Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Carey et al

Filing 12

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 11 Motion to Intervene -- For the reasons set forth in the ATTACHED WRITTEN MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, MetLife's motion for interpleader relief is granted and MetLife is dismissed from this action with pr ejudice. MetLife's request for injunctive relief is denied. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over the remaining parties in this action to determine the merits of their respective claims to the funds deposited in the court registry. This mat ter is referred to the magistrate judge for further pretrial proceedings. Metlife is directed to serve a copy of this Electronic Order on defendants within five days of the date of this Order, and immediately thereafter file proof of such service wit h the Court. Notably, none of the defendants have appeared in this case or answered the complaint, although is seems that they have waived service. As the proceeds at issue in this case are being held by the Clerk of this Court, the magistrate judg e respectfully is requested to direct the defendants to appear to resolve the remaining issues in this matter or to recommend remand or transfer to the appropriate court. SO ORDERED by Chief Judge Dora Lizette Irizarry on 9/29/2017. (Irizarry, Dora)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
:
COMPANY,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-against:
:
ROBERTA CAREY, CATHERINE MOODY, :
and BARBARA GRIFFIN,
:
:
Defendants.
:
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
16-CV-3814 (DLI)(SJB)

:

DORA L. IRIZARRY, Chief U.S. District Judge:
On July 8, 2016, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) filed an interpleader
complaint pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1131, and Rule 22 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See generally Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. Entry No. 1. Defendants Catherine
Moody (“Moody”), Roberta Carey (“Carey”), and Barbara Griffin (“Griffin”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) waived service of the Complaint. Mem. in Supp. of MetLife’s Mot. for Interpleader
Relief (“Pl.’s Mem.”), Dkt. Entry No. 11-1 at 2; Dkt. Entry Nos. 5-7. On September 1, 2016,
MetLife moved by letter motion to deposit $11,500 plus any applicable interest with the Court,
which is the amount owed under the life insurance plan at issue here. See Pl.’s Ltr. Mot., Dkt.
Entry No. 9. On September 2, 2016, the Honorable Lois Bloom, U.S.M.J., granted MetLife’s letter
motion. See Order, Dkt. Entry No. 10. On September 29, 2016, MetLife deposited the money into
the Register of the Court. Pl.’s Mem. at 2.
On October 7, 2016, MetLife made the instant motion requesting that the Court: (1) grant
MetLife interpleader relief and dismiss MetLife, AT&T, and the Plan from this action with
prejudice; (2) restrain and enjoin the Defendants from instituting any action or proceeding against

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MetLife, AT&T, or the Plan for recovery of the Plan Benefit; and (3) require the Defendants to
litigate their claim for the Plan Benefits amongst themselves. See generally Pl.’s Mem.; Compl.
at ¶ 30.

Defendants neither answered the Complaint nor opposed MetLife’s motion for

interpleader relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants MetLife’s motion for
interpleader relief, dismisses it from this action with prejudice, and denies MetLife’s request for
an injunction.
BACKGROUND
Sara A. Winbon (“Decedent”) was an AT&T employee who participated in a basic life
insurance coverage plan under the AT&T Group Life Insurance Program for Former Bargained
Employees (the “Plan”). Compl. at ¶ 7. As a claims fiduciary, MetLife is required to administer
claims under the Plan in accordance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”) and the Plan’s governing documents. Id. at ¶ 8. In October 1995, AT&T received a
signed beneficiary designations form that designated Carey, Decedent’s god-sister, as the primary
beneficiary, and Moody, Decedent’s friend, as the contingent beneficiary of the life insurance
benefits due upon Decedent’s death. Id. at ¶ 13.
The Decedent passed away on March 24, 2015. Id. at ¶ 14. On October 2, 2015, Griffin
advised AT&T’s record keeper, Fidelity Service Center, that she was the legal representative of
the Decedent’s estate. Id. at ¶ 16. Griffin’s letter also indicated that she was filing a counterclaim
to Decedent’s beneficiary designation because Carey had taken illegal actions to steal Decedent’s
estate. Id. On November 9, 2015, Griffin submitted a Claimant’s Affidavit to MetLife asserting
she was the rightful Plan beneficiary, but, on December 16, 2015, MetLife denied Griffin’s claim
on the basis that neither she nor the estate were Decedent’s beneficiaries. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. MetLife
also informed Carey and Moody on December 16, 2015 that their claims were adverse to one

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another and that MetLife could not resolve the issue without exposing itself and the Plan to the
“danger of double liability.” Id. at ¶ 20. Following MetLife’s denial, on January 14, 2016, Carey
sent a letter to MetLife indicating that she was Decedent’s beneficiary and seeking disbursement
of the Plan Benefits. Id. at ¶ 21. Griffin appealed MetLife’s denial of her claim, and on March 9,
2016 MetLife affirmed its denial. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.
MetLife contends that as a “mere stakeholder,” it has no claim to the Plan Benefits, other
than the payment of reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, and does not dispute that the money is
owed under the Plan. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29. MetLife requests that the Court dismiss MetLife, AT&T,
and the Plan with prejudice and discharge them from further liability.1 Id. at ¶ 30. MetLife further
requests that the Court “restrain and enjoin the Defendants . . . from instituting any action or
proceeding . . . against MetLife, AT&T, or the Plan for recovery of the Plan Benefits.” Id.
DISCUSSION
I.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Though none of the Defendants challenge the Court’s jurisdiction over this interpleader

action, “courts . . . have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
541 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). Thus, this Court
is tasked, as an initial matter, with determining whether it is an appropriate forum for MetLife’s
claims. Id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Claims brought
under ERISA constitute a federal question and establish subject matter jurisdiction. See Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Bigelow, 283 F.3d 436, 439-40 (2d Cir. 2002) (establishing the Court’s jurisdiction

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Neither AT&T nor the Plan are named as plaintiffs in this action.

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over a fiduciary’s ERISA interpleader claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.). In addition, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132, grants “exclusive jurisdiction” to district courts over actions brought by fiduciaries under
ERISA to “obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief . . . without respect to the amount in controversy
or the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3), (e), (f).
Since MetLife brings this interpleader action as a fiduciary under ERISA, this Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Bigelow, 283 F.3d at 439-40
(holding that, in an interpleader action “federal subject matter jurisdiction exists under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331”); Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. Little, 2013 WL 4495684, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2013) (“Jurisdiction is therefore proper under [29 U.S.C § 1132] and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.”); Compl. at ¶ 5 (invoking 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
II.

Interpleader Relief
Interpleader relief is appropriate where a stakeholder faces multiple claims against the

same fund. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Simonee, 2015 WL 8490998, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015).
“An interpleader action may be brought pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335
[“statutory interpleader”], and Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [“rule
interpleader”]. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, while 29 U.S.C. § 1132 creates the right for ERISA
plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries to obtain equitable relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 and
Rule 22 establish the requirements for interpleader relief.2
Courts assessing the merits of statutory and rule interpleader actions conduct a two-step
analysis: “[i]n the first step, a court must determine whether the interpleader action is appropriate,”
and, if the action is appropriate, the interpleader plaintiff is discharged from liability. See Simonee,
2015 WL 8490998, at *2 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At the second step, “the

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28 U.S.C. § 2361, discussed below, provides the “process and procedure” for granting an injunction.

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[c]ourt adjudicates the claims among the remaining adverse parties.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Only the first step is presently before the Court.
For a plaintiff to bring a statutory interpleader claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132, the
amount at issue must be $500 or more and there must be “[t]wo or more adverse claimants” that
are “of diverse citizenship.”

28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1).

However, a plaintiff invoking rule

interpleader, which permits “[p]ersons with claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple
liability [to] be joined as defendants and required to interplead” must “plead and prove an
independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction” because Rule 22 is merely a “procedural device.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 22; Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F.3d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 2007); See also
Simonee, 2015 WL8490998, at *2.
Here, the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1335 are not met because the parties are not diverse.
MetLife is a corporation with its principal place of business in New York, and Defendants are all
residents of New York. Compl. at ¶¶ 1-4.3 However, as discussed in Section I, supra, MetLife
has raised a federal question under ERISA, which satisfies the jurisdictional requirement.
Simonee, 2015 WL8490998, at *2 (“‘[A]n interpleader action brought under Rule 22 must fall
within one of the general statutory grants of federal jurisdiction,’ either federal question or
diversity jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted).
Once the jurisdictional element is satisfied, the court must then determine under Rule 22
whether the “plaintiff ‘may [be] expose[d] . . . to double or multiple liability . . . [.]’” Little, 2013
WL 4495684, at *2. Courts find that a plaintiff may be exposed to multiple liabilities if the
stakeholder “legitimately fear[s] multiple [liability] directed against a single fund, regardless of

Some courts have found that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 only requires “minimal” rather than complete diversity. See
Allstate Indem. Co. v. Collura, 2017 WL 1076328, at *4 (citing Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Simonee, 2016 WL 6956726,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2016)). However, since all parties to this litigation are residents of New York or have their
principal place of business in New York, not even “minimal” diversity exists.
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the competing claims.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The court ‘need not
analyze the merits of the claims because the stakeholder should not be obliged at its peril to
determine which of the two claimants has the better claim.’” Hartford, 2015 WL 8490998, at *3
(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 966 F. Supp.2d 97, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)).
Here, MetLife argues that it faces multiple liabilities from the beneficiaries (Carey and
Moody) and the estate (which is represented by Griffin), and the Defendants are adverse in that
they claim the same sum of money. See Pl.’s Mem. at 9. Such an allegation is sufficient to
demonstrate that MetLife is entitled to interpleader relief. See Little, 213 WL4495684, at *2
(interpleader relief appropriate where one party asserted a claim to funds otherwise payable to a
different party). Accordingly, the Court finds that interpleader relief is appropriate and MetLife is
dismissed from this case with prejudice.
III.

Injunctive Relief is Not Warranted
MetLife also seeks to permanently enjoin the Defendants from instituting any action

against it, AT&T, and the Plan with respect to the Plan Benefits deposited with the Court. Compl.
at ¶ 30. In its application for an injunction, MetLife invokes 28 U.S.C. § 2361, which provides
that “[i]n any civil action of interpleader . . . a district court may . . . enter its order restraining
[defendants] from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States
court . . . and may discharge the plaintiff from further liability, make [an] injunction permanent,
and make all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment.” See Pl.’s Mem. at 9-10; 28 U.S.C.
§ 2361. As MetLife points out, § 2361 “enables a party meeting the requirements of § 1335 to
obtain a restraining order without following the procedures set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, which
normally governs the issuance of injunctive relief.” Pl.’s Mem. at 10; See also 28 U.S.C. § 2361
(noting that § 2361 applies in “any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under

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section 1335”). However, as noted above, because the parties are not diverse, the requirements of
§ 1335 are not met, and therefore MetLife is not excused from satisfying the requirements of Rule
65.
MetLife has not demonstrated that an injunction is warranted here. In interpleader actions,
courts have declined to issue an injunction where all claimants are known, and an order dismissing
the interpleader plaintiff could be used to defend against future litigations. See, e.g., Little, 2013
WL 4495684, at *3 (finding “little reason for [an injunction]” because “should [claimant] ever
choose to assert a claim, [he] will be met in his chosen forum with this Court’s decree discharging
[the fiduciary] from any liability concerning the policy”); See also Wilton Reassurance Life Co. of
N.Y. v. Garbrecht, 2015 WL 1011714, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2015) (denying injunctive relief
where there was no danger of overlapping lawsuits where “[t]he beneficiaries of the policy have
already been determined”); WABC-AM Radio, Inc. v. United States, 1991 WL 2799, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1991) (“The power to enjoin conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 2361 is, by its terms,
discretionary.”). But see Mitchell, 966 F. Supp.2d at 104 (“[A] permanent injunction . . . is
necessary to protect [plaintiffs] from overlapping lawsuits and to ensure the effectiveness of the
interpleader remedy.”); Sotheby’s, Inc. v. Garcia, 802 F. Supp. 1058, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“An
injunction against overlapping lawsuits is desirable to insure the effectiveness of the interpleader
remedy.”).
Here, as in Little, there are no unknown claimants, and an order discharging MetLife from
liability sufficiently protects it from subsequent litigation by the Defendants. Accordingly,
MetLife’s request for an injunction is denied.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, MetLife’s motion for interpleader relief is granted and
MetLife is dismissed from this action with prejudice. MetLife’s request for injunctive relief is
denied. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over the remaining parties in this action to determine
the merits of their respective claims to the funds deposited in the court registry.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 29, 2017
/s/
DORA L. IRIZARRY
Chief Judge

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