Evans v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al

Filing 67

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Evan's request for front pay is denied for the same reason the Court set aside the jurys award of past lost wages. The parties shall confer in good faith regarding the details of Evanss request for reinstatement. Within fourteen days of this memorandum and order, they shall submit a joint letter setting out (1) any agreed-to details and (2) each partys position on any areas of disagreement. Ordered by Judge Frederic Block on 9/27/2018. (Innelli, Michael)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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TIFFANY SIMONE EVANS,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Case No. 16-CV-4560 (FB) (VMS)

METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
MANHATTAN AND BRONX
SURFACE TRANSIT OPERATING
AUTHORITY, ROBERT
SHARROCKS, and NEW YORK CITY
TRANSIT AUTHORITY a/k/a MTA
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT,
Defendants.
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Appearances
For the Defendants:
For the Plaintiff:
STEVEN GERBER, ESQ.
ERIC BAUM, ESQ.
JEREMY M. WEINTRAUB, ESQ.
SAGAR SHAH, ESQ.
Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Gerber LLP
Eisenberg & Baum, LLP
551 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1200
24 Union Square East, Fourth Floor
New York, New York 10176
New York, New York 10003
BLOCK, Senior District Judge:
After a four-day trial, the jury in this action found Robert Sharrocks and the
New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”) liable to Tiffany Evans for sex
discrimination. It awarded $100,000 in lost wages, $25,000 in non-economic
damages, and $7,500 in punitive damages.

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In a prior memorandum and order, the Court granted the defendants’ motion
for judgment as a matter of law on Evans’s claim for lost wages, but otherwise
denied their post-trial motions. It now turns to Evans’s post-trial motions.
First, Evans moves for attorney’s fees and costs. The Court follows its usual
practice of deferring considering of such motions until the appellate process has run
its course.
Second, Evans moves for equitable relief, seeking either front pay or “a
monitored opportunity to re-take the 10-day training course.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law 7.
Her request for front pay is denied for the same reason the Court set aside the jury’s
award of past lost wages: While Evans testified as to her understanding of the hourly
wage of an NYCTA bus driver and her hourly wage at her current job, she failed to
offer any evidence of the hours worked. As a result, there is no basis on which to
calculate total earnings.
Evans’s alternative request to re-take the training course is analogous to
reinstatement, which is the preferred remedy in employment discrimination cases.
See Reiter v. MTA New York City Transit Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 230 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“Under Title VII, the best choice is to reinstate the plaintiff, because this
accomplishes the dual goals of providing make-whole relief for a prevailing plaintiff

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and deterring future unlawful conduct.”). Reinstatement is not appropriate “where
there is animosity between an employer and an employee or where there is no longer
a position available at the time of judgment,” Bergerson v. New York State Office of
Mental Health, 652 F.3d 277, 288 (2d Cir. 2011), but neither circumstance is present
here.
Instead, the defendants argue that Evans should not be reinstated because she
did not successfully complete the training. See Bank v. Travelers Cos., 180 F.3d
358, 365 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[Reinstatement and front pay] are inappropriate where the
employment term would already have ended by the time of judgment.”). They argue
that the jury’s finding of no retaliation “severs a[ny] causal connection between the
discrimination and the plaintiff’s failure to obtain a particular job.” Defs.’ Mem. of
Law 4.
The Court agrees that the jury’s verdict is binding as to issues of fact common
to both legal and equitable relief. See Wade v. Orange Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 844
F.2d 951, 954 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen the jury has decided a factual issue, its
determination has the effect of precluding the court from deciding the same fact issue
in a different way.”). But it disagrees that the jury found no causal connection
between Sharrocks’s misconduct and Evans’s poor performance with other trainers.
To the contrary, despite finding that those trainers did not act with any retaliatory

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motive, the jury awarded past lost wages as damages for sex discrimination.
Although the Court set aside the award because it was not supported by adequate
evidence as to the amount of lost wages, the jury’s implicit finding that Sharrocks’s
conduct caused Evans to fail the training was adequately supported by the testimony
of one of the trainers that Evans was emotional during his portion of the training,
and Evans’s own testimony that she was emotional on the last day of training
because she had just filed her written complaint. Thus, the jury could reasonably
conclude that Evans’s experience with Sharrocks had contributed to her poor
performance.
The defendants further argue reinstatement poses a threat to public safety. But
Evans is not asking to be made a bus driver; she is asking for another opportunity to
take the training.
There is, in sum, no just reason to deny the “preferred remedy” of
reinstatement. However, Evans’s request that her training be “monitored” is vague
and possibly unnecessary. In addition, the Court is not inclined to require the Transit
Authority to offer the training on a special schedule or to make other
accommodations. Evans is entitled to training free of discrimination, but otherwise
the same training that any other applicant would receive.

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Accordingly, the parties shall confer in good faith regarding the details of
Evans’s request. Within fourteen days of this memorandum and order, they shall
submit a joint letter setting out (1) any agreed-to details and (2) each party’s position
on any areas of disagreement.
SO ORDERED.
/S/ Frederic Block
______________________________
FREDERIC BLOCK
Senior United States District Judge

Brooklyn, New York
September 27, 2018

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