Torres et al v. City of New York et al
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER dated 9/27/17 granting defendant's 24 Motion for Summary Judgment. ( Ordered by Judge Brian M. Cogan on 9/27/2017 ) *forwarded for jgm. (Guzzi, Roseann)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TYRIN TORRES and DAQUAN BRADLEY,
- against CITY OF NEW YORK, SGT. CHRISTOPHER
WARD, EUGENE JONNY, and JOHN SIOKAS,
DECISION AND ORDER
16 Civ. 6719 (BMC)
COGAN, District Judge.
Plaintiffs Tyrin Torres and Daquan Bradley brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of their right to a fair trial on the part
of the City of New York and police officers Sgt. Christopher Ward, Eugene Jonny, and John
Siokas. 1 Specifically, plaintiffs allege that (i) defendants arrested them for robbery, assault, and
other charges; (ii) the officers had no probable cause to arrest them because they were not
engaged in any criminal conduct; and (iii) thereafter, defendants fabricated statements to initiate
prosecution. Defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs were
arrested when a complaining victim identified them as having assaulted and robbed him. For the
following reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.
Plaintiffs had previously brought a Monell claim, but withdrew the claim during the pre-motion conference
briefing in connection with this motion for summary judgment.
The following undisputed facts are from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements. 2 On
March 11, 2015, plaintiff Torres was inside the Stillwell Avenue subway station in Brooklyn,
New York, at 8:40 p.m. At some time during the evening, plaintiff Bradley and non-party
Sebastian Colin were present at a barbershop on Mermaid Avenue between West 15th and 16th
Streets in Brooklyn, New York. As Torres walked home from the subway station, he
encountered Bradley and Colin on Mermaid Avenue. Plaintiffs and Colin agreed to go to a
liquor store located at the intersection of Mermaid Avenue and West 16th Street. They remained
inside the liquor store for some minutes, before exiting and hailing a passing livery cab.
At around the same time – about shortly after 8:30 p.m. – inside of a deli located on
Mermaid Avenue in Brooklyn, non-party Wilfredo Vasquez informed defendant Officer Siokas
that he had just been the victim of a crime. More specifically, Vasquez informed Officer Siokas
that he was the victim of an assault and robbery that occurred on the corner of Mermaid Avenue
and West 19th Street at approximately 8:30 p.m. Vasquez told Officer Siokas that a group of
individuals punched and kicked him until he fell to the ground, that he was kicked and punched
while on the ground, and that his cellular telephone was forcibly removed from his hand.
Plaintiffs deny several statements offered by defendants, but they often offer no citations to the record to dispute
defendants’ facts, which are supported by the deposition and documentary evidence. Litigants in this District are
required by our Local Rules to specifically respond to the assertion of each purported undisputed fact by the movant
and, if controverting any such fact, to support their position by citing to admissible evidence in the record. See
Local Rule 56.1(b), (d). Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the Local Rules in several ways. First, plaintiffs fail
to support their purported denials with any citations to admissible evidence or with citations to evidence that actually
support their contentions. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 310 (2d Cir. 2008)
(“A party opposing summary judgment does not show the existence of a genuine issue of fact to be tried merely by
making assertions that are conclusory or based on speculation.” (citations omitted)); Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258
F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that where there are no citations to admissible evidence, or the cited materials
do not support the purported undisputed facts in a party’s Rule 56.1 statement, those assertions must be
disregarded). Second, plaintiffs purport to deny certain factual assertions that the record shows were previously
admitted by plaintiffs during deposition. Third, plaintiffs’ denials are peppered with argument, rather than fact.
Vasquez also informed Officer Siokas that, as a result, he sustained bruising and swelling
to his face and body. Officer Siokas observed swelling to Vasquez’s face and redness to his ribs.
After Vasquez and Officer Siokas exited the deli, Vasquez pointed towards three males, Torres,
Bradley, and Colin, across the street getting into a livery cab in front of a liquor store, and
informed Officer Siokas that they were the ones that assaulted and robbed him.
The livery cab containing plaintiffs and Colin started to pull away but was immediately
pulled over by members of the NYPD. Plaintiffs and Colin were removed from the cab and
handcuffed. Thereafter, plaintiffs and Colin were lined up next to each other, consistent with a
show-up identification procedure, and Vasquez again confirmed to Officer Siokas that all three
of the men assaulted and robbed him. 3 From a vantage point of about twenty feet away from
plaintiffs and Colin, Vasquez pointed at the three men and identified them as the assailants.
Based on this information from Vasquez, plaintiffs and Colin were arrested immediately and
charged the following afternoon in a criminal complaint with Robbery in the Second Degree,
Assault in the Second Degree, Robbery in the Third Degree, Grand Larceny in the Fourth
Degree, Assault in the Third Degree, Petit Larceny, Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in
the Fifth Degree, Menacing in the Third Degree, and Harassment in the Second Degree.
Following arraignment, neither plaintiff made any additional court appearances, and the charges
were subsequently dropped some months later.
Standard of Review
“[S]ummary judgment may be granted only if there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Marvel Characters, Inc.
The record indicates that there were four individuals involved in the assault and robbery of Vasquez, and the fourth
individual is referred to as the “unapprehended other.”
v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining
whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, [the court] must resolve all ambiguities
and draw all inferences against the moving party.” Id. In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, a district court “may rely on any material that would be admissible at a trial.” Lyons
v. Lancer Ins. Co., 681 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Call Ctr. Techs., Inc. v. Grand Adventures Tour & Travel Publ’g Corp., 635 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir.
2011) (“[T]he nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” (internal quotation marks
“A party opposing summary judgment does not show the existence of a genuine issue of
fact to be tried merely by making assertions that are conclusory or based on speculation.” Major
League Baseball, 542 F.3d at 310 (citations omitted). A dispute is not “genuine” if no
reasonable factfinder “could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Nabisco, Inc. v. WarnerLambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986)). This means that the nonmoving party must present more than a “scintilla of
evidence,” Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted), or “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,”
Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Nor can a party rely on “mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not
credible.” Gottlieb v. Cty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citations
A. False Arrest
In evaluating a § 1983 claim for false arrest, courts have generally looked to the law of
the state in which the arrest occurred. See Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d
Cir. 2012). “A § 1983 claim for false arrest . . . is substantially the same as a claim for false
arrest under New York law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Under New York law, an
action for false arrest requires that the plaintiff show that ‘(1) the defendant intended to confine
him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the
confinement[,] and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.’” Id. (quoting Broughton
v. State, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 93 (1975)).
Probable cause “is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.” Weyant v. Okst, 101
F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the officers have
knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed
or is committing a crime.” Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2013).
“Information about criminal activity provided by a single complainant can establish probable
cause when the information is sufficiently reliable and corroborated;” however, “a report of a
crime alone will not necessarily establish probable cause,” and some corroboration by the police
is necessary. Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 647 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted); see
also Marin v. Viggiani, 92 Civ. 3836, 1993 WL 404098, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1993) (“[W]hen
a putative victim precisely identifies the alleged perpetrator of a crime and there is independent
evidence to support at least some of the victim’s assertions, a person of reasonable caution is
warranted in believing that an offense has been committed by the alleged perpetrator.”).
Here, the officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs and Colin. A complaining victim
told Officer Siokas that he was just assaulted and robbed, the complaining victim had bruising
and injuries to his face and ribs, which corroborated the allegations of assault, and after leaving
the deli, the complaining victim identified plaintiffs and Colin two times as the individuals who
assaulted him: first when he spotted them getting in to the livery cab, and second when he
pointed at them during the show-up shortly after his initial identification. Because the victim
identified the plaintiffs with conviction shortly after his assault and his injuries corroborated that
an assault had taken place, the officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs. See Miloslavsky
v. AES Eng’g Soc’y, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 993 F.2d 1534 (2d Cir.
1993) (“The veracity of citizen complaints who are the victims of the very crime they report to
the police is assumed.”).
The fact of Vasquez’s positive identification is actually supported by the testimony of
plaintiff Bradley, who admitted during deposition that Vasquez pointed at “us,” that is, Torres,
Bradley, and Colin, during the show-up. Plaintiffs’ after-the-fact allegation that Vasquez only
pointed at Colin is conjecture at best, and at twenty feet away, plaintiffs have no basis to
speculate whether Vasquez was pointing at one of them or all of them, nor could any of them
hear the conversation between Vasquez and Officer Siokas.
That the charges were thereafter dismissed and there later came to be evidence that at
least plaintiff Torres was elsewhere when Vasquez was assaulted is beside the point. It is wellsettled that even where the information on which a police officer relies later turns out to be
mistaken, probable cause still exists as long as the arresting officer acted reasonably in relying on
that information. See Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994). This means that
the test is an objective one, and an officer’s subjective belief at the time of the arrest is irrelevant.
See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 633 (2d Cir. 2000). That is why plaintiffs’ focus on the
inconsistencies arising from Officer Siokas’s memory, e.g., whether he witnessed the assault,
what time it occurred, or where it occurred, all miss the mark. Whatever Officer Siokas was
thinking he saw or when he saw it does not matter when the actual victim of the assault, bearing
the bruises and markings of just being assaulted, points at three individuals and identifies them
twice as his assailants. “[T]he validity of an arrest does not depend upon an ultimate finding of
guilt or innocence.” Haussman v. Fergus, 894 F. Supp. 142, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Thus,
whether the charges for which plaintiffs were arrested are later dismissed is irrelevant to a
determination of probable cause at the time of arrest. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,
This principle is also why courts hold that “[o]nce a police officer has a reasonable basis
to believe there is probable cause to arrest, he is not required to explore or eliminate every
theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460
F.3d 388, 396 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001)).
“Nor does it matter that an investigation might have cast doubt upon the basis for the arrest.” Id.
“Once officers possess facts sufficient to establish probable cause, they are neither required nor
allowed to sit as prosecutor, judge or jury. Their function is to apprehend those suspected of
wrongdoing, and not to finally determine guilt through a weighing of the evidence.” Little v.
Massari, 526 F. Supp. 2d 371, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). This means that plaintiffs’ protests as to their arrest did not require the police officers
to investigate that moment whether plaintiffs could have been somewhere else. The officers had
probable cause to arrest, and that defeats plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest. Accordingly,
defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim is granted. See Zanghi v. Inc. Vill. of
Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1985).
B. Malicious Prosecution
“To establish a malicious prosecution claim under New York law, a plaintiff must prove
(1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the
proceeding in plaintiff’s favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and
(4) actual malice as a motivation for defendant’s actions.” Manganiello v. City of New York,
612 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to these state
law elements, a malicious prosecution claim brought under § 1983 requires showing “a sufficient
post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.”
Rohman v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000). “[T]he law places a
heavy burden on malicious prosecution plaintiffs.” Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F.3d 275, 282 (2d
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The third element is the most important here “[b]ecause lack of probable cause is an
element of a malicious prosecution claim,” and “the existence of probable cause is a complete
defense to a claim of malicious prosecution.” Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 94-95 (2d
Cir. 2013). As established above in the analysis for false arrest, probable cause existed to arrest
both plaintiffs, and that probable cause did not dissipate prior to plaintiffs being charged with
robbery and assault. “Where there is no change in the information known to police at the time of
arrest and prosecution, probable cause sufficient to warrant arrest precludes a claim for malicious
prosecution.” Cortes v. City of New York, 148 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting
that plaintiff pointed to no change in the information available to the defendants after the time he
was arrested and, therefore, “[s]ince probable cause existed for the arrest and it did not dissipate,
that same probable cause requires dismissal of plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim”).
To the extent that plaintiffs allege that Officer Siokas provided false information to the
Kings County District Attorney’s Office (the “KCDA”), specifically that Officer Siokas
personally observed plaintiffs assault Vasquez, 4 it is well-settled that “even where plaintiff
alleges . . . that the malicious prosecution is based on fabricated evidence, the existence of
probable cause independent of the fabricated evidence is a defense to that claim.” Hoyos v. City
of New York, 999 F. Supp. 2d 375, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also Blau v. Suffolk Cty., No. 11CV4818, 2016 WL 426515, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
3, 2016); Maldonado v. City of New York, No. 11 CIV. 3514 RA, 2014 WL 787814, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2014) (“[T]he existence of probable cause independent of the allegedly
falsified evidence is a defense to a malicious prosecution claim.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)); Morse v. Spitzer, No. 07-cv-4793, 2012 WL 3202963, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
On this point, it is also useful to consider the documents the parties have tendered
because they also show that the facts as they existed on the evening of March 11, 2015, were one
and the same as the facts that existed on the afternoon of March 12, 2015, when plaintiffs were
charged in a criminal complaint. A close review of the criminal complaint shows no mention
whatsoever of the plaintiffs’ contention that Officer Siokas said he viewed the assault. To the
contrary, the criminal complaint is based solely on the victim’s identification, confirming that the
basis for plaintiffs’ arrest the night before and their charge that afternoon was the same.
On this point, I accept plaintiffs’ allegation that Officer Siokas stated initially that he observed the assault, even
though the support for plaintiffs’ allegation is shaky at best, given that the only document supporting this allegation
is the KCDA screening sheet, which was prepared by a KCDA paralegal and not reviewed or signed by Officer
Siokas. In any event, even accepting the facts favorably to the non-moving parties, the independent probable cause
provided by Vasquez means that plaintiffs’ purported dispute fails to raise a material issue of fact.
Thus, whether or not Officer Siokas provided false information to the KCDA with respect
to observing plaintiffs assault Vasquez is irrelevant as to plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim
because, as discussed, there was independent probable cause to prosecute plaintiffs based solely
on the complaining victim. And there was no change in information between the time of
plaintiffs’ arrests and the criminal complaint to vitiate the existence of probable cause. Thus,
defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim is also granted. See Zanghi, 752 F.2d
C. Fair Trial
Plaintiffs allege that Officer Siokas’s purported fabrications regarding his observation of
the assault deprived them of their right to a fair trial. A plaintiff establishes a constitutional
violation for the denial of his right to a fair trial based on the fabrication of evidence if he proves
that “an (1) investigating official (2) fabricates evidence (3) that is likely to influence a jury’s
decision, (4) forwards that information to prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff suffers a deprivation
of liberty as a result.” Jovanovic v. City of New York, 486 F. App’x 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012);
see also Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997) (“When a police
officer creates false information likely to influence a jury’s decision and forwards that
information to prosecutors, he violates the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial, and the
harm occasioned by such an unconscionable action is redressable in an action for damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). 5 Therefore, to have a cognizable claim for the denial of the right to a fair
trial, a plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the fabricated evidence and his
I have reservations about the existence of a claim for relief for “denial of the right to a fair trial.” To me, this is
merely a characterization of a particular species of the denial of due process that is part of a malicious prosecution
claim. The common law did not recognize such a claim and the Constitution does not expressly provide for one.
This may be why the title “denial of fair trial” is itself a misnomer – the claim is usually raised where, as here, there
has been no trial at all. When courts start splitting out and adding labels to particular fact patterns that present
themselves under existing claims, all they do is multiply the number of causes of action. However, I acknowledge
that the Second Circuit has, at least implicitly, acknowledged the existence of such a claim.
deprivation of liberty. See Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 348, 355 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The
manufacture of false evidence, in and of itself . . . does not impair anyone’s liberty, and therefore
does not impair anyone’s constitutional right,” and the “deprivation of liberty of which [plaintiff]
complains [must] be shown to be the result of [the defendant’s] fabrication of evidence.”
(internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added)).
Importantly, and unlike the law with respect to malicious prosecution claims, the Second
Circuit has held that the existence of probable cause to arrest and prosecute is not a complete
defense to a fair trial claim. See Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130. However, at the same time, the
Second Circuit has also held that a plaintiff must show causation between the alleged fabricated
evidence and a plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty. See Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 355. It is at the
intersection of these two cases that I find that plaintiffs have no claim for a violation of their
right to a fair trial. “[A]lthough probable cause is not a complete defense to a fair trial claim
based on fabricated evidence, plaintiff still must show . . . that the alleged fabrication caused a
deprivation of liberty.” Hoyos, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 394. In other words, to show causation,
“plaintiff must show that the misconduct caused some deprivation above and beyond the fact of
the prosecution itself, ” where “independent probable cause exists for the prosecution” in the first
As an initial matter, the facts of the instant case make it entirely distinguishable from
Ricciuti. There, the plaintiffs had alleged that the police deprived them of their right to a fair
trial by fabricating evidence, including a confession, concerning the circumstances of an alleged
assault, and as a direct consequence of the fabricated evidence, plaintiffs were charged with a
much more serious crime, felony assault in the second degree, rather than misdemeanor assault,
and the prosecutors added a charge for aggravated racial harassment. 124 F.3d at 126-27.
Here, unlike in Ricciuti, plaintiffs have not and cannot raise an issue of fact as to whether
the purported fabrications led them to be charged with more serious crimes or detained for a
longer period of time. There are three KCDA documents demonstrating that the alleged
fabrications played no role in the bringing of charges.
First, as noted above, there is nothing in the criminal complaint that supports even an
inference that Officer Siokas’s purported observation of the assault factored into the KCDA’s
decision to bring charges against plaintiffs. There is no mention whatsoever that Officer Siokas
had first-hand knowledge; rather, all of the information is from the complaining witness, referred
to as the “informant.” Notably, the criminal complaint states:
The source of deponent’s [Siokas] information and the grounds for deponent’s
belief are as follows:
Deponent is informed by Wilfredo Vasquez that, at the above time and place, the
defendants did act in concert with an unapprehended other and did repeatedly
punch and kick the informant about the face and body and further acted in concert
by removing informant’s cell phone from informant’s hand.
Deponent is further informed by the informant that the above described actions
caused informant to suffer bruising and swelling to the face and body, to suffer
substantial pain, to fear further physical injury and to become alarmed and
(emphasis added). Thus, the criminal complaint demonstrates that the basis of the charges was
Second, four months later, when the KCDA decided to dismiss the charges, its own
internal memorandum demonstrates that the entirety of the case rested on Vasquez’s
identification. In fact, the internal memorandum, which was drafted by the prosecutors, is itself
dispositive of the causation issue. It states:
The sole witness Wilfredo Vasquez, is unable to identify the defendants. When
interviewed by the District Attorney’s Office the complainant stated, in sum and
substance, that the complainant did not see the defendants attacking and robbing
the complainant. The complainant observed defendants Bradley, [Colin] and
Torres standing nearby with other males after the complainant made a 911 call.
NYPD Detective John Siokas (Shield No. 2825, Command No. 740), did not
observe the assault and the robbery.
(emphasis added). If Officer Siokas had viewed the assault, then the complaining witness’s lack
of subsequent identification would be balanced against his memory in the memorandum, if, of
course, the prosecutors had any basis to believe that Officer Siokas saw anything. The lack of
discussion, and the fact that the memorandum actually states affirmatively and unequivocally
that Officer Siokas did not view the assault, underscores the fact that Vasquez’s identification
was the alpha and the omega of the charges brought against plaintiffs.
This internal memorandum was drafted a short four months after the charges were
brought, and no reasonable juror could find that the prosecutors relied on any purported
observation by Officer Siokas in the time between bringing the complaint, which made no
mention of Officer Siokas’s observations, and the decision to dismiss, which stated affirmatively
that Officer Siokas did not observe the assault. Additionally, in the brief time between the
criminal complaint and the internal memorandum, plaintiffs made no subsequent court
appearances such that, as a fundamental insufficiency, plaintiffs have failed to show any
deprivation of liberty “above and beyond the fact of the prosecution itself” as a result of any
false statements. Hoyos, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
The third document is the KCDA screening sheet, which, as noted above, was prepared
by a KCDA paralegal after a telephone conversation with Officer Siokas. However, the record is
undisputed that Officer Siokas never saw it, reviewed it, signed it, nor verified any of the
information in it. Further, even though the paralegal recounted that the “A/O,” short for arresting
officer, observed the assault, it remains that neither the criminal complaint nor the internal
memorandum make any mention of this, such that no reasonable juror could find that this
statement or misstatement mattered in the prosecutors’ decision-making. Accordingly, plaintiffs’
fair trial claim also fails.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to
enter judgment in favor of defendants, dismissing the complaint.
Digitally signed by Brian M.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 27, 2017
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?