Haker v. Tentree International Inc.

Filing 19

ORDER granting 14 Motion for Default Judgment. For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum and Order, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for default judgment against Defendant and respectfully directs the Clerk of the Court to ente r judgment in favor of Plaintiff, in the total amount of $1,822, comprised of statutory damages in the amount of $1,000, attorney's fees in the amount of $420, and costs in the amount of $402. Additionally, post-judgment int erest shall accrue at the federal statutory rate from the entry of judgment until the judgment is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to close this case. Plaintiff is ordered to serve a copy of this Memorandum and Order and the judgment on the Defendant and file a declaration of service once the Clerk of Court enters judgment. Ordered by Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto on 8/31/2021. (Urquiola, Rebecca)

Case 1:20-cv-01499-KAM-RML Document 19 Filed 08/31/21 Page 1 of 19 PageID #: 200

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------X
MATTHIAS HAKER,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
20-cv-1499

Plaintiff,
-againstTENTREE INTERNATIONAL INC.,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------X

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Mathias Haker (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on
March 20, 2020, alleging that Defendant Tentree International
Inc. (“Tentree” or “Defendant”), without authorization,
reproduced and published a copyrighted photograph of Berlin,
Germany (“the Photograph”), owned and registered by Plaintiff,
in violation of Section 501 of the Copyright Act (“the Act”), 17
U.S.C. § 501.

(See ECF No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”); ECF No. 1-

1, Exhibit A, the Photograph.)

On December 28, 2020, an entry

of default was entered against the Defendant.
Clerk’s Entry of Default.)

(ECF No. 13,

Upon Defendant’s failure to appear,

answer, or respond to the Complaint, Plaintiff now moves for
default judgment, statutory damages, and costs.

For the reasons

set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for default judgment is
GRANTED.

Case 1:20-cv-01499-KAM-RML Document 19 Filed 08/31/21 Page 2 of 19 PageID #: 201

BACKROUND
I.

Facts
Where a defendant defaults, a court must accept the

plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Finkel v.

Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009); Bricklayers & Allied
Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d
182, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2015).

The Court consequently accepts

Plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true for the
purpose of reviewing its motion for default judgment.
Plaintiff is a Germany-based professional photographer
who is “in the business of licensing his photographs for a fee.”
(Compl. at ¶ 5.)

Defendant owns and operates a website at the

URL: www.Tentree.com (“the website”), and does business in New
York and California.

(Id. at ¶ 6.)

Defendant allegedly printed

Plaintiff’s photograph, without authorization from Plaintiff, in
an article titled “The 10 most ecofriendly cities,” posted on
Defendant’s website.

(Id. at ¶ 10; ECF No. 1-2, Exhibit B.)

Plaintiff owns all rights to the Photograph and had registered
the Photograph with the U.S. Copyright Office under Copyright
Registration Number VA 2-069-125. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.)

2

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II.

Procedural History
Plaintiff filed the instant action on March 20, 2020,

and

thereafter

properly

served

the

Summons

and

Complaint

on

Defendant. (Compl.; ECF No. 2, Summons Issued as to Tentree; ECF
No. 7, Summons Returned Executed as to Tentree.)

On November 23,

2020, Magistrate Judge Gold directed Plaintiff to seek an entry of
default by December 21, 2020 and move for default judgment within
two weeks of the entry of default.

(Dkt. Order 11/23/2020.)

On

December 21, 2020, Plaintiff requested a certificate of default.
(ECF No. 10, Request for Certificate of Default.)

On December 28,

2020, the Clerk of Court entered the Certificate of Default.
No. 13, Certificate of Default.)

On January 11, 2021, Plaintiff

filed a motion for default judgment.
Default Judgment.)

(ECF No. 14, Motion for

Defendant was served with the Motion for

Default Judgment on March 18, 2021.
Service.)

(ECF

(ECF No. 18, Certificate of

To date, Defendants have not answered, or otherwise

responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint, or motion for entry of default
judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, a movant
must complete a two-step process to obtain a default judgment.
Rodriguez v. Almighty Cleaning, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 114, 123
(E.D.N.Y. 2011); La Barbera v. Fed. Metal & Glass Corp., 666 F.
3

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Supp. 2d 341, 346-47 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).

First, the Clerk of the

Court must enter default “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment
for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(a); Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95 (2d
Cir. 1993).

Second, upon the Clerk’s entry of default, the movant

“may then make an application for entry of a default judgment,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).”
123.

Rodriguez, 784 F. Supp. 2d at

“‘The court is to exercise sound judicial discretion’ in

determining whether the entry of default judgment is appropriate.”
Trs. of Local 7 Tile Indus. Welfare Fund v. City Tile, Inc., No.
10-CV-322, 2011 WL 917600, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2011) (quoting
Badian v. Brandaid Commc’ns Corp., No. 03-CV-2424, 2004 WL 1933573,
at

*2

(S.D.N.Y.

Aug.

30,

2004)),

adopted

by

2011

WL

864331

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2011). “In evaluating a motion for default
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), the
[c]ourt must accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint,” except those relating to damages. Id. at *2 (citing
Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 154–
55 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Here, the Clerk of the Court entered a default against
Defendant on December 28, 2020, and Plaintiff thereafter filed
the unopposed motion for default judgment presently before the
4

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court.

As previously noted, Defendant has been properly served

with the summons and complaint, (see ECF No. 2, Summons Issued
as to Tentree; ECF No. 7, Summons Returned Executed as to
Tentree), and with the motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 18,
Certificate of Service.)

Defendant has neither appeared, nor

moved to vacate the Clerk’s entry of default, nor opposed the
motion for default, despite being provided notice.
Consequently, Plaintiff has completed the necessary steps to
obtain a default judgment.

See Bricklayers Ins. & Welfare Fund

v. David & Allen Contracting, Inc., No. 05-CV-4778, 2007 WL
3046359, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2007) (“In civil actions, when
a party fails to appear after given notice, the court normally
has justification for entering default.”) (citing Bermudez v.
Reid, 733 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1984)).
DISCUSSION
I.

Liability
Defendants’ default in this case, however, “does not

necessarily conclusively establish . . . defendant[s’]
liability.”

Trs. of the Plumbers Local Union No. 1 Welfare Fund

v. Philip Gen. Constr., No. 05-CV-1665, 2007 WL 3124612, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2007).

As such, this court “must still

determine whether . . . plaintiff has stated a cause of action.”
Bd. of Trs. of the UFCW Local 174 Pension Fund v. Jerry WWHS
5

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Co., No. 08-CV-2325, 2009 WL 982424, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10,
2009) (citing Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65
(2d Cir. 1981)); Philip Gen. Constr., 2007 WL 3124612, at *3
(“Nevertheless, ‘[e]ven after default it remains for the court
to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a
legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not
admit mere conclusions of law.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Wildlife Ctr., Inc., 102 B.R. 321, 325 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1989))).
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Tentree
violated §§ 106 and 501 of the Act.

(Compl. at ¶ 14.)

The

relevant subsections of the Act vest the owner of a copyright
with:
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any
of
the
following:
(1)
to
reproduce
the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2)
to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending....
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(3).
“Copyright infringement is a strict liability offense
in the sense that a plaintiff is not required to prove unlawful
intent or culpability.”

EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v.

MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Cartoon
6

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Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d
Cir. 2008); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316
F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963).

In order to establish copyright

infringement, “two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a
valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the
work that are original.”

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.

Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991).
Ownership of a valid copyright “can be established by
the introduction into evidence of a Copyright Office certificate
of registration,” which is sufficient to establish validity for
the purpose of default judgment.

Pasatieri v. Starline Prods.,

Inc., No. 18-CV-4688 (PKC)(VMS), 2020 WL 207352, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 14, 2020); see also Sheldon v. Plot Commerce, No. 15-CV5885 (CBA) (CLP), 2016 WL 5107072, at *11–12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
2016) (internal quotation omitted), report and recommendation
adopted, 2016 WL 5107058 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2016).

Here,

Plaintiff submitted the Certificate of Registration for the
Photograph with an effective date of registration of September
12, 2017.

(ECF No. 16-4, Certificate of Registration.)

The

Certificate lists the author of the Photograph as Plaintiff,
Matthias Haker.

(Id.)

Based on the Certificate of

Registration, the Court has determined that Plaintiff has
established ownership of a valid copyright for the Photograph.
7

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In order to establish the second element of
originality, “the burden is minimal.”

Sheldon v. Plot Com.,

2016 WL 5107072, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 5107058 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19,
2016).

“Originality does not mean that the work for which

copyright protection is sought must be either novel or unique
.... [I]t simply means a work independently created by its
author, one not copied from pre-existing works, and a work that
comes from the exercise of the creative powers of the author's
mind, in other words, ‘the fruits of [the author's] intellectual
labor.’”

Boisson v. Banian. Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir.

2001) (quoting In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
“The necessary originality for a photograph may be founded upon,
among other things, the photographer's choice of subject matter,
angle of photograph, lighting, determination of the precise time
when the photograph is to be taken, the kind of camera, the kind
of film, the kind of lens, and the area in which the pictures
are taken.”

Eastern Am. Trio Products. Inc. v. Tang Elec.

Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2000); see also
Korzeniewski v. Sapa Pho Vietnamese Rest. Inc., No. 17-CV-5721
(MKB) (SJB), 2019 WL 312149, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019)
(“Photographs are often found to be original works.”), report

8

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and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 291145 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23,
2019).
The originality of Plaintiff’s Photograph has been
established through his well-pleaded, uncontested allegations in
the Complaint.

Plaintiff alleges that he is the author of the

Photograph,” (Compl. at ¶ 8), and that he “photographed Berlin,
Germany.”

(Id. at ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff also alleges that “Tentree

International did not license the Photograph from Plaintiff for
its article, nor did Tentree International have Plaintiff’s
permission or consent to publish the Photograph on its Website.”
(Id. ¶ 11.)

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that he “exercised a

personal choice in the selection of the subjects; choice of his
own professional camera equipment; and determination of the
precise time when the photograph was taken.”
Memorandum in Support at 6.)

(ECF No. 15,

Accordingly, the Court finds that

Tentree is liable for copyright infringement under § 106 of the
Act.
II.

Damages
As previously noted, in the context of a motion for

default judgment, allegations pertaining to liability are deemed
admitted, but those pertaining to damages must be proven by the
movant.

Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp.,

973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992) (“While a party’s default is
9

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deemed to constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations
of liability, it is not considered an admission of damages.”).
After liability is determined, damages must be established “to a
‘reasonable certainty.’” Duro v. BZR Piping & Heating Inc., No.
10-CV-879, 2011 WL 710449, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2011) (quoting
Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp.,
109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997)), adopted by 2011 WL 744156
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2011).

The court need not hold a hearing to

determine damages “as long as it [has] ensured that there [is] a
basis

for

damages

specified

(alterations in original).

in

the

default

judgment.”

Id.

When evaluating damages, the court

“may rely on affidavits or documentary evidence.” Id. (citing
Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 54 (2d. Cir. 1993);
Chun Jie Yin v. Kim, No. 07-CV-1236, 2008 WL 906736, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2008)).
Once liability for infringement has been established
under the Act, a plaintiff can elect to pursue either actual or
statutory damages.

See Renna v. Queens Ledger/Greenpoint Star

Inc., No. 17-CV-3378 (DRH) (SIL), 2019 WL 1061259, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 13, 2019) (citing Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l,
996 F.2d 1366, 1380 (2d Cir. 1993)), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 1062490 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019).
requested

in

his

Complaint

that
10

the

Court

award

Plaintiff
either

“(a)

Case 1:20-cv-01499-KAM-RML Document 19 Filed 08/31/21 Page 11 of 19 PageID #: 210

Plaintiff’s

actual

damages

and

Defendant’s

profits,

gains

or

advantages of any kind attributable to Defendant’s infringement of
Plaintiff’s Photograph; or b) alternatively, statutory damages of
up to $150,000 per copyrighted work infringed pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
§ 504.”

(Compl. at Prayer for Relief, ¶ 2.)

However, upon

Defendant’s default, Plaintiff revised his request to consist of
“$7,500 in statutory damages;” “$420.00 in attorneys’ fees and
$440.00 in costs;” and “post-judgment interest.”

(ECF No. 14,

Notice of Motion for Default Judgment.)
A.

Statutory Damages
Section 504 of the Act provides for damages awards in

cases of copyright infringement. “[A]n infringer of copyright is
liable for either the copyright owner's actual damages and any
additional profits of the infringer ... or statutory damages.”
17 U.S.C. 504(a).

Section 504 and the cases in the Second

Circuit interpreting the statute have established that the
victim of a copyright infringement is entitled to elect damages
based on the actual damages suffered, plus additional profits,
or may elect statutory damages to be awarded within certain
specified time limits.

See Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications

Int'l, 996 F.2d 1366, 1380 (2d Cir. 1993) (permitting plaintiff
to elect statutory remedy where actual damages were not
ascertainable); see also Aleshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754
11

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F.2d 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1985); Engel v. Wild Oats, Inc., 644 F.
Supp. 1089, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Here, Plaintiff has elected to recover statutory
damages under the Copyright Act.

17 U.S.C. § 504(c); (ECF No.

15, Plaintiff’s Memorandum, (“Pl. Mem.”) at 10.)

Pursuant to

the Act, the Court may award statutory damages of not less than
$750 and not more than $30,000, as the court deems just.
U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).

17

In addition, the Act authorizes an award of

enhanced damages of not more than $150,000 where the violation
was willful.

17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).

“When determining the

amount of statutory damages to award for copyright infringement,
courts consider: (1) the infringer's state of mind; (2) the
expenses saved, and profits earned, by the infringer; (3) the
revenue lost by the copyright holder; (4) the deterrent effect
on the infringer and third parties; (5) the infringer's
cooperation in providing evidence concerning the value of the
infringing material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the
parties.”

Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 144

(2d Cir. 2010); see also N.A.S. Impor. Corp. v. Chenson Enter.,
Inc., 968 F.2d 250, 252–53 (2d Cir.1992).
With respect to the first factor, the infringer’s
state of mind, “[c]opyright infringement is deemed willful by
virtue of a defendant's default.”
12

Rovio Entm't, Ltd. v. Allstar

Case 1:20-cv-01499-KAM-RML Document 19 Filed 08/31/21 Page 13 of 19 PageID #: 212

Vending, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 536, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); accord
Seelie v. Original Media Grp. LLC, No. 19-CV-5643 (BMC), 2020 WL
136659, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2020).

As to the remaining

factors, Plaintiff addresses only the fourth factor, the need to
deter wrongful conduct, and cites to several Second Circuit
cases which address the fourth element of deterrence.

Plaintiff

fails to assess Plaintiff’s loss of revenues or Defendant’s
profits, asserting that he need not do so.

(Pl. Mem. at 17-18.)

As United States District Court Judge Pamela Chen noted in
Balhetchet v. Su Caso Mktg. Inc., “[p]laintiff's counsel,
Richard Liebowitz 1, has an extensive record in this Circuit of
requesting the maximum amount of statutory damages without
sufficiently developing the record in order to establish a basis
for the requested amount.”

Balhetchet v. Su Caso Mktg. Inc.,

2020 WL 4738242, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2020) (citing Bass v.
Diversity Inc. Media, No. 19-CV-2261 (AJN), 2020 WL 2765093, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2020); Jerstad v. N. Y. Vintners LLC, No.
18-CV-10470 (JGK) (OTW), 2019 WL 6769431, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.

1

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s original counsel of record was Richard
Liebowitz, but he was replaced by Liebowitz’s associate, James H. Freeman, when
Judge Gold ordered Mr. Liebowitz to alert his client of the reciprocal
discipline imposed by the Eastern District of New York based on Usherson v.
Bandshell Artist Mgmt., No. 19-CV-6368 (JMF), 2020 WL 3483661 (S.D.N.Y. June
26, 2020), aff'd in part sub nom. Liebowitz v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt., No. 202304, 2021 WL 2620416 (2d Cir. June 25, 2021), and aff'd sub nom. Liebowitz v.
Bandshell Artist Mgmt., 6 F.4th 267 (2d Cir. 2021). (Dkt. Order 12/4/2020.)

13

Case 1:20-cv-01499-KAM-RML Document 19 Filed 08/31/21 Page 14 of 19 PageID #: 213

12, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 58237
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2020); Mantel v. Smash.com Inc., No. 19-CV6113 (FPG), 2019 WL 5257571, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2019).
Though Plaintiff asserts that “the Court does not need
to assess Plaintiff’s loss of revenues or Defendant’s profits to
calculate an award,” “such evidence allows a court to determine
a fair award that would adequately compensate the copyright
holder while also deterring potential infringers.”

Balhetchet

v. Su Caso Mktg. Inc., 2020 WL 4738242, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14,
2020).

Here, without evidence of the loss of revenue or

defendant’s profits, the Court may infer that any revenue lost
by Plaintiff and profits by Defendant are de minimis.

See Bass

v. Diversity Inc. Media, No. 19-CV-2261 (AJN), 2020 WL 2765093,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2020).

The Court therefore fixes the

amount of statutory damages for the Copyright Act violation at
$1,000.

This amount is “above the statutory minimum, to account

for the willful actions of Defendant and the need to deter
others, but well below the statutory maximum given the dearth of
other evidence.”

Dermansky v. Tel. Media, LLC, 2020 WL 1233943,

at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2020) (finding that, as is the case
here, because there was “only one alleged act of infringement,
there are no cease-and-desist letters, there are no requests for

14

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injunctive relief, and there is no evidence of any actual harm,”
the Court fixed the statutory damages amount at $1,000.)
B. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Plaintiff requests that this Court award $420.00 in
attorney’s fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505.

(ECF No. 16,

Declaration in Support of Motion for Default Judgment, at ¶ 18.)
In the copyright context, “the Court's discretion to award costs
is governed by § 505 of the Act rather than the more general
cost-shifting provision.”

Balhetchet v. Su Caso Mktg. Inc.,

2020 WL 4738242, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2020) (citing Barrera
v. Brooklyn Music, Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 2d 400, 404–05 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).

Although “there is no precise rule or standard, [ ]

courts look to a non-exhaustive list of factors including
‘frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in
the factual and in the legal components of the case) and the
need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence.’”

Reilly v. Com., 2016 WL 6837895,

at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2016) (quoting Mahan v. Roc Nation,
LLC, No. 14-CV-5075 (LGS), 2015 WL 4388885, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July
17, 2015)).

Defendant has failed to appear, answer, or offer a

defense to Plaintiff’s claims; hence, attorney’s fees should be
awarded based on the factors above.

15

See id.

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Courts in this Circuit use the “lodestar” method for
calculating reasonable attorney's fees.

See Baker v. Urban

Outfitters, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 351, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Downs v. Yeshiva World News, LLC, No. 18-CV-250 (LDH)(JO), 2019
WL 1261406, at *3.

Under the lodestar method, “fees are

determined by multiplying the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.”
431 F. Supp. 2d at 360.

Baker,

Thus, the lodestar method requires the

court to consider first, the reasonableness of counsel's hourly
rate and second, the reasonableness of the number of hours
expended by counsel on the case.
Plaintiff’s counsel is an associate at Liebowitz Law
Firm, PLLC, and has been “admitted to practice for almost twenty
years.”

(ECF No. 16, Declaration in Support of Motion for

Default Judgment at ¶ 19.)

Mr. Freeman states that he has

“substantial experience in litigating copyright enforcement
actions, having appeared in more than 350 federal lawsuits
involving copyright disputes.”

(Id.)

Mr. Freeman’s hourly rate

is listed at $350.00 per hour and he cites to Mango v. BuzzFeed,
Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d 368, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) to support the
notion that other courts have accepted his hourly rate.

(Id.)

Mr. Freeman lists the total number of hours that he worked on
this case as 1.2 hours, totaling $420.00.
16

(Id.)

This Court

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finds that Mr. Freeman qualifies as a “senior associate” and
that his hourly rate and the number of hours he worked on the
motion for default judgment, totaling only 1.2 hours, are
reasonable.

Courts in the Eastern District have recently

awarded hourly rates ranging from $300 to $450 for partners,
$200 to $325 for senior associates, $100 to $200 for junior
associates, and $70 to $100 for legal support staff. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. Yayo Rest. Corp., 2019 WL 4482032, at *8 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 23, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL
4468054 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2019); Elvey v. Silver's Crust W.
Indian Rest. & Grill, Inc., 2019 WL 3937126, at *15 (E.D.N.Y.
July 3, 2019); Hernandez v. Delta Deli Mkt. Inc., 2019 WL
643735, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2019).
Plaintiff also requests $440 in costs, which includes
the court filing fee and the fee for service of process.

(ECF

No. 16, Declaration in Support of Motion for Default Judgment at
¶ 19.)

Although Plaintiff does not document the filing fee, the

Court may take judicial notice of it.

See Court Fees, (December

1, 2020) https://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/court-fees; see also
Annuity, Welfare & Apprenticeship Skill Improvement & Safety
Funds of Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Loc. 15, 15A, 15C &
15D, AFL-CIO by Callahan v. Coastal Env't Grp. Inc., No. 18-CV5791-LDH-SJB, 2019 WL 5693916, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019)
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(“filing fees are recoverable without supporting
documentation”); see also Joe Hand Promotions v. Elmore, No. 11
CV 3761, 2013 WL 2352855 at *12 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2013) (taking
judicial notice of the filing fee for this court).

However, the

Court cannot award process server fees because they must be
supported by documentation and, here, Mr. Freeman only requests
the process server fees in his declaration, but does not attach
a receipt for the service.

See Martinez v. Alimentos Saludables

Corp., No. 16-CV-1997, 2017 WL 5033650, at *29 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
22, 2017) (“[F]ailure to provide adequate documentation of costs
incurred will limit, or even defeat, recovery.”), report and
recommendation adopted, Order Adopting R. & R. dated Oct. 18,
2017; Sheldon v. Plot Commerce, No. 15-CV-5885, 2016 WL 5107072,
at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2016) (recommending the costs for
serving defendant “be denied due to lack of adequate
documentation”), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL
5107058 (Sept. 19, 2016).

Therefore, Plaintiff will only be

awarded $402 for the filing fee.
C. Post Judgment Interest
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, “the award of postjudgment interest is mandatory on awards in civil cases as of
the date judgment is entered.”

Tru-Art Sign Co. v. Local 137

Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 852 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir.
18

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2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As such,

post-judgment interest shall accrue at the federal statutory
rate from the entry of judgment until the judgment is paid in
full.

28 U.S.C. § 1961.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s

motion for default judgment against Defendant and respectfully
directs the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment in favor of
Plaintiff, in the total amount of $1,822, comprised of statutory
damages in the amount of $1,000, attorney’s fees in the amount of
$420, and costs in the amount of $402. Additionally, post-judgment
interest shall accrue at the federal statutory rate from the entry
of judgment until the judgment is paid in full.

28 U.S.C. § 1961.

The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to close this
case.

Plaintiff is ordered to serve a copy of this Memorandum and

Order and the judgment on the Defendant and file a declaration of
service once the Clerk of Court enters judgment.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

August 31, 2021
Brooklyn, New York

/s/____________
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
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