Kneitel v. City of New York et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM & ORDER, re Defendants' 26 Motion to Dismiss. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. 26) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's time-barred federal-law claims against Defendants Silvery and Parilla, time-barred f ederal constitutional claims against Defendant Ariano, and Title VII claims against Defendants Ariano and Gomez are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as any attempt to amend these claims would be futile. Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims against Defendant Gomez are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims, which are also DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is respectfully DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and to mail a copy of this order to pro se Plaintiff Michael J. Kneitel. So Ordered by Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis on 1/19/2018. (c/m to pro se; fwd'd for jgm) (Lee, Tiffeny)

p/f

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-X

MICHAEL!. KNEITEL,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against-

15-CV-6811(NGG)
(SJB)

RAYMOND SILVERY, ANTHONY PARILLA,
DIANE ARIANO,and MARISOLL GOMEZ,
Defendants.
-X

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS,United States District Judge.

On November 30,2015, prose Plaintiff Michael J. Kneitel initiated the instant civil rights

action relating to the termination of his employment by the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority("MTA")and his subsequent attempts to obtain employment with that agency.

(Compl.(Dkt. 1).) Before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. (Mot. to
Dismiss("Mot.")(Dkt. 26).) For the reasons stated below,the motion is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the complaint, and are presumed to be true for the

purposes ofthis motion. The court previously detailed the allegations in the complaint in
connection with Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis(Aug. 31, 2016, Mem.& Order

(Dkt. 5)), and recites only those allegations that are relevant to the present motion to dismiss.^

' the order granting Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauneris. the court dismissed certain named defendants
In
sua sponte. (Aug.31,2016, Mem.& Order.) The court does not include allegations against the dismissed parties in
this order.

1

A.

Factual Background
1,

Removal from the MTA

Plaintiff is a 53-year-old white male. (Compl, at 4.) He alleges that he was employed by
the MTA from August 2010 until March 2011. (Id)

On or about January 9,2011,Plaintiff states that he informed his superiors at the MTA

that he was unable to report to work due to a work-related injury. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff received
treatment for that injury until February 15,2011, during which time he was not paid either his
salary or workers' compensation. (Id.)

On approximately February 17,2011, he met with non-party Ray Brennan and Defendant
Anthony Parilla, an MTA general superintendent, and informed them that he had received
medical authorization to resume his duties and requested leave to retum to work. (Id) On or

about Febmary 18, 2011, Parilla informed Plaintiffthat the MTA viewed him as having been
"absent without leave" during the period of his treatment. (Id) Plaintiff was directed to receive
a medical examination, but his attempts to comply were hindered by delays in obtaining medical

paperwork. (Id at 5-6.) According to Plaintiff, he was removed from his employment on March
16, 2011, by Defendant Raymond Silvery, an Assistant Manager at the MTA. (Id at 6.)
2.

Denial of Unemnlovment Benefits and MTA Emnlovment Applications

Following his termination. Plaintifffiled for unemployment insurance benefits. (Id)
Plaintiff states that the MTA opposed his application on the basis that he had voluntarily

resigned his position, rendering him ineligible for unemployment benefits. (Id) Plaintiff alleges
that the New York State Department of Labor investigated his unemployment claims and the

MTA's opposition and ultimately concluded that Plaintiff had not abandoned his position and so
could receive unemployment benefits. (I^

In the months after his removal, Plaintiff"applied to numerous civil service positions

with the MTA." (Id) Plaintiff applied to be a bus chassis maintainer in August 2011 and claims
that he was "ranked as the #1 eligible candidate on the list." (Id.) Despite this rankmg,Plaintiff

was not hired for the position. (Id) Following his rejection, Plaintiff requested clarification as

to why he was not selected, but Defendant Diane Anano^ refused to provide any information or
allow him the opportunity for a hearing. (Id at 6, 12.)

Plaintiff subsequently appeared for interviews with the MTA for positions as a

provisional car inspector in April 2013, a train operator in July 2013, and a car inspector in July
2014, all without success. (Id at 7-8.) Prior to the last ofthese interviews. Plaintiff states that he

spoke with Defendant Marisoll Gomez, who he identifies as the Human Resources Director for
the MTA. (Id at 8.) Gomez heard Plaintiff's arguments as to why he should be considered for

the position, and she advised Plaintiffto report for his interview. (Id) Plaintiff completed the

application process and, despite several attempts in the following weeks, was unable to obtain
any substantial update from Gomez regarding the status of his application. (Id) When Plaintiff
finally reached Gomez,she informed him that"he would not be considered for any title within
the MTA." (Id)

In connection with his applications, Plaintiff asserts that he contacted non-party Mark D.

Lebow,the Board Committee Chairperson for the New York City Transit Authority. (Id at 7.)

Apparently as a result of this contact. Plaintiff avers that he was informed that there is

2 Plaintiff does not state explicitly that he discussed his August 2011 application with Ariano, nor,for that matter,
does he link Ariano directly to any ofthe allegations in the complaint. He does, however, state that his claims

against Ariano are based on actions that began on December 1,2011, and result from Anano's demal of his request
for an explanation as to why he was not hired despite his placement at"the very top ofthe eligibility list." (CompL
at 12.) The complaint does not detail any other applications by Plaintiff prior to December 1,2011, and so, based on
the dates and the overlap in the allegations, the court concludes the best reading ofthe complaint is that Plaintiffs
allegation on this point is specific to Ariano.

'something' written in [his employment]file that is so egregious [as to] preclude^ Plaintiff from
[obtaining] employment within the MTA." (Id)
B.

Procedural History

On November 30,2015,Plaintiff filed the current action bringing causes of actions under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his federal constitutional rights as well as a number of state-

law-based claims. (Compl.) On the same day. Plaintiff moved to proceed in forma pauperis,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). (Mot.to Proceed IFP (Dkt. 2).) The court granted Plaintiffs
motion to proceed in forma pauneris, but dismissed several ofthe defendants named in the

complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted sua sponte. (Aug. 31,2016,
Mem.& Order(Dkt. 5).) The remaining defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the
complaint in its entirety on June 15,2017. (Mot.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), defendants may move to dismiss a

claim against them on the basis that that it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim is to test the legal sufficiency of a plaintiffs claims for relief. Patane v. Clark. 508 F.3d
106, 112(2d Cir. 2007). In reviewing a complaint on such a motion, the court must accept as

true all allegations offact, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor ofthe plaintiff. ATSl
r.nmmc;u^. Inc. v. Shaar Fund. Ltd.. 493 F.3d 87,98(2d Cir. 2007). A complaint will survive a

motion to dismiss if it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to

reliefthat is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678(2009)(quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. V. Twomblv.550 U.S. 544,570(2007)). Even where a claim is otherwise plausible,

however, a defendant may move to dismiss based on an available affirmative defense, and the

court may grant the motion on that basis "ifthe defense appears on the face ofthe complaint.
Pani V. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67,74(2d Cir. 1998).

"[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Krickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94(2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,"the submissions of a pro se litigant must be
construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman
V. Fed. Bureau ofPrisons. 470 F.3d 471,474(2d Cir. 2006)(internal quotation marks omitted).

"However,even pro se plaintiffs cannot withstand a motion to dismiss unless their pleadings
contain factual allegations sufficient to raise a 'right to relief above the speculative level.'"
Jackson V. N.Y.S, Den't ofLabor. 709 F. Supp. 2d 218,224(S.D.N.Y. 2010)(quoting
Twomblv.550 U.S. at 555).
m.

DISCUSSION

Reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to the prose Plaintiff, the court fmds
that Plaintiff brings two sets offederal-law-based claims: first, claims against all defendants

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations ofhis rights to due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and second, claims against Gomez and

Ariano for alleged violations of Title VII ofthe Civil Right Act of 1964("Title VII ),42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e et seq.^ Plaintiff also brings claims under New York law for violations of his due

process and equal protection rights under Article I, Sections 6 and 11 (respectively) ofthe New
York State constitution, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress

against all defendants, and for defamation against Silvery and Parilla.

3 Plaintiff specifically alleges that Ariano and Gomez violated the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, which
amended Title VII.^Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.

A.

Federal-Law Claims

The court first addresses Plaintiffs claims brought xmder federal law. Those claims are

best viewed in two categories. First, Plaintiff brings claims against Silvery and Parilla for their
actions in connection with his 2011 termination from his position with the MTA. Next,Plaintiff

alleges that actions taken by Ariano and Gomez in connection with his later applications for
employment with the MTA violated both his statutory and constitutional rights. The court
examines these claims separately and concludes that each ofPlaintiffs federal-law-based claims
must be dismissed.

1.

Federal-Law-Based Claims against Silverv and Parilla

Plaintifffirst argues that actions taken by Silvery and Parilla violated his rights to due

process and equal protection under the federal constitution. (Compl. at 11-12.) The basis for
each ofthese claims is essentially the same: Plaintiff alleges that Silvery and Parilla fired

Plaintiff withoutjustification, knowing that his absence was attributable to medical need, and
inserted into his employment file unspecified false statements justifying that termination. (Id.)

In response. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs constitutional claims against Silvery and Parilla
are barred by the applicable statue oflimitations.

Section 1983 does not itself contain a statute oflimitations, which is instead determined

by reference to the "law ofthe State in which the cause of action arose." Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384,388(2007). In particular, courts look to the statutory period applicable to personal

injury torts, which in New York is three years from the date of accrual. Hoean v. Fischer, 738
F.3d 509,517(2d Cir. 2013); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214.

Unlike the statutory period, however,the question of when a cause of action under

Section 1983 accrues is a question offederal law. Wallace,549 U.S. at 388. Under the federal
standard, a Section 1983 claim accrues when a "plaintiff knows or has reason to know ofthe
6

injury giving rise to the claim." Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961,963(2d Cir. 2015)(internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). This does not require the plaintiffs awareness of all
consequences of an action, but only knowledge "that he is suffering from a wrong for which
damages may be recovered in a civil action." Lawson v. Rochester City Sch. Dist. 446 F.App'x
327,329(2d Cir. 2011)(quoting Eadeston v. Guido,41 F.3d 865,872(2d Cir. 1994)).
Based on the foregoing,the court concludes that Plaintiffs constitutional claims against

Parilla and Silvery are time-barred and must be dismissed. While the precise bases for his

federal due process and equal protection claims against Parilla and Silvery are not entirely clear

from the complaint, it is evident those claims stem from the termination of his employment and
that he had knowledge of at least some part ofthe claimed "wrongs" at that time. The fact that
other acts of which he was unaware—^including the claimed misstatement in his employment file
as to the basis for his termination—continue to cause harm to his employment prospects does not

alter this accrual date.^ ^Smith v. Citv of New York, 130 F. Supp. 3d 819,833(S.D.N.Y.

2015)("That [Plaintiff] later found out about a collateral consequence ofthat termination does
not toll the running ofthe limitations period."). Accordingly,Plaintiffs federal constitutional
claims directed at Parilla and Silvery accrued, at latest, on the date ofhis termination, March 16,

2011.^ Plaintiff was clearly aware ofthe denial of his application giving rise to his claimed

Plaintiff also claims generally that the MTA protested his eligibility for unemployment benefits b^ed on its claim
that he "abandoned" his employment(Compl. at 6), and appears to attribute this protest in part to Silvery(id at 1).
Plaintiff does not point to any specific participation by Silvery in opposing his application for unemplo^ent
benefits, however, and the allegation and claim appear to be based solely on Silvery's decision to fire Plamtitt.

Assuming, arsuendo. that this allegation is directed at Silvery, it is time-barred based on the same reasonmg stated

above.

5 The court assumes without deciding that Plaintiffs claims against Parilla—which allege that Parilla conMbuted to
Plaintiffs removal by declaring that Plaintiff was absent without leave—only crystalized into an action^le mjury
when Plaintiff was terminated, rather than on February 17,2011,foUowing the meeting between Plamtiff and
Parilla.

constitutional injuries, and any enduring injury from that is not sufficient to extend the accrual
period.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs constitutional claims against Silvery and Parilla must be
dismissed.

2.

Federal-Law-Based Claims against Ariano and Gomez

Plaintiffs second set ofclaims, brought against Ariano and Gomez,relate to his post-

termination applications for employment with the MTA. As with Silvery and Parilla, Plaintiff

brings claims against Gomez and Anano under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for claimed violations of his
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. (Compl. at 12-13.) He further claims that
each ofthose defendants violated Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964,as amended by the

Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Qd) The court discusses Plaintiffs constitutional and
statutory claims separately and,for the reasons that follow, concludes that bolh sets of clauns
must be dismissed.
a.

Constitutional Claims

Plaintiff contends that actions taken by Ariano and Gomez in connection with his

August 2011 and July 2014 employment applications, respectively, violated his federal
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Plaintiffrecites the same basis for his

claims against each ofthose defendants: That they "deemed Plaintiffineligible [for the position
to which he applied,] refused to disclose the reason....[and] denied [Plaintiffs] requests for
further explanation or a hearing. (Id. at 12(Anano), 13(Gomez).)
i.

Claims against Ariano

At the outset,the court finds that all ofPlaintiffs constitutional claims against Anano are

untimely for the reasons discussed in the preceding section. Though the complaint is not entirely
clear, it appears that all ofPlaintiffs claims against Ariano are based on the rejection ofhis
8

August 2011 application and Ariano's refusal to meet with Plaintiff or explain the basis for that
denial thereafter. tSee supra note 2.1 The cause of action thus accrued against her no later than

December 1,2011,the date on which the Plaintiff suggests Ariano rebuffed his request for a

meeting. Milan. 808 F.3d at 963(2d Cir. 2015)(holding that Section 1983 action accrues when

"plaintiffknows or has reason to know ofthe injury giving rise to the claim"(intemal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). Those claims thus accrued more than three years before Plaintiff
filed this action in November 2015 and so fall outside ofthe applicable statute oflimitations.
Hogan. 738 F.3d at 517.

ii.

Claims against Gomez

Plaintiffs claims against Gomez are concededly timely, and so the court separately
examines the merits ofthe claims against her, turning first to the due process claim. "In order to

prevail on a [Section] 1983 claim for violation ofthe procedural due process rights^^^ guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment,the plaintiff must show(1)that he possessed a protected liberty

or property interest; and(2)that he was deprived ofthat interest without due process. Rehman
V. State Univ. ofN.Y. at Stonv Brook. 596 F. Supp. 2d 643,656(E.D.N.Y. 2009)(citing
McMenemv v. Citv ofRochester. 241 F.3d 279, 285-86(2d Cir. 2001)). An interest is

constitutionally protected where the claimant has a "legitimate claim ofentitlement, a

requirement which is not satisfied by "[u]u abstract need, desire, or umlateral expectation.

® Claims under the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment may also seek redress for violations of a

plaintiffs substantive due process rights. "To prevail on a claim alleging a violation ofsubstantive due process, a
claimant must establish that the govemment conduct at issue was 'so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross

abuse of governmental authority.'" Sutera v. Transp. Sec. Admin..708 F. Supp.2d 304,314(E.D.N.Y.2010)
(citing Natale v. Town ofRidgefield. 170 F.3d 258,263(2d Cir. 1999)). In the court's reading. Plaintiffraises only
a procedural due process claim against Gomez, arguing that she refused to elaborate on the basis for the MTA's
decision not to hire Plaintiff or provide him with a hearing(Compl. at 13), and so the court does not separately
address any potential substantive due process arguments that could be raised.

Abramsonv.Pataki. 278 F.3d 93,99(2d Cir. 2002)(internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

Public employment may give rise to a protected property interest, but only where the
claimant can establish that his expectation in that employment"stem[med] from an independent
source such as a state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support

claims ofentitlements to those benefits." Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethnage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96

F.3d 623,629(2d Cir. 1996)(quoting Bd. ofRegents v. Roth,408 U.S. 564,577(1972)).

Likewise, a state employer's adverse employment action may implicate an individual's protected

liberty interests, but only where "[s]pecial aggravating circumstances" are present. 14 Such
claims are most commonly assessed under the rubric ofthe "stigma-plus" test, which requires a

claimant to allege "(1)the utterance of a statement about her that is injurious to her reputation,

that is capable of being proved false, and that he or she claims is false, and (2)some tangible and
material state-imposed burden...in addition to the stigmatizing statement." Velezv. Levy,401
F.3d 75,87(2d Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to be
actionable, the statement must be "sufficiently public to create or threaten a stigma." Id,

Following the same reasoning, an individual's liberty interests may be implicated on this basis
where an adverse employment action is "given a public airing which impaired the prospects of

the employee for other emplo3mient." Abramson,278 F.3d at lOlj cf. also Donato,96 F.3d at
630("The test of whether a state employer's decision not to rehire an employee denied that
employee due process is met when it deprives her ofthe freedom to take advantage ofother
employment opportunities."(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Examining the allegations in the complaint,the court finds no basis to conclude that

Gomez deprived Plaintiff of any constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. Plaintiff
10

points to no law, contract, policy, rule, or other external source that would justify his expectation
of potential employment with the MTA and, absent such an "independent source," there is no
basis for asserting a property right in such employment.

Donato,96 F.3d at 629. Likewise,

Plaintifffails to allege that Gomez took any action that would deprive him of a protected liberty
interest. At most, his allegations support an inference that Gomez passively received and acted

on defamatory statements made by others. There is no allegation that Gomez herself made or

published any derogatory statements about Plaintiff or his employability or took actions that
would damage Plaintiffs potential to obtain employment in the eyes of other prospective

employers."^ See, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. ofEduc. of Citv ofN.Y.. No. Ol-CV-1991 (NRB),2001
WL 840254, at *7-8(S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2001); Walker v. Daines, No. 08-CV-4861 (JG)(LB),
2009 WL 2182387, at *10(E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2009). Accordingly, as there is no protected
interest at issue. Plaintiffs due process claim against Gomez fails.

Plaintiffs equal protection clause claims are likewise insufficient to merit relief. "The

Equal Protection Clause requires that the Government treat all similarly situated people alike."
Gentile v. Nultv. 769 F. Supp. 2d 573,577-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). "To prove a violation ofthe

Equal Protection Clause ... a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was treated differently than
' court notes that, under the Second Circuit's decision in Velez v. Lew,a"stigma-plus" action may be
The
maintained where one party makes the allegedly injurious statement about a plaintiff and a separate individual

terminates the plaintiffs employment,so long as the latter individual implicitly adopted the defamatory statement in
a way that would allow a "reasonable observer" to determine the statement and the adverse employment action vvere
connected. 401 F.3d at 89. Even assuming that Gomez implicitly adopted the allegedly derogatory information in
Plaintiffs file, however. Plaintiffs claim would fail, as merely internal adoption of a statement without public

stigma does not support a claim of deprivation of a liberty interest in employment.^Donato.96 F.3d at 631
("[S]tigmatizing statements by the government about a discharge only implicate a liberty interest when there is also
public disclosure."); McDonald v. Bd.ofEduc. of Citv ofN.Y.. No. Ol-CV-1991 (NRB),2001 WL 840254, at *7-8
(S.D.N.Y. July 25,2001)(holding that Board ofEducation's purely internal dissemination ofinformation that
hampered plaintiff's ability to obtain employment with that agency did not satisfy publication requirement).
Moreover,the Second Circuit has stated that, in order to be actionable, there must be a close temporal proximity
between the alleged stigmatizing statement and the adverse employment action. The multi-year gap between the
underlying statements and Gomez's actions thus provides a separate reason not to apply this bifurcated stigma

theory to Gomez. Cf Patterson v. Citv ofUtica. 370 F.3d 322,330(2d Cir. 2004)("[Pjlaintiff must show the ^
stigmatizing statements were made concurrently in time to plaintiffs dismissal fi-om government employment.").
11

others similarly situated as a result ofintentional or purposeful discrimination." Barnes v. Ross,

926 F. Supp. 2d 499,506(S.D.N.Y. 2013)(quoting Phillips v. Girdich.408 F.3d 124,129

(2d Cir. 2005)). Here,Plaintiff has not made any allegation that Gomez treated him differently
than any other person, similarly situated or otherwise. Instead, he simply argues that Gomez
harmed him when she deemed him ineligible for employment with the MTA and declined to

explain her rationale for that decision. Even reading the complaint in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff^ his claim that Gomez violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause is thus
unsupportable and must be dismissed.
b.

Equal Employment Opportunity Act Claims

As noted. Plaintiff also brings claims against both Ariano and Gomez for alleged
violations ofTitle VII ofthe Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. These claims are facially insufficient:
"[IJndividual defendants may not be held personally liable for violations of[that] statute."
Fanelli v. New York,51 F. Supp. 3d 219,226-27(E.D.N.Y. 2014)(collecting cases). The claims
against Ariano and Gomez must be dismissed accordingly.
B.

Supplemental Jurisdiction

Because the court has dismissed all federal-law claims asserted by Plaintiff, it declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
Where a court dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may,in its

discretion, decline to exercise supplementaljurisdiction over remaining claims. Sec 42 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3)("The district courts may decline to exercise supplementaljurisdiction over a claim
...if... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction ....").

"[WJhere, as here, the federal claims are eliminated in the early stages of litigation, courts should
generally decline to exercise pendentjurisdiction over remaining state law claims." Klein & Co.
12

Futures. Inc. v. Bd. of Trade of City ofN.Y.,464 F.3d 255,262(2d Cir. 2006). Determination

of whether to exercise such jurisdiction is guided by the "Cohill factors" ofjudicial economy,

convenience,fairness, and comity. Id (citing Camegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill. 484 U.S. 343,
350(1988)).

Here,these factors favor the decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

First, there is no gain in judicial economy to be achieved by retaining the claims, as the court's
involvement with the case to this point has been limited to two opinions, issued nearly two years

apart, addressing only dismissal of claims based on the pleadings. See Chenenskv v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co.. 942 F. Supp. 2d 388,392-93(S.D.N.Y. 2013)(declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over five-year-old case in which the court decided two dispositive motions).

Likewise, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction would not inconvenience the parties or
unfairly disadvantage any ofthem: The litigation remains in its early stages, with no discovery
yet conducted, and all ofthe parties either reside or are employed in New York. (Compl. at 3.)
It would therefore not be difficult to refile and defend the case in state court. Finally,"given that

only state-law issues remain in this case, comity dictates that the [cjourt decline to decide those
disputes." Jackson v. Barden. No. 12-CV-1069(KPF),2018 WL 340014, at *21 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 8,2018).
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons. Defendants' motion to dismiss(Dkt. 26)is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs time-barred federal-law claims against Defendants Silvery and Parilla, time-barred
federal constitutional claims against Defendant Ariano, and Title VII claims against Defendants
Ariano and Gomez are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE,as any attempt to amend these claims
would be futile. Plaintiffs federal constitutional claims against Defendant Gomez are

13

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The court declines to exercise supplementaljurisdiction
over Plaintiffs state-law claims, which are also DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully DIRECTED to enterjudgment accordingly and to mail
a copy ofthis order to pro se Plaintiff Michael J. Kneitel.
SO ORDERED.

s/Nicholas G. Garaufis
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
January fj ,2018

IICHOLAS G. GARAUFCS

United States District Judge

14