Gonzalez v. Red Hook Container Terminal LLC

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM & ORDER re 7 Motion to Remand to State Court. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Dkt. 7) is GRANTED, and the entire action is REMANDED to the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to send a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of Court of Supreme Court of New York, County of Kings, and to close the case in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Plaintiff's request for fees and costs is DENIED. So Ordered by Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis on 12/14/2016. (certified copy of Order mailed to NYS, Supreme Court - Kings County Index No. 512988/2016) (Lee, Tiffeny)

vif

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-X

LEONARDO GONZALEZ,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff,

16-CV-5104(NGG)
(RER)

-againstRED HOOK CONTAINER TERMINAL LLC,

Defendant.
-X

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS,United States District Judge.

On July 27,2016, Plaintiff Leonardo Gonzalez initiated this personal injury action in the

Supreme Court ofNew York, Kings County, against Defendant Red Hook Container Terminal,
LLC. (Compl.(Dkt. 1-2 at ECF p. 3).) On September, 14,2016,Defendant removed the case to
this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 13.31,1333(1), 1441, and 1446. (Notice ofRemoval(Dkt. 1)

at 1.) On October 13,2016,Plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court(the "Motion
to Remand"). (Mot.to Remand (Dkt. 7).) For the reasons stated below,the court finds that it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion to Remand is
GRANTED.

I.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an alleged injury sustained by Plaintiff on July 29,2015, while

working on property operated and managed by Defendant. fSee generallv Compl.) Plaintiff
alleges that he fell 10 to 15 feet off a splitter that was being hoisted by a crane. (Id K 13.) He
avers that Defendant was negligent, reckless, and careless in not having a functional safety cage
that could be used for such activities. (Id. 18.) Plaintiff asserts state-law causes of action

sounding in common-law negligence and violations of various New York labor laws. (Id

18, 31.) Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant violated the rules and regulations ofthe New

York State Industrial Code,the Board of Standards and Appeals, and the Occupational Safety

and Health Administration("OSHA"). (Id 126.) Defendant plans to assert the defense that it
was Plaintiffs employer at the time ofthe accident, and is therefore immune from liability under
the U.S. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act(the "LHWCA"),33 U.S.C.

§§ 901-950. (Def.'s Mem.in Opp'n("Def. Mem.")(Dkt. 8)at 1.) Plaintiff disputes Defendant's

allegation that the parties had an employment relationship. (PL's Reply in Supp. of Mot. to
Remand ("PI. Reply")(Dkt. 9)at 6.)
n.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR REMOVAL AND REMAND

"[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts ofthe United
States have original jurisdiction!]

be removed by the defendant... to the [federal] district

court... embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District
courts "have originaljurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties ofthe United States," id § 1331, and also over "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime

jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled,"
id § 1333(1). "If at any time before finaljudgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." Id § 1447(c).
On a motion to remand,"the party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing to a
'reasonable probability' that removal is proper." Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.. 676

F. Supp.2d 285,292(S.D.N.Y. 2009)(quoting Blockbuster. Inc. v. Galeno.472 F.3d 53, 58
(2d Cir. 2006)). When considering a motion to remand,"the [district] Court'must construe all
disputed questions offact and controlling substantive law in favor ofthe pl^tiff.'" Marlin Bus.
Bank v. Halland Companies. LLC. 18 F. Supp. 3d 239, 240-41 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)(quoting In re
NASDAQ Mkt. Makers Antitrust Litig.. 929 F. Supp. 174,178 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). "[0]ut of

respect for the limited jurisdiction ofthe federal courts and the rights of states,[the Court] must

resolve any doubts against removability." Id at 241 (quoting In re Methvl Tertiarv Butvl Ether
Prods. Liab. Litig.. 488 F.3d 112,124(2d Cir. 2007)).
in.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the action is properly removed because the case involves a federal
question relating to the LHWCA. The court finds, however, that Defendant's anticipated defense
based on the LHWCA is insufficient to create federal question jurisdiction. Defendant also

contends that the court has admiralty subject matter jurisdiction. In the Second Circuit, however,
federal courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction over admiralty cases absent some additional
federal basis. Finding none,the court grants Plaintiffs Motion to Remand. The court further
finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to an award offees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
A.

Federal Question Jurisdiction

Defendant contends that removal is proper because Plaintiffs state-law personal injury
claims tum on substantial questions offederal law,thereby establishing federal question

jurisdiction under Grable & Sons Metal Products. Inc. v. Dame Eng'g & Mfg.. 545 U.S. 308

(2005). (Def. Mem. at 8.) The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of establishing
federal question jurisdiction.
1.

Legal Standard

Federal question jurisdiction exists for "all civil actions arising under" federal law. 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (emphasis added). "Under the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' a claim 'arises'
under federal law only if a question offederal law appears on the face ofthe plaintiffs 'well
pleaded complaint'—^thus requiring a court to ignore any and all answers, defenses, and
counterclaims." Nassau Cntv. Bridge Auth. v. Olsen. 130 F. Supp. 3d 753,755-56(E.D.N.Y.

2015)(citing Fleet Bank. Naf1 Ass'n v. Burke. 160 F.3d 883, 886(2d Cir. 1998)). Federal
3

With regard to the third Grable factor, Defendant must show a substantial interest in
litigating LHWCA-related questions in a federal forum. Gunn. 133 S. Ct. at 1066("The

substantiality inquiry under Grable looks [] to the importance ofthe issue to the federal system as
a whole."). In Grable,the Supreme Court found such an interest where the plaintiffs state-law

quiet title action centered on a dispute over the Intemal Revenue Service's notice requirements
when pursuing unpaid federal taxes. Grable, 545 U.S. at 310-11. "The Government's 'direct
interest in the availability ofa federal forum to vindicate its own administrative action' made the

question 'an important issue offederal law that sensibly belong[ed] in a federal court.'" Gunn,
133 S, Ct. at 1066(quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 315).
Here,the federal issue carries no such significance. While the parties' employment

relationship under the LHWCA may prove dispositive in this action, the issue does not appear to
have significant implications for "the federal system as a whole." Id The LHWCA does not

create a private right of action for suing non-employer third parties. S^ Rivera v. Horizon
Offshore Contractors. Inc.. No. 05-CV-6500(HB),2005 WL 3030841, at *2(S.D.N.YNov. 10,

2005). In addition, the LHWCA does not preempt state laws on workers' compensation. See
Sun Ship. Inc. v. Pennsvlvania. 447 U.S. 715, 716-17(1980). It thus appears that Congress

neither sought to guarantee a federal forum for individuals litigating third-party liability issues
relating to the LHWCA,nor to guarantee uniformity on such issues across state lines. This

makes the present action quite unlike Grable, where the Supreme Court emphasized the need for
a federal forum to provide uniformity on matters offederal law with substantial importance to a
federal agency's enforcement activities.

Grable, 545 U.S. at 312.

For similar reasons,the court finds that Defendant has not established the fourth Grable

requirement, which considers whether the federal issue is "capable ofresolution in federal court

question jurisdiction is "invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by
federal law." Grable. 545 U.S. at 312.

The Supreme Court has held, however,that federal question jurisdiction also extends to
state-law claims that "turn on substantial questions offederal law." Id.

[Fjederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal
issue is(1) necessarily raised,(2)actually disputed,(3)substantial,
and (4)capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the
federal-state balance approved by Congress. Where all four
requirements are met,... federal jurisdiction is proper because
there is a "serious federal interest in claiming the advantages
thought to be inherent in a federal forum" which can be vindicated
without disrupting Congress's intended division of labor between
state and federal courts.

Gunn V. Minton. — U.S. —133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065(2013)fquoting Grable. 545 U.S. at 313-14).
2.

Application

Plaintiff has asserted only state-law causes of action, and so the case does not qualify for
removal under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Defendant argues, however,that Plaintiffs
negligence claim "arises under"federal law because Defendant plans to assert defenses provided
for in the federal LHWCA. (Def. Mem.at 7-13.) The availability of a federal defense does not
necessarily justify removal, however,"even ifthe defense is anticipated in the plaintiffs

complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at
issue." Mateo v. JetBlue Airwavs Corp.. 847 F. Supp. 2d 383, 386(E.D.N.Y. 2012)(quoting
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams. 482 U.S. 386,393(1987)). Federal question jurisdiction will only
exist if all four Grable requirements are satisfied. Gunn. 133 S. Ct. at 1065. The court assumes,

without deciding, that federal issues related to LHWCA are necessarily raised and actually

disputed, thereby satisfying the first two factors. Even so,the court finds that Defendant has not
met its burden of satisfying the remaining Grable factors. The court therefore finds that federal
question jurisdiction does not exist in this case.
4

without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress." Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065.
The court has already determined that there is no special need for LHWCA-related issues to be
heard in a federal forum. Conversely, the fact that the LHWCA does not preempt state workers'

compensation laws preserves a major role for state courts and state legislatures in this area. See
Sun Ship. 447 U.S. at 724(noting that states may provide for more generous workers'

compensation than the federal system). Indeed, ifthe court were to accept Defendant's
reasoning,then federal question jurisdiction would exist in any case involving the application of
the LHWCA. Such an outcome would surely upset the federal-state balance in a legal domain
where plaintiffs often rely primarily or entirely on state-law claims. See, e.g..

Rivera. 2005 WL 3030841, at *2(remanding a personal injury case premised on negligence

claims, one of which involved interpreting LHWCA);Eldoh v. Astoria Generating Co.. 917

N.Y.S.2d 289,292(App. Div. 2011)(finding that the LHWCA did not preempt claims brought
under New York Labor Law and common-law negligence).
*

*

*

Plaintiff did not state a question offederal law on the face of his complaint. The court
further finds that Defendant failed to satisfy the Grable test with regard to its anticipated
LHWCA defense. Therefore, the court finds an absence offederal question jurisdiction in this
case.

B.

Admiralty Jurisdiction

Defendant contends that the court has federal admiralty jurisdiction over this action, and

that removal is appropriate on that basis alone. (Def. Mem. at 3.) Defendant's argument accords
great importance to a 2011 amendment to Section 1441 (the "2011 Amendment"), as analyzed in
a line of cases beginning with Rvan v. Hercules Offshore. Inc.. 945 F. Supp. 2d 772
(S.D. Tex. 2013). Courts in this jurisdiction and elsewhere have predominantly rejected the
6

Ryan interpretation, however. Consistent with those opinions, this court finds that the 2011

Amendment should not be interpreted to upset longstanding precedent holding that admiralty

issues, standing alone, are insufficient to make a case removable.^ Because the court finds no
independent basis for federal jurisdiction, this case must be remanded.
1.

Admiralty Jurisdiction Before the 2011 Amendment

Prior to 2011, Section 1441 provided that an action was removable ifthe district court
had "original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States." Then, as now. Section 1333 provided that the district courts shall have

original jurisdiction, exclusive ofthe courts ofthe States, of"[a]ny civil case of admiralty or

maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). This "saving to suitors" clause "has been interpreted by the

Supreme Court as a means of preserving the role ofstate courts in administering common law
remedies, such as ajury trial, in admiralty cases." Nassau. 130 F. Supp. 3d at 759; see also

Lewis V. Lewis & Clark Marine. Inc.. 531 U.S. 438,445(2001)("Thus,the saving to suitors
clause preserves remedies and the concurrentjurisdiction of state courts over some admiralty and
maritime claims."). To that end,the Supreme Court held long ago that admiralty cases did not
present federal questions, and that admiralty cases were only removable ifthere was an
independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction. S^ Romero v. IntT Terminal Operating Co..
358 U.S. 354,371-72(1959); see also Pierpont v. Barnes. 94 F.3d 813, 816(2d Cir. 1996)
(applying similar reasoning).

' light ofthis finding, the court need not address the parties' dispute over whether admiralty jurisdiction even
In
exists in this action, fCompare Def. Mem. at 3-5 with PL's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand (Dkt. 7)at 4-6.)

2.

The 2011 Amendment and Subsequent Case Law

The 2011 Amendment altered Section 1441 to remove the language about jurisdiction
"foimded on a claim or right under the Constitution, treaties or laws ofthe United States."

Section 1441 now provides simply that a civil action is removable if"the district courts ofthe
United States have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(emphasis added). Because
Section 1333 vests the district courts with original jurisdiction over admiralty cases, the amended
Section 1441 could be read as making admiralty actions newly removable. In Ryan,the
Southern District of Texas adopted that logic and held that the 2011 Amendment meant that
admiralty claims are now removable to federal court without an independent basis offederal
jurisdiction. 945 F. Supp. 2d at 778.

This change, however, overrides the historic understanding ofthe "saving to suitors"
clause, as articulated in clear Supreme Court precedent. Legislative history makes clear that
Congress did not intend such a change. S^ Nassau, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 763. House Reports

indicate that Congress's intention was to make modest procedural changes; there was no
discussion of creating a new category ofremovable cases. S^ H.R. Rep. No. 112-10 at 12

(2011)("This change is intended to make it easier for litigants to locate the provisions that apply
uniquely to diversity removal."); see also Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs.. LLC.38

F. Supp. 3d 749,763(E.D. La. 2014)("The House Report on the 2011 amendments evidences no
intent to change the operation ofremoval of maritime or admiralty cases.").
The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the 2011 Amendment, but the majority of

courts, including at least one in this district, have disagreed with Rvan by holding that, as has

long been the case, admiralty claims are only removable ifthey possess an additional basis of
federal jurisdiction.

Nassau. 130 F. Supp. 3d at 763: see also Langlois v. Kirbv Inland

Marine. LP. 139 F. Supp. 3d 804,809-10(M.D. La 2015)(collecting cases). Even within the
8

Fifth Circuit, the majority of district courts have rejected Ryan and concluded that "general
maritime claims are not removable absent some other independent basis offederal jurisdiction."
See Clear Lake Marine Center. Inc. v. Leidolf. No. H-14-3567, 2015 WL 1876338, at *2(S.D.

Tex. Apr. 22,2015)(collecting cases).
*

*

*

The court is persuaded by the weight of historical precedent on the purpose ofthe "saving
to suitors" clause, by the absence of any evidence that Congress intended to substantially alter
the doctrines of admiralty law, and by the clear consensus among the district courts. The court is
also conscious ofits obligation to "resolve any doubts against removability." Marlin Bus. Bank,

18 F. Supp. 3d at 241 (quoting In re MethvL 488 F.3d at 124). The court therefore holds that
common-law admiralty claims continue to require an independent basis offederal jurisdiction in
order to be removed. No such basis exists in this case. Accordingly,the case must be remanded.
C.

Fees and Costs

Plaintiff has requested an award ofthe "fees and costs incurred as a result of Defendant's

improper removal." (PI. Mem.in Supp. of Mot. to Remand ("PI. Mem.")(Dkt. 7)at 8.) Fees
and costs are authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), but "there is no reason to suppose Congress
meant to confer a right to remove, while at the same time discouraging its exercise in all but

obvious cases." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132,140(2005). "Absent unusual
circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under § 1447(c)only where the removing party

lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal." Id. at 141. The court finds that
Defendant had an "objectively reasonable basis" for removal in light ofthe factual disputes and
legal uncertainties noted above. Therefore, the court declines to award costs and fees under
Section 1447(c).

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (Dkt. 7)is GRANTED,and

the entire action is REMANDED to the Supreme Court ofNew York, Kings County. The Clerk
of Court is respectfully directed to send a certified copy ofthis Order to the Clerk of Court of
Supreme Court ofNew York, County of Kings, and to close the case in this court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). Plaintiffs request for fees and costs is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

s/Nicholas G. Garaufis
NICHOLAS G. GARAUl

Dated: Brooklyn,New York
December

,2016

United States District Judge

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