Strujan v. De Blasio et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The case is dismissed for failure to state a claim against defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Any state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 44445 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to ent er judgment and close this case. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order and accompanying judgment to Strujan and note the mailing on the docket. Ordered by Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf on 3/26/2019. (Taronji, Robert)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------X
ELENA STRUJAN,
also known as ELENA CHITOIU,
Plaintiff,
-against-
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
16-CV-3150 (RRM) (SMG)
BILL DE BLASIO, Mayor of the City of New
York; WILLIAM J. BRATTON, New York
City Police Commissioner; SCOTT M. STRINGER,
New York City Comptroller; Each Unnamed
Wrongdoer,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------X
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Elena Strujan, appearing pro se, filed this action against defendants as a
“Common Law suit” pursuant to “Common Law jurisdiction.” (Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 9–10.) 1
By Memorandum and Order dated March 8, 2017, the Court granted Strujan’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the complaint against defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) with leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days. On April 5, 2017,
Strujan filed an amended complaint pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Am. Compl.
(Doc. 10) at 4.) For the reasons set forth below, this action is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Strujan’s original complaint did not include a statement of facts. (See generally Compl.)
Instead, Strujan included a list of claims and appended numerous documents to the complaint.
(Compl. at 11.) The amended complaint also includes a list of claims (see Am. Compl. at 9, 23)
and also appends over 250 pages of documents. Similar to her original complaint, Strujan does
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For ease of reference, citations to court documents utilize ECF pagination.
not allege facts to suggest that any of the named defendants had personal involvement in the
violation of her constitutional rights. (See generally Am. Compl.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In
reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful that a plaintiff’s pleadings should be
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). However, pro se status “does not
exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Boddie
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 285 F.Supp.2d 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck,
710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). The Court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action if
the Court determines the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
DISCUSSION
I.
Section 1983
In order to maintain a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (a) acted
under color of state law (b) to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the Constitution or
federal law. Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d
545, 547 (2d Cir. 1984)). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. This statute “creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for
redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519
(2d Cir. 1993); see also Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999.)
Strujan fails to plead any plausible allegations to support a violation of her constitutional
rights under § 1983. (See Am. Compl. at 13-15, 18-23.) “It is well-settled in this Circuit that
personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an
award of damages under § 1983.” Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing
Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006)). A § 1983 complaint that does not allege the
personal involvement of a defendant fails as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Barney, 360
F.App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order). Although given an opportunity to amend the
complaint, she again relies on a list of claims and conclusory statements. (See generally Am.
Compl.) Therefore, Strujan has failed to comply with the Court’s instruction set forth in the
Memorandum and Order dated March 9, 2017.
II.
Sections 1985 and 1986
As to Strujan’s allegations of conspiracy to deprive her of her constitutional rights, the
claim is dismissed as to all defendants. Granting Strujan’s complaint the liberal reading
required, it may be construed as a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging a conspiracy by
two or more persons to deprive her of the equal protection of the laws. However, Strujan has
failed to allege facts sufficient to show the existence of any conspiracy designed to deprive her of
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her rights. Claims of conspiracy that are vague and provide no basis in fact must be dismissed.
Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding allegations of conspiracy “baseless”
where the plaintiff “offer[ed] not a single fact to corroborate her allegation of a ‘meeting of the
minds’ among the conspirators”); Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2003) (to
maintain a conspiracy action, the plaintiff “must provide some factual basis supporting a meeting
of the minds”); Gyadu v. Hartford Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 590, 591 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Since Strujan’s § 1985 conspiracy claim fails, her § 1986 claim also fails. See Graham v.
Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that “a § 1986 claim is contingent on a valid §
1985 claim”); see also Wang v. Office of Professional Medical Conduct, 228 F.App’x. 17, 19 (2d
Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Strujan fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and
1986.
III.
Title 18
Strujan also seeks to proceed pursuant to various sections of Title 18 of the Federal
Criminal Code. However, Strujan cannot bring a civil action to enforce criminal statutes.
“Criminal prosecutions are within the exclusive province of the public prosecutor who has
complete discretion over the decision to initiate, continue or cease prosecution.” Yashaahla v.
M.H.A.N.Y, No. 05-CV-4963 (JFB), 2006 WL 845586, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006) (citations
omitted). A private citizen does not have a constitutional right to initiate or to compel the
initiation of criminal proceedings against another individual. See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S.
83, 86 (1981) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)); Ostrowski v.
Mehltretter, 20 F.App’x. 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2001). None of the various statutes invoked by Strujan
provide for a private right of action. See, e.g., Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21
F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 1994) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 242); Lodrini v.
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Sebelius, No. 14-CV-3137 (SJF), 2014 WL 2446073, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2014) (18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242 do not provide a private cause of action); Hamilton v. Reed, 29 F. App’x 202,
204 (6th Cir. 2002) (“no private right of action against the defendants for alleged violations of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1506, and 1509.”); Garay v. United States Bancorp, 303 F.Supp.2d 299, 303
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (obstruction of justice is a criminal matter for which there is no private cause of
action) (citations omitted); Dugar v. Coughlin, 613 F.Supp. 849, 852 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (18
U.S.C. § 2071 does not provide a civil right of action). As such, Strujan’s claims brought
pursuant to Title 18 of the Federal Criminal Code are dismissed for failure to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the case is dismissed for failure to state a claim against defendants pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Any state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Court
certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in
good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to
enter judgment and close this case.
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order and
accompanying judgment to Strujan and note the mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
March 26, 2019
Roslynn R. Mauskopf
____________________________________
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF
United States District Judge
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