Duran v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 25

ORDER granting 18 22 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 19 Defendant's Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, Plaintiff's motion for jud gment on the pleadings is GRANTED, Defendant's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment remanding this case and close the case. Ordered by Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto on 8/1/2022. (Ahn, Lois)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------X
RAFAEL DURAN,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against-

20-cv-4542 (KAM)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------X
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Rafael Duran (“Plaintiff”) appeals the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or
the “Commissioner”) finding him not disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and not entitled to disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Act.

Plaintiff and the

Commissioner have cross moved for judgment on the pleadings.
the

reasons

herein,

Plaintiff’s

motion

is

GRANTED,

For
the

Commissioner’s motion is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.

1

BACKGROUND
The parties have filed a joint stipulation of relevant
facts, which the court has reviewed and incorporates by reference.
(See generally ECF No. 21, Joint Stipulation of Facts.)

Here, the

court briefly recounts the facts relevant to the instant motions.
On October 3, 2016, 1 Plaintiff filed an application for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), alleging disability since
October 1, 2016.
at 21.)

(ECF No. 17, Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”),

Plaintiff claimed that he was disabled due to a heart

condition, diabetes, depression, learning problems, knee pain, and
a swollen foot.

(Id. at 85.)

December 6, 2016.

(Id. at 81.)

His application was denied on

On December 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed a written request
for a hearing before an administrative law judge.

(Id. at 87.)

Administrative Law Judge Ifeoma N. Iwuamadi (the “ALJ”) held a
hearing on December 4, 2018, during which Plaintiff appeared and
testified.

(Id. at 49.)

By a decision dated July 2, 2019, the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled.

(Id. at 15.)

Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council.
(Id. at 193.)

On July 22, 2020, the Appeals Council denied review

of the ALJ’s decision, rendering it the final decision of the
Commissioner.

(Id. at 1.)

Plaintiff’s memorandum of law in support of his motion for judgment on the
pleadings mistakenly notes this date as October 6, 2016. (Pl. Mem. at 2.)
1

2

Plaintiff initiated the instant action on September 24,
2020.

(ECF No. 1, Complaint.)

issued a scheduling order.

On September 29, 2020, the court

(ECF No. 4, Scheduling Order.)

On

October 14, 2021, Defendant filed the Administrative Transcript.
(Tr.)
On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff served his notice of motion
and memorandum of law in support of his motion for judgment on
the pleadings.

(ECF Nos. 18, Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings; 18-1, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in
Support
Mem.”).)

of

his

Motion

for

Judgment

on

the

Pleadings,

(“Pl.

On September 22, 2021, Defendant served its notice of

cross-motion and memorandum of law in support of its cross-motion
for judgment on the pleadings and in opposition to Plaintiff’s
motion.

(ECF Nos. 19, Defendant’s Notice of Cross-Motion; 19-1,

Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Cross-Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, (“Def. Mem.”).)

Plaintiff then

served a reply memorandum of law in further support of his motion
for judgment on the pleadings on October 13, 2021.
Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum of Law.)
papers was filed on October 14, 2021.

3

(ECF No. 20,

The entire set of motion

LEGAL STANDARD
To

receive

disability

benefits,

“disabled” within the meaning of the Act.
(d).

a

claimant

must

be

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a),

A claimant qualifies as disabled when he is unable to “engage

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
423(d)(1)(A).

Id. §

The impairment must be of “such severity” that the

claimant is unable to do his previous work or engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.

42

U.S.C.

§

423(d)(2)(A).

“The

Commissioner

must

consider the following in determining a claimant’s entitlement to
benefits:

‘(1)

the

objective

medical

facts

[and

clinical

findings]; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such facts;
(3) subjective evidence of pain or disability . . . ; and (4) the
claimant’s educational background, age, and work experience.’”
Balodis v. Leavitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(quoting

Brown

v.

Apfel,

174

F.3d

59,

62

(2d

Cir.

1999)

(alterations in original)).
Unsuccessful claimants for disability benefits under
the Act may bring an action in federal district court seeking
judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits “within
sixty days after the mailing . . . of notice of such decision or
4

within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security
may allow.”

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“A district court may set aside

the Commissioner’s determination that a claimant is not disabled
only if the factual findings are not supported by substantial
evidence or if the decision is based on legal error.”

Burgess v.

Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“Substantial

evidence is more than a mere scintilla,” and must be relevant
evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”

Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d

Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 420 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
If

there

is

substantial

evidence

in

the

record

to

support the Commissioner’s factual findings, those findings must
be upheld.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Inquiry into legal error requires

the court to ask whether “the claimant has had a full hearing
under the [Commissioner’s] regulations and in accordance with the
beneficent purposes of the [Social Security] Act.”

Moran v.

Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

The

reviewing court does not have the authority to conduct a de novo
review, and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the
ALJ, even when it might have justifiably reached a different
result.

Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.

2012).
5

Pursuant

to

regulations

promulgated

by

the

Commissioner, a five-step sequential evaluation process is used
to determine whether the claimant’s condition meets the Act’s
definition of disability.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

This process

is essentially as follows:
[I]f the Commissioner determines (1) that the
claimant is not working, (2) that he has a
‘severe impairment,’ (3) that the impairment
is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations] that conclusively requires a
determination of disability, and (4) that the
claimant is not capable of continuing in his
prior type of work, the Commissioner must find
him disabled if (5) there is not another type
of work the claimant can do.
Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
During this five-step process, the Commissioner must
consider whether the combined effect of all of the claimant’s
impairments, including those that are not severe (as defined by
the regulations), would be of sufficient severity to establish
eligibility for Social Security benefits.
404.1545(a)(2).
step

framework,

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523,

At steps one through four of the sequential fivethe

claimant

proving . . . disability.”

bears

the

“general

burden

Burgess, 537 F3.d at 128.

of

At step

five, the burden shifts from the claimant to the Commissioner,
requiring

that

the

Commissioner

show

that,

in

light

of

the

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education,
6

and work experience, the claimant is “able to engage in gainful
employment within the national economy.”

Sobolewski v. Apfel,

985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
Lastly,

federal

regulations

explicitly

authorize

a

court, upon reviewing decisions of the Commissioner, to order
further proceedings when appropriate.

“The court shall have power

to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.”

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Remand is warranted

where “there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has
applied an improper legal standard.”

Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d

72, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34,
39 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Remand is

particularly appropriate where further findings or explanation
will clarify the rationale for the ALJ’s decision.
F.3d at 39.
“persuasive

Pratts, 94

However, if the record before the court provides
proof

of

disability

and

a

remand

for

further

evidentiary proceedings would serve no purpose,” the court may
reverse and remand solely for the calculation and payment of
benefits.

See, e.g., Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir.

1980); Kane v. Astrue, 942 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

7

DISCUSSION
I.

The ALJ’s Disability Determination
Using

determined

at

the
step

five-step
one

sequential

that

Plaintiff

process,
had

not

the

engaged

ALJ
in

substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of
October 1, 2016.

(Tr. at 23.)

At step two, the ALJ determined

that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of coronary
artery

disease,

status-post

stents,

hypertension,

diabetes

mellitus, bilateral knee derangement, major depressive disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, and panic disorder.

(Id.)

At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in
20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
404.1525, and 404.1526). (Tr. at 24.) Specifically, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the criteria of major
dysfunction

of

a

joint

under

Listing

1.02,

disorders

of

the

cardiovascular system under Listing 4.00, depressive, bipolar, and
related disorders under Listing 12.04, and anxiety and obsessivecompulsive disorders under Listing 12.06.
Regarding
considered

whether

Plaintiff’s
the

mental

“paragraph

(Id. at 24-27.)
impairments,
B”

criteria

aforementioned mental impairment listings were satisfied.
24.)

the

ALJ

of

the

(Id. at

To satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria, Plaintiff’s mental
8

impairments must result in at least one “extreme” or two “marked”
limitations in the following areas of mental functioning: (1)
understanding,
interacting

remembering,

with

others;

or

(3)

applying

information;

concentrating,

persisting,

maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself.
24.)

(2)
or

(Id. at

Based on her review of Plaintiff’s medical records, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in the first
and third areas of mental functioning, and mild limitations in the
second and fourth areas.
The

ALJ

(Id. at 24-27.)

determined

that

Plaintiff

had

a

moderate

limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information,
based

on:

(1)

the

October

28,

2016

consultative

psychiatric

examination by Dr. Michael Kushner, who opined that Plaintiff had
no limitations in understanding and following simple instructions,
and carrying them out independently, though he may have mild to
moderate limitations in doing the same for complex tasks and in
learning new tasks; and (2) Plaintiff’s November 1, 2016 Adult
Function Report, in which he noted that he was unable to follow
written instructions and had trouble remembering things.
24-25.)

(Id. at

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a mild limitation

in interacting with others, based on the October 2016 consultative
examination,

Plaintiff’s

treatment

records,

both

physical

and

mental, the November 2016 Adult Function Report, and Plaintiff’s
hearing testimony.

(Id. at 25.)

As for the third area of mental
9

functioning, concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the
ALJ found that, based on the evidence as a whole, Plaintiff had,
at most, a moderate limitation. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff had a mild limitation in adapting or managing
oneself, having observed that Plaintiff consistently demonstrated
normal demeanor and behavior, and the ability to engage in personal
care and grooming, and did not appear to have any limitations in
making appropriate decisions.
The

ALJ

also

(Id. at 25-26.)

considered

whether

the

“paragraph

C”

criteria of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 were satisfied, and concluded
that

“the

evidence

fails

‘paragraph C’ criteria.”

to

establish

the

presence

of

the

(Id. at 27.)

At step four of the five-step sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light
work, with the following conditions: (1) sitting for 6 hours and
standing/walking for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, (2) occasionally
lifting and carrying 20 pounds, (3) frequently lifting and carrying
10

pounds,

(4)

occasionally

climbing

ramps

or

stairs,

(5)

occasionally kneeling, crouching, and crawling, (6) occasionally
driving a motor vehicle, (7) never using foot controls with either
foot, (8) never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, (9) making
simple work-related decisions, and (10) performing simple, routine
tasks.

(Id. at 27.)

10

In determining that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform
light work, with special conditions, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s
hearing testimony and medical records, which included pharmacy
records, hospital records, consultative examination reports of Dr.
Iqbal Teli (internist) and Michael Kushner, Ph. D. (psychologist),
and treatment records from Drs. Lubov Sychikov (internist) and
Nagmo Fatakhova (psychiatrist). (Id. at 36-38.) The ALJ concluded
that although Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, Plaintiff’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of these symptoms were not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record.
Finally,

at

step

five

of

the

(Id. at 36.)

sequential

evaluation

process, the ALJ found, based on Plaintiff’s RFC, that he was
capable of performing his past relevant work as a poultry dresser.
(Id. at 38.)

In arriving at this conclusion, the ALJ relied on

the vocational expert’s testimony that Plaintiff retains the RFC
to perform the functional demands and job duties of a poultry
dresser.

(Id.)

Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not

“disabled” and thus not entitled to DIB under the Act.

11

(Id.)

II.

The ALJ’s Assessment of Opinion Evidence
Under the treating physician rule, the opinion of a

claimant’s treating physician as to “the nature and severity of
the [claimant’s] impairment is given ‘controlling weight’ if the
opinion is ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’”

Greek v.

Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Burgess, 537 F.3d
at 128; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). 2
An ALJ who does not accord controlling weight to a
treating physician’s medical opinion must consider the following
non-exclusive Burgess factors in determining how much weight to
give to the opinion: (1) the frequency, length, nature, and extent
of treatment; (2) the amount of medical evidence supporting the
opinion; (3) the consistency of the opinion with the remaining
medical

evidence;

specialist.

and

(4)

whether

the

physician

is

a

Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95‒96 (2d Cir.

2019) (citation omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); but see
Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We require
no such slavish recitation of each and every factor where the ALJ’s
reasoning and adherence to the regulation are clear.”).

“The ALJ

2 In 2017, new regulations were issued that changed the standard for evaluating
medical opinion evidence for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c. However, because Plaintiff filed his claims on October 3,
2016, the previous regulations, including the treating physician rule, still
apply.

12

must then ‘comprehensively set forth [her] reasons for the weight
assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.’”

Cichocki v. Astrue,

534 F. App’x. 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Burgess, 537 F.3d at
129).

“The failure to provide ‘good reasons for not crediting the

opinion

of

remand.’”

a

claimant’s

treating

physician

is

a

ground

for

Greek, 802 F.3d at 375 (quoting Burgess, 537 F.3d at

129-30).
However,

“a

treating

physician’s

conclusion

that

a

claimant is disabled is not entitled to controlling weight, as
this determination is reserved to the Commissioner.”

Quiles v.

Saul, No. 19-cv-11181(KNF), 2021 WL 848197, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
5, 2021); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). “[W]hen an ALJ discounts
a treating physician’s opinion that a claimant is disabled, the
ALJ is obligated to give good reasons for doing so.”

Id.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly apply
the

treating

Plaintiff’s

physician
treating

rule

in

physician,

psychiatrist, Dr. Fatakhova.

assessing
Dr.

the

Lee,

opinions
and

(Pl. Mem. at 4-7.)

of

treating
The court

discusses each of their opinions in turn.
A.

The ALJ’s Assessment of Dr. Lee’s Opinion
The ALJ gave “[n]o weight” to Dr. Lee’s December 2018

opinion that Plaintiff could never stoop or bend, only occasionally
reach, only occasionally, or up to two hours in an eight-hour day,
lift and carry 5 to 10 pounds, sit for less than 6 hours per day,
13

and stand and/or walk for less than 2 hours per day.
37, 451‒53.)

(Tr. at 30,

The ALJ deemed Dr. Lee’s assessment of Plaintiff’s

limitations “excessive,” finding that “the medical evidence and
clinical

findings

limitations.”

of

record

(Id. at 37.)

do

not

support

such

extreme

In particular, the ALJ found that the

limitations Dr. Lee ascribed to Plaintiff were not consistent with
Plaintiff’s

hearing

testimony,

conservative

treatment

bilateral knee impairments, and daily activities.
Although

the

ALJ

acknowledged

that

for

his

(Id.)
Dr.

Lee

was

“reportedly a treating source,” the ALJ did not analyze Dr. Lee’s
opinion using the Burgess factors nor provide good reasons for not
according it controlling weight.

(Id. at 30, 37.)

In particular,

the ALJ failed to explain the supportability and consistency of
Dr. Lee’s opinion; her conclusory statements that Dr. Lee’s opinion
is not consistent with the medical evidence and clinical findings
in the record are not enough to allow the court to assess whether
the opinion was properly rejected.

(Id.)

See Rugless v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 548 F. App’x 698, 700 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)
(finding that the ALJ’s “conclusory explanation” for assigning
little weight to a treating physician’s opinion, namely, that the
opinion is “inconsistent with the record and not supported by any
facts or findings” is a cause for remand for further proceedings).
Further, the ALJ did not consider the frequency, nature, and extent

14

of Dr. Lee’s treating relationship with Plaintiff. 3

(Id.)

Though

“[i]t is not necessary that the ALJ recite each factor explicitly,”
her decision must “reflect[] application of the substance of the
[treating physician] rule.”

Martinez-Paulino v. Astrue, No. 11-

cv-5485(RPP), 2012 WL 3564140, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2012).
Here,

because

the

ALJ

did

not

apply

physician rule properly, remand is appropriate.

the

treating

See Kennedy v.

Astrue, 343 F. App’x 719, 721 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order)
(“Where

an

ALJ

fails

properly

to

acknowledge

[the

treating

physician rule] or to provide ‘good reasons’ for the weight given
to

the

treating

physician’s

remand.”) (citation omitted).
comprehensively

apply

the

opinion,

we

do

not

hesitate

to

On remand, the ALJ is directed to

Burgess

and

regulatory

determine the weight to be given to Dr. Lee’s opinion.

factors

to

If the ALJ

determines that a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to
controlling weight, the ALJ “must nonetheless articulate a basis
for the alternative weight assigned.”

Knight v. Comm’r, No. 18-

cv-2474(KAM), 2020 WL 3085778 at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020).

Defendant contends that “[a]lthough Dr. Lee indicated that she treated
Plaintiff for more than three years, the record contained no clear evidence of
a treating relationship as required to be entitled to deference as a ‘treating
source’ under the regulations.” (Def. Mem. at 8.) The ALJ’s decision, however,
does not reflect any determination on the ALJ’s part, express or implied, that
the treating physician rule did not apply to Dr. Lee’s opinion due to the
purported lack of a treating relationship between Dr. Lee and Plaintiff.
Accordingly, the court respectfully declines to adopt Defendant’s post-hoc
rationalization of the ALJ’s decision to accord no weight to Dr. Lee’s opinion
of Plaintiff’s physical functionality without properly applying the treating
physician rule.

3

15

B.

The ALJ’s Assessment of Dr. Fatakhova’s Opinion
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “summarily rejected” Dr.

Fatakhova’s opinion.
“considerable

weight”

Plaintiff’s

ability

information,

and

maintain pace.

This argument is meritless.
to

Dr.

to

Fatakhova’s

understand,

concentration,

(Tr. at 37.)

The ALJ gave

opinion

remember,

persistence,

related

and

and

to

apply

ability

to

In assigning such weight, the ALJ

appropriately considered and gave deference to Dr. Fatakhova as a
treating source. 4

(Id.)

Indeed, the ALJ’s mental functioning

assessment that Plaintiff should be limited to performing simple,
routine

tasks,

and

making

simple

work-related

decisions

is

consistent with the portions of Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion to which
the ALJ gave considerable weight.
The ALJ gave “less weight” to Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion
that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in adapting and managing
himself,

and

that

Plaintiff’s

mental

impairments

would

“substantially interfere with his productive work for more than
20% of the workday.”

(Id.)

The ALJ may “only credit portions of

a medical source opinion, or weigh different parts of the opinion
differently” so long as the ALJ “provid[es] sound reasons for the
discrepancy.”
4964103,

at

Destina v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-2382(ADS), 2018 WL
*6

(E.D.N.Y.

Oct.

15,

2018).

Here,

the

ALJ

The ALJ noted that Dr. Fatakhova had treated Plaintiff since December 2016,
and that Plaintiff had been receiving outpatient psychiatric treatment from Dr.
Fatakhova on a bimonthly basis since January 2017. (Tr. at 32‒35.)

4

16

appropriately examined the administrative record, explained which
portions of Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion were accorded less weight, and
explained why the selected portions were weighed differently. (Tr.
at 37.)
Regarding

Plaintiff’s

ability

to

adapt

and

manage

himself, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified to being able to
perform certain daily activities such as cooking, cleaning, and
buying groceries, and that he was “able to travel on vacation,
with

minimal

medications.”

anxiety

due

to

forgetting

his

psychiatric

(Id.); see also Kelly Ann C. v. Saul, No. 18-cv-

468(DJS), 2019 WL 3321923, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2019) (finding
substantial evidence supporting the assessment of mild limitations
adapting and managing oneself where the plaintiff was able to
“handle self-care and personal hygiene and prepare meals, pay
bills, go to doctors’ appointments, take medications, shop, and
read”); Dayle B. v. Saul, No. 20-cv-00359(TOF), 2021 WL 1660702,
at *13 (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2021) (finding substantial evidence
supporting

the

assessment

of

mild

limitations

adapting

and

managing oneself where the plaintiff “retained the capacity to
care for her personal needs, cook, clean, grocery shop, and drive”)
(internal quotation

omitted).

The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff

had never been hospitalized for his psychiatric conditions and
that the results of Dr. Fatakhova’s mental health examinations of
Plaintiff stated that he was well groomed, cooperative, with calm
17

motor behavior, adequate insight, and good judgment.
35.)

(Tr. at 32‒

Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has mild

limitations in adapting and managing himself is supported by
substantial evidence, and the ALJ properly applied the treating
physician rule in according less weight to Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion
that Plaintiff has moderate limitations.
Similarly,

the

ALJ

determined

that

Dr.

Fatakhova’s

opinion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would “substantially
interfere with his productive work for more than 20% of the
workday” should be assigned less weight, based on Dr. Fatakhova’s
own treatment notes indicating that Plaintiff was responding well
to treatment, his symptoms were less prominent, and the results of
his

mental

status

examinations

were

normal.

(Tr.

at

37.)

Therefore, the court finds that the ALJ properly applied the
treating physician rule in assigning less weight to this portion
of Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion, and that the decision to give less
than controlling weight is supported by substantial evidence.

See

also Heaman v. Berryhill, 765 F. App’x 498, 501 (2d Cir. 2019)
(summary

order)

(approving

the

ALJ’s

decision

to

partially

discount a treating provider’s opinions because those opinions
“were inconsistent with the moderate findings” reflected in the
notes); Ruff v. Saul, No. 19-cv-01515(SRU), 2020 WL 6193892, at
*11 (D. Conn. Oct. 22, 2020) (finding that the ALJ’s decision to
give

partial

weight

to

a

treating
18

source’s

opinion

based

on

evidence of plaintiff’s symptom improvement with medication was
supported by substantial evidence); Muratovic v. Saul, No. 19-cv2290(SPM), 2020 WL 5642294, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2020)
(finding that the ALJ’s decision to discount part of a treating
source’s opinion based on conflicting evidence of plaintiff’s
appearance, daily activities, lack of inpatient treatment, and
improvement of symptoms with medication was supported by good
reasons based on substantial evidence).
III. ALJ’s Classification of Plaintiff’s Prior Work as “Poultry
Dresser,”
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s finding that
he can return to his past relevant work constitutes legal error
because his past work was incorrectly classified.
10.)

(Pl. Mem. at 7-

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that his previous work

should have been classified as a composite job, combining “poultry
dresser,” Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 525.687-070,
and “poultry dresser worker,” DOT 525.687-082.
composite

job

“combines

positions . . . .”

significant

elements

(Id. at 8-10.)
of

two

or

A

more

Izzo v. Saul, No. 18-cv-09681(NSR), 2020 WL

1189095, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2020).

According to Plaintiff,

because the DOT job description for “poultry dresser” does not
capture the frequent lifting and carrying of up to 50 pounds, which
was an important part of his past job, (id. at 8; Tr. at 216), the
ALJ erred in classifying his previous employment according to its
19

“least

demanding

function.”

(ECF

No.

20,

Plaintiff’s

Reply

Memorandum of Law, at 5.)
At step four of the sequential five-step framework, a
“claimant has the burden to show an inability to return to her
previous specific job and an inability to perform her past relevant
work generally.”
2003)

(citations

Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir.
omitted).

The

“inquiry

requires

separate

evaluations of the previous job and the job as it is generally
performed.”

Id.

According to the DOT, the job of a poultry dresser
involves:
Slaughter[ing]
and
dress[ing]
fowl
in
preparation for marketing, performing any
combination of following tasks: Chop[ping] off
bird’s head or slit[ting] bird’s throat to
slaughter bird, using knife. Hang[ing] bird
by feet to drain blood. Dip[ping] bird into
scalding water to loosen feathers. Hold[ing]
bird against projecting rubber fingers of
rotating drum to remove feathers. Cut[ting]
bird open, remov[ing] viscera, and wash[ing]
bird and giblets. May pluck chickens by hand.
DOT 525.687-070.
expert,

ALJ

Relying on the testimony of the vocational

determined

that

the

demands

of

Plaintiff’s

past

relevant work do not exceed his RFC and, therefore, Plaintiff could
perform “his past relevant work” as a poultry dresser, the way it
is “generally performed” in the national economy.

20

(Tr. at 38.)

In determining whether a claimant can perform his past
relevant work as generally performed, “[t]he inquiry . . . is not
whether a claimant is able to perform the duties of [his] previous
job, but whether the claimant is able to perform the duties
associated with [his] previous ‘type’ of work.”

Halloran, 362

F.3d at 33 (finding that plaintiff could perform her prior work as
a computer operator because she could perform the sedentary work
required of her “previous ‘type’ of work,” even though she could
not sit continuously for eight hours as specifically required by
her previous job (citing Jock v. Harris, 651 F.2d 133, 135 (2d
Cir. 1981) (finding that plaintiff could perform her past relevant
work as a cashier because she could perform the sedentary work
required of cashier positions that could be performed in the
sitting position, even though her previous cashier position at a
supermarket

required

extended

periods

of

standing))).

Accordingly, because the job of a poultry dresser as generally
performed does not involve lifting and carrying of up to 50 pounds,
as Plaintiff prior work did, the ALJ did not err when she found
that Plaintiff remains able to perform his “previous ‘type’ of
work.”

Halloran, 362 F.3d at 33.

21

CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

Plaintiff’s

motion

for

judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, Defendant’s cross-motion for
judgment on the pleadings is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment remanding this
case, and to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
DATED:

August 1, 2022
Brooklyn, New York

__________/s/_______________
HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge

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