Zsa Zsa Jewels, Inc. v. BMW of North America, LLC et al
Filing
171
ORDER denying 153 Motion in Limine. For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum and order, Plaintiff's motion in limine seeking to preclude evidence regarding the "authorized user" of the vehicle against Defendant is denied, without prejudice. Ordered by Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto on 6/27/2022. (Wong, Leah)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ZSA ZSA JEWELS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
15-CV-6519(KAM)(RLM)
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,
Defendant.
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KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
This action arises from an incident where a BMW X3
automobile (the “Vehicle”) designed and manufactured by
Defendant BMW of North America, LLC (“BMW NA” or “Defendant”),
and leased to Plaintiff Zsa Zsa Jewels, Inc. (“Zsa Zsa” or
“Plaintiff”) caught fire and damaged merchandise belonging to
Plaintiff.
In particular, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
seeks to recover for the destruction of “95% of its inventory
and related losses incurred when the vehicle that was
transporting the company’s property suddenly caught fire.”
No. 115, p. 1.)
(ECF
Trial is scheduled to commence on December 5,
2022.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion in
limine for an order to preclude evidence at trial regarding the
“authorized users” of the Vehicle.
(ECF No. 153.)
reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
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For the
BACKGROUND
The Court incorporates by reference the factual
background provided in its October 11, 2019, memorandum and
order.
(ECF No. 97, pp. 3-8.)
As relevant to this motion, the
parties plan on disputing two critical facts at trial: whether
the Vehicle’s low tire-pressure warning light turned on and
whether Ms. Tiffany Sobers (“Ms. Sobers”), the Plaintiff’s
employee and driver of the Vehicle on the night of the fire,
failed to see the light.
(Id., p. 9.)
Plaintiff’s motion asserts that Defendant intends to
introduce at trial evidence that Ms. Sobers was not a permitted
operator of the vehicle under Plaintiff’s lease agreement with
the non-party Morristown BMW dealer.
see also ECF No. 86, p. 2.)
(See ECF No. 153, p. 2;
The lease agreement states in
relevant part:
1. Vehicle Use. I agree not to use (or permit
others to use) the Vehicle: (a) in any way that violates
the law or the terms of my Insurance policy of this
lease; (b) to transport goods or people for hire, lease
or rental to others ... . I will not allow an uninsured
person to operate the Vehicle at any time, or allow any
third party, other than my spouse, to operate the
vehicle without written permission from [the Vehicle’s
lessor].
(ECF No. 159, Exh. A.)
Plaintiff has conceded that it was subject to the
lease agreement and that Plaintiff allowed its employee, Ms.
Sobers, to drive the Vehicle to transport goods on November 6,
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2013, the night of the fire, from Plaintiff’s office in New York
to a trade show in Massachusetts.
(ECF No. 153, p. 2.)
It is
similarly undisputed that Plaintiff did not obtain the written
permission of the lessor, as required by the lease agreement, to
allow its employee to transport goods.
(Id.)
Plaintiff, however, contends that neither the lease
agreement nor the unauthorized-user status of Ms. Sobers bears
on the material issues in this case, including whether Defendant
is liable for the fire and Plaintiff’s damages were caused by
the Vehicle.
(Id.)
Plaintiff accordingly filed the instant
motion in limine on February 8, 2022.
(ECF No. 153.)
Defendant
filed an opposition with supporting affidavits and exhibits on
February 17, 2022.
(ECF No. 159.) 1
LEGAL STANDARDS
I.
Motions in Limine
The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow the
trial court to rule in advance of trial on the admissibility and
relevance of potential evidence.
See Luce v. United States, 469
U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984) (defining in limine “to refer to any
motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude
anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually
The Court notes that the parties wrote this Court to supplement
their briefing for the motion in limine (ECF Nos. 164 and 165),
but the Court has concluded that no additional briefing was
necessary. (Order on March 2, 2022.)
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offered”); Jackson v. City of White Plains, No. 05-cv-0491, 2016
WL 234855, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2016) (“The purpose of an in
limine motion is to aid the trial process by enabling the Court
to rule in advance of trial on the relevance of certain
forecasted evidence, as to issues that are definitely set for
trial, without lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the
trial.” (quoting Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir.
1996) (emphasis added)).
A motion in limine calls on the Court
“to make a preliminary determination on the admissibility of the
evidence under Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”
Jackson, 2016 WL 234855, at *1 (citations omitted); see also
Fed. R. Evid. 104.
Evidence should be excluded on a motion in limine
“only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential
grounds,” and courts may “reserve judgment on a motion in limine
until trial, so that the motion is placed in the appropriate
factual context.”
Ali v. Connick, No. 11-cv-5297, 2016 WL
3080799, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2016) (citations omitted).
Finally, a court’s ruling regarding a motion in limine is
“subject to change when the case unfolds, particularly if the
actual testimony differs from what was [expected].”
Luce, 469
U.S. at 41; see United States v. Jacques, 684 F.3d 324, 328 n.1
(2d Cir. 2012) (“We note that the district court is free to
alter these rulings, if appropriate, as the case progresses.”).
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Accordingly, the Court’s ruling in the instant memorandum and
order is without prejudice.
II.
Admissibility of Evidence at Trial
The admissibility of evidence at trial is governed by
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 402, evidence must be relevant to be admissible.
Fed. R. Evid. 402.
See
Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.”
Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Therefore, under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, a court’s determination of what constitutes
“relevant evidence” is “guided by the nature of the claims and
defenses in the cause of action.”
Ramos v. Trifone, No.11-cv-
679, 2015 WL 6509114, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 28, 2015) (citing
Jean-Laurent v. Hennessey, 840 F. Supp. 529, 536 (E.D.N.Y.
2011)).
In addition to considerations of relevance, any
evidence that the parties seek to offer or exclude in their
motions is subject to the Court’s balancing of its probative and
prejudicial value, as provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Rule 403 permits the exclusion of evidence, even if relevant,
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of [...] unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
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cumulative evidence.”
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Courts have broad
discretion in making decisions under Rule 403’s probativeprejudice balancing analysis.
See United States v. Abu-Jihaad,
630 F.3d 102, 131 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We review a district court’s
evidentiary rulings deferentially, mindful of its superior
position to assess relevancy and to weigh the probative value of
evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice.” (citing
United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 901 (2d Cir. 2008)); see
also United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924, 927 (2d Cir. 1976)
(“In the balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice
required by Rule 403, the trial judge has wide discretion[.]”
(quotation omitted)).
Under Rule 403, courts make “a
conscientious assessment of whether unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs probative value with regard to each
piece of proffered evidence.”
United States v. Pugh, 162 F.
Supp. 3d 97, 103 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting United States v. AlMoayad, 545 F.3d 139, 160 (2d Cir. 2008)).
DISCUSSION
In the instant motion in limine, Plaintiff asserts
that evidence about Ms. Sobers’s authorization to drive the
Vehicle is irrelevant to Defendant’s liability and that the
prejudicial effect of such evidence would far outweigh its
probative value.
(ECF No. 153, p. 2.)
Plaintiff contends that
whether Ms. Sobers was authorized to use the Vehicle has no
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“conceivable bearing” on whether a jury would find that the
Vehicle gave a warning before the tire caught on fire or whether
Ms. Sobers’s testimony regarding the events would be credible.
(Id., p. 4.)
Without further elaboration, Plaintiff also
alleges that that the unauthorized-user status of Ms. Sobers
“certainly has no bearing on the issues of damages.”
(Id.)
In
opposition, Defendant argues that the unauthorized-user status
of Ms. Sobers is relevant to Defendant’s comparative-fault
defense and the overall calculation of damages.
pp. 1-3.)
(ECF No. 159,
This Court agrees with Defendant in that there are at
least conceivable uses of the challenged evidence that may be
considered by the jury at trial.
Because Plaintiff has brought both strict liability
and negligence causes of action, and Defendant plans on raising
a comparative-fault defense, the jury will be charged with
assessing Plaintiff’s comparative fault at trial.
(See ECF No.
97, p. 13; ECF No. 159, p. 1; see also Oden v. Boston Scientific
Corporation, 330 F. Supp. 3d 877, 887 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Under
New York law, a Plaintiff’s claim based upon an alleged design
defect or manufacturing defect sounding in either negligence or
strict liability are functionally equivalent and will be
analyzed concurrently.”); Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,
No. 96 CIV. 4798 (VM), 2000 WL 640625, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 18,
2000)(finding, in a negligence case, that comparative fault is
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whether a “plaintiff's own conduct may or may not have played a
role” in the question of damages); Hirsch v. Polymark Corp., 889
F. Supp. 714, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)(where a jury, in a negligence
case, found that two parties could have both been the proximate
cause of an injury and apportioned fault to both accordingly).
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s
decision to allow an unauthorized user to operate the Vehicle is
at least relevant to the question of Plaintiff’s comparative
fault.
As summarized in this Court’s summary judgment decision,
a dispute remains as to whether the Vehicle’s warning light ever
turned on and whether Ms. Sobers saw the light.
97, pp. 9, 39-40).
(See ECF No.
Based on the nature of Plaintiff’s claims,
Ms. Sobers’s relationship to and experience with the Vehicle is
relevant, because the jury may consider whether she was the
primary user of the Vehicle with full information on its
operation, including its warning lights, or merely an employee
of Plaintiff who used the Vehicle from time to time.
As
Defendant points out, Plaintiff’s willingness to permit its
employee, Ms. Sobers, to operate the Vehicle in violation of
Plaintiff’s lease agreement is at least probative of Plaintiff’s
own overall degree of care.
(ECF No. 159, p. 2.)
Moreover,
considering that Ms. Sobers is a key witness to circumstances
leading to the night of the fire, additional information about
the circumstances by which she took possession of the Vehicle
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and operated the Vehicle is relevant.
Furthermore, to the extent that the jury will need to
determine the total damages owed to Plaintiff by Defendant and
consider the value of the goods in the Vehicle, the Court agrees
that a jury may consider whether Plaintiff’s authorization of
its employee to transport Plaintiff’s goods is relevant to
Plaintiff’s own valuation of the goods.
Evidence should only be
precluded if it is “clearly inadmissible on all potential
grounds,” and, here, the information about the degree of care
that Plaintiff undertook in transporting the lost goods is at
least probative of Plaintiff’s valuation of the goods entrusted
to its employee for transport.
See Ali, No. 11-cv-5297, 2016 WL
3080799, at *1; see also United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393,
416 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous
Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 927 (2d Cir.1977) (“Evidence need not
be conclusive in order to be relevant.”); SEC v. Singer, 786 F.
Supp. 1158, 1166 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“Nonconclusive evidence should
still be admitted if it makes a proposition more probable than
not; factors which make evidence less than conclusive affect
only weight, not admissibility.”).
Plaintiff contends that Ms. Sobers’s unauthorized-user
status would potentially confuse the jury, resulting in jurors
conflating Plaintiff’s breach of its contractual obligations in
the lease agreement with the merits of its tort claim.
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(ECF No.
153, p. 5.)
Plaintiff and Defendant are free to argue to the
jury during summation regarding the relevance, or lack thereof,
of the trial evidence.
The Court does not find that any risk of
potential prejudicial effect or confusion of the jury
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
The evidence regarding the lease is
probative to Defendant’s defenses and any danger of prejudice
arising from the evidence can be addressed by providing
appropriate jury instructions, which the parties may timely
propose.
If Defendant intends to introduce evidence of Ms.
Sobers’s unauthorized-user status at trial, the Court will
consider a request by Plaintiff to instruct the jury regarding
this evidence.
In sum, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention that the
unauthorized-user status will have no relevance to any part of
trial, the Court concludes that evidence of Ms. Sobers not being
authorized to operate the Vehicle is the type of information a
jury is entitled to consider in weighing liability and how much
fault, if any, to attribute to Plaintiff and the total damages,
if any, that Defendant may potentially owe.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion in
limine to preclude any evidence at trial regarding the
“authorized users” of the Vehicle is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 27, 2022
Brooklyn, New York
____________/s/___
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
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