Washington v. Gray et al
Filing
7
MEMORANDUM & ORDER: The Court grants Plaintiff's 2 request to proceed in forma pauperis solely for the purpose of this Order. The Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdicti on pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff is granted 30 days to file an amended complaint consistent with the Court's ruling in this Memorandum and Order. Because the Complaint is dismissed, the Court denies Plaintiff 's 5 request to appoint counsel to represent her. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. SO ORDERED by Judge Margo K. Brodie, on 5/5/2016. C/mailed. (Latka-Mucha, Wieslawa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------JEANNINE CAMPBELL WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
PETER GRAY, ESQ., JOSEPH LEDWIDGE, ESQ.,
MARGO T. MURRAY, HONORABLE DIANA
JOHNSON, HONORABLE DAVID VAUGHN,
HONORABLE TERRENCE MCELRATH,
HONORABLE HARRIET THOMPSON,
JOHNATHON SAAT c/o NYC SHERRIFS
DEPARTMENT, MYJ PARTNERS LLC, SRGREM LLC, PONCE DE LEON BANK FEDERAL
BANK, CHASE PRIVATE BANK, BANK OF
NEW YORK MELLON CORPORATION, NYC
BUREAU OF HIGHWAYS, GAMAL HASAN,
PAULA MARILYN FERNANDEZ, MURRAY
SURETY BONDS, FIDELITY DEOSIT OF
MARYLAND, WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
SALVOY SA, RIDGE COUNTY ABSTRACT,
INC., PHILLIP WORBEL, RICHARD
BERNSTEIN, PARK PLACE ENTERPRISES,
LLC, DAVID LUBIN, ESQ., HELFNER, HELFER,
KARDISH, LLP, MICHEAL HELFNER,
STEPHEN CHEPIGA, FRANK SEDDIO,
MIRIAM SUNSHINE, PAUL T. BLUFAT,
WESTERN SURETY BONDING COMPANY,
AMBROISE LAFLUER, DAVID PHILLIPS, 129
PUTNAM LLC, TONINO TERRANOVA,
BURGER KING CORP., CHURCH OF GOD
CHURCH AVENUE, CONRAD MURRAY, AJ
SHOPS LLC, BLOCK 21 CENTURY REAL
ESTATE, NYS DEPARTMENT OF TAX AND
FINANCE, CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF
NEW YORK, INC., MICHELL E. STACO,
PRINCE YEHUDAH, GARY H. ROSE c/o US
MARSHALL SERVICE, CIVILIAN COMPLAINT
REVIEW BOARD, NYC BUILDING
DEPARTMENT, NYC FINANCE DEPARTMENT,
NYC DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE-PARKING
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
15-CV-7197 (MKB)
VIOLATIONS and NYC DEPARTMENT OF
TAXATION,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:
On December 15, 2015, Plaintiff Jeannine Campbell Washington, appearing pro se,
commenced the above-captioned action against fifty-one Defendants, including state court
judges, attorneys, banks, agencies for the City of New York, private individuals and companies.
(Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) Plaintiff states that she asserts her claims pursuant to forty-eight
statutes in the United States Code. (Id. ¶ 2.) On January 14, 2016, Plaintiff requested that
counsel be appointed for her.1 (Docket Entry No. 5.) The Court grants Plaintiff’s request to
proceed in forma pauperis solely for the purpose of this Order. The Court denies Plaintiff’s
request for counsel. For the reasons discussed below, the court dismisses the Complaint.
I.
Background
Plaintiff’s claims appear to concern the ownership of real property at 633 Remsen
Avenue, Brooklyn, NY (the “Property”). Plaintiff refers to the estate of her late grandfather,
James Defreitas, and requests that the Court review cases related to the Property filed in
Surrogate’s Court, Housing Court, Supreme Court and Family Court that appear to determine
ownership of the Property and the sale of the Property at a tax lien auction. (Compl. ¶¶ 3–4.) In
a general manner, Plaintiff alleges that these courts have not complied with “procedural law and
process of summons,” that “illegal transfers and conversions . . . took place to officers of the
1
Plaintiff also notified the Court that she was being detained at the Rose M. Singer
Center on Rikers Island and requested an order to produce her in federal court. (Docket Entry
No. 5.) Plaintiff has since notified the Court that she is no longer incarcerated and, on May 3,
2016, the Court deemed this request moot.
2
court,” and that other unspecified fraud has occurred. (Id. ¶ 3.)
Plaintiff requests that the Court vacate “all previous orders by Supreme Court and
[Surrogate’s] Court” and “dismiss all motions before Family Court.” (Id. ¶ 4.) She seeks “full
payment” of a lien apparently associated with the Property, “plus interest and penalties after
default.” (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks “full prosecution and imprisonment for all [D]efendants of
crimes against the government” and the recovery of “[a]ll personal property and assets of any
and all [D]efendants found guilty.”2 (Id.)
II. Discussion
a.
Standard of review
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir.
2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations contained
in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must be mindful that a plaintiff’s
pleadings should be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104–105 (1976)); see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after
Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”).
Nevertheless, the Court is required to dismiss sua sponte an in forma pauperis action if the Court
2
Plaintiff attaches to the Complaint a letter sent to other individuals and agencies that
makes similar claims. (Letter dated Dec. 15, 2015, annexed to Compl. as Unmarked Ex.)
3
determines it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). In
addition, if the Court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court
must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v.
Hellas Telecomms., S.À.R.L., 790 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2015) (A district court may dismiss an action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) when the court “lacks the
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it . . . .” (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201
F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000))).
b.
Rooker–Feldman doctrine
Plaintiff seeks to vacate decisions entered by various state courts — apparently Supreme
Court, Surrogate’s Court and Family Court decisions related to the Property and the estate of
Plaintiff’s grandfather. However, under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, federal courts generally
lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims that seek review of adverse state court
judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)
(“[A] United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in
judicial proceedings.”); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (holding that “no
court of the United States other than [the Supreme Court] could entertain a proceeding to reverse
or modify [a state court’s] judgment for errors”); see also Teichmann v. New York, 769
F.3d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 2014) (denying relief “[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] only seeks a
declaration that his state conviction is invalid, [because the plaintiff] seeks nothing more than
review of a state court judgment”); Galtieri v. Kelly, 441 F. Supp. 2d 447, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(“[F]ederal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from
4
state-court judgments.” (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d
Cir. 2005))).
Specifically, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to
consider a plaintiff’s claim when that plaintiff is “complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered prior to the commencement of district court proceedings and inviting district
court review of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2010)
(explaining the rule in Exxon and rejecting an as-applied challenge to New York state law that
invited review of New York state court judgment). The underlying theory justifying this
doctrine is “the principle, expressed by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, that within the federal
judicial system, only the Supreme Court may review state-court decisions.” Hoblock, 422 F.3d
at 85; see also Williams v. 2720 Realty Co., No. 12-CV-6408, 2013 WL 55685, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 3, 2013) (“[O]nly the United States Supreme Court is vested with jurisdiction over appeals
from final state court judgments.”). Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, federal courts must
abstain from considering claims when the following four requirements are met:
(1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of
injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites
district court review of that judgment, and (4) the state court
judgment was entered before the plaintiff’s federal suit commenced.
McKithen, 626 F.3d at 154. The first and fourth requirements are considered to be procedural
requirements, whereas the second and third are seen as substantive requirements. Morrison v.
City of New York, 591 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2010).
It appears from the vague allegations in the Complaint that the procedural requirements
are met here. Plaintiff challenges the decisions of the Supreme Court, Surrogate’s Court and
Family Court, and she states that the Property has since been “auction[ed] . . . off in [a] tax lien
5
sale,” implying both that she has lost claims to the Property and that court proceedings involving
the Property or the distribution of her grandfather’s estate have concluded. (Compl. ¶ 3.) The
substantive requirements are also met, as Plaintiff alleges that various courts, judges, and court
staff have failed to comply with procedural laws, refused to demand production of records from
unspecified banks, and committed fraud, which Plaintiff appears to allege resulted in her being
defrauded out of her legitimate claim to the Property. (See id.) Plaintiff expressly requests that
the Court vacate unspecified orders entered by these courts. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Because of the nature of
Plaintiff’s claims, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine precludes the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over these claims. The Complaint is therefore dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3
3
The Court notes that even if it was not deprived of jurisdiction over this matter based
on the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, the Complaint would still fail against the various named judges
based on judicial immunity. See Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009) (“It is well
settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their
judicial actions. . . . [E]ven allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial
immunity.”); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity
is an immunity from suit, not just from the ultimate assessment of damages.” (citation omitted));
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (holding that persons “performing adjudicatory
functions within a federal agency are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for
their judicial acts”). Plaintiff’s claims against state court judges in their official capacity also fail
based on the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which bars federal court action against a
state, its agencies or state agents absent a waiver of immunity or congressional legislation
specifically overriding immunity. See Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S.
247, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011) (“A State may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure
and in some circumstances Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent
waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person’s suit against a
State.” (citation omitted)); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99–100
(1984) (same); Mamot v. Board of Regents, 367 F. App’x 191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The
Eleventh Amendment bars such a federal [civil rights] action against a state or its agencies
absent a waiver of immunity or congressional legislation specifically overriding immunity. It is
well-established that New York has not consented to [such] suits in federal court . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
6
c.
No right to criminal prosecutions
Plaintiff appears to seek the criminal prosecution of all Defendants “for crimes against
the government.” (Id.) A private citizen does not have a constitutional right to initiate or compel
the initiation of criminal proceedings against another individual. See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454
U.S. 83, 86 (1981) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973)); Ostrowski v.
Mehltretter, 20 F.App’x. 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2001); Yashaahla v. M.H.A.N.Y, No. 05-CV-4963, 2006
WL 845586, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006) (“Criminal prosecutions are within the exclusive
province of the public prosecutor who has complete discretion over the decision to initiate,
continue or cease prosecution.” (citations omitted)). Therefore, any claims seeking to initiate
criminal prosecutions are dismissed.
d.
Rule 8
Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff’s complaint must
include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The “statement should be plain because the principal function of
pleadings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the adverse party fair notice of
the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo,
861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (holding that a complaint “easily satisfies” Rule 8 because it gave “fair
notice” of the claims and “the grounds upon which they rest”); Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d
73, 79 (2d Cir. 2004) (defining “fair notice” as “that which will enable the adverse party to
answer and prepare for trial, allow the application of res judicata, and identify the nature of the
case so that it may be assigned the proper form of trial” (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d
83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995))). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed
7
factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Complaint fails to give the fifty-one Defendants notice of Plaintiff’s claims and fails
to allege facts against each individual and each company or corporation named as a Defendant.
Plaintiff’s statement of facts lists allegations against “defendants” generally, but fails to
distinguish Defendants’ conduct or allege facts against any individual Defendants. See, e.g.,
Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33 (2d Cir. 2001) (“By lumping all the defendants
together in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct, [the plaintiff’s]
complaint failed to satisfy this minimum standard, even after the district court graciously
accorded him several opportunities to correct its manifest flaws.”). Moreover, the Complaint
fails to include factual allegations stating how Defendants violated any of the federal statutes
cited by Plaintiff. (See Compl. ¶ 2 (listing nearly fifty sections of the United States Code).)
e.
Leave to amend
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to pursue claims that do not challenge determinations
made by state courts, Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days’ leave to file an amended complaint in
accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Any amended complaint must contain a brief
factual description of each claim asserted. For each defendant named in the caption of the
amended complaint, Plaintiff must include a brief description of what that defendant did or failed
to do, and how that act or omission caused Plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff may not rely on legal
conclusions and must allege clear and concise facts to support each of her claims. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a). The facts relevant to each claim should be alleged in chronological order by date.
Each event should be described in a separate numbered paragraph and Plaintiff should provide
the dates and locations of all relevant events. The amended complaint must be captioned
8
“Amended Complaint” and bear the same docket number as this Memorandum and Order.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, without
prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
Fed. R. Civ. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff is granted 30 days to file an amended complaint consistent with
the Court’s ruling in this Memorandum and Order. Because the Complaint is dismissed, the
Court denies Plaintiff’s request to appoint counsel to represent her. The Court certifies pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and
therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
SO ORDERED:
s/ MKB
MARGO K. BRODIE
United States District Judge
Dated: May 5, 2016
Brooklyn, New York
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?