Patterson v. City of New York et al

Filing 71

ORDER denying Plaintiff's 67 Motion for Partial Final Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So Ordered by Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis on 11/14/2017. (Lee, Tiffeny)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-X

TAJ PATTERSON,
ORDER

Plaintiff,

16-CV-3525(NGG)
(SMG)

-against-

CITY OF NEW YORK;POLICE OFFICER RODRIGO
FERNANDEZ;SERGEANT IVAN FURDA;
SERGEANT ZAIKOWSKI; WILLIAMSBURG
SAFETY PATROL,INC.: SHMIRA VOLUNTEER
PATROL CORP.; ABRAHAM WINKLER; AHARON
HOLLENDER; MAYER HERSKOVIC; JOSEPH
FRIED;PINCHAS BRAVER; YOELIITZKOWITZ; and
JOHN DOES 1-10.

Defendants.
-X

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS,United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Taj Patterson moves the court to direct entry of a partial final judgment against

him under Rule 54(b)ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.^ (Mot.for Entry of J.("Mot.")
(Dkt. 67).) No defendant who has appeared in this action opposes the motion. (Nov.6,2017,

City ofNew York, Furda,Zaikowski, and Fernandez Ltr.(Dkt. 68); Nov.6,2017, Herskovic Ltr.
(Dkt. 69); Nov. 8, 2017, Braver Ltr.(Dkt. 70).) For the reasons that follow,the motion is
DENIED.

The relevant facts are set forth in the court's August 9,2017, memorandum and order

("M&O").(M&O (Dkt. 64).) "Plaintiffis a Black, gay, non-Jewish man who lives in a
Brooklyn neighborhood with a large population of Orthodox Jews." (Id. at 3.) He alleged that.

'Plaintiff also requests that, in the alternative, the court"may... wish to enter a finaljudgment as against all
defendants" but cites no authority by which the court may do so. (Mem.in Supp. of Mot.("PI. Mem.")(Dkt. 67-1)
at 3.)
1

while he was walking through Brookljui early in the morning ofDecember 1,2013, he was
chased and attacked by members ofa "Shomrim" group—a "neighborhood safety patrolQ

organized and operated by volunteer orthodox Jews in different neighborhoods throughout

Brooklyn." (Am. Compl.(Dkt. 43)K 10; M&O at 3-4.) His attackers shouted homophobic slurs
while they beat bim^ and the attack left him blind in one eye. (M&O at 3-4.) Plaintiff also

alleged that the New York City Police Department("NYPD")and the police officers named in

his complaint botched their investigation into his attack(Am.Compl.

35-45)and that

inappropriate ties exist between Shomrim groups, the NYPD,and the Brooklyn District
Attomey's office (id. at 46-56; see also M&O at 6-7). Based on these allegations. Plaintiff
brought claims against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985. (Am. Compl.
nil 57-88.)

Only some Defendants appeared and contested Plaintiffs allegations. The City ofNew
York and the three NYPD officers named as defendants—Sergeant Ivan Furda, Sergeant Joseph

Zaikowski, and Officer Rodrigo Fernandez(together with the City ofNew York,the "Municipal

Defendants")—^all appeared. (M&O at 1.) Two ofthe individuals who assaulted Plaintiff—

Defendants Pinchas Braver and Mayer Herskovic—also appeared.^ (Id) (The court refers to
these defendants as the "Appearing Defendants.") The two Shomrim organizations named as
defendants did not appear, however, nor did individual Defendants Abraham Winkler, Aharon

Hollender, Joseph Fried, or Yoeli Itzowitz. (Id) (The court refers to these non-appearing
defendants collectively as the "Absent Defendants.")

^ Braver "'pled guilty to misdemeanor unlawful imprisonment for [his] role[] in the matter,' and Herskovic was
convicted ofgang assault in the second degree and unlawfiil imprisonment." (M&O at 5(quoting Am. Compl.
If 44).)

The Municipal Defendants and Herskovic separately moved to dismiss, and Braver

moved forjudgment on the pleadings. (Municipal Defs. Mot. to Dismiss(Dkt. 50); Def. Braver
Mot. for J. on the Pleadings(Dkt. 52); Def. Herskovic Mot. to Dismiss(Dkt. 63).) On August 9,
2017,the court granted those motions. (M&O at 6.) Having appealed to the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit from that order(Notice of App.(Dkt. 65)), Plaintiff now moves
the court to enter a partial finaljudgment under Rule 54(b) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure with respect to his claims against the Appearing Defendants.

Rule 54(b) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[wjhen an action
presents more than one claim for relief... or when multiple parties are involved,the court may

direct entry of a finaljudgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only ifthe

court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The
court thus may certify a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b)"only when three requirements
have been satisfied:(1)there are multiple claims or parties;(2)at least one claim or the rights
and liabilities of at least one party has been finally determined; and(3)the court makes an

'express [] detennm[ation] that there is no just reason for delay.'" Acumen Re Mgmt. Corp. v.
Gen. Sec. Nat. Ins. Co.. 769 F.3d 135,140(2d Cir. 2014)(alterations in original)(quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 54(b)). "The determination of whether there is no just reason to delay entry ofa final

judgment is a matter committed to the sound discretion ofthe district court." L.B. Foster Co. v.
Am.Piles. Inc.. 138 F.3d 81,86(2d Cir. 1998)fciting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co..
446 U.S. 1,8-10(1980)).

When considering "whether there are no just reasons to delay the appeal ofindividual

finaljudgments ...a district court must take into accountjudicial administrative interests as well
as the equities involved." Curtiss-Wright 446 U.S. at 8. In particular, the court must consider

"the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals," and should therefore be mindful of
"whether the claims under review [are] separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated

and whether the nature ofthe claims already determined [is] such that no appellate court would
have to decide the same issues more than once even ifthere were subsequent appeals."

In

light ofthese considerations, the district court should exercise its discretion to certify a partial

final judgment "sparingly." Harriscom Svenska AB v. Harris Corp.,947 F.2d 627,629(2d Cir.
1991))

Here,the first two requirements of Rule 54(b)are clearly met:"there are multiple claims

or parties," and the court has finally determined Plaintiffs claims against the Appearing
Defendants. ^Acumen Re. 769 F.3d at 140. Plaintiff has not, however, met his burden of

showing that there is"no just reason for delay"—i.e..that certification ofa partial finaljudgment

is appropriate in light ofthe competing considerations ofjudicial efficiency and possible

prejudice to the parties. Plaintiff argues that a Rule 54(b)certification is appropriate because the
grounds on which the court resolved his claims against the Appearing Defendants "apply equally
to the claims against" the Absent Defendants. (Mem.in Supp. of Mot.("PI. Mem.")(Dkt. 67-1)

at 3.) Therefore, Plaintiff contends,"[rjequiring [him]to obtain [a] defaultjudgment against the
remaining defendants... simply so that the Court can dismiss them on grounds already
established as law ofthe case in the[M&O]would unnecessarily delay resolution ofthe case"
and would not serve the interests ofjudicial economy. (Id)

Plaintiffs argument makes clear that Rule 54(b)certification would not promote the

interests ofjudicial economy. The Second Circuit has "repeatedly noted that the district court
generally should not grant a Rule 54(b)certification 'ifthe same or closely related issues remain
to be litigated.'" Novick v. AXA Network. LLC.642 F.3d 304,311 (2d Cir. 2011)(quoting

Harriscom. 947 F.2d at 629). This is because "'[i]t does not nonnally advance the interests of

sound judicial administration or efficiency to have piecemeal appeals that require two(or more)
three-judge panels to familiarize themselves with a given case' in successive appeals from
successive decisions on interrelated issues."(quoting Harriscom. 947 F.2d at 631)). Thus,to the
extent that Plaintiffs claims against the Absent Defendants raise the same issues as his claims

against the Appearing Defendants, and will, as he concedes, be dismissed on the same grounds,
the interests ofjudicial economy would be better-served if he were to resolve his claims against
the Absent Defendants before this court and then take a single appeal to the Second Circuit,

rather than appealing separately from the dismissal of his claims against the Appearing
Defendants and the denial of his anticipated motion for a defaultjudgment against the Absent
Defendants. While this may slow the disposition ofPlaintiffs case (see PI. Mem. at 3), any such

delay is justified in light ofthe "historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals." CurtissWright 446 U.S. at 8. Plaintiff may minimize this delay by promptly applying for a renewed

certificate of default and renewing his motion for a defaultjudgment.^
Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for entry of partial finaljudgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)
ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 67)is denied.
SO ORDERED.

s/Nicholas G. Garaufis

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
November

2017

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFR
United States District Judge

^ In November 2016,Plaintiffrequested and obtained a certificate of default against the Absent Defendants
(Request for Certificate ofDefault(Dkt. 40); Clerk's Entry of Default(Dkt. 41))and moved for a defaultjudgment
(Mot.for Default J.(Dkt.42).) After Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint(Dkt. 43),the court denied the Motion
for Default Judgment as moot. (Apr. 4,2017, Order re Plaintiffs Mot. for Default J.)