Holden et al v. Department of Corrections et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, For the reasons set forth herein, the complaint is dismissed. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 USC sec. 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose o f an appeal. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, to serve a copy of the judgment, this order, and an appeals packet on pltff at his address of record, and to close the case. (Ordered by Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto on 4/25/2018) c/m (Galeano, Sonia)

FILED
Mc
CLERK'S OFFICE
US district court E.O.N.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

^

^
5

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

mQ

JERMELL HOLDEN,

§FFI9E

Plaintiff,

Not for Publication

—against"

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

CITY OF NEW YORK; JULIE
TRIVEDI(ADA); MICHELLE HOLMES

17-CV-2934(KAM)

(ADA),
Defendants.
X

MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

On May 2, 2017, pro se plaintiff Jermell Holden
(''plaintiff"), currently incarcerated at the Anna M. Kross
Center on Rikers Island, filed this action against defendants

Department of Corrections ("DOC") and the City of New York ("the
City") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983"), alleging
that on December 15, 2016, he was "made to go before the grand

jury in prison clothes," in Queens County court.
Complaint, ECF No. 2, at 4.)

(Initial

By memorandum and order dated

August 17, 2017 (the "Order," ECF No. 8), the court dismissed
plaintiff's complaint, without prejudice, and granted him leave
to file an amended complaint against the City, or to add
individual defendants who were personally involved in the

alleged constitutional violation, within thirty (30) days of the
order.

(See Order at 6-8.)

On October 24, 2017, plaintiff filed an amended

complaint (''Am. Compl." or the "complaint," EOF No. 10) against
defendants the City and two Queens County Assistant District

Attorneys, Julie Trivedi and Michelle Holmes, alleging that
on December 15, 2016 I Jermell Holden was taken

to court in prison clothes I asked for my clothes
and was denied.

I was th[e]n taken to the grand

jury proceeding in my prison clothes and was
uncuffed in the courtroom in front of the jury

which impaired the integrity of the jury.

(Am. Compl. at 5.)

Plaintiff requests that this court intervene

in his New York State criminal case by dismissing his indictment

and ordering a new grand jury.

(Id. at 6.)

For the reasons

discussed below, the instant action is dismissed.
STJ^ARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court

shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it . is satisfied
that the action "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief."

At the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the court

must assume the truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory

factual allegations" in the complaint.

Klobel v. Royal Dutch

Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft

V. Iqhal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth.,
584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009)).

A complaint must plead

sufficient facts to ^^state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face."

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a district court ''shall

review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon

as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a).

Pro se complaints are held to less stringent

standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys and the court is

reguired to read a plaintiff's pro se complaint liberally.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted);
Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d
Cir. 2008).

This means that the court must interpret a pro se

complaint "to raise the strongest arguments that [it]

suggest[s]." Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Nonetheless, a pro se complaint "must contain sufficient factual
allegations to meet the plausibility standard."

Green v.

McLaughlin, 480 F. App'x 44, 46 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order)
(citing Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)).
DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks the court's intervention in an ongoing

state court criminal proceeding.

In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37 (1971), the Supreme Court concluded that although federal

courts have the power to enjoin state criminal proceedings ''when

absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights . .
. this may not be done, except under extraordinary
circumstances, where the danger of irreparable loss is both

great and immediate." Id. at 45. "Certain types of injury, in
particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to
defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by
themselves be considered 'irreparable' in the special legal
sense of that term.

Instead, the threat to the plaintiff's

federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated
by his defense against a single criminal prosecution." Id. at
46 (citing Ex Parts Young, 209 U.S. 123, 145-47 (1908)).

In Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69
(2013), the Supreme Court clarified that Younger abstention is

required where a federal action parallels one of three types of
state court proceedings:

First, Younger preclude[s] federal intrusion into
ongoing state criminal prosecutions. Second,
certain "civil enforcement proceedings" warrant[]
abstention. Finally, federal courts [must]
refrain[] from interfering with pending "civil

proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts' ability to

perform their judicial functions."

Id. at 78 (quoting and citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.

Council of City of New Orleans C'NOPSI''), 491 U.S. 350, 368

(1989)); see also id, (''We have not applied Younger outside

these three 'exceptional' categories, and today hold, in accord
with NOPSI, that they define lounger's scope.").

Here, plaintiff seeks to have this court dismiss his
criminal indictment and convene a new grand jury.

at 5.)

(Am. Compl.

Granting the relief sought would surely constitute

"federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal proceedings."
Id. at 78; see also Manchanda v. Bose, No. 14-CV-9658, 2015 WL

81998(LGS), at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.6, 2015) ("Because Plaintiff
seeks to review, intervene in, or enjoin pending state criminal

proceedings, the Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's federal claims in the absence of special

circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable
injury." (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 54 and Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1973))).

Moreover, plaintiff fails to allege any facts that

would bring his case within any exception to the general

requirement that the federal court abstain from intervening in,
or enjoining, pending state criminal proceedings. Accordingly,

plaintiff's constitutional claims regarding his pending criminal
case must be dismissed, though the dismissal is without

prejudice.

See Manchanda, 2015 WL 81998 at *2 (citations

omitted); Graham v. Crim. Ct. of the City of N.Y,, No. 15-CV-

337, 2015 WL 427981, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2015).^

For the

reasons set forth in footnote 1 to this memorandum and order,

and because plaintiff has already been granted an opportunity to
file an amended complaint, the court will not grant plaintiff a
second opportunity to amend his complaint.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the complaint is

dismissed.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

The

Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any

appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma
pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal.
United States, 269 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
^

Coppedge v.

The Clerk of Court

The court notes that to the extent plaintiff may wish to bring a claim

for damages against the City, such a claim would be dismissed because

plaintiff again fails to allege any facts demonstrating that an officially
adopted policy or custom of the City of New York caused a violation of his
federally protected rights. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, OK v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). "Absent such a custom, policy, or usage,

a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for the
tort of its employee." Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir.
2012).

Additionally, any claim for damages against the Assistant District

Attorneys prosecuting his criminal case would be dismissed. It is well
established that "a state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of
his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is immune from a
civil suit for damages under [section] 1983." Shmueli v. City of New York,
424 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Imbler v. Pacbtman, 424 U.S. 409,
410, 431 (1976)). "Prosecutorial immunity from [section] 1983 liability is
broadly defined, covering virtually all acts, regardless of motivation,
associated with the prosecutor's function as an advocate." Hill v. City of
New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

Immunity extends to deciding which offenses to charge,

initiating a prosecution, presenting the case at trial, and evaluating and
organizing evidence for presentation at trial or to a grand jury. Id.
(citations omitted). Absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts can be
defeated only if the prosecutor is alleged to have acted in the complete
absence of jurisdiction, Shmueli, 424 F.3d at 237, which is not the case
here.

is respectfully directed to enter judgment dismissing this case
without prejudice, to serve a copy of the judgment, this order,

and an appeals packet on plaintiff at his address of record, and
to close the case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

April 25, 2018
Brooklyn, New York
/s/

Kiyo A. Matsumoto
United States District Judge