Gindi v. Bennett et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that Gindi's claims, including the newly added claims relating to the state court action, against all defendants with the exception of the New York City Department of Education are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). No summons shall issue as to these defendants, and it is further; ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all parties, with the exception of the New York City Department of Education, from this action , and it is further; ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to serve the summons, complaint, first amended complaint, second amended complaint, the Court's Orders dated February 1, 2016, and April 13, 2016, and the instant Order upon defendant the New York City Department ofEducation. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appea l. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk or Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the plaintiff pro se and note the mailing on the docket.Ordered by Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf on 6/17/2016. (Taronji, Robert)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------------------------------)(
LISA GINDI,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
15-CV-6475 (RRM) (MDG)
- against THOMAS BENNETT, et al.,
Defendants.
-----------------------------------------------------------)(
ROSL YNN R. MAUSKOPF, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff pro se Lisa Gindi filed the instant complaint alleging violations of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA''), and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). By Order dated February 1, 2016, the Court granted Gindi's
request to proceed in forma pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and granted her leave to file
an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 4.) On February 12, 2016, Gindi submitted an amended
complaint which was reviewed for sufficiency under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (Doc. No. 5.)
By Order dated April 13, 2016, the Court granted Gindi leave to submit a second amended
complaint and provided specific guidance regarding the filing of the complaint. (Doc. No. 6.)
On April 29, 2016, Gindi filed her second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 7.) For the reasons
below, Gindi's second amended complaint is dismissed in part, leaving only her employment
discrimination claims against the New York City Department of Education ("DOE") to proceed.
BACKGROUND
The Court presumes familiarity with the underlying facts of this case, as set forth in this
Court's previous decisions. The second amended complaint, at sixty-nine pages including its
attachments, names twenty-eight defendants. 1 The Court will attempt to summarize the claims
that Gindi may be making, keeping in mind that great liberality must be shown to a pro se
plaintiff. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that prose papers are
interpreted liberally to raise the strongest arguments suggested therein).
Rather than simply amending the complaint to clarify her claims of employment
discrimination, Gindi has added a new claim. As best as can be discerned, Gindi alleges that
defendants Judge Bernadette Bayne, Thomas Bennett, Hubert Guscott, Anne Garner, and John P.
Guyette violated her rights in connection with a state court action. Gindi avers that she is facing
"continual discrimination and abuses" in connection with an action that she instituted against the
DOE and others, which is presently pending in Kings County Supreme Court. (See Second Am.
Compl. at 1.)2
As to her original claims of employment discrimination, in its April 13, 2016 Order, the
Court provided specific guidance regarding the filing of a second amended complaint that
plaintiff failed to follow. In brief, Gindi's second amended complaint alleges that she was
employed as a teacher for many years, and that her employment was terminated because she is
an older, Jewish woman who suffers from a mental disability. Despite being informed that Title
VII, the ADA, and the ADEA do not permit the imposition of individual liability, Gindi's second
amended complaint names individuals who are employed by the DOE. Although unclear, Gindi
appears to seek monetary compensation and injunctive relief.
1
In addition to her second amended complaint, Gindi filed a post-it on May 27, 2016, adding that defendant
Morrissey "also discriminated [against her] for being Jewish ." (Suppl. Note (Doc. No . 9).)
2
A search of the New York State Unified Court System indicates that plaintiff has a pending defamation and
discrimination action based on her divorce against defendant Bennett and others in Kings County Supreme CourtGindi v. Bennett, Index No . 002229/2015. See WEBCIVIL SUPREME,
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASSearch (last visited May 18, 2016).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Ahlers v. Rabinowitz, 684 F.3d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S . 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)); see also James v.
Westchester Cnty., No. 13-CV-19-NSR, 2014 WL 4097635, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2014)
("Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, even
following Twombly and Iqbal." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, a prose
complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a pro se party is "not exempt ... from
compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must contain "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8(a) "does not require detailed factual allegations, .. . it demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A complaint must plead
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding that Rule 8 calls for
"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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DISCUSSION
I.
New Claims Relating to Gindi's State Court Action
a. Younger Abstention
Insofar as Gindi alleges that her federal constitutional rights are being violated in
connection with her state court civil proceedings - for which she seeks injunctive relief - this
Court lacks jurisdiction over her claims. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971), the
Supreme Court held that federal courts should abstain from granting injunctive relief against a
state criminal prosecution instituted in good faith "except under extraordinary circumstances,
where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate." Id at 45. In Sprint
Commc 'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591-92 (2013), the Supreme Court held that the
Younger doctrine applies to three classes of state court proceedings: (1) "state criminal
prosecutions"; (2) "civil enforcement proceedings"; and (3) civil proceedings that "implicate a
State' s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts." Id at 588 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here, abstention is appropriate under the Sprint framework and the Younger doctrine. No
extraordinary circumstances exist, which would allow this Court to exercise jurisdiction on
Gindi's new claims brought in connection with her ongoing state court action. Accordingly, this
Court may not exercise jurisdiction over Gindi's federal claims because doing so would intrude
into ongoing state civil proceedings. Sprint Commc 'ns, Inc., 134 S.Ct. at 591 (citing New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. ( "NOPSJ'') v. Council of City ofNew Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368
(1989)). Therefore, to the extent that Gindi seeks injunctive relief, her claims are barred by
Younger. See Morpurgo v. Inc. Vil!. ofSag Harbor, 327 F. App'x 284, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2009)
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(holding that Younger applies to claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, not to damages
claims).
b. Judicial Immunity
Gindi alleges that Judge Bernadette Bayne raised her voice, reprimanded, and humiliated
Gindi in connection with her state court proceeding. (Second Arn. Compl. Timeline (Doc. No. 71) at 1.) Gindi's claims against Judge Bayne must be dismissed because judges have absolute
immunity for judicial acts performed in their judicial capacities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11
(1991) ; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) ; Dupree v. Bivona, No. 07-CV-4599, 2009
WL 82717, at * 1-2 (2d Cir. Jan. 14, 2009) (summary order). This absolute "judicial immunity is
not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice," nor can a judge "be deprived of immunity
because the action he took was in error ... or was in excess of his authority." Mireles, 502 U.S.
at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted); Horton v. City of New York, No . 14-CV-4279-KAM,
2014 WL 3644711 , at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014); Eda v. Queens Cnty. Criminal Court, No.
13-CV-7089-JBW, 2013 WL 6732811 , at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013); Gamez v. US. Dist. Ct.
E. and S. Dist. of- Tyranny, No. 11-CV-4068-KAM, 2011WL3949807, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
6, 2011). Further, to the extent that Gindi seeks monetary damages against Judge Bayne in her
official capacity, her claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. N. Y State Court Clerks Ass 'n
v. Unified Court System of the State of N. Y, 25 F. Supp. 3d 459, 467 (S.D .N.Y. 2014) ("The
Eleventh Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to suits in federal court against a state and its
officers in their official capacities.").
Finally, to the extent that Gindi seeks injunctive relief against Judge Bayne, the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 309(c), Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983) bars all claims for injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a
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judicial action or omission "unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable." Rodriguez v. Trager, No. 10-CV-0781-ARR, 2010 WL 889545, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 8, 2010). Accordingly, all claims against Judge Bayne are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
II.
Employment Discrimination Claims
Although Gindi ' s second amended complaint is not without significant deficiencies, the
Court notes that in Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 310 (2d Cir. 2015), the Second
Circuit emphasized that, under Iqbal, the plausibility requirement should not be elevated to a
"probability requirement. " Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). While allegations must support
"more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," they need not be sufficient
to make it likely that the plaintiff would prevail on the merits if she proved those allegations to
be true. Iqbal, 556 U.S . at 678; see also Dawson v. N YC. Transit Auth., 624 F. App'x 763 , 767
n.1 (2d Cir. 2015).
Nevertheless, Gindi ' s claims against all individual defendants must be dismissed. As the
Court previously informed Gindi, Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA do not permit the
imposition of individual liability. See Rasperdo v. Carlone; 770 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2014)
(stating that Title VII does not create liability in individual supervisors and co-workers who are
not the plaintiffs' actual employers); Guerra v. Jones, 421 F. App 'x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2011)
(stating that the ADEA does not create liability in individual supervisors and co-workers);
Castro v. City of New York, 24 F. Supp. 3d 250, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that the ADA does
not create liability in individual supervisors and co-workers). Accordingly, Gindi's claims
against all individual defendants must be dismissed.
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Further, to the extent that Gindi seeks to name the City of New York as a defendant, her
claim are dismissed. See Dimitracopoulos v. City of New York, 26 F. Supp. 3d 200, 210
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that the City and the DOE are separate legal entities and that the City
cannot be held liable for the alleged torts of DOE employees). Likewise, to the extent that Gindi
intends to name "New York State Human Rights Violation" as a defendant, her claim is
dismissed because there is no such organization. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In light of Gindi ' s pro se status and the guidance provided by Littlejohn, the Court will
allow Gindi ' s Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims to proceed solely against the DOE, the only
proper defendant in this employment discrimination action. See Davis v. NYC Dept. of Educ.,
No. 10-CV-3812-KAM, 2012 WL 139255, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2012) (stating that the DOE
is an employer subject to discrimination claims).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED that Gindi ' s claims, including the newly added claims relating to the state
court action, against all defendants with the exception of the New York City Department of
Education are dismissed. See 28 U.S .C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). No summons shall issue as to these
defendants, and it is further;
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all parties, with the exception
of the New York City Department of Education, from this action, and it is further;
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to serve the summons, complaint,
first amended complaint, second amended complaint, the Court's Orders dated February 1, 2016,
and April 13, 2016, and the instant Order upon defendant the New York City Department of
Education.
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The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauper is status is denied for purpose of
an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk or Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the
plaintiff pro se and note the mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
~ (7,2016
s/Roslynn R. Mauskopf
ROSL YNN R. MAUSK6PF
United States District Judge
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