Knights v. Legere et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint (the "Complaint") on December 18, 2016. (Compl.,ECF Doc. No. 1.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff purports to seek foreclosure upon liens he allegedly perfected on "[a]ll" of Defendants' property. (Id if 11). Plaintiff bases his alleged right to foreclose on an agreement he purports to have formed with Defendants on or aboutMarch 30, 2016. As alleged in the Complaint, the purported agreement (see Compl. Ex. B) is co mprised of several unsolicited, unilateral communications from Plaintiff to Defendants asserting that Defendants owe him $285,550,000 and "agree[d] to the liquidation of private assets to satisfy the debt." Plaintiff does not allege th at Defendants ever gave their affirmative assent to any such "agreement." Rather, in alleging that he and Defendants formed a binding contract, Knights relies entirely on a recital in the so-called agreement stating that Defendants' &q uot;failure to sufficiently respond" to his demands "constitutes... acceptance and/or approval of all the facts/claims made therein" (as well as on other, nearly identical formulations of this recital). Based on the foregoing, this act ion is dismissed, with prejudice, as frivolous. Fitzgerald, 221 F.3d at 362. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915 (a)(3) that any informa pauperis appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). (See attachment for further details). Ordered by Judge LaShann DeArcy Hall on 2/3/2017. (Basnight, Jasmine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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RYAN JASON KNIGHTS,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
16-CV-6965 (LDH) (RER)

Plaintiff,
-againstJOHN J. LEGERE D/B/A T-MOBILE USA,
INC., President and ChiefEJCecutive Officer;
T-MOBILE USA, INC., Washington Incorporated,
Defendants.
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LASHANN DEARCY HALL, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Ryan Jason Knights filed this prose complaint seeking to foreclose upon liens
he allegedly perfected on Defendants' property. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs
complaint is dismissed as frivolous.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint (the "Complaint") on December 18, 2016. (Compl.,
ECF Doc. No. 1.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff purports to seek foreclosure upon liens he allegedly
perfected on "[a]ll" of Defendants' property. (Id

if 11).

Plaintiff bases his alleged right to

foreclose on an agreement he purports to have formed with Defendants on or about
March 30, 2016. (See id.

ifil 13-16.)

As alleged in the Complaint, the purported agreement (see

Compl. EJC. B) is comprised of several unsolicited, unilateral communications from Plaintiff to
Defendants asserting that Defendants owe him $285,550,000 and "agree[d] to the liquidation of
private assets to satisfy the debt." Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants ever gave their
affirmative assent to any such "agreement." Rather, in alleging that he and Defendants formed a
binding contract, Knights relies entirely on a recital in the so-called agreement stating that
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Defendants' "failure to sufficiently respond" to his demands "constitutes ... acceptance and/or
approval of all the facts/claims made therein" (as well as on other, nearly identical formulations
of this recital). (Id at 34; see also

Comp!.~~

13-16.) In other words, Knights alleges that

Defendants agreed to pay him $285,550,000 by failing to respond to his demands, that
Defendants' silence should be deemed consent, and that they have defaulted on their debt. (See
Compl. ~~ 16-17.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to provide "(l) a short
and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction ... , (2) a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the relief sought .
. . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). To withstand scrutiny, a complaint must contain "sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id "[A] plaintiffs
obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do....
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In other words, Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The Court is mindful that "[a] document filed prose is to be liberally construed, and a

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). If a liberal reading of the complaint "gives any
indication that a valid claim might be stated," the Court must grant leave to amend the complaint.

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See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). However, a district court nevertheless
has the inherent power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it determines that the action is frivolous
or the court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants

Corp., 221F.3d362, 363-364 (2d Cir. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs complaint-even under the very liberal reading we
accord pro se pleadings (and even if Plaintiff believes them to be true)-fails to conform with
the dictates of Rule 8. That is, it neither establishes a basis for the Court's jurisdiction nor
presents a cognizable demand for relief. Instead, the voluminous pleading is rambling and
largely nonsensical, making inexplicable references to, inter alia, a purported real estate
foreclosure judgment, a mortgage lien, a "Notice oflntemational Commercial Claim in
Admiralty Administrative Remedy," and default of an "Agreement."
For example, Plaintiff states:
On or about March 30, 2016, Defendant(s) entered into an [sic]
contractual/consensual agreement with Plaintiff pursuant to Certificate of Default
in Dishonor (Consent to Judgment), with Apostille No. NYC-560636 ("COD")
dated March 30, 2016; Notice of International Commercial Claim within the
Admiralty ab initio Administrative Remedy, with Apostille No. NYC56065("ICC") dated March 30, 2016; Notice of Final Determination and
Judgment in nihil dicit("NFD") dated March 30, 2016; Affidavit of
Obligation/Commercial Lien, with Apostille No. NYC-560634("AOO") dated
March 30, 2016; and Certificate of Non-Response, with Apostille No. NYC560633("CNR") dated March 30, 2016, (collectively, the 'Agreement') ....
(Compl.

~

13.) Plaintiff further states:

In Addition, Defendant(s) agreed to pledge as surety for the outstanding overdue
principal amount of $285,550,000.00, all ofDefendant(s) personal and real
property rights and/or interest in into subject property, along with certain other
collateral thereto (collectively, the "Collateral") upon default in making a
sufficient response and/or by not satisfying fees and/or violations of Plaintiff
claim(s) ....
3

(Id at 1f 18.)
Moving to the substance of Plaintiffs claim, it is a fundamental tenet of contract law that
"where the recipient of an offer is under no duty to speak, silence, when not misleading, may not
be translated into acceptance merely because the offer purports to attach that effect to it."

Albrecht Chem. Co. v. Anderson Trading Corp., 298 N.Y. 437, 440 (1949). In addition, to plead
a foreclosure claim under New York law, the Complaint must allege "the existence of an
obligation secured by a mortgage, and a default on that obligation." Gustavia Home, LLC v.

Rice, No. 16-CV-2353, 2016 WL 6683473, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2016). The Complaint
manifestly fails to plead these elements and the attached documents fail to offer any support.
Plaintiffs allegations can only be described as "fanciful," "fantastic," and "delusional."

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Because Plaintiffs complaint is devoid of any
basis in law or fact-defects which cannot be cured by amendment-this action is dismissed.

Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this action is dismissed, with prejudice, as frivolous. Fitzgerald,
221 F.3d at 362. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any informa

pauperis appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
February 1, 2017

SO ORDERED:
/s/LDH
LASHANN DEARCY HALL
United States District Judge

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