Groeneveld v. St. Charles Hospital and Rehabilitation Center et al
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The Hospital's 32 motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. Forwarded for judgment. Ordered by Senior Judge Frederic Block on 6/16/2011. (Chee, Alvin)
ORIGINAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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elM
1/tF
HARRIET P. GROENEVELD,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Case No. 07-CV-4803 (FB) (WDW)
-againstST. CHARLES HOSPITAL AND
REHABILITATION CENTER a/k/a ST.
CHARLES HOSPITAL, PORT JEFFERSON,
NEW YORK,
Defendant.
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Appearances:
For the Plaintiff:
WILLIAM D. WEXLER
William D. Wexler, Esq.
816 Deer Park Avenue
North Babylon, NY 11703
For the Defendant:
MARY ELLEN DONNELLY
MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER MOON
Putney, Twombly, Hall & Hirson LLP
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10175
BLOCK, Senior District Judge:
Harriet P. Groeneveld ("Groeneveld"), a sixty-five-year-old woman, claims
that st. Charles Hospital and Rehabilitation Center (the "Hospital") discriminated against
her because of her age-then fired her in retaliation for her complaints about that
discrimination - in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (" ADEN') and
the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL").' The Hospital moves for summary
judgment and, for the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
'Groeneveld's complaint also alleged claims under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act and the New York State Public Health Law; she
voluntarily dismissed those claims with prejudice. DE #27.
I
The following facts are taken from the Hospital's Rule 56.1 statement, except
where noted: 2
In May 1997, the Hospital hired Groeneveld as a secretary in its Facilities
Maintenance Department (the "Department"). From 1997 through 2001,Bill Mahalovich,
the director of the Department, filled out a form each year reviewing Groeneveld's job
performance. During that time, she received good annual reviews. Thomas Lyons took
over as director from 2002 through 2004, and instead of reviewing Groeneveld himself, he
had Harry Radenberg ("Radenberg") - the Hospital's Plant Coordinator - complete
Groeneveld's annual reviews. During that time, too, Groeneveld received good reviews.
Groeneveld alleges in her 56.1 statement that in September 2004, Susan
Murphy ("Murphy")-another secretary in the Department-accessed Groeneveld's
medical records to acquire her date of birth for the purpose of throwing her a 60th birthday
party at work.
Thomas Miranda ("Miranda") acted as director of the Department from late
2The Hospital properly submitted a statement of undisputed material facts,
consisting of 72 numbered paragraphs, pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a). Groeneveld was
required under Local Rule 56.1(b) to submit a statement including "correspondingly
numbered paragraph[s] responding to each numbered paragraph in the statement of
the moving party." Instead, Groeneveld submitted her own Rule 56.1 statement
consisting of eleven numbered paragraphs that neither correspond to nor respond to
the paragraphs in the Hospital's statement. Under Local Rule 56.1(c), each paragraph of
the Hospital's statement "will be deemed to be admitted for purposes of the motion."
The Court has reviewed the parties' submissions to insure that any fact deemed
admitted is supported by the record.
2
2004 until Michael Ingoglia ("Ingoglia") was hired in August 2005. Groeneveld's annual
review for May 2004 through May 2005 stated that she was "unable, over the past year, to
adequately perform many of the duties for her job description." Def.'s Ex. I. In her
deposition, Groeneveld said that Miranda completed the 2005 annual review form; it was
signed by both Miranda and Ingoglia.
On November 18, 2005, Groeneveld met with Ingoglia and Mark Boehrer
("Boehrer"), the Director of Human Resources, to discuss her inadequate job performance.
During the meeting, Groeneveld asked to speak to Boehrer privately and informed him
that she suspected Murphy had unlawfully accessed Groeneveld's husband's medical
records to locate his room at the Hospital.
On November 29, 2005, Groeneveld again met with Ingoglia and Boehrer to
discuss her job performance.
Between the two meetings, Ingoglia discovered that
Radenberg had been preparing the Department's payroll sheets, even though this was one
of the duties listed in Groeneveld's job description. Groeneveld said that she had never
prepared the payroll sheets, and had never inquired about why it was listed in her job
description. Boehrer told Groeneveld that from then on she would have to prepare the
Department's payroll sheets, and provided her with twelve weeks of training under
Radenberg.
On November 30,2005, Boehrer met with Murphy to discuss Groeneveld's
allegation that Murphy had unlawfully accessed Groeneveld's husband's medical records.
Boehrer determined that Murphy had indeed done so, gave her an employee warning
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notice, and required her to attend training.
At the end of December 2005, Ingoglia told Boehrer that Groeneveld's job
performance continued to be inadequate: she took inaccurate phone messages, misfiled
documents, fell behind on other tasks, and could not follow Ingoglia's instructions.
Boehrer told Ingoglia to meet with Groeneveld again to discuss her job performance.
On February 9, 2006, Groeneveld again met with Ingoglia and Boehrer to
discuss her job performance. During that meeting, Ingoglia issued a written warning to
Groeneveld, which stated that if her job performance did not improve, further disciplinary
action would be taken, including termination. On March 7, Ingoglia gave Groeneveld
another written warning.
On April 6, 2006, Boehrer told Groeneveld that her employment at the
Hospital would be terminated because of her inability to adequately perform her job
duties. On May 4, 2006, Boehrer met with Groeneveld to discuss a severance agreement,
which Groeneveld refused to sign; Groeneveld was terminated the same day.
Groeneveld filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on October 4, 2006. In her EEOC charge, she claimed
that her "new supervisors had repeatedly and falsely accused [her] of being forgetful,
suffering from memory loss, transposing telephone numbers and misplacing and
incorrectly completing paperwork," and "implied [she] was too old to perform [her] job."
Def.' sEx. G. She further claimed that after she complained to human resources about her
treatment, and that" a co-employee had improperly ... accessed [her] medical records and
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acquired [her] date of birth," id., her supervisors" adversely changed [her] job duties and
employment conditions," id., and later used her allegedly deficient job performance as a
pretext for firing her. Finally, Groeneveld stated: "I believe that a younger individual has
taken over my job or job duties." Id. The EEOC issued her a right to sue letter on
September 7, 2007.
II
In ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, the Court" must determine
(a) whether there is a 'genuine issue as to any material fact,' and (b) whether, in light of the
undisputed facts, 'the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Vivenzio v. City
of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). "An issue of
fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Gorzynski v. Ietblue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, "facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party." Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 5.Ct. 2658, 2676 (2009).
III
A. Age Discrimination
Where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, age discrimination claims
are analyzed using the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework:
[T]he plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff does so, the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Once such a reason is
provided, the plaintiff can no longer rely on the prima facie
case, but may still prevail if she can show that the employer's
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determination was in fact the result of discrimination.
Gorzynski v. Jetblue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Age must be "the 'but-for' cause of the challenged adverse
employment action and not just a contributing or motivating factor." Id. (citing Gross v.
FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 5.Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009)).
1. Prima Facie Case
To establish her prima facie case, Groeneveld must show: "(1) that she was
within the protected age group, (2) that she was qualified for the position, (3) that she
experienced adverse employment action, and (4) that such action occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 107.
It is undisputed that Groeneveld satisfied the first and third elements, as she was over 40
years old and was fired from her job. See id. The Hospital disputes whether Groeneveld
was qualified for her position, but because she had held her job for seven years before the
Hospital fired her, this element is also satisfied. See Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 696 (2d
Cir. 2001) ("In a discharge case in which the employer has already hired the employee into
the job in question, the inference of minimal qualification is, of course, easier to
draw ... because, by hiring the employee, the employer itself has already expressed a belief
that she is minimally qualified.").
The Hospital also disputes whether Groeneveld has satisfied the fourth
element, namely, an adverse employment action occurring under circumstances giving rise
to an inference of discrimination. Construing her papers charitably, Groeneveld claims to
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have satisfied this element for two reasons. First, Groeneveld argues that" the disturbing
violation of plaintiff's medical records by [Murphy] for the express purpose of determining
plaintiffs age must at the very least show that she was treated differently from her
coworkers with respect to the conditions of her employment." P!.'s Mem. of Law at 7.
There is no evidence, however, that Murphy played a role in the Hospital's decision to
terminate her employment, and "[a]ctions by an individual not involved in the adverse
employment decision at issue do not give rise to an inference of discrimination." Chang v.
Safe Horizon, No. 03-CV-I0100, 2005 WL2125660, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2005) (citing McLee
v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Second, although she did not make this argument in her memorandum of
law, Groeneveld alleged in her complaint that the Hospital replaced her with" a younger
employee believed to be in her early 30's." Comp!. '\I 20. If supported by evidence, this
allegation would satisfy the fourth element. See 0' Cunha v. Genovese/Eckerd Corp., 479 F.3d
193,195 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding an eight-year age difference" significant enough to support
an inference" of discrimination). Groeneveld has not, however, provided evidence to
support this allegation, and the bare allegations of a complaint are insufficient to prevent
summary judgment. See Wright v. Goard, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) ("When a motion
for summary judgment is properly supported by documents or other evidentiary materials,
the party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials
of his pleading; rather his response, by affidavits or otherwise as provided in the Rule,
must set forth 'specific facts' demonstrating that there is 'a genuine issue for tria!.'" (citing
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
Thus, Groeneveld has not provided evidence sufficient to raise in inference
of discrimination, and has failed to establish her prima facie case.
2. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason and Pretext
Assuming, arguendo, that Groeneveld has established a prima facie case of age
discrimination, Groeneveld has not satisfied her burden of showing that the Hospital's
reason for terminating her - inadequate job performance - was pretextual.
Once a
defendant proffers a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision,
"the question ... becomes simply whether the evidence in plaintiff's favor, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to sustain a reasonable finding that
her dismissal was motivated at least in part by age discrimination." Tomassi v. Insignia
Financial Group, Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.s. 133,142-43 (2000)). Groeneveld has provided no evidence that any
decisionmaker at the Hospital ever considered her age.
B. Retaliation
Retaliation claims under the ADEA are also analyzed under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 110. To establish a prima
facie case, Groeneveld must show:" (1) that she participated in a protected activity, (2) that
she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there was a causal connection
between her engaging in the protected activity and the adverse employment action."
rd.
The Hospital argues that Groeneveld cannot satisfy the first element, because
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she did not engage in "protected activity" under the ADEA.
Groeneveld's papers
opposing summary judgment do not address her retaliation claim, but her complaint
alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for "complaining to the Defendant regarding
a co-employee's unlawful access to the Plaintiff's medical records[.]" CompI. 'Il 30. The
ADEA prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for" oppos[ing] any
practice made unlawful by [the ADEA]." 29 U.s.c. § 623(d). Practices made unlawful by
the ADEA are employment decisions made "because of [an] individual's age." Id.
§§ 623(a)(1), (2). Groeneveld complained to Ingoglia and Boehrer that Murphy had
accessed Groeneveld's husband's medical records to locate his room at the Hospital;
despite the allegation in her complaint, there is no evidence that Groeneveld told Ingoglia
or Boehrer that she suspected Murphy had previously accessed Groeneveld's own records.
Be that as it may, complaining about a co-worker's unlawful access of medical records is
not opposing a practice made unlawful by the ADEA because it has nothing to do with age.
Thus, Groeneveld's complaint to Ingoglia and Boehrer regarding Murphy's access to
medical records is not a "protected activity."
IV
"In deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state-law
claims, district courts should balance the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity[.]" Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. v. Board of Trade, 464 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2006).
Groeneveld's claims under the NYSHRL are analyzed under the same standards as claims
brought under the ADEA. See Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 n.l (2d Cir. 2009).
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Where, as here, state- and federal-law claims are governed by the same standards, judicial
economy is best served by exercising supplemental jurisdiction. See Chambers v. Capital
Cities/ABC, 851 F. Supp. 543, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Duplicative litigation at multiple levels
of government involving the same facts [is] contrary to the objectives of the Supplemental
Jurisdiction Act and the public interest."). Accordingly, the Court exercises supplemental
jurisdiction over Groeneveld's state-law claims, and grants summary judgment on them
for the same reasons set forth above.
v
The Hospital's motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Judge Frederic Block
(/
.
F~EDERIC BLOd District Judge
Senior United States
Brooklyn, New York
June 16, 2011
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