Scully v. Chase Bank USA, National Association et al
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Plaintiff's motion to withdraw the Amended Complaint(Dkt. 27 ) is DENIED; Plaintiff's objections (Dkt. 28 ) to Judge Levy's R&R are OVERRULED;and the R&R (Dkt. 26 ) is ADOPTED IN PART. Ac cordingly, Defendants' Motions (Dkt. 24 ) are GRANTED with respect to the motion for dismissal and DENIED AS MOOT with respect to the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's claims pertaining to mortgage payments and assignments are DISM ISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of standing; Plaintiff's claims pertaining to wrongful foreclosure, credit rating, and quiet title are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the case. The Clerk is further directed to send a copy of this order to pro se Plaintiff. So Ordered by Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis on 7/7/2017. (c/m to pro se plaintiff; fwd'd for jgm) (Lee, Tiffeny)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
CHASE BANK USA,NA,and U.S. BANK
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS,United States District Judge.
In this action, pro se Plaintiff Winston Scully alleges misconduct relating to a residential
mortgage by Defendants Chase Bank USA,NA (a.k.a. JP Morgan Chase, Chase Bank, and
Chase)("Chase"); and U.S. Bank National Association("U.S. Bank"). fSee Am. Compl.
(Dkt. 16).) On October 17,2016, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment("Defendants' Motions"). (Defs. Mots.(Dkt. 24).) The court referred
Defendants' Motions to Magistrate Judge Robert M.Levy for a report and recommendation
("R&R"). (Nov. 28, 2016, Order(Dkt. 25)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(1)).) On May 31,2017, Judge Levy issued an R&R recommending that Defendants'
Motions be granted. (R&R(Dkt. 26).) Plaintiffthen moved to withdraw the Amended
Complaint and dismiss all claims without prejudice. (PI. Mot. to Withdraw(Dkt. 27).) Plaintiff
also filed objections to the R&R. (PI. Objs.(Dkt. 28).) For the reasons stated below. Plaintiffs
motion to withdraw is DENIED;Plaintiffs objections to the R&R are OVERRULED;and the
R&R is ADOPTED IN PART. The court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss and DENIES
AS MOOT Defendants' motion for summaryjudgment. The case is DISMISSED.
The court assumes the parties' familiarity with the prior proceedings in this action, and
reviews the factual and procedural background only as necessary to adjudicate the parties'
A. Plaintiffs Allegations
Plaintiffresides at a property located on the Grand Central Parkway in Queens County,
New York (the "Property"). (Am. Compl.^ 1.) The Property was encumbered by a mortgage.
(See id. ^ 5(iv)(referring to "plaintiffs note and mortgage"); PI. Ltrs.(Am. Compl.,Ex.6)
(referring to a "Promissory Note made payable to VirtualBank").) The court discerns five
distinct legal claims in Plaintiffs allegations,^ all of which rest on the premise that neither
Defendant ever had a valid claim to the promissory note underlying mortgage, and that
Defendants therefore did not have a valid claim to collect on or reassign the mortgage itself.
(See, e.g.. PI. Mot. to Am.(Dkt. 13) at 1 (arguing that Chase "was never the owner ofthe
promissory note and [therefore] had no legal right to assign [the] mortgage to U.S. Bank").)
First,from October 2008 to November 2013, Chase allegedly "engaged in an unlawful
and illegal act to collect mortgage payments from Plaintiff totaling $164,917.80"(the "Payment
Plaintiffs second claim concerns an "Assignment of Mortgage" filed in February 2013
with the City Register ofthe City ofNew York, which purported to reassign a mortgage on the
Property from Chase to U.S. Bank. (Id. H 5(ii); see also Assignment of Mortgage(Am. Compl.,
The court is conscious that that a pro se complaint"must be construed liberally to raise the strongest arguments it
suggests." Walker v. Schult. 717 F.3d 119, 124(2d Cir. 2013)(internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations
Ex. 4)(Dkt. 16 ECF p.16-19).) Plaintiff asserts that this reassignment was "without any legal
basis"(the "Assignment Claim"). (Am. Compl. K 5(ii).)
Plaintiffs third and fourth claims relate to an attempted foreclosure on the Property. In
April 2014, U.S. Bank "filed a Notice ofPendency with the county Clerk, Queens County," and
also "filed a Summons and Foreclosure Complaint against the Plaintiff' in New York Supreme
Court. (Am.Compl.^ 5(iv).) On March 13, 2015,the state court dismissed the action for lack
of standing, and offered the following explanation:
[U.S. Bank] did not submit an affidavit by someone with personal
knowledge of the facts that stated how and when it became the
holder or assignee ofthe note and mortgage.... Without evidence
that it possessed or was assigned the original note at the time [the
foreclosure action was initiated, U.S. Bank] cannot rely on its
possession ofa copy ofthe note to establish its standing.
U.S. BankNaf1 Assoc. v. Scullv (the "Foreclosure Dismissal"),No. 5436/14, slip op. at 3(N.Y.
Sup. Ct., Mar. 13, 2015).^ Plaintiff argues that, dismissal notwithstanding, he suffered
"irreparable harm" as a result of"the Wrongful Foreclosure" action (the "Wrongful Foreclosure
Claim"). (Am. Compl. at 3.) In particular, he alleges that his "credit rating was adversely
affected" by the foreclosure proceedings (the "Credit Rating Claim"). (Id. H 5(v).)
Plaintiff requests the following relief: compensatory and punitive damages; quiet title to
the Property (the "Quiet Title Claim"); and an order removing the foreclosure from Plaintiff's
credit report. (Id.)
B. The Ri&R and Subsequent Filings
On March 31,2017, Judge Levy issued an R&R recommending that the case be
dismissed. (See generallv R&R.) Judge Levy recommended that the Payment and Assignment
2 The Foreclosure Dismissal slip opinion is available on the docket in Exhibit 5 to the Amended Complaint. (See
Claims be dismissed for lack of standing (id. at 7-10), and that the Credit Rating and Quiet Title
Claims be dismissed based on Plaintiffs failure to plead sufficient facts(id, at 10-11). The R&R
did not construe the Wrongful Foreclosure Claim as a separate cause of action, and therefore did
not address it.
The parties had 14 days from receipt ofthe R&R to file any objections. (Id at 12.) See
also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Within that 14-day window.Plaintiff not
only filed objections, but also moved to withdraw the Amended Complaint and dismiss the
action without prejudice. (PI. Objs.; PI. Mot. to Withdraw.) Defendants responded to Plaintiffs
objections and also oppose the motion to withdraw. (Defs. Opp'n to PI. Mot to Withdraw &
Resp. to PI. Objs.(Dkt. 30).)
The court denies Plaintiffs motion to withdraw the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff has
not offered any justification for the court to dismiss the action without prejudice in lieu of
adjudicating Defendants' Motions. Turning to the R&R,the court finds Plaintiffs objections to
be without merit except insofar as Plaintiff points out the R&R's silence on Plaintiffs Wrongful
Foreclosure Claim. The court finds that Plaintiffs claims must all be dismissed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). In light ofthis holding, the court need not address Defendants'
motion for summaryjudgment or the portions ofthe R&R that discuss it.
A. Plaintiffs Motion to Withdraw
1. Legal Standard
Plaintiffs motion to withdraw is govemed under Rule 41(a)(2), which provides that"an
action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs request only by court order, on terms that the court
considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).^ "Factors relevant to the consideration ofa motion
to dismiss without prejudice" include the following:
 the plaintiffs diligence in bringing the motion; any "undue
vexatiousness" on plaintiffs part;  the extent to which the suit
has progressed, including the defendant's effort and expense in
preparation for trial;  the duplicative expense of relitigation; and
 the adequacy of plaintiffs explanation for the need to dismiss.
Zagano v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d 12,14(2d Cir. 1990)(citation omitted).^ "These factors are
not necessarily exhaustive and no one ofthem, singly or in combination with another, is
dispositive." Kwan v. Schlein. 634 F.3d 224,230(2d Cir. 2011).
Plaintiffs argument in favor of withdrawal rests entirely on the third Zagano factor ("the
extent to which the suit has progressed"). Plaintiff contends that that "[t]his case is still in its
preliminary stages" because "there has been no hearing on the complaint, no trial date has been
set and discovery has not even commenced." (PI. Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Withdraw & Objs.
("PI. Reply")(Dkt. 31) at 2.) That may be so, but Plaintiff has already called on the court to
adjudicate motions to remand and to amend the complaint,(see May 15, 2016, Mem.& Order
(Dkt. 12); June 13,2016, Order(Dkt. 15)), and Judge Levy has already undertaken a full review
of Defendants' Motions(see R&R). The third Zagano factor therefore does not provide strong
support for either outcome.
The court fmds, however,that "each ofthe [other Zagano! factors weighs against
dismissal" without prejudice. George v. ProFl Disposables Inf1. Inc.. No. 15-CV-3385(RA),
^ Civil plaintiffs may withdraw their pleadings as ofright under two circumstances, neither of which applies here:
(1)"before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summaryjudgment," and(2)after filing "a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
A second "lme of authority"—^which does not apply to the circumstances presented in this case—cautions that
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2)"would be improper if'the defendant would suffer some plain legal prejudice other
than the mere prospect ofa second lawsuit.'" Kwan v. Schlein. 634 F.3d 224,230(2d Cir. 2011)(quoting Camilli
V. Grimes. 436 F.3d 120, 123(2d Cir. 2006)).
2017 WL 1740395, at *2(S.D.N.Y. May 2,2017)(emphasis added). Critically, Plaintiff has not
offered any explanation for why he seeks to withdraw his pleadings, or why he waited to file his
motion until after Judge Levy issued a 12-page R&R analyzing Defendants' Motions. That
failure speaks directly to the fifth Zagano factor ("the adequacy of plaintiffs explanation for the
need to dismiss"), and colors the court's consideration ofthe remaining factors as well.
After reviewing Defendants' motion papers. Plaintiff could have conceded the nonviability ofsome or all claims, or could have sought leave to make curative amendments to his
pleadings. Instead, Plaintiff made the tactical decision to moimt a full opposition and wait for
Judge Levy's R&R. The R&R's recommendations were not favorable, and now Plaintiff seeks
to withdraw without prejudice, avoiding the binding impact of an order adopting the R&R. That
strategy cannot be construed as "diligent." Absent any proffered justification. Plaintiffs actions
border on vexatious: it seems Plaintiff seeks to reformulate and relitigate his claims in a new
Particularly in light ofthe fact that Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to amend the
complaint,the court declines to permit withdrawal without prejudice. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
motion to withdraw is denied.
B. Review of a "Report and Recommendation"
A district court may "accept, reject, or modify,in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). "[T]he district court
'may adopt those portions ofthe Report to which no objections have been made and which are
not facially erroneous.'" Locurto v. United States. No. lO-CV-4589(NGG)
2016 WL 4257550, at *2(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12,2016)(quoting La Torres v. Walker.
216 F. Supp. 2d 157,159(S.D.N.Y. 2000^)1: see also Porter v. Potter, 219 F. App'x 112
(2d Cir. 2007)(summary order); cf 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The court shall review de novo any portions ofthe R&R to which a party timely objects.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If, however,"a party 'makes only conclusory or general objections, or
simply reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only
for clear error.'" Locurto. 2016 WL 4257550, at *2(quoting Pall Com,v. Entegris. Inc.. 249
F.R.D. 48,51 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)). In addition,"courts 'ordinarily refuse to consider arguments,
case law and/or evidentiary material which could have been, but was not, presented to the
magistrate judge in the first instance.'" Id (quoting Kennedv v. Adamo. No. 02-CV-1776
(RML),2006 WL 3704784, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2006), affd 323 F. App'x 34
(2d Cir. 2009)(summary order)).
"[T]he court must 'liberally construe [filings] submitted by pro se litigants, reading such
submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.'" Moore v. Newton,No. 14-CV-6473
(CLP),2016 WL 7011476, at *5(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1,2016) rquoting Bertin v. United
States, 478 F.3d 489,491 (2d Cir. 2007)). "However, a court 'need not argue a pro se litigant's
case nor create a case for the pro se which does not exist.'" Obanva v. Select Portfolio Servicing.
Inc.. No. 14-CV-5255(NGG)
(LB),2015 WL 5793603, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,2015)(quoting
Molina V. New York. 956 F. Supp. 257,259(E.D.N.Y.1995)).
C. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
1. Legal Standard
"On a motion to dismiss, all factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and
all inferences are drawn in the plaintiffs favor." Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics. Inc..
823 F.3d 51,59(2d Cir. 2016)(quoting Littleiohn v. Citv of N.Y.. 795 F.3d 297,306(2d Cir.
2015)). However,that leniency is "inapplicable to legal conclusions" or "[tjhreadbare recitals of
the elements ofa cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
556 U.S. 662,678 (2009). "Where, as here, the complaint was filed pro se. it must be construed
liberally to raise the strongest arguments it suggests. Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must state
a plausible claim for relief." Walker v. Schult 717 F.3d 119,124(2d Cir. 2013)(internal
quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). Defendants' arguments invoke two bases for
dismissing Plaintiffs claims: dismissal for "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction" under
Rule 12(b)(1), and for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" under
Rule 12(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
a. Dismissalfor Lack ofStanding Under Rule 12(b)(1)
"Article III ofthe U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction offederal courts to 'Cases' or
'Controversies.'" Keepers. Inc. v. Citv of Milford, 807 F.3d 24,38(2d Cir. 2015), cert, denied
sub nom. Keepers. Inc. v. Citv of Milford. Conn., 137 S. Ct. 277(2016)(footnote omitted). As
part ofthatjurisdictional limitation,"plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue" by
demonstrating that(1)the defendants have caused them to suffer a redressable injury; and (2)the
plaintiffs seek to vindicate their own legal rights rather than rights belonging to third parties. Id
at 38-39 (citations omitted)(discussing the requirements of constitutional and prudential
standing); see also CBF Industria de Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings. Inc.. 850 F.3d 58, 77(2d Cir.
2017)("The complaining party bears the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively and plausibly
suggest that it has standing to sue."(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
b. Dismissalfor Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)
To defeat a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6),"a complaint must plead specific facts
sufficient to support a plausible inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
While 'the plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'" Doe v. Columbia Univ.. 831 F.3d 46,
54(2d Cir. 2016)(internal citations omitted)(quoting lobal. 556 U.S. at 678).
2. The Payment and Assigmnent Claims
Judge Levy recommended that the Payment and Assignment Claims be dismissed for
lack of constitutional and prudential standing. "Broadly construed," these claims "challengeQ
the right of defendant Chase Bank to have collected [Plaintiffs] mortgage payments, and the
propriety" ofthe February 2013 mortgage assignment to U.S. Bank. (R&R at 7.) However,"it
is well established in the Second Circuit that mortgagors lack standing to bring claims against
mortgagees based on alleged defective assignments or breaches oftrust agreements, because
mortgagors have no actual or concrete injury stemming from any deficiencies in the transfers of
their mortgage loans." (Id (collecting cases).) See Raiamin v. Deutsche BankNaf1 Tr. Co.. 757
F.3d 79, 84-86(2d Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff objects that "[sjtanding is not an issue here," but offers no factual or legal
support for that claim. (PI. Objs.^ 12.) This type of"conclusory or general objection" is not
sufficient to justify de novo review. Plaintiff also objects to various factual findings in the R&R
(see, e.g., id.
2-4), but never calls into question the dispositive facts for the purpose of
standing: as Judge Levy explained. Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable injury because he "does not
dispute that he received loan proceeds[,][n]or does he allege that... he has been subjected to
excessive or duplicative billings." (R&R at 8 (citations omitted).)
The Amended Complaint is sparse on details, but Plaintiff does clearly allege that the
Property was encumbered by a mortgage. (See Am. Compl.15(iv)(referring to "plaintiffs note
and mortgage"); PI. Ltrs.(referring to a "Promissory Note made payable to VirtualBank").) In
addition,"[i]t is well established that a district court may rely on matters of public record in
deciding a motion to dismiss." Fairlev v. Collins, No.09-CV-6894(PGG),2011 WL 1002422,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011)(collecting cases). New York's online Automated City Register
Information System ("ACRIS")^ contains records ofPlaintiffs initial mortgage with
VirtualBank, dated January 21,2004, and a mortgage reassignment from VirtualBank to Chase,^
dated February 3, 2004. ACRIS therefore allows the court to connect the dots between the
original mortgagee and the Defendants in this case.
Plaintiffs objection do not meaningfully challenge any aspect of Judge Levy's legal
analysis, and so the court reviews the R&R for clear error. The court finds that the R&R
properly applied binding precedent on the issue of mortgagor constitutional standing, and
therefore adopts the recommendation to dismiss the Payment and Assignment Claims on that
basis. This dismissal is without prejudice. John v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp.. Inc.. — F.Sd —,
No. 16-986-CV,2017 WL 2381191, at *2(2d Cir. June 2,2017)("[Wjhere a complaint is
dismissed for lack of Article III standing, the dismissal must be without prejudice, rather than
with prejudice."(quoting Carter v. HealthPort Techs.. LLC,822 F.3d 47,54(2d Cir. 2016))).
3. The Wrongful Foreclosure Claim
Plaintifffaults the R&R for not discussing Plaintiffs Wrongful Foreclosure Claim.
(PI. Objs. 14.) Though Plaintiff was not explicit in asserting wrongful foreclosure as a distinct
cause of action, the term "wrongful foreclosure" does appear in the Amended Complaint
(Am. Compl. at 3), and Plaintiff explained in his motion to amend that he "[sought] to add an
allegation for  wrongful foreclosure." (PI. Mot. to Am. at 2.) The court will therefore apply^
novo review to this claim.
^ Automated City Register Information System. Office ofthe City Register, N.Y.C. Dept. of Fin., http://a836acris.nvc.gov/CP/. Records for the Property may be found by searching ACRIS for Block 9953, Lot 15, in the
borough of Queens.
^ The assignee in the February 3,2004, assignment is "Chase Manhattan Bank, USA," a prior incarnation of Chase
Bank USA,NA. See Chase Manhattan Bank USA.National Association. NatT Info Ctr., Fed. Reserve,
https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/InstitutionProfile.aspx7parID Rssd=489913&DarDT END=20000410
(last visited June 26,2017).
Under New York law, a wrongful foreclosure action may only be asserted based on a
successful jnHprnent offoreclosure, not merely an attempted foreclosure.
Kasnrzvk. 281 A.D. 346, 348(N.Y. App. Div. 1953)("The alleged wrong was completed upon
the entry ofthe judgment offoreclosure and sale on August 28,1933 and the cause ofaction [for
wrongful foreclosure], if any, accrued at that time."). "Without a 'factual basis supporting an
allegation of[actual] foreclosure, a cause of action for wrongful foreclose cannot survive.'"
CahVaire v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Svs.. Inc., No. 14-CV-1542(CBA)
895741, at *9(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6,2017)(quoting Pawaroo v. Countrywide Bank. No.09-CV2924(ARR)
(SMG),2010 WL 1048822, at *7(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010)).
U.S. Bank's attempted foreclosure was dismissed, as described above. (See Am. Compl.
T[ 5(iv).) See also Foreclosure Dismissal. No. 5436/14. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a
claim for wrongful foreclosure. The Wrongful Foreclosure Claim is dismissed with prejudice.
4. The Credit Rating Claim
Judge Levy recommended that the Credit Rating Claim be dismissed based on Plaintiffs
failure to properly allege a cause of action under any applicable federal or state law. (See R&R
at 10 n.3.) Rather, Plaintiff"appears to have assumed that, because the foreclosure action was
dismissed for failure to provide adequate proof of standing, U.S. Bank must have engaged in
some type of unlawful conduct." (Id.; see, e.g.. Am. Compl.^ 5(iv)(mischaracterizing the
Foreclosure Dismissal as an affirmative determination "that US Bank had no legal basis to ...
hold [Plaintiffs] note and mortgage").) Plaintiffs objections do not appear to address any
aspect ofthe Credit Rating Claim. Therefore, the court reviews for clear error. Finding none,
the court adopts the R&R's analysis and dismisses the Credit Rating Claim with prejudice.
5. The Quiet Title Claim
Judge Levy recommended dismissal ofthe Quiet Title claim because, although the
Amended Complaint lists "quiet title" among the relief sought,"the Amended Complaint does
not contain a single allegation that either references a quiet title claim or would otherwise
support the assertion of one." (R&R at 11 (footnote omitted),) Plaintiffs objections contain
language that track elements ofNew York's quiet title cause of action. Compare PL Objs. 6
("The 'assignments of mortgage' have caused a cloud on the title ofthe property.") with
Acocella V. Bank ofN.Y. Mellon, 127 A.D.3d 891, 892-93(N.Y. App. Div. 2015)("To maintain
an equitable quiet title claim, a plaintiff must allege... the existence ofa removable 'cloud' on
"). Nonetheless, Plaintiff has never disputed that a mortgage lien was,in fact,
attached to the Property. The issue of whether either Defendant was properly assigned all
beneficial interest under the mortgage is distinct from the issue of whether the property was
properly encumbered by a mortgage in the first instance.^ The court therefore overrules
Plaintiffs objection, adopts the R&R's recommendation, and dismisses the Quiet Title Claim
For the reasons stated above. Plaintiffs motion to withdraw the Amended Complaint
(Dkt. 27)is DENIED;Plaintiffs objections(Dkt. 28)to Judge Levy's R&R are OVERRULED;
and the R&R(Dkt. 26)is ADOPTED IN PART. Accordingly,Defendants' Motions(Dkt. 24)
are GRANTED with respect to the motion for dismissal and DENIED AS MOOT with respect to
the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs claims pertaining to mortgage payments and
' court notes, in addition, that ACRIS lists a satisfaction of mortgage for the Property under Plaintiffs name,
dated June 28, 2016. To the extent that the satisfaction discharged the lien on the Property, any quiet title claim
concerning that lien would appear to be moot.
assignments are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of standing; PlaintifPs claims
pertaining to wrongful foreclosure, credit rating, and quiet title are DISMISSED WITH
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the case. The Clerk is further
directed to send a copy ofthis order to pro se Plaintiff.
s/Nicholas G. Garaufis
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS
United States District Judge
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