Chizor v. Lilley

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION, Chizor has failed to show any basis for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, the Petition is denied. Additionally, I decline to issue a certificate of appealability because Chizor has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), I certify that any appeal taken from this decision and order would not be taken in good faith. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directe d to mail a copy of this memorandum decision and the judgment to Chizor at his last address of record. The Clerk of Court is also respectfully directed to seal the state court record located at Dkts. 8-1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4, 8-5. So Ordered by Circuit Judge VJ-Denny Chin on 8/29/2024. (TLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - x
REUBEN CHIZOR,

:
Petitioner,
-v-

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

LYNN J. LILLEY, Superintendent,

21-cv-4411 (DC)

:
:

Respondent.
:
------------------------------------x
APPEARANCES:

REUBEN CHIZOR
Petitioner Pro Se
DIN 17A4199
Eastern NY Correctional Facility
30 Institution Rd., P.O. Box. 338
Napanoch, NY 12458-0338
MELINDA KATZ, Esq.
District Attorney, Queens County
By:
Johnnette Traill, Esq.
Danielle S. Fenn, Esq.
Assistant District Attorneys
125-01 Queens Boulevard
Kew Gardens, NY 11415
Attorney for Respondent

CHIN, Circuit Judge:
On June 8, 2017, following a jury trial, petitioner Reuben Chizor was
convicted in the Supreme Court of New York, Queens County (Latella, J.), of multiple
counts of rape in the first and second degrees, sexual abuse in the first degree, and

endangering the welfare of a child. Dkt. 8 at 7. On July 11, 2017, the trial court
sentenced Chizor to a total of fifteen years' imprisonment followed by ten years' postrelease supervision. See Dkt. 8 at 7-8. The Appellate Division, Second Department
affirmed his convictions, People v. Chizor, 190 A.D.3d 763 (2d Dep't 2021) ("Chizor I"), and
the New York Court of Appeals denied his application for leave to appeal, People v.
Chizor, 37 N.Y.3d 954 (2021) (Wilson, J.) ("Chizor II").
On August 2, 2021, Chizor filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the "Petition") in this Court. Dkt. 1. 1 Chizor raises
three grounds in his Petition, alleging violations of his constitutional rights because: (1)
the trial court denied his request for an adjournment to secure the testimony of an
expert witness, (2) his trial was plagued by prosecutorial misconduct in the form of
repeated improper questions and comments, and (3) the prosecutor engaged in further
misconduct by violating the trial court's ruling on evidence about uncharged crimes
under People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264 (1901) (the "Molineux ruling"). Id. at 6, 9. The
Queens County District Attorney's Office opposed the Petition on December 27, 2021.
Dkt. 8. On April 9, 2024, the case was reassigned to the undersigned.
For the reasons that follow, the Petition is DENIED.

In the Petition, Chizor spells his first name "Rueben." See Dkt. 1 at 1. The docket,
however, uses the spelling "Reuben" and that is what I use here.
1

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

The Facts 2
The evidence at trial established the following:
In November 2006, WC (age nine) and PS (age seven), who are sisters, met

Chizor at a church event, where Chizor was distributing turkeys for Thanksgiving. At
the time, Chizor was the pastor of the church -- New Hope Restoration Ministries in
Queens Village. WC and PS attended the church with their family. Dkt. 8-5 at 56.
The church had a basement that was used for events and storage. The
basement also contained a bed. Children in the church community, including WC and
PS, sometimes slept in the church basement. Chizor lived in the church building; his
bedroom was on the third floor. Id.
WC and PS had a verbally and physically abusive mother, who sometimes
deprived the children of food for days and hit them. As a result, the children lived in
foster homes at times. Id.
To help WC and PS cope with their mother's abuse, Chizor conducted
counseling sessions with them at the church. Chizor hugged WC and rubbed her back,

The facts are primarily drawn from Respondent's brief submitted in opposition to
Chizor's direct appeal in the Appellate Division in 2020. See Dkt. 8-5 at 44-107. It is not
necessary to give a more detailed recitation of the facts -- many of which are graphic -- to
resolve Chizor's habeas corpus petition. Respondent's brief to the Appellate Division contains
more detailed recitations of the facts with extensive citations to the trial record. See, e.g., id. at
56.
2

3

and WC testified that Chizor made her feel protected. Chizor also rubbed PS's back and
told her that she would be okay. PS testified that Chizor made her feel protected and
she felt that she could confide in Chizor. In the beginning, PS considered their
relationship like one between a father and child. Id. at 57.
In July 2011, when WC was fourteen, WC and Chizor became friends on
the social media platform Facebook, where they sent each other messages. WC called
Chizor nicknames like "Daddy" and "Hun," and complimented his appearance by
calling him "fine." Chizor, in turn, called her "Baby," which WC took to be a nickname
"that your boyfriend gives you." They only used these nicknames in their Facebook
communications because of the "secretive" nature of their relationship. Id.
Also in 2011, when PS was twelve, PS and Chizor became friends on
Facebook. They exchanged Facebook messages, with Chizor calling her "Baby" and
"Sweetheart." Id.
On July 27, 2011, WC visited the church basement after school. Chizor
was there, along with PS and another girl -- but those two soon left, leaving WC and
Chizor alone in the basement. They talked about WC's mother. Chizor asked WC to sit
on her lap, and she did, though she later felt weird about it. Chizor asked WC to kiss
him. She did -- on the cheek. Chizor then asked WC to kiss him on the lips. She did.
Chizor told WC he had feelings for her but that they had to keep it a secret from other

4

people, who would not understand. WC got up from Chizor's lap after hearing
someone enter the basement. Id. at 57-58.
Once that person left, Chizor told WC that he wanted to have sex, and she
said "okay." He locked the basement door, told her to calm down, and reassured her.
He told WC to lie down on the bed, which he covered with blankets and a sheet. He
inserted his penis into her vagina. Afterwards, Chizor told WC not to tell anyone that
they had sex and repeated that warning on a later phone call. In August 2011, Chizor
inserted his penis into WC's vagina for a second time in the church basement. WC
thought they were in a secret relationship. Because of these encounters, she saw
Chizor's penis and testified that he was uncircumcised. Id. at 58.
A similar scenario unfolded between Chizor and PS. Chizor told PS that
their relationship had to be a secret, or other people would try to separate them out of
jealousy. On August 22, 2011, Chizor told PS to come to the church basement. There,
Chizor inserted his penis into PS's vagina. PS testified that this physically hurt her, and
the sex made her feel "confused" and "weird." Id. at 58-59.
Chizor and PS continued to exchange messages on Facebook. On April
10, 2012, Chizor told PS that he was disappointed that she discussed their secret
relationship with others and told her not to do so again. Id. at 59.
In March 2013, PS spent two days at Zucker Hillside psychiatric hospital
after being admitted for auditory hallucinations. PS heard voices and sometimes would
5

talk or laugh in response to the voices as a coping mechanism; she also cut her arms -leaving scars -- during these episodes. The auditory hallucinations stopped after PS
took an antipsychotic medication. During her stay at the psychiatric hospital, hospital
staff asked her questions about physical abuse and sexual activity. PS denied being
abused to protect her mother and said she was not sexually active. Id. at 60.
Also in March 2013, WC ended her relationship with Chizor. WC did not
like how Chizor treated her in public, which differed from how he treated her in
private. Id.
After a stint living upstate, WC returned to Queens in May 2015, when she
was 18 years old, and lived with a friend. On July 26, 2015, WC saw Chizor at church,
and he allowed her to sleep at the church that night. Chizor also slept at the church.
On July 28, 2015, WC spoke to a friend -- Wislande Desir -- who also belonged to the
church and lived there with her son. They spoke about boys and sex, and their
conversation made WC feel that it was time to disclose her relationship with Chizor.
Accordingly, she told Desir that Chizor took her virginity in 2011. Id. at 60-61.
In the evening of July 28, 2015, after speaking with Desir, WC told PS that
Chizor took her virginity and that they had sex in July 2011 and August 2011. By this
time, the relationship between PS and Chizor had also ended -- PS stopped attending
Chizor's church in February 2015 because she did not want to be in a relationship with
him. Id. at 60. PS disclosed that she had sex with Chizor in August 2011 -- a fact that
6

upset WC, making her scream and curse. WC returned to the church and told Desir,
who was outside, that she was going to call the police. The police arrived at the church
thereafter. Id. at 61.
Finally, the parties "stipulated that if Police Officer [Lawrence] Sloan had
testified, he would state that he was the first officer to interview PS and that his aided
card report states that she reported that [Chizor] forcibly raped her." Id. at 64.
II.

The State Court Proceedings
a.

The Indictment and Pre-Trial Proceedings
In 2016, Chizor was indicted in Queens County for multiple counts of

rape, sexual abuse of a child, and endangering the welfare of a child. Dkt. 8-5 at 43;
Dkt. 8-1 at 54. The indictment alleged that Chizor raped WC and PS, and committed
other sexual crimes against them, in Queens County in July and August 2011.
On May 23, 2017, the prosecution made a written application under People
v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264 (1901), seeking the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes
-- specifically, evidence that Chizor continued to have sex with W.C. and P.S. after the
dates charged in the indictment. Dkt. 8 at 29 n.5; Dkt. 8-1 at 89. In proceedings before
the trial court on May 30, 2017, the People argued that without this evidence, the jury
would be confused about why the victims took so long to go to the police. Dkt. 8-1 at
89-90. The defense objected, and the trial court denied the application. Specifically, the
court ruled:
7

[W]ith respect to any testimony concerning continued sexual
contact between the complainants and the defendant after
the dates charged in the indictment, I'm not going to allow
any testimony concerning continued sexual act. Clearly
those are uncharged crimes which the People could have
chosen to indict the defendant for, for whatever reason the
People chose not to do that. To allow that type of evidence
in now would clearly go to propensity . . . . There's no
reasonable basis to allow evidence of subsequent sexual
contact between the complainants and the defendant into
evidence.
Id. at 93.
In the same pre-trial hearing, the prosecution moved to preclude Chizor
from cross-examining PS on her psychiatric records, which had been provided to the
defense. The court denied the prosecution's motion to preclude cross-examination. Id.
at 95-96.
b.

The Trial
Trial began on May 31, 2017. Dkt. 8-1 at 98. The jury heard testimony

from the People's witnesses: WC, Dkt. 8-2 at 106-165; PS, Dkt. 8-2 at 181 to Dkt. 8-3 at 11;
Wislande Desir, the woman who lived at the church and spoke with WC, Dkt. 8-3 at 1532; and Dr. Anne Meltzer, a child psychologist who gave expert testimony on child
sexual abuse, Dkt. 8-3 at 33-56. At the close of the prosecution's case, Chizor moved for
a trial order of dismissal for failure to establish a prima facie case. The trial court denied
the motion. Id. at 57-59.

8

The defense presented a case with just one witness: Chizor, Dkt. 8-3 at 76125. Chizor testified that he had a father-daughter relationship with WC and PS, which
included hugging them. He conducted counseling sessions with WC, PS, and their
mother, grandmother, and brother, but neither WC nor PS spoke to him about their
mother's abuse. Dkt. 8-5 at 63. He did testify, however, that WC told him about her
mother's abuse over private Facebook messages.
Chizor testified that he messaged WC and PS on Facebook late at night.
He called WC "baby," and she called him "daddy." Id. He further testified that WC
requested to stay at the church in July 2015, but he refused because she was no longer a
member of the church. Id. at 63-64.
Chizor testified that he did not have sex with WC and PS. He was
circumcised as a child and a photograph purportedly depicting his penis was admitted
into evidence by the defense. Id. at 64.
The People did not present a rebuttal case. Dkt. 8-3 at 126-27. At the close
of trial, Chizor moved to dismiss the charges, and the trial court denied the application.
Id. at 127-28.
On June 8, 2017, the jury found Chizor guilty of one count each of rape in
the first degree of PS on August 22, 2011, rape in the second degree of WC on July 27,
2011, and sexual abuse in the first degree of PS on August 22, 2011, as well as one count
each of endangering the welfare of a child with respect to PS on August 22, 2011 and
9

with respect to WC on or about and between July 27, 2011 and August 31, 2011. Id. at
219, 223-24. The jury found Chizor not guilty of one count of rape in the second degree
with respect to WC in August 2011. Id. at 223.
c.

The Sentencing Hearing
On July 11, 2017, the trial court sentenced Chizor. Dkt. 8 at 7. The People

requested that Chizor be sentenced to forty years' incarceration, Dkt. 8-4 at 2, and
Chizor's defense counsel requested leniency, id. at 3. Chizor spoke on his behalf at
sentencing and maintained his innocence. Id. at 3-6.
The court sentenced Chizor to: (1) ten years' imprisonment followed by 10
years' post-release supervision on the first-degree rape count, (2) five years'
imprisonment followed by 10 years' post-release supervision on the second-degree rape
count, to run consecutively to the sentence for first-degree rape, (3) five years'
imprisonment followed by 10 years' post-supervision release on the count of firstdegree sexual abuse, to run concurrently to the other sentences, and (4) one year
imprisonment for each of the two counts of endangering the welfare of a child, to run
concurrently to the other sentences. Id. at 7. Accordingly, Chizor was sentenced to a
total of fifteen years' imprisonment.
d.

Direct Appeal
Chizor appealed his convictions and sentence to the Appellate Division,

Second Department, asserting the following claims: (1) the court violated his right to
10

present a defense when it denied his counsel's request for an adjournment to call an
expert to testify about PS's psychiatric records, (2) the prosecutor improperly used the
child psychologist's testimony to bolster the credibility of WC and PS, and tried to elicit
testimony about how sexual offenders groom their victims, (3) the prosecutor
improperly questioned WC and PS on direct examination and committed prosecutorial
misconduct during Chizor's cross-examination and summation, (4) the prosecutor's
violation of a Molineux ruling -- which precluded evidence that Chizor had a sexual
relationship with WC and PS that continued beyond the dates in the indictment -deprived him of a fair trial. Because of the alleged prosecutorial misconduct and other
purported errors, Chizor requested a new trial. Dkt. 8 at 8.
On January 13, 2021, the Appellate Division affirmed Chizor's convictions.
See Chizor I, 190 A.D.3d at 763-64. The Appellate Division held that (1) Chizor's claim
that he was deprived of his right to present a defense had "no merit," (2) Chizor failed to
preserve for appellate review his bolstering claim, and (3) Chizor "largely" failed to
preserve for appellate review his claims about prosecutorial misconduct about the
prosecutor's questioning of witnesses and summation, but "[i]n any event, while some
comments and questions were improper, they did not, either alone or in combination,
serve to deprive [Chizor] of a fair trial." Id. Finally, the Appellate Division found that
Chizor's remaining contentions lacked merit. Id.

11

On May 16, 2021, the New York Court of Appeals (Wilson, J.) denied leave
to appeal. Chizor II, 37 N.Y.3d at 954.
III.

The Petition
In the Petition, Chizor seeks habeas relief on three grounds: (1) the trial

court denied his request for an adjournment to introduce testimony of an expert
witness, (2) the trial was plagued by prosecutorial misconduct in the form of repeated
improper questions and comments, and (3) the prosecutor engaged in further
misconduct by violating the trial court's Molineux ruling. Dkt. 1 at 6, 9. Respondent
filed its opposition and the state court record on December 27, 2021. Dkt. 8 at 1. Chizor
did not file a reply.
On December 29, 2021, Respondent moved to seal the already-filed state
court record pursuant to New York Civil Rights Law § 50-b because it contained
references to the names of sex offense victims. Dkt. 11. On January 3, 2022, this Court
(DeArcy Hall, J.) granted Respondent's request to seal the state court record. On
January 21, 2022, Chizor opposed Respondent's motion to seal. Dkt. 13. Despite the
Court's order, however, the record was never sealed.
On October 7, 2022, Chizor moved to amend the Petition to add a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and requested that the Petition be held in abeyance
while he exhausted that claim. Dkt. 14. On April 27, 2023, Magistrate Judge Bloom
recommended that this Court deny Chizor's motion without prejudice because he failed
12

to file a proposed amended petition with his motion to amend and noted that any
motion to amend had to address whether the additional claim relates back to the claims
in the Petition. Dkt. 15 at 2-3. Judge Bloom also recommended that this Court deny
Chizor's request to stay the proceeding without prejudice, because of Chizor's failure to
file a proposed amended petition. Id. at 4.
On May 7, 2023, Chizor notified this Court of his intention to resubmit his
motion to amend by June 5, 2023. Dkt. 16. Chizor failed to resubmit his motion to
amend, and on September 13, 2023, this Court (DeArcy Hall, J.) adopted Judge Bloom's
report and recommendation and denied Chizor's motion to amend with leave to renew.
Chizor has not sought to renew the motion.
DISCUSSION
I.

Federal Review of State Convictions
A federal court may not grant a habeas petition on a claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-98 (2011); Waiters v. Lee, 857
F.3d 466, 477 (2d Cir. 2017). Hence, when a claim is adjudicated on the merits, the state
13

court's decision must be accorded "substantial deference." Fischer v. Smith, 780 F.3d 556,
560 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 2009)). "A federal
court may reverse a state court ruling only where it was 'so lacking in justification that
there was . . . [no] possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Vega v. Walsh, 669 F.3d 123,
126 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103); see also Wetzel v.
Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 524 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102).
A federal court cannot review a habeas petition unless the petitioner "has
exhausted the remedies available" in state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This
requirement affords state courts the "opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged
violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Jackson v. Edwards, 404 F.3d 612, 619 (2d Cir.
2005) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). "This requires that the
prisoner 'fairly present' his constitutional claim to the state courts, which he
accomplishes 'by presenting the essential factual and legal premises of his federal
constitutional claim to the highest state court capable of reviewing it.'" Jackson v.
Conway, 763 F.3d 115, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Rosa v. McCray, 396 F.3d 210, 217 (2d
Cir. 2005)). But if a petitioner's unexhausted claim is "plainly meritless, the court may
deny the claim on the merits notwithstanding the petitioner's failure to exhaust." Ortiz
v. Heath, No. 10-cv-1492 (KAM), 2011 WL 1331509 at *14 (E.D.N.Y. April 6, 2011) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005)).

14

Moreover, "federal courts will not review questions of federal law
presented in a habeas petition when the state court's decision rests upon a state-law
ground that 'is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the
judgment.'" Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 729 (1991)). In other words, if the state court refused to consider an argument
because it was procedurally barred under state law, the argument is barred from federal
habeas review so long as the procedural bar is "adequate to support the judgment."
Murden v. Artuz, 497 F.3d 178, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d
130, 138 (2d Cir. 2006)). A petitioner's failure to comply with a state procedural rule
qualifies as such an adequate and independent state ground, provided that (1) the state
court actually "relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition
of the case," Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1989) (citation omitted), and (2) the state
procedural rule is "firmly established and regularly followed," James v. Kentucky, 466
U.S. 341, 348 (1984).
The Second Circuit has "held repeatedly that the contemporaneous
objection rule" -- that state appellate courts will review only those errors of law that are
presented contemporaneously such that the trial court is "reasonably prompted" to
correct them -- "is a firmly established and regularly followed New York procedural
rule." Downs v. Lape, 657 F.3d 97, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). Hence, the
Circuit has affirmed the denial of habeas relief based on the Appellate Division's ruling
15

that the failure of a petitioner to object at trial rendered a claim unpreserved for
appellate review. See, e.g., Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming the
denial of habeas relief where the petitioner's trial counsel failed to bring to trial court's
attention a claim that he later attempted to advance on appeal). If a claim is
procedurally barred pursuant to an independent and adequate state rule, a federal
habeas court may not review it on the merits, unless the petitioner demonstrates (1)
"cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal
law," or (2) "that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage
of justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
II.

Analysis
In his Petition, Chizor contends that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated because: (1) the trial court denied an adjournment of
the trial, (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and (3) the prosecutor engaged in
further misconduct by violating the trial court's Molineux ruling. Dkt. 1 at 6, 9. I
address each claim in turn.
a.

The Denial of an Adjournment
First, Chizor argues that the "[t]rial court arbitrarily denied [him] an

adjournment to introduce the material testimony of an expert witness on behalf of the
defense" and that denial violated his constitutional amendment rights. Dkt. 1 at 6. The
Appellate Division considered the claim on direct appeal and concluded that it lacked
16

merit. Chizor I, 190 A.D.3d at 763-64 ("Under the circumstances presented, there is no
merit to the defendant's contention that he was deprived of his right to present a
defense as a result of the Supreme Court's refusal to grant him an adjournment to
secure the testimony of an expert witness.").
Because the Appellate Division disposed of Chizor's adjournment claim
on the merits, "a federal habeas court simply reviews the specific reasons given by the
state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable." Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S.
122, 125 (2018) (noting further that "[w]e have affirmed this approach time and again").
Accordingly, this Court must accord the state court's decision "substantial deference,"
Fischer, 780 F.3d at 560, and will only grant habeas relief if the state court's decision was
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law," Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98.
The Appellate Division's decision that Chizor's adjournment claim lacked
merit was reasonable, and thus habeas relief is not available to Chizor on his
adjournment claim. The Supreme Court has instructed that "not every denial of a
request for more time" violates a defendant's constitutional rights. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376
U.S. 575, 589-90 (1964) (due process not violated when trial judge declines to give a
defendant more time unless the judge exhibits "a myopic insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay"); see also Morris v. Slappy,
461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) ("Not every restriction on counsel's time or opportunity to
17

investigate or to consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." (citation omitted)).
Instead, the decision to adjourn or interrupt a trial is within a trial judge's
"broad discretion." United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing United
States v. Bein, 728 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1984)). "To show abuse of that discretion,
appellants must demonstrate arbitrary action substantially impairing the defense."
Bein, 728 F.2d at 114. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]here are no mechanical
tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due
process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case,
particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied."
Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589-90.
The circumstances of the denial of Chizor's adjournment request are as
follows. On May 30, 2017, the prosecution raised the issue of PS's psychiatric records -showing that PS had delusions or hallucinations -- and moved to preclude Chizor from
cross-examining PS on the records. Chizor's attorney stated: "I think I sent it out to an
expert to take a review of it" and argued that the hallucinations affected her credibility.
The court denied the prosecution's motion to preclude cross-examination. Dkt. 8-1 at
95-96.
After the prosecution rested on Monday, June 5, 2017, Chizor's attorney
told the trial court that he would present a defense case, he would prefer to begin
18

presenting the case the next morning, and he expected Chizor and one witness -- Dr.
Burrell -- to testify. Chizor's attorney described Dr. Burrell as "an important witness"
but indicated that the doctor would not be available the next day. Dkt 8-3 at 59-60. The
court responded, "I really don't want to go over to Wednesday with the defense case at
this point." Id. at 60. The court continued: "Just in terms of scheduling, then, assuming
the defense case is concluded by tomorrow morning, we should be prepared [to] sum
up tomorrow afternoon, certainly charge the jury by Wednesday morning. That would
be how I would prefer to proceed. You can see what the status of this doctor [is], I'm
not sure what testimony he has, but we'll cross that bridge tomorrow." Id. at 61.
Chizor's attorney also indicated that he might move PS's medical records into evidence.
The trial court, however, said it would not admit the records because Chizor's attorney
already cross-examined PS about the records and no other witness could testify about
them. Dkt. 8 at 15.
The next day, Tuesday, June 6, 2017, Chizor's attorney informed the court
that Dr. Burrell would not be available until Friday. Dkt. 8-3 at 64, 69 ("I understand
that my doctor is not available [until] Friday. I understand the Court is not waiting
[until] Friday. Just an exception to the ruling."). The court requested an offer of proof
regarding the doctor's testimony, and the attorney indicated the doctor would testify
about P.S.'s psychiatric records and "[a]lso what Dr. Meltzer had talked about, the delay
in reporting and, you know, how the psychological issue may impact upon that." Id. at
19

74. The trial court asked Chizor's attorney why he could not find another witness to
testify, given that he had known about the psychiatric records, and counsel did not
provide an answer. Id. ("I mean, I knew about it."). The court concluded that it would
not "delay the trial for that purpose" because Chizor's attorney already cross-examined
Dr. Meltzer and established P.S.'s psychiatric history during P.S.'s cross-examination.
Id. at 74-75.
The trial court's decision was reasonable, and it did not abuse its
discretion by declining to interrupt the trial and delay it for three days for the defense to
present a witness where: (1) Chizor's attorney had known for a week that it might need
an expert based on the prosecution's disclosure of P.S.'s psychiatric records, (2) Chizor's
attorney had already cross-examined two witnesses on related topics -- Dr. Meltzer who
could testify about victim reporting habits and P.S. who could testify about her
psychiatric history, and (3) Chizor's attorney failed to explain why he could not secure a
different expert to testify in a timely manner. See Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589-90; Drake v.
Portuondo, 321 F.3d 338, 344 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that a state trial court's decision
to provide a shorter continuance than requested "d[id] not appear to be an unreasonable
application of federal constitutional law" where the court "did not curtail crossexamination or exclude rebuttal by the defense" of a key prosecution witness). The

20

Appellate Division's determination to that effect was certainly reasonable. 3 Thus, this
claim provides no basis for federal habeas relief.
b.

Improper Questions and Statements
Nor is Chizor entitled to habeas relief on his claim that the People

engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during trial by repeatedly asking improper
questions and making improper comments during questioning and statements in
summation. See Dkt. 1 at 9. Chizor challenges the prosecutor's conduct during the
direct and cross-examination of several witnesses, including Chizor, because "[t]he facts
on record show how the prosecutor persistently ignored the judge's ruling on sustained
questions and continued to proceed with the improper line of questions displayed to
the jury." Id. He further challenges the prosecutor's summation because "the prosecutor
flatly misstated the evidence and misle[d] the jury . . . [and] gave his opinion about the
weight of the evidence, and repeatedly vouched for the credibility of the complainants
and witness[es]." Id. The Appellate Division considered the claim on direct appeal and
rejected it on the ground that it was "largely unpreserved for appellate review." Chizor
I, 190 A.D.3d at 763 (citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.05 (2)). This determination

Indeed, in a pre-trial conference on June 5, 2017, the court had already
emphasized it was not going to delay trial for witness testimony -- there, with respect to
a police officer who was on vacation and was on the prosecution's witness list. See Dkt.
8-2 at 178-79 ("THE COURT: I'm not going to keep this jury another week because of
Officer Sloan.").

3

21

constitutes an independent and adequate state ground that precludes habeas review of
this claim in federal court. See Downs, 657 F.3d at 104.
Moreover, the Appellate Division addressed the merits, concluding that
"while some comments and questions were improper, they did not, either alone or in
combination, serve to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Any prejudice from these
comments and questions was, for the most part, ameliorated by sustained objections
and the trial court's instructions to the jury . . . , and those improper comments or
questions which were not the subject of sustained objections were not so flagrant or
pervasive as to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial." Chizor I, 190 A.D.3d at 763.
This determination is an adjudication on the merits, see Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125, that is
entitled to "substantial deference," Fischer, 780 F.3d at 560. This Court will not disturb
the Appellate Division's determination unless Chizor can show that it "involved an
unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Chizor has not done so.
"[A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a
prosecutor's comments standing alone . . . in an otherwise fair proceeding." United
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). "[I]t 'is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks
were undesirable or even universally condemned.'" Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,
181 (1986) (citation omitted). "In order to reach the level of a constitutional violation, a
prosecutor's remarks must 'so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
22

conviction a denial of due process.'" Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 934 F.2d 419, 424 (2d Cir. 1991)
(alteration adopted) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
"Whether a prosecutor's improper remarks result in a denial of due process depends
upon whether the remarks caused 'substantial prejudice' to the defendant." United
States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1136 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Nersesian, 824
F.2d 1294, 1327 (2d Cir. 1987)). To determine whether "substantial prejudice" exists, the
Second Circuit has "adopted a contextual approach that considers the following factors:
'the severity of the misconduct; the measures adopted to cure the misconduct; and the
certainty of conviction absent the improper statements.'" Id. (quoting United States v.
Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 514 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also Gonzalez, 943 F.2d at 424 (same).
Many of the prosecutor's questions and comments were indeed improper.
For example, during Dr. Meltzer's expert testimony, the prosecutor asked Dr. Meltzer
three questions about grooming. The court sustained the defense's objections to each
question, instructed the prosecutor to "[m]ove on to another area," and informed the
prosecutor that he was "getting very close to the line of being in contempt of this Court."
Dkt. 8-3 at 49-50. Additionally, during Chizor's cross-examination, the prosecutor told
Chizor to answer a question "[t]ruthfully." Dkt. 8-3 at 90. The prosecutor's comment
prompted the trial court to sustain the defense's objection and instruct the prosecutor to
"refrain from these characterizations" and avoid "argu[ing] with the witness." Id. at 91.

23

The trial court minimized any prejudice by sustaining many of defense
counsel's objections and on occasion admonishing the prosecutor and giving curative
instructions. See Gonzalez, 934 F.2d at 424 (emphasizing the trial court's "curative action"
of sustaining an objection and instructing the jury). Moreover, with respect to the
prosecutor's three questions about grooming, the questions did not indicate his
"flagrant disregard of sustained objections and the court's admonitions" or suggest that
he "ignor[ed] the court's instruction[s,]" People v. Stewart, 459 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855-56 (2d
Dep't 1983); see also People v. Alicea, 37 N.Y.2d 601, 604 (1975) (ordering a new trial for
misconduct where the trial court gave the following admonishment to the prosecutor:
"you deliberately four times in a row ask[ed] the question that I sustained and excluded
the first time. You repeated it three additional times. And that's the twenty-fifth time in the
course of the trial at least that you have done that." (emphasis added)). Instead, the
questions indicated that he did not understand why he could not question the witness
about grooming, see Dkt. 8-3 at 49-51 (prosecutor's exchange with the court), suggesting
that his actions were not intentional. See Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1136 (explaining that the
unintentional nature of a prosecutor's action factors into the severity of any
prosecutorial misconduct). Nor was the prosecutor's line of questioning on crossexamination a "transparent attempt[]" to undermine Chizor's credibility with the jury.

24

Stewart, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 856-57 (ordering new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct in
more extreme circumstances). 4
Ultimately, the trial was not so infected with unfairness as to result in the
denial of due process. See Gonzalez, 934 F.2d at 424. Accordingly, it was reasonable for
the Appellate Division to conclude that reversal on this ground was unwarranted, and
habeas relief on this claim is denied.
c.

Molineux Claim
Finally, Chizor is not entitled to habeas relief on his prosecutorial

misconduct claim for the prosecutor's "blatant[] violat[ion of] the court's Molineux
ruling over repeated sustained objections to questions pertaining to precisely what the
Molineux doctrine prohibits." Dkt. 1 at 9. Chizor did not raise this claim below.
Instead, he argued that, as a matter of state evidentiary law and unrelated to

Chizor also challenges the prosecutor's conduct during summation; for example, Chizor
contends that the prosecutor misstated the evidence when, in summation, the prosecutor
implied that PS did not disclose the sexual abuse at the hospital because she was loyal to
Chizor. See Dkt. 8-3 at 161-62 ("When being asked, [w]ere you sexually abused, the loyalty to
this man. The help is right in front of you. Are you being sexually abused? No, because she is
loyal to him."). But the prosecutor's comments were largely responsive to the defense counsel's
summation, see Dkt. 8-3 at 136 (questioning whether PS was reliable given her "psychotic
episode"), and thus fall within the bounds of acceptable argument during summation. See
Cooper v. Costello, 112 F.3d 503 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming the denial of a habeas petition on
prosecutorial misconduct grounds where "the prosecutor was merely responding to the content
of defense counsel's summation, which had attacked the credibility of the same witness"); People
v. Gillespie, 831 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84 (2d Dep't 2007) (no prosecutorial misconduct where "most of the
challenged remarks were fair comment on the evidence, permissible rhetorical comment, or
responsive to the defense counsel's summation"). Hence, the prosecutor's comments were likely
not improper.
4

25

prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor's violation of the Molineux ruling deprived
him of a fair trial; the Appellate Division, after considering that claim, concluded that
"[t]he defendant's remaining contentions are without merit." Chizor I, 190 A.D.3d at 764.
Nonetheless, Chizor's prosecutorial misconduct claim, though arguably unexhausted,
may be denied because it is plainly without merit. See Ortiz, 2011 WL 1331509, at *14.
As described above, "[i]n order to reach the level of a constitutional
violation, a prosecutor's remarks must 'so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process.'" Gonzalez, 934 F.2d at 424 (alteration
adopted) (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643). No denial of due process occurred here.
Before trial, the trial court denied the prosecutor's Molineux application, which sought
to establish that Chizor had relationships with the victims that predated the rapes, and
that Chizor continued to have sex with the victims after the dates in 2011 charged in the
indictment. Dkt. 8-1 at 89. At trial, when the prosecutor asked WC about events that
occurred in 2015 -- after the dates charged in the indictment -- the trial court repeatedly
sustained the defense's objections. Dkt. 8-2 at 139-40. The following exchange occurred
regarding an alleged encounter in 2015:
Q:
So, when you went to see the defendant, what if
anything happened next?
A:
We was just talking, stuff like that. Later that night
like around 2 o'clock in the morning I fell asleep. I was
sleeping, and then it was like a dream. Like I was like deep
slumber. Then I felt somebody next to me. When I woke up,
it was him trying to engage in having -26

MR. RENFROE:
THE COURT:
disregard that.
MR. SWEET:
THE COURT:
next question.
Q:

Objection.
Sustained. Yes. The jury will

Can we approach?
No, Counsel. You can ask your

On July 26, 2015, did the defendant give you oral sex?
MR. RENFROE:

Objection.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

Q:
Was the -- was there any physical contact between
you and the defendant on this date?
MR. RENFROE:

Just objection.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. SWEET:

Your Honor, could we approach?

THE COURT:

Approach, Counsel.

(Side-bar discussion held off the record.)
Dkt. 8-2 at 140.
After testimony concluded that day, Chizor's attorney requested a
mistrial. Dkt. 8-2 at 166. The prosecutor argued that WC was 18 and so any testimony
about sexual contact with Chizor would not be evidence of uncharged crimes in
violation of the Molineux ruling. The trial court disagreed, finding that the prosecutor
27

"certainly" violated the Molineux ruling because that evidence had no relevance "other
than to have this jury speculate to exactly what I said you couldn't put into evidence . . .
that there was some continuing course of conduct that ended at some point in 2015." Id.
at 166-68. But the trial court declined to grant the mistrial because it had sustained the
objection immediately and directed the jury to disregard the testimony. The court
permitted Chizor's attorney to request a curative instruction to the jury. Id. at 167-68.
Defense counsel later declined to seek such an instruction. Id. at 173.
In short, as the trial court concluded, there was no erroneously admitted
evidence. The only testimony WC gave on the subject of the Molineux ruling -- evidence
of a sexual relationship after the dates charged in the indictment -- was an incomplete
sentence, see Dkt. 8-2 at 140 ("When I woke up, it was him trying to engage in
having --"), before the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to
disregard the testimony, id. The trial court sustained objections to the prosecutor's
other questions on the subject before WC could answer them. See id. The trial court's
actions thus minimized any prejudice that could have resulted from the prosecutor's
questions. See Gonzalez 934 F.2d at 424. Accordingly, this claim is plainly meritless and
provides no basis for federal habeas relief.
CONCLUSION
Chizor has failed to show any basis for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Accordingly, the Petition is denied. Additionally, I decline to issue a certificate of
28

appealability because Chizor has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), I
certify that any appeal taken from this decision and order would not be taken in good
faith.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this
memorandum decision and the judgment to Chizor at his last address of record. The
Clerk of Court is also respectfully directed to seal the state court record located at Dkts.
8-1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4, 8-5.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, New York
August 29, 2024

_____________________________
DENNY CHIN
United States Circuit Judge
Sitting By Designation

29