Greenidge v. NY Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons stated, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and because this action is barred by t he Eleventh Amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). Plaintiff is warned that any actions she may file in the future are not to repeat claims that have already been dismissed in prior cases or to ignore guidance offered in this and previous opinions. Ordered by Judge Sandra L. Townes on 11/4/2015. (Barrett, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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07- r- ICE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.y,
X

FIONA GREENIDGE,

*

N0VO4 2015 *

BROOKLYN OFFICE

Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

15-CV-5747 (SLT)

NYS OFFICE OF TEMPORARY AND
DISABILITY ASSISTANCE DIVISION OF
DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS,
Defendant.
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x
-

TOWNES, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Fiona Greenidge, proceeding pro se, brings this action against a division of the
New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA"), seeking monetary
damages for discrimination she allegedly suffered after she applied for Social Security benefits.
Although there is no indication that plaintiff was ever employed by defendant, plaintiff alleges
jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). The Court grants
plaintiffs request to proceed informapauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons
discussed below, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and because the OTDA, as a New York State agency, is immune from suit in this Court
for money damages.
BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from plaintiff's pleading, the allegations of which are
assumed to be true for the purpose of this memorandum and order.' On June 26, 2015, plaintiff
'Plaintiffs pleading in this case consists of four pages, plus a one-page exhibit. The first
page—hereafter, the "Complaint"—is a one-page document which lists the parties and their
addresses, invokes jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII, states that the only remedy plaintiff is
seeking is "Monetary Damages," and notes that plaintiffs "Statement of Claim" is set forth in
an attachment. The remaining three pages—the "Attachment"—are in the form of a letter
addressed to an unnamed "Judge."

applied for Social Security disability benefits. (Attachment, p. 1). Plaintiff's pleading does not
specify the medical conditions that have allegedly rendered plaintiff disabled but states that
plaintiff has a "combination of health problems" that "became life threatening" in May 2013.
(Id., p. 1).
Since applying for benefits, plaintiff has been receiving letters from defendant,
scheduling appointments relating to illnesses plaintiff does not have. One such letter, dated
September 16, 2015, is attached as an exhibit to plaintiff's pleading. That letter directs plaintiff
to appear at IMA Disability Services in downtown Brooklyn on October 6, 2015, to be examined
by doctors regarding "a lung problem" and "a mental problem." However, plaintiff's
application for benefits did not allege either a lung problem or a mental problem and plaintiff
has never been diagnosed with a pulmonary or mental illness. (Id., pp. 1-2).
On October 2, 2015—four days before the doctors' appointments—plaintiff commenced
this Title VII action, alleging that defendant violated her "[nights as an Applicant for Social
Security Disability...." (Id., p. 3). Plaintiff's pleading asserts (1) that a police officer from her
neighborhood had her involuntarily committed to a mental hospital for observation sometime in
2012 and (2) that she has been "constantly ... harassed and observed by [her] neighborhood
Police Precinct" ever since she passed the New York Corrections Officer Exam in 2013.

(Id., p.

2). Plaintiff believes that the letters she has received from defendant demonstrate that "a
representative at the [OTDA] has been taking orders from Officials in the City who are violating
[her] ... Constitutional and Civil Rights ...." (Id., p. 3). However, plaintiff does not allege that
her application for Social Security benefits has been denied or otherwise explain how her rights
have been violated.
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DISCUSSION
Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an informapauperis
action where it is satisfied that the action "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief." An action is "frivolous" when either (1) "the 'factual contentions are clearly
baseless,' such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy"; or (2) "the claim is
'based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141
F.3d 434 5 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted).
"[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). A court must "read the pleadings
of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them 'to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burgos v.
Hopkins, 14 F.3d 878, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)). If a liberal reading of the complaint "gives any
indication that a valid claim might be stated," the court must grant leave to amend the
complaint. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); Gomez v. USAA Fed.
Say. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs Complaint Fails to State a Claim
Plaintiff's complaint both fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and
seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. First, although the
Complaint alleges that this Court has jurisdiction under Title VII, plaintiff's pleading fails to
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state a claim under that statute. As this Court has advised plaintiff in prior cases, "Title VII
makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Greenidge v. NYCHA New York City Hous. Auth.,

No. 15-CV-1366 SLT, 2015 WL

5518481, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2015) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also
Greenidge v. NYC Human Res. Admin., No.

14-CV-7360 (SLT), 2015 WL 4879420, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)); Greenidge v. NYSDep'tof
Labor, No. 14-CV-4958 (SLT), 2015 WL 170574, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015), appeal
dismissed, No. 15-371 (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 2015). Here, plaintiff does not allege that she was ever
employed by defendant or that she is a member of a protected class.
Second, while plaintiff's pleading alleges that defendant discriminated against her and
violated her rights as an applicant for Social Security benefits, the facts alleged in the
Attachment do not suggest that the OTDA has yet taken any actions adverse to plaintiff. The
pleading, which was filed four days prior to the doctors' appointment, does not allege that
plaintiffs application for disability benefits has been disapproved or otherwise adjudicated. If
plaintiffs claim for benefits is disapproved, the OTDA or Social Security Administration will
explain how she can administratively appeal that determination. Plaintiff is required to exhaust
her administrative remedies prior to filing a claim for denial of benefits in this Court. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865, 867 (2d Cir. 1983).

OTDA has Eleventh Amendment Immunity from Federal Suits for Money Damages

Even if plaintiff were able to amend her pleading to allege a constitutional or federal
statutory violation, plaintiff's complaint would be dismissed because the OTDA enjoys Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to claims for monetary damages. The Eleventh Amendment
provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although the express language of this Amendment does not prohibit a
state's own citizens from maintaining an action against the state in federal court, the Supreme
Court has "extended a State's protection from suit to suits brought by the State's own citizens."
Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997) (citing Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1(1890)).
The OTDA is an agency of the State of New York and, accordingly, enjoys Eleventh
Amendment immunity against claims for damages. See, e.g., McCluskey v. Comm 'r of Nassau
County Dep 't of Soc. Servs., No. 12-CV-3852 (JFB)(ETB), 2013 WL 4780954, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 5, 2013); Cincotta v. N YC. Human Res. Admin., No. 00 Civ. 9064 (JGK), 2001 WL
897176, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2001). To be sure, a state can waive its Eleventh Amendment
protection and allow a federal court to hear and decide a case commenced or prosecuted against
it. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U. S. at 267. Moreover, "Congress may abrogate the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and 'act[s]
pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority." Bd. of Trs. of Univ. ofAlabama v.

5

Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73
(2000)).
If plaintiff were to allege facts suggesting a violation of plaintiffs constitutional or
federal statutory rights, the Court could liberally construe the pleading as alleging claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to maintain a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege both that the
conduct complained of was "committed by a person acting under color of state law" and
"deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States." Pitchell v. Cal/an, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994). However, this section itself
"creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of
rights established elsewhere." Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
512 U.S. 1240 (1994). It is well established § 1983 does not abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity, see Dube v. State Univ. off. Y, 900 F.2d 587, 594-95 (2d Cir. 1990),
and there is nothing to suggest that New York State has waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity with respect to suits of this sort.
Warning

Since mid-August 2014, plaintiff has filed eight pro se complaints with this Court. With
one exception, all of the other actions have been dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Greenidge v, Baya Moving & Storage, No. 15-CV-5944 (SLT),
slip op. at 9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2015); Greenidge v. NYCHA New York City Hous. Auth.,

2015

WL 5518481, at *9; Greenidge v. NYC Human Res. Admin., 2015 WL4879420, at *5;
Greenidge v. Bklyn Landlord Tenant Ct., No. 15-CV-1 144, slip op. at 11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,
2015); Greenidge v. State Processing Ctr., No. 14-CV-7361 (SLT), 2015 WL 502231, at *4
rel

(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2015); Greenidge v. NYS Dep 't of Labor, 2015 WL 170574, at *3• Five of
the above-cited opinions were issued before the complaint in this action was filed. As noted
above, at least three of the cases alleged Title VII violations. Moreover, in two of those cases,
the Court explained Eleventh Amendment immunity in some detail. Greenidge v. State
Processing Ctr., 2015 WL 502231, at *3; Greenidge v. NYS Dep't of Labor, 2015 WL 170574,
at *3
"[D]istrict courts have the power and the obligation to protect the public and the efficient
administration of justice from individuals who have a history of litigation entailing vexation,
harassment and needless expense to [other parties] and an unnecessary burden on the courts and
their supporting personnel." Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal
quotations and citations omitted; brackets in original). Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that
a filing injunction "is appropriate when a plaintiff 'abuse[s] the process of the Courts to harass
and annoy others with meritless, frivolous, vexatious or repetitive ... proceedings."

Id.

(brackets in original) (quoting In re Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 305 (2d Cir.1981)
(per curiam)); see also Malley v. N.Y City Bd. of Educ.,

112 F.3d 69, 69 (2d Cir. 1997) (per

curiam). Plaintiff is warned that if she files actions in the future which ignore guidance offered
in this and previous opinions or which repeat claims that have already been dismissed, the Court
may direct her to show cause why a filing injunction should not issue prohibiting her from filing
additional actions without first obtaining the Court's permission.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted and because this action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for
purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). Plaintiff is
warned that any actions she may file in the future are not to repeat claims that have already been
dismissed in prior cases or to ignore guidance offered in this and previous opinions.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sandra L. Townes
/SANDRA
United States District Judge
Dated: November 1', 2015
Brooklyn, New York