Knight v. Colvin

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM DECISION, Knight has failed to show any basis for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, the Petition is denied. Additionally, I decline to issue a certificate of appealability because Knight has not made a substantial showing o f the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), I certify that any appeal taken from this decision and order would not be taken in good faith. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case. So Ordered by Circuit Judge VJ-Denny Chin on 4/24/2023. (c/m to Jerry Knight, # 12-A-4884, Coxsackie Correctional Facility, P.O. Box 999, Coxsackie, NY 12051) (TLH)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------x
JERRY KNIGHT,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

17-CV-2278 (DC)

-v-

JOHN COLVIN, Superintendent,
Five Points Correctional Facility,
Respondent.

------------------------------------x
APPEARANCES:

JERRY KNIGHT
Petitioner Pro Se
12-A-4884
Coxsackie Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 999
Coxsackie, NY 12051
ERIC GONZALEZ, Esq.
District Attorney, Kings County
By:
Howard B. Goodman, Esq.
Assistant District Attorney
350 Jay Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Attorney for Respondent

CHIN, Circuit Judge:
In 2012, following a jury trial, petitioner Jerry Knight was convicted of
first-degree assault and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon in connection
with the shooting of Cleveland White. Knight was sentenced to concurrent prison
terms of twenty-three years for the assault count and ten years for the weapon

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possession count, to be followed by five years of post-release supervision. See Dkt. 7 at
2. The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed his convictions, People v.
Knight, 19 N.Y.S.3d 901 (2d Dep't 2015) ("Knight I"), and the New York Court of Appeals

denied his application for leave to appeal, People v. Knight, 59 N.E.3d 1222 (N.Y. 2016)
(Ste:in, J.) ("Knight II").
On March 31, 2017, proceed:ing prose, Knight filed the :instant petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the "Petition"). See Dkt. 1. Knight
argues that (1) he was deprived of his right to counsel because the trial court did not
adequately consider his request for new counsel and (2) there is :insufficient evidence to
support his convictions. Knight also raised two additional claims, which he has asked
this Court for permission to withdraw because they are unexhausted. See Dkt. 22. The
K:ings County District Attorney's Office filed its opposition to the Petition on June 14,
2017. See Dkt. 7. On February 3, 2023, the case was reassigned to the undersigned.
For the reasons set forth below, Knight's petition is DENIED.
BACKGROUND

I.

The Facts'
The evidence at trial established the follow:ing:
Knight was a member of the Crips gang. White was a member of the

Bloods, a rival gang. White lived :in Coney Island, Brooklyn, and had known Knight

The relevant facts are primarily drawn from the affirmation submitted in opposition
to the Petition. The recitation of facts set forth in the affirmation are supported by detailed
citations to the record, including the trial transcript. See Dkt. 7.
2

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from the neighborhood for two or three years. White only knew Knight by the
nickname "Cuda." In 2010, Knight and White had several negative interactions with
each other. On one occasion, Knight yelled, "What's cracking" to White, which was a
sign of disrespect to a Bloods member. On another occasion, Knight gave White dirty
looks, and White, feeling disrespected, challenged Knight to a fight but ultimately
walked away. See id. at 19-20.
On May 8, 2011, around 10:00 p.m., White and three friends -- two of
whom were fellow Bloods members -- were at a "chicken spot" in Brooklyn and saw
Knight standing outside. Knight "grilled," or looked disrespectfully at, White when
they were about four feet away from one another. White looked at Knight but did not
pursue anything further because there were police officers around and he was on
probation. White left the store as Knight was still standing outside, and White started
to walk home. As White was walking, he stopped at a store and saw that Knight,
wearing a hoodie, was trailing him. When White came out of the store, Knight said to
White, "What's cracking" to which White responded, "Nothing cracking over here."
White saw Knight walk to the front of White's apartment building, and White walked
into his building lobby through the back entrance. White remained in his building
lobby for five to ten minutes, during which he went outside twice and returned to the
lobby. See id. at 20-21.
Through the lobby windows, White saw a man wearing a hoodie and
standing in front of the apartment building along with two men who he knew as
"Peanut" and "Court Knox." The men left the steps, and White exited the apartment
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building and followed the men around the corner. White asked the man wearing the
hoodie who he was, and the man responded, "Who are you?" White recognized the
man's voice and called out to a friend. The man removed the hood, and White saw that
it was Knight. Knight pulled a gun out of the pocket of his hoodie and shot White
twice. White leaned against a nearby U-Haul truck and saw Knight go toward Surf
Avenue. White's friend put him inside a car and took him to the hospital. See id. at 21.
Officers Clive Thomas and Anthony Contessa responded to the scene of
the shooting. White was in the back seat of a car, and the person in the driver's seat told
Officer Contessa that White had been shot and that he was going to drive him to the
hospital. Officer Contessa told the driver to wait for the ambulance, but the driver
drove the car away. Officer Thomas followed the car to the emergency room at Coney
Island Hospital, but could not speak to White right away because he was in a trauma
room and had a tube in his throat. Meanwhile, Officer Contessa stayed at the crime
scene and interviewed witnesses, but later he went to Coney Island Hospital and
interviewed White after the tube was removed from his throat. White told Officer
Contessa that he was a member of the Bloods gang and that he could identify the
person who shot him. See id. at 21-22.
At 11:35 p.m. the same evening, Officer Thomas Ryley of the Evidence
Collection Team responded to the crime scene. He photographed the scene, recovered
two .380 caliber shell casings., and sent them to the laboratory for testing. See id. at 23.
Detective Robert Johnson also went to the scene of the shooting and
obtained video surveillance footage of the shooting from NYPD cameras attached to a
4

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building on Surf Avenue. The video footage was received into evidence but not shown
at the trial due to technical difficulties. See Dkt. 7-8 at 51-52. Detective Johnson testified
that in the video he "saw the victim kneeling, or should I say basically kneading himself
against a U-haul truck that was parked on the corner of West 21st and Surf." Id. at 52.
On May 14, 2011, Detective Johnson went to Coney Island Hospital to interview White.
Detective Johnson showed White a photo array from which White identified Knight as
the person who shot him. Detective Johnson issued a warrant card for Knight, and
Knight was arrested on June 14, 2011. See Dkt. 7 at 23.
Dr. Tindelo Adaniel treated White at Coney Island Hospital for gunshot
wounds in his chest and right arm. White was in critical condition from life-threating
injuries to his lung and liver and remained in the hospital for over a month due to
numerous complications that caused permanent limitations. See id. at 23-24.
When White was released from the hospital, he went to his mother's
house. At some point, he met with a Crips gang member named Julani, who was in the
same "sect" as Knight and told White not to testify but to "keep it in the streets." After
speaking with Julani, White also spoke with Allen, who informed him that he had been
labeled "food" or a "snitch" in Coney Island, meaning he could be beaten up or shot.
White felt "scared for [his] life" and stopped staying in Coney Island. See id.
When White left Coney Island, one of his friends called to tell him that
Knight and his friends were saying that White snitched because an order of protection
had been served on Knight to protect White. See id. at 24-25. The order of protection,
which was served on Knight on August 9, 2011, was received in evidence at the trial.
5

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See id. at 25 & n.7. Knight only returned to Coney Island once a month to get money

from his mother, and he did not tell the police or the District Attorney's Office where he
was staying because he was afraid to testify. See id. at 25; Dkt. 7-6 at 90, 93. White did
not decide to "do the right thing" and testify until July 2, 2012, when he was arrested for
failing to report to probation. He was not promised anything in exchange for testifying.
See Dkt. 7 at 25; Dkt. 7-6 at 44-45.

Officer Peter Contessa of the Department of Corrections Gang Intelligence
Unit testified that on March 27, 2012, Knight reported during one of three inmate
interviews on file that he was in the "upper-echelon" of the Crips gang. See Dkt. 7 at 25;
Dkt. 7-8 at 70, 75-76, 83. Officer Contessa, an expert on gangs, also testified about
recorded phone calls that Knight made from Rikers Island and that were played for the
jury. During the calls, Knight discussed a victim testifying. In the first phone call made
on June 18, 2011 -- four days after Knight was arrested -- Knight used the term
"canining," which meant snitching or testifying, and said "don't let him make a movie,"
which meant that he did not want the victim of the shooting to testify. In another
recorded phone call made on July 3, 2011, Knight used the word "skeleton" to refer to
the victim of the shooting, spoke about not letting the victim testify, and said that if the
victim comes forward, he might have to carry out an act of violence against him. In
another phone call on May 4, 2012, Knight used the terms "going to church" and "sing,"
which mean going to court and testifying. See Dkt. 7 at 25-26.
At trial, White's testimony of the events leading up to the shooting was
corroborated by surveillance videos from his building's lobby and outside area, and by
6

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the footage recovered from the building on Surf A venue. See Dkt. 7-10 at 68. White also
identified Knight in court as the person who shot him. See id. at 69.
II.

Procedural History
A.

State Court Proceedings

Knight was charged with second-degree attempted murder, first-degree
assault, two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, and two counts
of fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon. Before trial, the weapon possession
counts related to Knight's possession of a loaded firearm at the time of his arrest were
severed from the other charges. See Dkt. 7 at 2.
At the beginning of the trial, defense counsel informed the court that
Knight had asked to be relieved of counsel and appointed new counsel. The court,
defense counsel, and Knight had the following exchange:
THE COURT: What's the reason?
MR. SWEENEY: I do not have his best i.c'l.terest at stake. There are certain
motions he wishes to file to make sure he has all the information
pertaining to this case that does, in fact, exist and that I think that's
essentially it. Right?
THE DEFENDANT: I have been misguided a few times where he told me
certain offers on the table, and I wasn't interested at the time, but I asked
how long it would be available. He told me until the next offer takes place
or whatever the case. When I finally decided to take the offer which he
presented to me, he told me DA give him, the DA never gave him that
offer. He made it seem I made that offer up. He told me on the phone one
time, video conference and couple of times he rnisleaded me by -- I am on
Court lockdown. He challenged it very late. I have been asking him to
challenge it.
Dkt. 7-2 at 4-5.

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The court asked defense counsel if, in his opinion, the motions that
Knight had requested him to file were valid. Defense counsel said no. The court
responded:
There would be no reason why a skilled attorney would file motions
that aren't properly brought before the Court.
See, young man, you are in a position where you just don't like the
situation you put yourself in. And you can't blame the attorney for
bad news. Mr. Sweeney is a skilled attorney. He is a highly regarded
member of the profession. He is representing you to the best of his
ability. And, quite frankly, you're lucky to have such a skilled lawyer
representing you.
What you want and what you get in the world are often different
things. Now, an attorney is not going to file a motion when it's what
we call in our profession frivolous, meaning worthless. It serves no
purpose. The district attorney is under a duty to provide you certain
documents and evidence before trial. If they fail to do that, you have
remedies available to you which your attorney will scrupulously
handle.
I find there is no breakdown in the attorney client relationship. You
are obviously communicating with one another.
Your motion to have Mr. Sweeney removed and replaced is denied.

Id. at 6-7.
The case proceeded to trial. On September 20, 2012, the jury found Knight
guilty of first-degree assault and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. On
October 15, 2012, Knight was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty-three
years on the assault count and ten years on the weapon possession count, to be
followed by five years of post-release supervision. 2 See Dkt. 7 at 2.

On November 19, 2012, Knight pleaded guilty to the severed fourth-degree criminal
possession of a weapon charge related to the firearm he possessed at the time of his arrest
and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment. See 0kt. 7 at 3.

2

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Represented by counsel, Knight appealed from the judgment of conviction
to the Appellate Division, Second Department in June 2014 asserting that 1) the
convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and the convictions were
against the weight of the evidence; 2) the trial court improperly denied his request for
new assigned counsel; and 3) the sentence was excessive. On December 9, 2015, the
Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, rejecting all three claims. See Knight I, 19
N.Y.S.3d at 902.
On January 15, 2016, Knight applied forleave to appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals, asserting one issue in the application -- that the trial court failed to
adequately investigate his request for new counsel. On April 4, 2016, the New York
Court of Appeals denied Knight's application for leave to appeal. See Knight II, 59
N.E.3d at 1222.
B.

Proceedings Below
On March 31, 2017, proceeding prose, Knight filed the Petition raising four

claims: 1) deprivation of the right to counsel because the court failed to adequately
inquire into his request for new counsel; 2) insufficient evidence to support the
convictions; 3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and 4) prosecutorial misconduct at
trial. See Dkt. 1 at 7-10. Knight explained that the Petition contains both exhausted and
unexhausted claims and asked the court to hold the Petition in abeyance so he could
exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims. On
June 14, 2017, Respondent opposed the Petition. See Dkt. 7. On February 12, 2018, the
district court denied without prejudice Knight's request to hold the Petition in
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abeyance, explaining that Knight failed to demonstrate good cause for his failure to
exhaust the claims. See Dkt. 12.
On April 13, 2018, Knight submitted another motion requesting that the

Petition be held in abeyance so that he could exhaust the two unexhausted claims:
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct at trial. See Dkt. 17.
On February 11, 2019, the court again denied Knight's motion to stay the Petition

because he failed to demonstrate good cause for failure to exhaust the claims. See Dkt.
20. The court granted Knight sixty days to amend the Petition to remove the
unexhausted claims. See id. On April 11, 2019, Knight filed a motion requesting
permission to withdraw the unexhausted claims from the Petition. See Dkt. 22. That
motion is hereby GRANTED, and the Petition is deemed amended to assert only two
claims: deprivation of the right to counsel and sufficiency of the evidence.
DISCUSSION

I.

Federal Review of State Convictions
A federal court may not grant a habeas petition on a claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-98 (2011); Waiters v. Lee,
857 F.3d 466,477 (2d Cir. 2017). Hence, when a claim is adjudicated on the merits,
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the state court's decision must be accorded "substantial deference." Fischer v. Smith,
780 F.3d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 2015). "A federal court may reverse a state court ruling
only where it was 'so lacking in justification that there was ... [no] possibility for
fairminded disagreement."' Vega v. Walsh, 669 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103); see also Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520,
524 (2012) (per curiam).
While a defendant has a right to counsel of his choice under the Sixth
Amendment, it is not an absolute right. See United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341
(2d Cir. 1979). "It is settled in [the Second Circuit] that once trial has begun a
defendant does not have the unbridled right to reject assigned counsel and demand
another." McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927,931 (2d Cir. 1981) (cleaned up); see also

United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 392 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Absent a conflict of interest, a
defendant in a criminal case does not have the unfettered right to retain new
counsel, particularly after trial has commenced."). Rather, a defendant's right to
counsel must be restrained to prevent manipulation by the defendant or interference
with the fair administration of justice. See McKee, 649 F .2d at 931.
The Second Circuit uses a four-factor test to evaluate whether a district
court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel: (1) whether
the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; (2) whether the district court
adequately inquired into the matter; (3) whether the conflict between defendant and
attorney was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an
adequate defense; and (4) whether the defendant substantially and unjustifiably
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contributed to the breakdown in communication. See United States v. John Doe No. 1,
272 F.3d 116, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2001). As to the second factor, "where a defendant
voices a seemingly substantial complaint about counsel, the court should inquire
into the reasons for dissatisfaction." McKee, 649 F.2d at 933 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). "However, if the reasons proffered are insubstantial and the
defendant receives competent representation from counsel, a court's failure to
inquire sufficiently or to inquire at all constitutes harmless error." John Doe No. 1, 272
F.3d at 123.
Defendants in a criminal trial may be convicted only upon proof
establishing their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 323 (1979). When reviewing a claim that the evidence introduced at trial was
insufficient to sustain a defendant's conviction, the reviewing court applies the
standard set forth in Jackson to determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 318-19. In
doing so, the court defers to the jury's assessments on both "the weight of the
evidence [and] the credibility of witnesses." Maldonado v. Scully, 86 F.3d 32, 35 (2d
Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the court "must look to state law to determine the elements
of the crime." Ponnapula v. Spitzer, 297 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2002). A "petitioner
bears a very heavy burden in convincing a federal habeas court to grant a petition on
the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Indeed, a federal court may overturn a state court decision
12

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rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge only if the state court decision was
"objectively unreasonable." Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
II.

Analysis
Two claims remain in the Petition: deprivation of the right to counsel

and insufficient evidence to support his convictions. I address the claims in turn.

A.

The Right to Counsel
Knight claims he was denied his constitutional right to counsel because

the trial court failed to adequately consider his request for new counsel. See Dkt. 1 at
6. On direct appeal, the Appellate Division explained that the court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Knight's request for new counsel because the court "conducted
a sufficient inquiry" and "the defendant's assertions did not suggest the serious
possibility of a genuine conflict of interest [or] other impediment to the defendant's
representation by assigned counsel." Knight I, 19 N.Y.S.3d at 902. Thus, the
Appellate Division concluded that "[t]he Supreme Court did not improvidently
exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's request for a new assigned
counsel." Id.
The Appellate Division's decision is entitled to "substantial deference,"
Fischer, 780 F.3d at 560, and is not unreasonable because Knight's claim fails the

Second Circuit's four-factor test. The first factor is the timeliness of the request. The
Second Circuit has held that a "defendant with assigned counsel cannot decide for
no good cause on the eve or in the middle of trial that he will have another attorney

13

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represent him." United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 986 (2d Cir. 1972). Knight
requested new counsel after trial proceedings had commenced. Therefore, his
request was not timely.
Nor can Knight satisfy the second factor -- that is, showing that the
court failed to adequately inquire into the new counsel request. When Knight's
counsel informed the court of Knight's request, the court asked why Knight was
dissatisfied and allowed both Knight and his counsel to explain. Knight asserted
that counsel had misguided him concerning certain plea offers and had been late in
challenging a lockdown order issued by a judge. Defense counsel explained that
Knight had been put on lockdown by a court order because of allegations that he
had contacted and threated witnesses by phone and that the judge denied his
challenge to the order on two occasions. See Dkt. 7 at 14; 7-2 at 4-5. The court also
asked defense counsel if he had reviewed Knight's requests to file various motions
and asked defense counsel if, in his professional opinion, he thought the motions
were valid. Defense counsel responded that they were not. See Dkt. 7-2 at 6. The
court considered Knight's and his counsel's explanations and determined that they
did not warrant the replacement of counsel. Therefore, the court adequately
considered the request.
The third factor is whether the conflict between Knight and his counsel
resulted in a total breakdown in communication. Right before telling the court that
Knight had requested new counsel, Knight's attorney told the court that he had had
numerous discussions about potential pleas with Knight, including discussions
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about Knight's counteroffer. Counsel's report demonstrated that he maintained
ongoing communication with Knight. See id. at 3-4. Accordingly, the court
reasonably concluded that there was no breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship. As to the fourth factor, because there was no breakdown in
communication, whether the defendant contributed to a breakdown in
communication is inapplicable.
Knight has not demonstrated that the court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to substitute counsel. Therefore, the Appellate Division's
decision was not unreasonable, and Knight's first claim fails.
B.

Sufficiency of the Evidence
Knight also argues that the evidence supporting his conviction was

legally insufficient. Knight raised this claim on appeal to the Appellate Division, see

Knight I, 19 N.Y.S.3d at 901-02, but failed to raise this claim in his application for
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, see Dkt. 7-10 at 95-97. The application letter,
dated January 15, 2016, does not indicate whether Knight submitted his Appellate
Division briefs along with the application. But even if he had, attaching the
Appellate Division brief to his leave application does not "=e" the fact that the
leave application did not present the insufficiency of the evidence as an issue for
review by the New York Court of Appeals. Indeed, the Second Circuit has rejected
this very argument. See Grey v. Hoke, 933 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
two claims discussed in petitioner's Appellate Division brief but not identified in his
letter application to the Court of Appeals were procedurally defaulted, pursuant to
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New York's procedural rules, and thus, petitioner was barred from litigating the
merits of those claims in the federal habeas proceeding). Likewise, here, because
Knight failed to include his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim in his application for
leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, it is procedurally defaulted.
A federal habeas court may not review the merits of a procedurally
defaulted claim, unless the petitioner demonstrates (1) "cause for the default and
actual prejudice," or (2) "that failure to consider the claims will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
To establish "cause" for a procedural default, the petitioner must ordinarily show
that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] efforts to comply
with the State's procedural rule" in state court. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986); accord Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382,393 (2d Cir. 2008). To establish "actual
prejudice," a petitioner must show that "errors at his trial ... worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Finally, to show a
"fundamental miscarriage of justice," a petitioner must show that "a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent."

Murray, 477 U.S. at 496.
Knight has not met any of these exceptions. He has not presented any
facts showing that there was cause for the procedural default. Furthermore, he can
show neither prejudice nor a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The Appellate
Division held that, "[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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prosecution ... it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the
perpetrator and his guilt of the crimes of which he was convicted beyond a
reasonable doubt." Knight I, 19 N.Y.S.3d at 901-02. The Appellate Division further
determined that upon reviewing the record, "the verdict of guilt was not against the
weight of the evidence." Id. at 902. The Appellate Division's determination is
entitled to substantial deference, and given the evidence presented at trial, the
court's determination was not unreasonable.
The evidence established that Knight and White had previously known
each other for two or three years before the shooting, and leading up to the shooting,
they had several negative interactions. They nearly had a fight in 2010, and they had
a negative encounter with each other on the night of the shooting. White saw Knight
trailing behind him when he left the chicken spot, and when White exited the store
on his way home, Knight asked him "What's cracking?," which was a sign of
disrespect. When White saw the three men from the lobby window, the man that he
could not recognize was wearing a hoodie. When he approached the man and asked
who he was, he recognized that it was Knight, and he identified Knight in a photo
array and in the courtroom. Furthermore, the details of his testimony regarding the
events before and after the shooting were corroborated by the surveillance videos
from White's building lobby and the building on the block where he was shot. As
the Second Circuit has previously held that "the testimony of a single,
uncorroborated eyewitness is generally sufficient to support a conviction," White's
corroborated testimony is sufficient to support Knight's conviction. Edwards v. Jones,

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720 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Lastly, the jury could have reasonably concluded that this shooting motivated
Knight's recorded phone calls. The evidence supporting Knight's conviction was
legally sufficient, and therefore his second claim fails as well.
CONCLUSION
Knight has failed to show any basis for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Accordingly, the Petition is denied. Additionally, I decline to issue a certificate of
appealability because Knight has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), I certify
that any appeal taken from this decision and order would not be taken in good faith.
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this
memorandum decision and the judgment to Knight at his last address of record.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, New York
April 24, 2023

7

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(_; ----~ ,;

DENNY CHIN
United States Circuit Judge
Sitting By Designation

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