Samsel v. Peters et al

Filing 14

ORDER: For the reasons explained in the attached memorandum and order, petitioner's 3 motion for a preliminary injunction order is denied. Ordered by Judge Rachel P. Kovner on 8/28/2024. (BRS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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RYAN SAMSEL,
v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
24-CV-5026 (RPK)

Petitioner,

COLETTE S. PETERS, Director of Federal
Bureau of Prison; METROPOLITAN
DETENTION CENTER BROOKLYN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; RONALD
DAVIS, Director U.S. Marshalls Service;
MERRICK GARLAND, U.S. Attorney General;
and THOMAS N. FAUST, Director of
Corrections,
Respondents.
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RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:
Pro se petitioner Ryan Samsel has moved for a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 against respondents Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Colette S. Peters,
the Metropolitan Detention Center Brooklyn BOP (“MDC Brooklyn”), Director of the United
States Marshals Service (“USMS”) Ronald Davis, United States Attorney General Merrick
Garland, and the District of Columbia Director of Corrections Thomas N. Faust. Petitioner seeks
(1) to enjoin respondents from transferring petitioner from MDC Brooklyn, (2) to require certain
medical examinations of petitioner, and (3) to require the disclosure of petitioner’s medical
records. See Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 2–3 (Dkt. #3) (“Pet’r’s PI Mot.”). Respondents Peters, MDC
Brooklyn, Davis, and Garland (collectively, “respondents”), the only respondents that have
appeared in this case, oppose the motion. See Mem. in Opp’n 12–17 (Dkt. #9). For the reasons
explained below, petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

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BACKGROUND
Petitioner was arrested in January 2021 on federal charges stemming from the breach of
the United States Capitol building on January 6. Decl. of Nicole T. Lewis (“Lewis Decl.”) (Dkt.
#10), Ex. 2, at 1; Jan. 30, 2021 Dkt. Entry, United States v. Samsel, 21-CR-00537 (JMC) (D.D.C.
Jan. 30, 2021) (hereinafter “D.D.C. Crim. Dkt.”). Petitioner has since been in custody at various
federal and local facilities, Lewis Decl., Ex. 1, pending the adjudication of his criminal case in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, see generally D.D.C. Crim. Dkt. The
following facts regarding his health and medical treatment are taken from petitioner’s filings, their
attachments, and the filings in petitioner’s criminal case in the District of Columbia, as noted
below.
I.

Petitioner’s Medical Condition
For at least the past ten years, petitioner has suffered from various medical complications

due to Bilateral Neurogenic Thoracic Outlet Syndrome, Venous Thoracic Outlet Syndrome, and
gynecomastia. These conditions cause blood clots and swelling. Pet. 10–13, 18–26 (Dkt. #1)
(“Habeas Pet.”); Compl. 6–8, 20–24, Samsel v. Peters, 24-CV-05027 (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 2024)
(Dkt. #1) (“Mandamus Pet.”); see Mandamus Pet. 167–232 (medical records dated from 2014 to
2020). 1 Petitioner states that he also has “irregular glands in [his] chest, armpit, left arm and neck,”
and “[t]he glands behind [his] nipples . . . regularly discharge blood.”

Habeas Pet. 11.

Mammograms and venograms at state facilities confirm he has blood clots and deep vein
thrombosis throughout his chest and bilaterally in his arms. Ibid.
Petitioner alleges that before his arrest, he was scheduled for surgery by a plastic surgeon
in March of 2021, and that while in federal custody, other doctors have twice recommended the
Citations to petitioner’s habeas petition and mandamus petition use ECF pagination. Other record citations use
internal pagination unless otherwise noted.
1

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same surgical procedure. Habeas Pet. 11; Mandamus Pet. 7. Petitioner refers to this procedure as
a “glandsectomy,” but attached medical documents indicate that the procedure contemplated is a
glandectomy, or a surgery to treat gynecomastia. Habeas Pet. 50.
More specifically, while in federal custody, petitioner was examined by a breast surgeon
at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital in Philadelphia in August 2022. The surgeon noted “no
suspicious findings” from either petitioner’s examination or certain imaging that had occurred the
prior week, but scheduled a surgical biopsy. Habeas Pet. 131–37, 147–51, 153–58; Mandamus
Pet. 112–18, 128–32, 134–39. That surgery was later cancelled for reasons that are in dispute. A
BOP administrative note in the medical records submitted by petitioner states that the “surgery
was cancelled by the outside provider as a result of [petitioner’s] refusal to get the required” preadmission lab testing and that Thomas Jefferson thereafter discharged petitioner and “confirmed
that no further follow-up appointment [was] needed.” Habeas Pet. 68; Mandamus Pet. 49.
Petitioner alleges that Dr. Andrew Edinger, from BOP’s prison in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania,
cancelled the procedure without consulting petitioner. Mot. to Amend 2 (Dkt. #5). Petitioner also
alleges Dr. Edinger had previously submitted a medical recommendation to the district judge
presiding over petitioner’s criminal case stating that petitioner “required immediate surgery
urgently,” but that Dr. Edinger changed his recommendation in testimony before the district court
after “the FBI had visited him and pressured him to change his medical opinion.” Id. at 3.
In November 2022, petitioner was examined by a vascular surgeon at the Vascular Surgery
Hospital for Advanced Medicine in Danville, Pennsylvania. See Habeas Pet. 49–59; Mandamus
Pet. 151–61. The surgeon advised against a rib resection surgery to treat petitioner’s thoracic
outlet syndrome. Habeas Pet. 56–57; Mandamus Pet. 158–59. The surgeon noted that petitioner
was scheduled for a plastic surgery consult in April 2023 for “evaluation of lymph nodes/mass of

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left brea[s]t with nipple discharge,” Habeas Pet. 56, and described it as of the “utmost import” that
petitioner be “evaluated and treated” for these conditions, id. at 57.
Petitioner states that three days before he was scheduled for a plastic surgery appointment,
he “was transferred to MDC Brooklyn without any of the past follow ups.” Id. at 13. He alleges
that while at MDC Brooklyn, “several large arching lumps have surfaced on the back of [his]
neck,” and that “[l]ast November, painful tumors . . . surfaced in [his] foot and leg and remain
untreated.” Id. at 19.
II.

Litigation in Petitioner’s Criminal Case
Petitioner was arrested in January 2021, and, since then, has made numerous requests for

medical care in his underlying criminal case.
In September 2021, petitioner filed an emergency motion in his criminal case in the district
court for the District of Columbia seeking certain medical treatment and the production of his
medical records. D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Emergency Mot. (Dkt. #49). Petitioner’s counsel thereafter
acknowledged receipt of “a voluminous production of medical records” from USMS. See D.D.C.
Crim. Dkt., Mot. for Temporary Release 2–3 (Dkt. #63). Petitioner’s request for treatment was
denied upon the court’s granting petitioner’s unopposed motion for “temporary release to the
custody of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” for the purpose of medical treatment. See id. at
1–2, 4; D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Nov. 23, 2021 Minute Order; D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Nov. 29, 2021 Order
(Dkt. #65).
In April 2022, petitioner filed a motion to revoke his pretrial detention based on alleged
deficiencies in his medical treatment. See D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Mot. to Revoke Pretrial Detention
(Dkt. #142). Petitioner’s motion was denied the following month, but he was ordered to be

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transferred to a “tertiary research center” for further treatment. See D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., May 17,
2022 Order (Dkt. #159); D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., May 18, 2022 Order (Dkt. #161).
In September 2022, petitioner filed in his criminal case a second motion for release to
permit him to undergo a glandectomy with a doctor who had been scheduled to operate on
petitioner prior to his arrest. See D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Second Mot. for Release (Dkt. #191). That
motion was denied in October 2022. See D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Oct. 3, 2022 Order.
In December 2022, petitioner filed in his criminal case a motion to compel “medical
treatment and medication, to include any anti-coagulation therapy and [] pain medication” and the
release of all medical records. D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Mot. to Compel Treatment 8–9 (Dkt. #229).
The court denied petitioner’s request to compel treatment, but granted petitioner the opportunity
to identify any medical records “that [BOP] is withholding” for purposes of his request to compel
the release of medical records. D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Jan. 30, 2023 Minute Order. No follow up
request appears on the docket. See generally D.D.C. Crim. Dkt.
In August 2023, petitioner moved for reconsideration of his detention order based in part
on medical necessity and petitioner’s request to see the doctor with whom petitioner’s surgery had
been scheduled prior to his arrest. D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Mot. for Recons. of Detention 1 (Dkt. #264).
The motion was denied in October 2023. D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Oct. 2, 2023 Minute Order.
After a bench trial, petitioner was convicted in February 2024 of eight counts: obstruction
of an official proceeding; disorderly conduct in a Capitol building or grounds; act of physical
violence at the Capitol building or grounds; two counts of civil disorder; and three counts of
assault. Lewis Decl., Ex. 3. Petitioner was transferred to MDC Brooklyn that same month, id.,
Ex. 1, where he has remained in custody pending his sentencing in Washington, D.C. on September
19, 2024, D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., July 25, 2024 Minute Order.

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Petitioner has recently sought to continue his sentencing proceeding in the District of
Columbia. In his motion seeking an adjournment, petitioner states that he “is scheduled to undergo
surgery later this fall, with a pre-surgery consultation scheduled in September.” D.D.C. Crim.
Dkt., Mot. to Continue Sentencing (Dkt. #393).
III.

Habeas and Mandamus Filings and Motion for Emergency Relief
In July 2024, petitioner filed in this district a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a

petition for a writ of mandamus. See Habeas Pet.; Mandamus Pet. The habeas petition requests
petitioner’s immediate release and transfer to independent physicians for certain medical
treatment, including: “[i]mmediate examination and treatment of blood clots, large lumps, and/or
tumors”; consultations with oncology specialists “concerning the glandular growths of the male
breasts and blood clots”; a consultation with the Thomas Jefferson breast cancer surgeon;
“[s]urgery to remove excess bone growth pinching major blood vessels near the neck and
shoulder”; and “[r]econstructive surgery by a plastic surgeon to perform . . . a glandsectomy.” See
Habeas Pet. 7–9, 35. The mandamus petition requests substantially similar relief. Mandamus Pet.
14–17 (Section VII.C–J). Petitioner alleges that respondents have blocked his medical treatment
by repeatedly transferring him between facilities. See Habeas Pet. 9, 26–28; Mandamus Pet. 4–5,
24, 26–27. Petitioner also puts forth allegations regarding the conditions of medical care generally
in MDC Brooklyn, see Habeas Pet. 25–27; Mandamus Pet. 4–5, and in Washington D.C. jails, see
Habeas Pet. 27–28; Mandamus Pet. 18–20.
Petitioner filed the present motion seeking a temporary restraining order or, alternatively,
a preliminary injunction. See Pet’r’s PI Mot. 2. Petitioner seeks injunctive relief in three respects:
(1) to require that he “be immediately examined by doctors qualified in . . . each of the areas
necessary to independently determine what if any urgent care [he] requires to preserve his health

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while the Court considers this case and to independently confirm that [he] requires the medical
care,” (2) to prevent his transfer from MDC Brooklyn, and (3) to compel the disclosure of
petitioner’s medical records. Id. at 2–3. In support, petitioner incorporates his habeas petition and
his mandamus petition, as subsequently amended. See id. at 3; Mot. to Amend. Petitioner argues
that he is “at risk of medical harm . . . even death,” that respondents have been “shuttling
[petitioner] around to disrupt and avoid him accessing medical care,” that petitioner’s health risks
outweigh any burden on respondents, and that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. Id.
at 3–5.
Petitioner moved for a hearing on his request for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. See Mot. for Hearing (Dkt. #4). The Court denied petitioner’s request for
a temporary restraining order and directed respondents to respond to petitioner’s request for a
preliminary injunction. See Aug. 6, 2024 Order. The Court also denied petitioner’s motion for a
hearing on his request for a temporary restraining order as moot and deferred judgment on his
request for a hearing regarding a preliminary injunction. See Aug. 14, 2024 Order.
Respondents timely filed their opposition to petitioner’s request for a preliminary
injunction as well as his request for habeas and mandamus relief. See generally Mem. in Opp’n.
As relevant to this motion, respondents argue that petitioner’s eventual transfer is necessary for
petitioner to attend his sentencing and does not threaten irreparable harm, that petitioner has not
been deprived of proper medical care, and that respondents have already produced, on several
occasions, copies of petitioner’s medical records. See Mem. in Opp’n 12–17. Respondents also
submitted a declaration from BOP Dr. Bruce Bialor. See Decl. of Bruce Bialor, M.D. (Dkt. #11)
(“Bialor Decl.”). Dr. Bialor attests to petitioner’s plastic surgery consultation scheduled in

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September and notes various medications which petitioner has been prescribed at MDC Brooklyn.
Id. at ¶¶ 4, 7.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Second Circuit “allows for injunctive relief for unconstitutional prison conditions”
upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Fernandez-Rodriguez v. LiconVitale, 470 F. Supp. 3d 323, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). A preliminary injunction, however, is an
“extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation
omitted). Such injunctions are “never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555
U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To obtain such an injunction, as a general matter, a litigant must establish (1)
a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant’s favor, and (4) that an
injunction is in the public interest. Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 990 F.3d 217,
225 (2d Cir. 2021).
When a petitioner proceeds pro se, his pleadings must be “liberally construed,” and
“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted). Pro se status,
however, “does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).

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DISCUSSION
For the reasons described below, petitioner fails to establish a likelihood of irreparable
harm absent the injunctive relief he seeks. Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction is
therefore denied. 2
First, petitioner has not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm absent a preliminary
injunction mandating that respondents arrange for new independent medical examinations.
Petitioner’s own filings establish that petitioner has had multiple evaluations by specialists outside
the Bureau of Prisons since his arrest in 2021. For example, petitioner was evaluated by a breast
surgeon in August 2022, see Habeas Pet. 49–58, he was evaluated by a vascular surgeon in
November 2022, see id. at 131–37, 147–51, 153–58, and by petitioner’s own account he “is
scheduled to undergo surgery later this fall, with a pre-surgery consultation scheduled in
September,” D.D.C. Crim. Dkt., Mot. to Continue Sentencing (Dkt. #393); cf. Bialor Decl. ¶ 7.
Petitioner has not on this record demonstrated that he will suffer irreparable harm absent additional
court-ordered medical evaluations.
Second, petitioner has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm absent a
preliminary injunction that requires respondents to keep petitioner at the MDC, instead of
transporting him to the District of Columbia for sentencing on September 19. Petitioner suggests
that such an injunction is needed because care may be delayed if he is removed from the MDC.
Pet’r’s PI Mot. 2, 4. But while transporting petitioner to the District of Columbia may delay his
pre-surgery consultation, Bialor Decl. ¶ 7, petitioner’s submissions do not support the conclusion

Because this decision on petitioner’s motion relies only on the facts as presented by petitioner or as judicially noticed
from the docket in petitioner’s criminal case, petitioner’s request for a hearing is denied because there is no need for
live testimony to resolve factual disputes. See Md. Cas. Co. v. Realty Advisory Bd. on Lab. Rels., 107 F.3d 979, 984
(2d Cir. 1997) (“Generally, the district court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a
preliminary injunction when essential facts are not in dispute.”); see, e.g., Jarecke v. Hensley, 552 F. Supp. 2d 261,
264 (D. Conn. 2008).

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that such a delay will lead to irreparable harm. Petitioner’s filings and their attachments indicate
that petitioner suffers from chronic conditions that he has lived with for years. While one doctor
in 2022 wrote that it was “[o]f utmost import” that petitioner be “evaluated and treated for his
breast mass and nipple discharge,” see Habeas Pet. 57, and a breast surgeon in the same year
deemed it “reasonable” for petitioner to undergo surgical excision of breast tissue due to his
experiencing nipple discharge, id. at 150, the fact that petitioner has been scheduled for both a presurgery consultation and surgery indicates that BOP has arranged medical care aimed at these
objectives. And none of the records that petitioner has supplied describe it as urgent that petitioner
undergo surgery to treat his longstanding gynecomastia (or any other health condition)
immediately. Petitioner suggests that immediate intervention is necessary based on a concern that
recent worsening of his symptoms is caused by cancer. See Habeas Pet. 19–21. But petitioner has
not submitted any record evidence suggesting that this is the case. Multiple doctors have expressed
the view that petitioner’s gynecomastia is incidental to past steroid use, id. at 50, 60–61, and the
mammogram and breast ultrasounds conducted by Thomas Jefferson University Hospital revealed
“no suspicious findings,” see id. at 131, 134, 136, 147, 150, 153, 155; see also Mandamus Pet.
164. Accordingly, petitioner’s submissions do not support a conclusion that he will likely suffer
irreparable harm if his pre-surgical consultation is delayed when he is transported from MDC to
Washington, D.C., for sentencing.
Because petitioner has not put forth specific facts indicating that he requires urgent
treatment that will be impeded by his transport for sentencing, petitioner has failed to establish that
he will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction forbidding his transfer from
MDC. See Quint v. Lantz, 248 F. App’x 218, 219 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that a prisoner failed to
show irreparable harm necessary to support a preliminary injunction ordering certain medical

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treatment because “the evidence in the record does not support a claim that the proposed treatment
options are medically necessary”); Jarecke, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (“Prisoners do not have a
constitutional right to their treatment of choice; disagreement over treatment does not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation as long as the treatment provided is adequate.” (citing Chance v.
Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998))); see also, e.g., Jones v. Frost, No. 23-CV-277, 2023
WL 5573783, at *2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2023) (holding that prisoner failed to “establish a
likelihood of irreparable harm” because he was “scheduled [for a] CT scan” and “offer[ed] no
evidence . . . suggesting that he will suffer any aggravation of his abdominal condition if he does
not receive a CT scan on his preferred schedule”); Bradford v. Ogbuehi, No. 17-CV-1128, 2020
WL 6130892, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020) (“Plaintiff[, a state prisoner,] has failed to establish
the imminent irreparable harm required to support a preliminary injunction. Indeed, the medical
document attached to Plaintiff’s motion specifically states that a chronic care appointment has
been scheduled for Plaintiff.”); Moss v. Griffen, No. 15-CV-74, 2015 WL 4880398, at *2 (E.D.
Ark. July 20, 2015) (“[T]he Court finds Plaintiff does not provide sufficient evidence of a threat
of irreparable harm to [require] a hearing . . . . The medical records show[, inter alia,] that
Plaintiff . . . has been scheduled for a surgical consultation by an independent surgeon.”), report
and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 4762992 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 10, 2015).
Petitioner has also not established irreparable harm from his potential transfer from MDC
by arguing that the transfer may moot his requests for equitable relief in these lawsuits. See Pet’r’s
PI Mot. 2–3. Even if these recently filed cases were to be mooted because of a transfer, petitioner
would be free to litigate his constitutional claims regarding medical care against appropriate
custodians at a new facility, such as the facility to which he is designated after sentencing.
Accordingly, the risk that this particular lawsuit will be mooted does not establish a likelihood of

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irreparable harm. See Allen v. Ronan, 764 F. Supp. 738, 740 (D. Conn. 1991) (denying prisoner’s
request for a preliminary injunction to prevent his transfer to a different prison, despite plaintiff’s
claim that such relief was necessary to prevent defendants from “silenc[ing]” plaintiff by mooting
his claims); Town of Newburgh, New York v. Newburgh EOM LLC, No. 23-CV-4212 (CS), 2024
WL 1507585, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2024) (noting the view of “[a] majority of courts” that “a
risk of mootness, standing alone, does not constitute irreparable harm” for the purposes of a stay
pending appeal (quoting Liberty Synergistics, Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., No. 11-CV-523, 2013 WL
101427, at *2 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013)). Petitioner’s request to preliminarily enjoin respondents
from transferring him is denied.
Finally, petitioner has failed to establish that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent
a preliminary injunction requiring respondents to locate and disclose to petitioner all medical
records maintained by prison officials. Petitioner does not identify any particular materials that he
believes are missing from the “extensive” and “voluminous” set of records already produced to
him, Habeas Pet. 3; see id. at 28 (noting that petitioner has “assembled most or all of [his] extensive
relevant medical records”); see also id. at 39–159; Mandamus Pet. 41–232. While petitioner
complains that respondents have, in the past, allegedly misplaced or lost petitioner’s medical
records, see Habeas Pet. 9, 27–28; Mandamus Pet. 27; Pet’r’s PI Mot. 3; Mot. to Amend 2, these
allegations of past mishandling are insufficient to establish that petitioner will suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of a judicial order governing respondents’ recordkeeping while litigation in
this case proceeds. Petitioner’s motion to preliminarily enjoin respondents to require them to
locate and disclose all his medical records is therefore denied.

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CONCLUSION
Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction order is denied. The Court reserves
judgment on petitioner’s request for habeas and mandamus relief. Petitioner may file a reply to
respondents’ opposition to such relief within 14 days of this Memorandum and Order.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Rachel Kovner
RACHEL P. KOVNER
United States District Judge
Dated: August 28, 2024
Brooklyn, New York

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