Local Union No. 1 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada v. P.A.C. Heating, Inc.
OPINION & ORDER: Petitioner's 15 motion for summary judgment to confirm the award is granted and respondent's 24 motion to vacate the award is denied. Further, petitioner is awarded pre-judgment interest in the amount of 9% per annum from the date of the award to the date of judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.. Ordered by Judge Nina Gershon on 3/23/2017. (Barrett, C)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LOCAL UNION NO. 1 OF THE UNITED
ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN &
APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING &
PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE
UNITED STATES & CANADA, by
MICHAEL APUZZO, as Financial
OPINION & ORDER
No. 16-cv-547 (NG) (RML)
IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT E.D.NX.
* MAR 22017 *
- V. -
P.A.C. HEATING, INC., d/b/a/ P.A.C.
PLUMBING, HEATING & AIR
GERSHON, United States District Judge:
Local Union No. 1 of the United Association of Journeyman and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada (the "Union" or "petitioner")
brings this action to confirm a labor arbitration award of February 5, 2015 in the amount of $67,500
(the "Award") against P.A.C. Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning ("PAC" or "respondent").
It now moves for summary judgment to confirm the award pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Respondent opposes this motion and
moves for summary judgment seeking that the arbitration award be vacated. For the reasons set
forth below, I grant petitioner's motion to confirm the award and deny respondent's motion to
The historical facts are undisputed. The Union is a labor organization that is the exclusive
bargaining agent for all journey-level plumbers and apprentices employed by employers that are
members of the Association of Contracting Plumbers of New York City, Inc. (the "Association")
PAC was a member of the Association until August 29, 2012, at which time the Association
terminated its membership. The Association informed the Union of PAC's termination on
September 17, 2012. After receiving this notice from the Association, the Union wrote PAC on
September 24, 2012 informing it that, "since you are no longer a signatory contractor with the
[Association], it is necessary for you to sign the enclosed [Agreement]." Pet. Ex. E. at 9.
Central to this case are three collective bargaining agreements between the Union and the
Association, which it negotiated on behalf of its members ("Agreements"). The first is referred to
as the "A-Agreement," which was in effect from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2016. The other
two are referred to as the "MES Agreements." The first MES Agreement was in effect from
October 1, 2010 through September 30, 2013. The second MES Agreement was in effect from
October 1, 2013 through September 30, 2016.
The Agreements provide that they continue in full force and effect during their terms and
that an entity wishing to abrogate any of the Agreements must notify the Association and the Union
180 days prior to the expiration date of the Agreement. PAC did not send a request to abrogate
the Agreements until December 31, 2014.
Pursuant to the Agreements, disputes and controversies arising out of the Agreements are
referred to an arbitration committee comprised of an equal number of members appointed by the
Union and the Association. According to the Union, PAC did not comply with certain provisions
of the Agreements, including its failure to: post a bond; obtain green cards on jobs performed; hire
only union laborers; pay fringe benefit contributions; and use the proper ratio of journeymen to
On December 16, 2014, the Union requested arbitration, and PAC was notified on January
7, 2015 that the arbitration hearing would be held on January 29, 2015. On January 9, 2015, PAC's
attorney objected to the arbitration. An arbitration hearing was held on January 29, 2015, at which
the Union appeared, but PAC did not.
On February 5, 2015, the arbitration committee issued its written decision (the "Decision").
It found that PAC was bound by the Agreements because it did not request to abrogate them until
December of 2014. In reaching this conclusion, the committee found that, though PAC's
membership in the Association had been terminated, that did not occur until after the A-Agreement
went into effect. Therefore, PAC was bound by this A-Agreement and had to abrogate it if it
wanted to forgo its obligations, which it did not do. As to the MES Agreements, the arbitration
committee concluded that PAC never requested to abrogate the first MES Agreement, thus
remaining bound, and that its failure to abrogate the first MES Agreement also caused it to be
bound to the second MES Agreement. Also influencing the committee's Decision was that PAC
continued to submit fringe benefit contributions to the Union throughout 2014, which, according
to the committee, demonstrated PAC's intent to remain bound. Ultimately, the committee imposed
a fine of $67,500 for various breaches of the Agreements, and it directed PAC to pay this fine by
March 1, 2015, which PAC did not do. The Union then filed this petition to confirm the arbitration
award on February 2, 2016.
Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate if the
movant demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
"A dispute is not genuine unless the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party." Shiflett v. Scores Holding Co., Inc., 601 Fed. Appx. 28, 29 (2d Cir.
2015) (internal quotation omitted). A court is required to "construe all evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in its
favor." Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 740 (2d Cir. 2010). The moving party bears the
burden of proof that no genuine issues of fact exist, but, once it satisfies this initial burden, the
burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. "Summary judgment is appropriate where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Rosenfeld v. Hostos Cmty.
Coll., 554 Fed. Appx. 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2014).
PAC argues that, at the time of the actions underlying the committee's award, it was not
bound by any of the Agreements. According to PAC, once the Association terminated its
membership on August 29, 2012, it ceased being a party to any of the Agreements.
Respondent's Opp. at 5. Because it was not a party to the Agreements, PAC argues, the arbitration
award, which was based on PAC violating these Agreements, should be vacated. The Union
contends that PAC's termination from the Association is insufficient to abrogate its responsibilities
pursuant to the Agreements. Rather, the Agreements set forth specific procedures that required
PAC to provide 180 days' notice if it desired to abrogate. Since PAC did not provide such notice
until 2014, it is the Union's position that PAC continued to be bound by the Agreements.
As a threshold issue, it must be determined if PAC was bound to arbitrate whether its
termination from the Association also terminated its obligations under the Agreements. The issue
of arbitrability arises when there is a question as to whether "there is even a valid agreement to
arbitrate in effect at a particular time." Abram Landau Real Estate v. Bevona, 123 F.3d 69, 72-73
(2d Cir. 1997). Here, PAC argues that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate in effect after
August 29, 2012.
The question whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists usually arises in one of two
(1) whether the parties ever entered into an arbitration agreement at all, and (2)
whether an arbitration agreement has expired or been terminated. When parties
disagree about whether they ever entered into an arbitration agreement, a court
decides that issue, absent a clear and unmistakable delegation of that authority to an
arbitrator . . . The question of whether an otherwise valid collective bargaining
agreement has expired or has been terminated is different. In these situations, the
parties' dispute is not really over what an arbitration clause provides; rather, it is a
dispute over the interpretation of other clauses of the collective bargaining
agreement, e.g., termination clauses, or. . . an 'evergreen clause.' . . . Where the
agreement contains a sweeping arbitration clause covering all disputes involving the
meaning of terms and provisions of the agreement and where the arbitration clause
does not expressly exclude disputes over the termination provision or the
'evergreen' clause, disputes over these matters should be submitted to arbitration.
Id. (internal citations omitted). If the situation falls into the latter category—whether an arbitration
agreement has expired—so long as there is a "broad arbitration clause" and "at least  a colorable
claim under the contract that the contract has not terminated," then the issue of termination is for
the arbitrator. Ottley v. She epshead Nursing Home, 688 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1982).
A-Agreement and First MES Agreement
The Association terminated PAC's membership on August 29, 2012. At that time, two of
the three Agreements at issue were already in effect—the A-Agreement (which came into effect
on July 1, 2012) and the first MES Agreement (which was in effect from October 1, 2010 through
September 30, 2013). 1 Therefore, as to these two Agreements, there is no question that the parties
entered into an Agreement to arbitrate. The only issue is whether the termination from the
Association also terminated PAC's obligations under the Agreements. 2 As long as there is a broad
arbitration clause and a colorable claim that the Agreements were not terminated, then the issue of
termination is for the arbitrator.
The arbitration clauses in these two Agreements state, "All disputes and controversies
arising out of and under this Agreement or related thereto shall be settled by arbitration."
Ex. A at 67; Pet. Ex. B-i at 24. By comparison, the arbitration clause in Ottley, which the court
found to be broad, stated:
All complaints, disputes, controversies or grievances arising between the parties
hereto involving questions of interpretation or application of any clause of this
agreement, or any acts, conduct or relations between any of the parties hereto and/or
between the Union and any Employer, directly or indirectly, which shall not have
been adjusted by and between those involved shall be submitted to the Impartial
I reject PAC's argument that, as of August 29, 2012, it was not bound by the AAgreement that went into effect on July i, 2012. PAC was still a member of the Association on
July i, 2012 when the A-Agreement went into effect. PAC's arguments that it was suspended
from the Association only 30 days after the A-Agreement went into effect and terminated from
the Association only 8 weeks after it went into effect is irrelevant. There can be no dispute that,
as of August 29, 2012, PAC was bound to the A-Agreement and its arbitration clause. The only
issue is whether its termination from the Association relieved it of its obligations under the AAgreement.
PAC argues that the court's analysis should be affected by the fact that it was terminated
from the Association rather than voluntarily withdrawing. However, "this is a distinction
without a difference... [and] has no bearing on the applicability of the notification
requirements." Trustee of Plumbers Local Union No. 1 Welfare Fund v. Bass Plumbing &
Heating Corp., 2014 WL 6886107, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2014).
Chairman hereinafter mentioned for arbitration and his decision shall be final and
binding upon the parties hereto.
The arbitration clauses at issue here are at least as broad, if not broader, than what was at
issue in Ottley, especially when one considers the "or related to" language present here, which was
absent in Ottley. Moreover, the arbitration clauses do not exclude issues relating to termination.
As Landau noted, the dispute here is not about what the arbitration clause provides; "rather, it is a
dispute over the interpretation of other clauses of the collective bargaining agreement, e.g.
termination clauses." Landau, 123 F.3d at 72-73.
In addition to these broad arbitration clauses, there is also at least a colorable claim that the
Agreements did not terminate on August 29, 2012. The Agreements had very clear abrogation
procedures. They stated, "Any entity wishing to abrogate this Agreement must notify both the
Association and the Union in writing. . . a minimum of one hundred and eighty (180) days prior
to the expiration of this Agreement." See Pet. Ex. A at 73; Pet. Ex. B-i at 30. It is undisputed that
PAC did not seek to abrogate until December 31, 2014. This provides at least a colorable claim
that the contract had not terminated. Accordingly, the issue of whether PAC's termination from
the Association also terminated its obligations under these two Agreements was an issue for the
See Steelmasters, Inc. v. Local Union 580 of Int'l Ass 'n of Bridge,
Structural Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, 2008 WL 312096, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 1, 2008); Cleveland Wrecking Co. v. Iron Workers Local Union 40, 947 F. Supp. 745, 74849 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, criticized on other grounds, 136 F.3d 884 (2d Cir. 1997).
Second MES Agreement
The second MES Agreement is in a different posture than the two Agreements discussed
above. It went into effect on October 1, 2013, more than a year after respondent was terminated
from the Association on August 29, 2012. Therefore, unlike the other two Agreements, respondent
was not already a signatory to the second MES Agreement upon its termination from the
Like the other two Agreements, the second MES Agreement had a broad arbitration clause.
It states, "All disputes and controversies arising out of and under this Agreement or related thereto
shall be settled by arbitration." Pet. Ex. B-2 at 24. Accordingly, so long as there is a colorable
claim that PAC's obligations under the second MES Agreement did not terminate, then this was
an issue for the arbitration committee to decide.
"[T]he Second Circuit has held that an entity does not have to sign a CBA to be bound by
its terms, and a party can adopt the terms of the relevant CBA through its actions."
Sheet Metal Workers In,' '1 Ass 'n Local No. 38 Vacation Fund v. Katonah Roofing, Inc., 2011 WL
9010113, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2011) (citing Brown v. C. Volante Corp., 194 F.3d 351, 355-56
(2d Cir. 1999)). For actions to bind an employer to a CBA, they must demonstrate an unequivocal
intention to be bound. Bricklayers Ins. & Welfare Fund Bricklayers Pension Fund v. P.P.L.
Construction Servs. Corp., 2015 WL 1443038, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015).
It is undisputed that respondent continued to pay fringe benefits on behalf of one employee
pursuant to the MES Agreement through 2014 (at which time the second MES Agreement had
gone into effect and more than 16 months after respondent was terminated from the Association). 4
I use the figure of 16 months because the arbitration award states that respondent
continued to submit fringe benefit contributions "throughout 2014." Because of this imprecision,
it is impossible to know when (if at all) respondent ceased making these payments in 2014.
Giving respondent every benefit of the doubt, even if I assume it stopped making these payments
in January of 2014, this still amounts to it making fringe benefit contributions for 16 months
after its termination. I do note, though, that the more likely interpretation of the arbitration
award's language of "throughout 2014" is that respondent's payments continued well past
January of 2014.
By contrast, in Lanzfame v. Dana Restoration, Inc., 2011 WL 1100111, at * 3 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 2011), the court concluded that continuing to comply with the terms of the CBA for
Respondent attempts to minimize this action by highlighting that it was only one employee for
whom it paid fringe benefits, but, as respondent itself states, it had only one employee subject to
the MES Agreement.
See Campione Dccl. at ¶ 7. Besides minimizing these contributions,
respondent does not attempt to otherwise explain them other than to say that the fringe benefits
were contributed "purely as a courtesy" to this employee. 5 Id. at ¶ 5. PAC's payment of fringe
benefits for at least 16 months after August 29, 2012 establishes a colorable claim that its
obligations pursuant to the MES Agreements never terminated. See C. Volante Corp., 194 F.3d at
In addition to and independent of its conduct after August 29, 2012, the language of the
first MES Agreement also provides a colorable claim that PAC's obligations pursuant to the MES
Agreements did not terminate on August 29, 2012. As of August 29, 2012, PAC was a signatory
to the first MES Agreement. It provided that, "One hundred and twenty (120) days prior to the
expiration of this Agreement a conference of all Parties hereto shall be held for the purpose of
only two months after the expiration was insufficient to manifest a clear intent to be bound by
the new agreement. Similarly, in Steelmasters, Inc. v. Local Union 580 of mt 'lAss 'n of Bridge,
Structural Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, 2008 WL 312096, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2008), the court concluded that the employer submitting 16 weeks of fringe
benefit remittance reports was insufficient to bind it to a CBA through its course of conduct
because the conduct did not occur for a sufficiently long period of time.
The cases respondent relies on to support its argument that these payments are
insufficient to signify its intent to be bound are unavailing. See Cuyahoga Wrecking Corp. v.
Laborers Int'l Union of No. Am., Local Union No. 210, 644 F. Supp. 878, 881 (W.D.N.Y. 1986)
(conduct insufficient to manifest intent to be bound where employer was never a part of the
association that negotiated the agreements, rather than having withdrawn or been terminated
from the association); Trustees of mt '1 Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 531 Sick & Welfare
Fund v. Marangi Bros., 289 F. Supp. 2d 455, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (after agreement expired,
employer continued to make payments despite the fact that no subsequent agreement was ever
drafted, in which case the court concluded an employer's conduct could not bind it to a
consummating a new Agreement." Pet. Ex. B-i at 29. Undoubtedly, this is why the arbitration
committee found that signatories of the first MES Agreement would be bound by the second MES
Agreement (as it would be executed while the first MES Agreement was still in effect) unless a
party provided notice of its desire to abrogate. PAC never provided such notice. This also provides
a colorable claim that PAC's obligations under the MES Agreements did not terminate.
In light of the broad arbitration clause and colorable claim that its obligations under the
second MES Agreement did not terminate, the issue of whether PAC's termination from the
Association also relieved it of its obligations pursuant to the second MES Agreement was an issue
for the arbitration committee.
Arbitration Committee's Decision and Award
In evaluating whether a labor arbitration decision should be confirmed, a court's "task is
simply to ensure that the arbitrator was even arguably construing or applying the contract and
acting within the scope of his authority and did not ignore the plain language of the contract.
As long as the award draws it essence from the collective bargaining agreement and is not merely
the arbitrator's own brand of industrial justice, it must be confirmed." National Football League
Mgmt. Council v. National Football League Players Ass 'n, 820 F.3d 527, 537 (2d Cir. 2016). As
to factual issues, as long as "no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator's improvident, even silly,
factfinding, does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award." Major
League Baseball Players Ass 'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).
The arbitration committee determined that PAC was bound to all three Agreements. As to
the A-Agreement and first MES Agreement, it concluded that PAC "had given its bargaining rights
to the [Association] which entered into the CBAs... [and there was] no request to abrogate from
PAC.. . until December 31, 2014, well after the alleged infractions of the CBAs." Decision at 3.
As to the Second MES Agreement, it found PAC to be bound because "it never requested to
abrogate from the previous agreement . . . 180 days prior to expiration . . . Furthermore, PAC
throughout 2014 continued to submit Union fringe [benefits] on at least one of its employees
which we find evidences its intent and obligation to remain a signatory contractor." Id.
In reviewing the committee's decision, my task is only to ensure that it did not ignore the
plain language of the contract and that the award drew its essence from the Agreements. PAC first
argues that the award should not be confirmed and should be vacated because it was not bound by
the Agreements after August 29, 2012. I disagree. The committee was operating within the scope
of its authority when it interpreted the termination provisions of the three Agreements. As noted
above, the arbitration clause was broad and encompassed issues related to termination. These
termination provisions were also clear—PAC had to provide notice to abrogate the Agreements,
which it did not do. The committee did not ignore the plain language of the contract. To the
contrary, it followed it. The contract required notice to abrogate, which PAC did not provide. The
committee's decision is only reinforced by PAC's conduct after August 29, 2012 evidencing its
intent to be bound. As discussed above, the committee's decision regarding this conduct finds
strong support in law.
Respondent next argues that the arbitration committee awarded penalties based on conduct
outside of the Agreements' two year look-back period. The Agreements provide for liability for
actions that occurred two years immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. Given petitioner
filed its complaint and request for arbitration on December 16, 2014, respondent argues that the
arbitration award can be based only on actions it took between December 16, 2012 and December
16, 2014 (the "liability period"). Respondent's position is that it was not a signatory to any
Agreements during that time, thus making it impossible for it to have committed a violation during
that period. Based on my conclusions above that respondent was bound by all three Agreements,
this argument is meritless. The A-Agreement was in effect from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2016.
Therefore, the liability period of December 16, 2012 to December 16, 2014 falls within the term
of the A-Agreement. The first MES Agreement was in effect from October 1, 2010 to September
30, 2013. Accordingly, any violation from December 16, 2012 to September 30, 2013 (when the
first MES Agreement expired) can give rise to liability. The second MES Agreement was in effect
from October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2016. Any violation from October 1, 2013 to December
16, 2014 can similarly give rise to liability.
Even if a court's review of an arbitrator's factual findings was not limited, the Decision
shows that for all five of the alleged violations, the actions occurred within the liability period.
The Decision demonstrates that respondent: (1) had no bond during the liability period; (2) did not
request green cards for jobs done in 2014; (3) employed non-union laborers in 2014; (4) used an
improper ratio of journeymen to helpers in 2014; and (5) did not pay fringe benefits for workers
for a period that included August of 2013.6 All of these violations fall within the liability period
of December 16, 2012 to December 16, 2014, thus complying with the two year look-back
provision in the CBAs. 7 Accordingly, I reject respondent's argument that the arbitration award
violated the two year look-back provision of the Agreements.
As to the fourth claim, the use of an improper ratio of journeymen to helpers, the
arbitration committee dismissed this claim.
As to the bond, the Agreements required the employer to furnish a bond to guarantee
fringe benefit payments. According to the arbitration committee's decision and award, it relied
on evidence that, as of January 5, 2015, which is outside the liability period as it comes after
December 16, 2014, PAC had no bond. I interpret this as providing the most up to date status
regarding the bond—that respondent still, as during the liability period, did not have one. I do
not interpret it to mean that respondent had a bond during the relevant liability period, but then
dropped the bond at some point after December 16, 2014. Respondent does not argue otherwise.
Respondent provides no other grounds to support its position that the arbitration award
should not be confirmed. Notably, respondent does not dispute that the Agreements required it to
do the four things the arbitration committee determined it failed to do. Accordingly, because the
arbitration committee acted within the scope of its authority and did not ignore the plain language
of the contract, I conclude that the arbitration award should be confirmed and respondent's motion
to vacate the award should be denied. 8
"New York law provides for prejudgment interest running from the date of an arbitration
award until the entry of final judgment." Local 2006, Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union,
United Food & Comm. Workers v. Basic Wear, Inc., 2016 WL 7469621, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28,
2016) (internal quotation omitted). Petitioner seeks prejudgment interest in the amount of 9%
from the date of the award through the date of judgment. Though respondent generally opposes
confirming the award, as discussed above, it does not address pre-judgment interest. Given the
presumption in favor of pre-judgment interest and respondent's failure to oppose such an award, I
grant petitioner's request. See In re Arbitration Between Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Massamont
Ins. Agency, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing In re Waterside Ocean
Navigation Co. v. Int'l Navigation, Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1984)). "The common
I also note that respondent's motion to vacate is untimely. Contrary to respondent's
argument, it is irrelevant that its motion was made pursuant to a court ordered briefing schedule.
Respondent had ninety days from the date of the award to move to vacate it. See Local 802,
Assoc. Musicians of Greater New York v. Parker Meridien Hotel, 145 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1998).
The arbitration award was delivered on February 6, 2015. Therefore, respondent had until May
6, 2015 to move to vacate it. The petition in this case was not filed until February 2, 2016, which
is within the one-year period a party has to confirm an award. Accordingly, there is no schedule
the court could have set that would have made PAC's motion timely. Instead, if PAC wanted to
vacate the award, it had to have filed its own action prior to May 6, 2015.
practice among courts within the Second Circuit is to grant interest at a rate of 9%, the rate of
prejudgment interest under New York State law." Basic Wear, 2016 WL 7469621, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 28, 2016) (quoting NY City Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Metro Furniture Servs. LLC,
2012 WL 4492384, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012)). See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5004 ("Interest shall
be at the rate of nine per centum per annum, except where otherwise provided by statute.").
Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to pre-judgment interest from the date of the award to the date
of judgment in the amount of 9% per annum.
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment to confirm the award is granted and
respondent's motion to vacate the award is denied. Further, petitioner is awarded pre-judgment
interest in the amount of 9% per annum from the date of the award to the date of judgment. The
Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
1 I) 3U 1 Mi
United States District Judge
Dated: March 23, 2017
Brooklyn, New York
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