”). Defendants US Bank National Association, as Trustee for CFSB
HEAT 2007 (“USB”) and Frankel Lambert Weiss Weisman & Gordon LLP (“FLWWG,”
collectively “defendants”) moved separately to dismiss Daniels’ complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (USB Mem. Supp. Mot. to
Dismiss (Doc. No. 22-10) at 2; FLWWG Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. No. 25) at 3.)1 For
the reasons discussed below, defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted and Daniels is granted
thirty (30) days leave to amend her complaint.
BACKGROUND
This action relates to a mortgage and foreclosure action involving real property at 575
East 28th Street in Brooklyn, New York. (See Compl., Ex. B (“Corrective Assignment of
1
For ease of reference, citations to court documents utilize ECF pagination.
1
Mortgage”) (Doc. No. 1) at 17.) 2 Daniels is the mortgagor of that property. (Id.) The mortgage
was originally issued on June 28, 2006 and recorded on August 8, 2006 by Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc. (Id.) USB alleges that Daniels defaulted on the note and mortgage as of August 1,
2007. (Compl. (Doc. No. 1) ¶ 6.)
On January 17, 2008, the mortgage was assigned to “US Bank National Association, as
Trustee for CSFB HEAT 2006-7.” (Corrective Assignment of Mortgage.) The assignment was
recorded on February 1, 2008. (Id.) On January 24, 2008, USB accelerated the mortgage and
note by commencing a foreclosure action in the Supreme Court of New York Kings County
(Index No. 2629/2008). (Compl. ¶ 6.) On July 16, 2012, a Corrective Assignment of Mortgage
was executed to correct a scrivener’s error in the February 1, 2008 assignment, correcting the
mortgagee’s name from “US Bank National Association, as Trustee for CSFB HEAT 2006-7” to
“US Bank National Association, as Trustee for Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp., Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-7, Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 20067.” (Corrective Assignment of Mortgage at 17.)
On March 3, 2014, Judge Sylvia G. Ash of Kings County Supreme Court issued a
decision and order finding that the note related to Daniels’ mortgage was “payable to [USB] as
bearer” and that USB held “title to the note.” (Schiavo Decl., Ex. B (“3/3/14 State Court Order”)
(Doc. No. 22-3) at 3.)3 On July 29, 2015, Daniels served a Notice of Dispute, which she alleges
required USB and FLWWG to “validate the alleged debt, and obtain verification from the
2
On a motion to dismiss the Court may consider documents attached to the complaint, integral to the complaint, or
documents of which a Court may take judicial notice. See Thomas v. Westchester Cty. Health Care Corp., 232 F.
Supp. 2d 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Because the Corrective Assignment of Mortgage is attached to Daniels’
complaint, the Court may consider it in evaluating the motion to dismiss.
3
The Court may take judicial notice of state court proceedings without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment. See Thomas, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 276–77.
2
creditor.” (Compl. ¶ 8.) She alleges that she received no such verification or validation. (Id.)
On December 21, 2015, Judge Ash issued the final judgment of foreclosure, granting USB’s
motion “for a judgment of foreclosure and sale.” (Dougherty Decl., Ex. A (“Judgment of
Foreclosure”) (Doc. No. 22-7) at 4.)
Daniels alleges that the foreclosure action was a “debt collection action masquerading as
a foreclosure” and constitutes “an attempt to collect a debt” as defined by the FDCPA and asserts
that defendants provided “conflicting information regarding the alleged debt.” (Compl. ¶¶ 7,
11.) She challenges the authenticity and validity of the documents USB and FLWWG claim she
executed, (id. ¶¶ 10, 13), despite Judge Ash’s finding that this argument was without merit in the
state foreclosure action, (3/3/14 State Court Order at 2).
Daniels claims “significant harms, damages, [and] injuries as a result of defendants’
failure and or inability to obtain accurate, factual and reliable information regarding the alleged
current creditor and amount of the alleged debt.” (Compl. ¶ 14.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
At this stage, the Court assumes the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, and draws
all reasonable inferences in Daniels’ favor. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Court is not, however, “bound to accept as true a[ny] legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
In order to withstand defendants’ motions to dismiss, Daniels’ complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)); see also Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010). Although the
3
complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” simple “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Harris, 572 F.3d at 72. Rather, the
complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, which means “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The Court is also mindful, however, that Daniels is proceeding pro se. As such, her
complaint is held to a less exacting standard than a complaint drafted by an attorney. See
Haines, 404 U.S. at 520–21; Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2008). Because pro
se litigants “are entitled to a liberal construction of their pleadings,” the Court reads Daniels’
complaint to “raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Green v. United States, 260
F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the Court “need not argue a
pro se litigant’s case nor create a case for the pro se which does not exist.” Molina v. New York,
956 F. Supp. 257, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). Where a pro se plaintiff has altogether failed to satisfy
a pleading requirement, the Court must dismiss the claim. See Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d
62, 65 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I.
FDCPA
Congress enacted the FDCPA “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect
consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692. To plead a FDCPA claim, a
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plaintiff must show that (1) he has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer
debt; (2) the defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has
engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA. See Ogbon v. Beneficial Credit Servs.,
Inc., No. 10-CV-370 (GBD), 2011 WL 347222, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011); see also 15
U.S.C. § 1692.
A. FDCPA Claim Against USB
Daniels fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim that USB is a “debt collector” as
defined by the FDCPA. Accordingly, Daniels’ FDCPA claim against USB is dismissed.
The statute defines “debt collector” as a person either (1) involved “in any business the
principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts,” or (2) “who regularly collects or
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due [to]
another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Creditors seeking to collect their own debts are not considered
“debt collectors” for the purpose of the FDCPA. Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Servs., Inc., 147
F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (“As a general matter, creditors are not subject to the FDCPA.”).
The FDCPA defines a creditor as “any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to
whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an
assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such
debt for another.” Id. § 1692a(4). The statute further clarifies that a “debt collector” does not
include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at
the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).
Daniels alleges no facts suggesting that USB was assigned the debt for the purpose of
collecting on it for some other entity. In fact, Daniels states that the “purported Assignment”
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assigned both the mortgage and note to USB.4 (Compl. ¶ 13.) This assertion is corroborated by
the Corrective Assignment of Mortgage, dated July 16, 2012, which assigns the “full benefit of
all the powers and of all the covenants and provisos” contained in the mortgage to USB. Further,
the state court in foreclosure proceedings found the relevant note to be “payable to [USB] as
bearer” and that USB had “title to the note.” (3/3/14 State Court Order at 3.) Nowhere in her
complaint does Daniels allege that any other party has come forward as the owner of her debt or
has initiated foreclosure proceedings on the property. She merely asserts in conclusory fashion
that USB is, and admits to being, a debt collector. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 17.)
Daniels’ assertion that USB should nonetheless be considered a debt collector because it
was assigned the mortgage after it was in default is unavailing.5 Even where an entity acquired a
defaulted debt, it is not a debt collector pursuant to the FDCPA where it does not engage in
collection activities “for another.” Munroe v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, No. 14-CV-1883
(MKB), 2016 WL 1248818, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2016); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(4), (6)
(stating that a “creditor” collecting a debt owed to itself does not fall under the FDCPA’s
4
Daniels alleges throughout her complaint that the assignment was defective and that the documents were not
authentic. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 13.) However, the state court in a foreclosure action against Daniels already determined
that the assignment of the note and mortgage was not defective and was authorized. Thus, the Court cannot
entertain Daniels’ attempt to re-litigate that issue. (3/3/14 State Court Order; Judgment of Foreclosure at 4.) See
Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999) (under New York law, collateral estoppel “means simply that
when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit”); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S.
75, 81 (1984) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 federal courts “must give a state-court judgment the same preclusive
effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered”); see also
Jacobs v. Law Offices of Leonard N. Flamm, No. 04-CV-7607 (DC), 2005 WL 1844642, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 29,
2005) (“In cases where some of those factual allegations have been decided otherwise in previous litigation, . . . a
court may take judicial notice of those proceedings and find that plaintiffs are estopped from re-alleging those
facts.”).
5
USB argues that it purchased the mortgage in 2006 – before the default – as part of a “pooling and services”
agreement. As this is a motion to dismiss, the Court will not entertain USB’s factual assertions, particularly those
set forth in its memorandum of law. Accordingly, the Court takes as fact Daniels’ assertion that USB purchased the
mortgage after default. See Harris, 572 F.3d at 71 (stating that on a motion to dismiss, the court must assume that
all allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party).
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definition of “debt collector,” but the term “creditor” “does not include any person to the extent
that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating
collection of such debt for another”). Where a plaintiff does not allege that “either [defendant’s]
principal purpose is the collection of debts or that [defendant] regularly collects debts owed
another,” and relies merely on the assertion that defendant “took an assignment of the alleged
debt while the debt was allegedly in default,” he has failed to state facts sufficient to state a claim
that defendant is a debt collector under the FDCPA. Izmirligil v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 11CV-5591 (LDW), 2013 WL 1345370, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2013); see also Schuh v.
Druckman & Sinel, L.L.P., 602 F. Supp. 2d 454, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Whether a debt is in
default at the time it is acquired by the person seeking to collect on it, however, is relevant only
to an exception to the definition of debt collector. . . . Because the Schuhs have failed to allege
that HSBC is a ‘debt collector’ in the first place, the statutory exception is irrelevant.” (citation
omitted)).
Thus, Daniels has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim that USB is a debt
collector under the FDCPA. Accordingly, USB’s motion to dismiss is granted.6
6
USB argues in its reply that Daniels’ FDCPA claims are also precluded based on the Younger abstention doctrine –
which identifies a “longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings,
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971), – res judicata, and collateral estoppel. (See USB Mem. Supp. Mot. to
Dismiss at 8–11.) However, it is possible for Daniels to state an FDCPA claim that does not implicate the state
court foreclosure action. See, e.g., Schuh, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 467–69 (finding that an FDCPA claim alleging that a
debt collector made false statements in a letter to the debtor was “independent from the transaction that was
adjudicated in the state court – that is, the foreclosure on the mortgage and the amounts due under the [mortgagor’s]
loan” and thus not barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel). Accordingly, as discussed below,
Daniels is granted thirty days leave to amend.
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B. FDCPA Claim Against FLWWG
Daniels has failed to state a claim that FLWWG engaged in an act or omission prohibited
by the FDCPA.7 Accordingly, Daniels’ FDCPA claim against FLWWG is dismissed.
Daniels’ primary claim appears to be that she submitted a notice of dispute pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 1692g, and FLWWG “failed and omitted to validate the alleged debt” in response.
(Comp. ¶ 17.) Section 1692g(a) states in part:
Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection
with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall . . . send the consumer a
written notice containing . . . a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty
days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion
thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; [and] a
statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the
thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt
collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the
consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the
consumer by the debt collector.
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). Section 1692g(b) further states,
If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period
described in subsection (a)[,] . . . the debt collector shall cease collection of the
debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification
of the debt or a copy of a judgment.
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
For a debt collector to violate this section of the FDCPA, there must be some initial
communication by the debt collector prompting the debtor’s notice of dispute. See Derisme v.
Hunt Leibert Jacobson P.C., 880 F. Supp. 2d 339, 368 (D. Conn. 2012). Otherwise, “[t]o permit
a consumer to unilaterally trigger a debt collector’s duty to validate the debt would unduly
7
FLWWG does not argue that it is not a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA. (See generally FLWWG Mem.
Supp. Mot. to Dismiss.) See also Goldstein v. Hutton, Ingram, Yuzek, Gainen, Carroll & Bertolotti, 374 F.3d 56,
60, 62 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that “the FDCPA applies to attorneys ‘regularly’ engaging in debt collection activity,
including such activity in the nature of litigation” and noting that mortgage foreclosures constitute “collection
litigation”).
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burden and potentially frustrate a valid debt collection process. Requiring a debt collector to
suspend or stay a foreclosure action following a consumer initiated communication outside of the
legal proceeding would burden the courts unnecessarily as the judicial process affords a debtor
an avenue to challenge the action by asserting any defenses she or he may have and requires that
the debt collector prove its claim to the relief sought.” Id.
Daniels has alleged no facts suggesting that FLWWG initiated any communication with
her. She alleges that she served a Notice of Dispute on July 29, 2015, but nothing in the
complaint asserts that this notice was in response to an initial communication by FLWWG. (See
Compl. ¶ 8.) Because Daniels has failed to allege that FLWWG initiated communication with
her in connection with the collection of a debt triggering its section 1962g obligations, she has
failed to state a claim pursuant to Section 1692g(b).8
Daniels also alleges that FLWWG failed to cease and desist collection until the proper
validation and verification had been obtained, (Compl. ¶ 19), that FLWWG provided conflicting
information regarding the alleged debt, (id. ¶ 11), and that FLWWG engaged in harassing,
oppressive, and abusive behavior while attempting to collect the debt, (id. ¶ 18).9 Daniels has
failed to allege any specific facts to support these assertions. Such “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a
8
In her verified opposition, Daniels also acknowledges that FLWWG did indeed respond to her notice of dispute
with a “Debt Validation Letter” that contained “payoff figures, payment history, reinstatement figures, [a] copy of a
note and mortgage, [and a] copy of assignment.” (Pl.’s FLWWG Opp’n (Doc. No. 25-1) at 8.) She goes on to state
in conclusory fashion “[c]learly [FLWWG] did not comport to the statutory requirement § 1692g(a)(1)(2).” (Id.)
9
FLWWG invites the Court to convert its motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and to consider
the validation letter FLWWG provided Daniels. (See FLWWG Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 10 n.1.) Because
Daniels attempts to assert claims that go beyond the mere existence of the validation letter, and because the Court
finds that Daniels has failed to state a claim in her complaint, the Court declines to convert the motion.
9
claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Accordingly, the Court
dismisses Daniels’ FDCPA claim against FLWWG.10
II.
New York General Business Law § 349
Section 349 is a New York State consumer protection law prohibiting deceptive
practices. Harary v. Allstate Ins. Co., 983 F. Supp. 95, 97–98 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). To establish a
cause of action under Section 349, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant’s
deceptive acts were directed at consumers; (2) the acts are materially misleading; and (3) injury
resulted from the acts. See Maurizio v. Goldsmith, 230 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2000). Section
349 “does not grant a private remedy for every improper or illegal business practice and cannot
fairly be understood to mean that everyone who acts unlawfully, and does not admit the
transgression, is being ‘deceptive,’ within the meaning of that statute.” Schlessinger v. Valspar
Corp., 723 F.3d 396, 399 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Consumer oriented conduct must be the “type of conduct that would have an impact on
consumers generally.” Harary, 983 F. Supp. at 98. “A defendant will not be held liable under
§ 349 where the disputed private transaction does not have ramifications for the public at large.”
10
FLWWG asserts that Daniels’ claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which directs federal courts to
abstain from considering claims where (i) the plaintiff lost in state court; (ii) the plaintiff complains of injuries
caused by the state court judgment; (iii) the plaintiff invites district court review of that judgment; and (iv) the state
court judgment was entered before the plaintiff’s federal suit commenced. Gabriele v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing,
Inc., 503 F. App’x 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order). FLWWG asserts that, because Daniels filed a motion to
dismiss in USB’s state foreclosure action, she “clearly” could have raised allegations pertaining to the FDCPA and
NYGBL. (FLWWG Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 8–9.) FLWWG cites absolutely no legal support for this
assertion. Moreover, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only applies where a plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a
state court judgment, and it is not clear that such is the case here. See Gabriele, 503 F. App’x at 92 (finding that,
where a plaintiff raised an FDCPA claim based on a law firms conduct during a foreclosure action, the RookerFeldman doctrine did not bar the claim because the state court judgment did not cause the injury); see also McKithen
v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine turns not on the similarity between a
party’s state-court and federal-court claims . . . but rather on the causal relationship between the state-court
judgment and the injury of which the party complains in federal court.”); Derisme, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 357 (noting
that an FDCPA claim against a law firm prosecuting a foreclosure action is “an entirely distinct and separate claim”
from a foreclosure action itself). To the extent that Daniels attempts to undo the state court judgment, her claim
would be barred. See Gabriel, 503 F. App’x at 92. However, it is possible for Daniels to state an FDCPA claim that
would not require any intrusion into the state court’s foreclosure determination.
10
Cohen v. Transp. Ins. Co., No. 10-CV-743 (GTS), 2011 WL 3650284, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18,
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the conduct alleged – failure to properly respond to Daniels’ notice of dispute of a
debt – is not an act that will have ramifications for the public at large. The request for validation
was sent with respect to Daniels’ debt only and the alleged lack of response would not have an
impact on consumers beyond Daniels. Daniels’ conclusory allegations that “[e]ach action
alleged was consumer oriented” and that defendants’ “recurrent pattern of deceptive conduct that
is recurring . . . affects broadly the New York State consuming public,” (Compl. ¶ 23), cannot
save her claim. See Harary, 983 F. Supp. at 99 (dismissing a Section 349 claim because a
“conclusory assertion . . . that these acts have injured the public at large is insufficient to
demonstrate that this dispute is anything other than one between the parties”); Grand Gen.
Stores, Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., No. 93-CV-3741 (CSH), 1994 WL 163973, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 22, 1994) (dismissing a Section 349 claim because “[e]xcept for a conclusory statement at
the end of a list of allegations . . . Plaintiff has failed to include any evidence of the existence of a
. . . policy designed to deceive the public at large”).
Because Daniels fails to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants’ conduct impacted
the public at large, defendants’ motions to dismiss her Section 349 claim are granted.
III.
Leave to Amend
In light of the Court’s duty to liberally construe pro se complaints, Daniels is granted
thirty (30) days leave to file an amended complaint. Daniels’ amended complaint must set forth
the legal basis for her claims and factual allegations in a clear and concise manner in order to
11
support her claims against defendants, and she must state the relief that she is seeking with
respect thereto.
The amended complaint must be captioned “Amended Complaint” and bear the same
docket number as this Order. If Daniels fails to amend her complaint within thirty (30) days as
directed by this Order, judgment shall be entered.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. Because of
her pro se status, Daniels is granted thirty (30) days leave to amend her complaint.
The Clerk of Court is directed to send Daniels a copy of this Order and note the mailing
on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
Roslynn R. Mauskopf
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 28, 2016
_______________________
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF
United States District Judge
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