Watson v. Whole Foods Market

Filing 4

ORDER: The Court directs that the Complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court grants her leave to file an amended complaint against Whole Foods within thirty (30) days from the entry of this Memorandum and Order, provided that Plaintiff has a good faith basis to proceed on her employment discrimination complaint. In the amended complaint, Plaint iff must provide facts to support a plausible claim that Defendant discriminated against her in violation of Title VII. She must also show that she has exhausted her remedies by filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC based on the fact s presented in the amended complaint against Defendant. All further proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, it shall be captioned AMENDED COMPLAINT and bear the same docket number as this Order, 17-C V-3865 (PKC) (LB). The amended complaint shall replace the original complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will enter judgment dismissing this action. The Court will review the amended complaint for compliance with this Memorandum and Order and for sufficiency under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 10/26/2017. (Rediker, Ezekiel)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------X
EBONY WATSON,
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
17-CV-3865 (PKC) (LB)

-againstWHOLE FOODS MARKET,
Defendant.
-------------------------------------------------------------X
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On June 27, 2017, plaintiff Ebony Watson, appearing pro se, filed this action alleging
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, against her former employer, Whole Foods Market (“Whole
Foods”). The Court grants Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. The Complaint is
dismissed with leave to amend as set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff claims that she suffered discrimination by her employer Whole Foods on March
19, 2017. (Dkt. 1 at 4.) She alleges that the discriminatory conduct in this action includes
“[e]xposing confidential information.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s claim consists of the following statement:
I walked in the team leaders office and found seperation [sic] papers
with all my information in the office for everyone to see. It also had
false accusations for their reasoning of being fired. These papers
were written up by Antonique, the assistant team leader and Shifty
Tim. A few days later by [sic] chase account was flagged for fraud
and prompt me for a new debit card. The incident that occurred that
lead to those seperation [sic] papers happened a week before I was
asked to go to another department (coffee bar) and I did not feel
comfortable going to that department. The conditions were worst
than my department. It had twice as much rodents and I didn’t want
to go through that again. Antonique called the store team leader
Carmen and she sent me home. The seperation [sic] papers were
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made because I did not go to the coffee bar and my information was
left out in the office for everyone to see.
(Id. at 5-6.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint states that she has exhausted her federal administrative remedies with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and that she received a Notice of
Right to Sue Letter on June 16, 2017. (Id. at 6.) She alleges that Whole Foods is still committing
these acts against her. (Id. at 4.) The Complaint does not request any specific relief, but merely
states, “[e]xposing confidential information, and putting me at risk for fraud (Chase account was
flagged for fraud activity).” (Id. at 6.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and “allow[] the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The pleading standard is necessarily “less stringent” in the context of a pro
se litigant, whose complaints the Court is required to construe liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2008).
Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of “all wellpleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Nevertheless, under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), district courts shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action that “(i) is
frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
DISCUSSION
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Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to
“compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). In the Title VII context, “at the
initial stage of the litigation[,] . . . the plaintiff does not need substantial evidence of discriminatory
intent,” and need only “sustain a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting an inference of
discriminatory motivation.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015)
(emphasis in original); see also Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d
Cir. 2015) (“[A] plaintiff must allege that the employer took adverse action against her at least in
part for a discriminatory reason, and she may do so by alleging facts that directly show
discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference
of discrimination.”). “[A] plaintiff need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of
discriminatory motivation.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d at 84 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “a discrimination complaint . . . must [still] at a minimum
assert nonconclusory factual matter sufficient to nudge its claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible to proceed.” EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2014)
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, even under the most liberal interpretation of Plaintiff’s allegations, she provides no
facts that could connect or link any adverse action to a protected status. Plaintiff has also not
provided any facts that would suggest an inference of discriminatory motivation. Although
Plaintiff has utilized the Court’s form for employment discrimination actions, she does not select
any of the protected status categories (e.g., race, color, gender, religion or national origin) as the
basis for Whole Foods’s purported discrimination required in order to proceed under Title VII.
(See Dkt. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff’s statement of claim does not contain any plausible allegations that
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Whole Foods took adverse action against her at least in part for a discriminatory reason. Vega v.
Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d at 87. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that her confidential
information was exposed, thereby putting her at risk for fraud; she also alleges that she was
terminated from employment because she refused to be assigned to the coffee bar. (Id. at 5-6.)
In addition, Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC on April 11, 2017 does not
allege any facts to conclude that any employment discrimination statute was violated by
Defendant. (Id. at 10-14.) Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is dismissed,
without prejudice, for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In light of Plaintiff’s
pro se status, the Court grants her leave to file an amended complaint against Whole Foods within
thirty (30) days from the entry of this Memorandum and Order, provided that Plaintiff has a good
faith basis to proceed on her employment discrimination complaint. In the amended complaint,
Plaintiff must provide facts to support a plausible claim that Defendant discriminated against her
in violation of Title VII. She must also show that she has exhausted her remedies by filing a timely
charge of discrimination with the EEOC based on the facts presented in the amended complaint
against Defendant. See Hamzik v. Off. for People with Dev. Disabilities, 859 F. Supp. 2d 265, 277
(N.D.N.Y. 2012).
All further proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, it shall be captioned “AMENDED COMPLAINT” and bear the same docket number
as this Order, 17-CV-3865 (PKC) (LB). The amended complaint shall replace the original
complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will
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enter judgment dismissing this action.

The Court will review the amended complaint for

compliance with this Memorandum and Order and for sufficiency under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED:
/s/ Pamela K. Chen_____________________
Pamela K. Chen
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
October 26, 2017

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