Marini et al v. Adamo et al
Filing
248
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. For the reasons contained herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs have not carried their burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the unjust enrichment and money had and received claims against Mrs. Adamo. Wi th respect to the damages question on the Exchange Act claims, having considered the evidence and arguments, plaintiffs have met their burden of proving $6,243,270 in compensatory damages, reflecting transactions occurring after September 30, 20 03, and thus are entitled to that amount on those claims. Finally, defendants advised the Court that the previous Memorandum and Order included an award of post-judgment interest of 9% on the state-law claims, while the award for the Exchange A ct claims reflected the federal rate established under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. Defendants correctly observed that both sets of claims should reflect the federal rate for post-judgment interest, and plaintiffs have conceded the point. Therefore, the judgment shall reflect the federal rate for post-judgment interest on all claims. SO ORDERED. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bianco on 4/15/2014. (Lamb, Conor)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
No 08-CV-3995 (JFB) (ETB)
_____________________
ROCCO MARINI AND JOSEPHINE MARINI,
Plaintiffs,
VERSUS
HAROLD ADAMO, JR., LISA ADAMO, THE BOLTON GROUP, INC., AND H. EDWARD
RARE COINS & COLLECTIBLES, INC.,
Defendants.
___________________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
April 15, 2014
__________________
JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:
The Court concluded that plaintiffs are
entitled to the following relief: (a) Adamo, H.
Edward, and Bolton are liable for violations
of the Exchange Act; (b) Adamo, H. Edward,
and Bolton are liable for $11,304,079 in
compensatory damages for committing
common law fraud; (c) Adamo is liable for
$11,304,079 in compensatory damages for
violations of the breach of fiduciary duty; and
(d) Adamo, H. Edward, Bolton, are liable for
$11,304,079 in compensatory damages for
unjust enrichment and money had and
received.
Plaintiffs Rocco Marini (“Marini”) and
Josephine
Marini
(“Mrs.
Marini”)
(collectively, “plaintiffs”) brought this action
against Harold Adamo, Jr. (“Adamo”), Lisa
Adamo (“Mrs. Adamo”), The Bolton Group,
Inc. (“Bolton”), and H. Edward Rare Coins &
Collectibles,
Inc.
(“H.
Edward”)
(collectively, “defendants”), asserting claims
under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(the “Exchange Act”), as well as claims of
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, and money had and received
under New York common law. After a bench
trial, this Court rendered a verdict in
plaintiffs’ favor on all claims against Adamo,
Bolton, and H. Edward. See Marini v.
Adamo, -- F. Supp. 2d --, No. 08-CV-3995
(JFB)(ETB), 2014 WL 465036, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2014).
In the same Memorandum and Order as
the verdict, the Court ordered supplemental
briefing on two issues. The primary issue
concerned Mrs. Adamo’s liability for unjust
enrichment and money had and received.
Plaintiffs’ theory at trial was based on the fact
that Mrs. Adamo held joint bank accounts
into which her husband deposited some fraud
proceeds. Because holding a joint bank
account is insufficient under New York law
1
[T]here is no evidence, or even an
allegation, that Mrs. Adamo was
aware of any wrongful conduct by
her husband. Moreover, although
she was an officer of H. Edward and
Bolton, there is no evidence or
allegation that she had any personal
involvement in coin transactions at
issue in this case.
to give rise to liability for unjust enrichment,
see Zell & Ettinger v. Berglas, 690 N.Y.S.2d
721 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999), the Court
requested supplemental briefing “as to any
evidence in the record that Mrs. Adamo
personally benefited from money in the joint
account that can be traced to fraudulent
proceeds from the coin transactions at issue
in this case.” Marini, 2014 WL 465036 at
*40. Ultimately, plaintiffs have not met their
burden, and the Court finds that Mrs. Adamo
is not liable on the unjust enrichment and
money had and received claims.
Id. at *40.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that
Mrs. Adamo’s joint bank accounts with her
husband were insufficient to hold her liable
for unjust enrichment or money had and
received. The Court directed the parties that
“if it could be proven that she personally
benefitted from the specific funds in the joint
account that represented the fraudulent
proceeds from her husband’s coin
transactions with plaintiffs, equity and good
conscience would require restitution by Mrs.
Adamo for that particular amount of money.”
Id.
The Court also requested supplemental
briefing on the damages for the Exchange Act
claims. Counsel for defendants have since
concluded that “there are no grounds to
contest Plaintiffs’ suggested damages on
their securities claims.” (Dkt. No. 246 at 2.)
Having considered the evidence and
arguments, the Court agrees with plaintiffs’
calculation and awards $6,243,270 on the
Exchange Act claims, based on transactions
occurring after September 30, 2003. In
addition, the Court corrects its previous
award of post-judgment interest, to reflect
only the federal rate. Thus, the remainder of
this Memorandum and Order addresses the
claims against Mrs. Adamo.
I.
On February 24, 2014, the Court
established a briefing schedule for the parties
to address whether the evidence already in
the record proved Mrs. Adamo’s liability.
On March 1, 2014, plaintiffs filed a brief
arguing that Mrs. Adamo was liable because
she spent freely from the joint accounts and
from her husband’s business earnings, both
of which were pools of funds that included
proceeds of the Marini fraud. On April 1,
2014, defendants responded in opposition
that plaintiffs had not traced Mrs. Adamo’s
spending to the Marini fraud. Defendants
argued that Mrs. Adamo’s lifestyle could
have been funded by the proceeds of
Adamo’s other business transactions, both
before and during the Marini fraud. On April
8, 2014, plaintiff replied, arguing that
Adamo’s other business transactions were
not profitable, and that he was insolvent
BACKGROUND
The Court’s previous opinion provides a
full description of the background and
procedural history of this case, as well as the
Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law after the bench trial. See Marini v.
Adamo, -- F. Supp. 2d --, No. 08-CV-3995
(JFB)(ETB), 2014 WL 465036 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 6, 2014).
For the purposes of this Memorandum
and Order, it is sufficient to note the Court’s
earlier finding with respect to Mrs. Adamo:
2
are that (1) defendant received money
belonging to plaintiff; (2) defendant
benefitted from the receipt of money; and (3)
under principles of equity and good
conscience, defendant should not be
permitted to keep the money.”). Thus, the
following discussion focuses on the unjust
enrichment claim, but its conclusion applies
to both claims.
before he defrauded the Marinis, suggesting
that the Marini fraud provided the only
income used to support Mrs. Adamo.
BURDEN OF PROOF
II.
Plaintiffs must prove the unjust
enrichment and money had and received
claims against Mrs. Adamo by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Newman
v. Herbst, No. 09-CV-4313, 2011 WL
684165, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011)
(unjust enrichment); Lum v. New Century
Mortg. Corp., 800 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005) (stating that unjust enrichment
and money had and received claims are
“quasi-contract” claims); see also Mercury
Partners LLC v. Pac. Med. Bldgs., L.P., No.
02 Civ. 6005, 2007 WL 2197830, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2007) (“Under New York
law, the burden of proof in an action for
breach of contract is on the plaintiff to prove
the elements of its complaint by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (citations
omitted)).
III.
When considering an unjust enrichment
claim, a court’s “essential inquiry” is one of
“equity and good conscience.” Paramount
Film Distrib. Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415,
421 (1972). Though these are “broad
considerations,” id., the New York courts
have applied them consistently in cases
involving
“gratuitous
donee[s]”
or
“[i]nnocent parties.” Simonds v. Simonds, 45
N.Y.2d 233, 242 (1978). In those cases, New
York courts have required proof that the
innocent party received a “specific and direct
benefit” from the property sought to be
recovered, not an “indirect benefit.” Kaye v.
Grossman, 202 F.3d 611, 616 (2d Cir. 2000).
The direct-indirect distinction is consistent
with a separate line of unjust enrichment
cases in New York holding that a plaintiff’s
relationship with the defendant cannot be
“too attenuated.” See Sperry v. Crompton
Corp., 8 N.Y.3d 204, 216 (2007) (concluding
that “the connection between the purchaser of
tires and the producers of chemicals used in
the rubber-making process is simply too
attenuated to support” an unjust enrichment
claim). Both sets of cases demonstrate that
courts are cautious about extending unjust
enrichment liability beyond the principals to
the transaction, and that when they do so, it is
possible as a matter of equity to draw a clear
line between the plaintiff’s loss and the
defendant’s gain or misconduct.
See
Paramount, 30 N.Y.2d at 421 (“Generally,
courts will look to see if a benefit has been
conferred on the defendant under mistake of
fact or law, if the benefit still remains with
DISCUSSION
The Court has concluded, and the parties
do not dispute, that the question whether Mrs.
Adamo benefitted from the Marini fraud is
the same for both the unjust enrichment and
money had and received claims. Compare
Hughes v. Ester C Co., 930 F. Supp. 2d 439,
471 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“To prevail on a claim
for unjust enrichment in New York, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) defendant was
enriched; (2) the enrichment was at plaintiff’s
expense; and (3) the circumstances were such
that equity and good conscience require
defendant[ ] to make restitution.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)), with
Aaron Ferer & Sons Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 731 F.2d 112, 125 (2d Cir.
1984) (“The essential elements in a claim for
money had and received under New York law
3
unjustly enriched by a benefit also realized by
a relative, those cases are not to the contrary.
For example, in Blue Cross of Cent. N.Y. v.
Wheeler, the Fourth Department noted that
the defendant may have benefitted from Blue
Cross’s payment for his wife’s medical
services under the defendant’s insurance
policy, since those payments “saved [an]
expense” he otherwise would have had to
pay. 461 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983). Thus, there was a clear benefit to both
the defendant and the wife. Furthermore,
there was no question in Wheeler that the
defendant’s benefit was directly tied to the
funds spent by Blue Cross—those funds went
from Blue Cross to the hospital, but in effect,
the defendant was spending them (instead of
his own funds) for the treatment of his wife.
Id.; see also Nakamura v. Fujii, 677 N.Y.S.2d
113 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding claim for
unjust enrichment stated where plaintiff
alleged he sent tuition for defendants’
children directly to school); accord Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 797
F.2d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1986) (“To recover on a
theory of unjust enrichment under New York
law, a party must establish not only that there
was enrichment, but that the enrichment was
at the plaintiff’s expense.”) (emphasis
added).
the defendant, if there has been otherwise a
change of position by the defendant, and
whether the defendant’s conduct was tortious
or fraudulent.”).
Sufficient proof that an innocent party
specifically and directly benefitted requires
more than a showing that the innocent party
may have had access to, or some awareness
of, the funds in question. “[O]n a theory of
unjust enrichment, there must first be
enrichment.” Indyk v. Habib Bank Ltd., 694
F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Jaffe v.
Capital One Bank, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010)
(noting “[t]he absence of an allegation that
Defendants tangibly benefitted at Jaffe's
expense”) (emphasis added). Thus, in Zell &
Ettinger v. Berglas, the Second Department
held that a husband was not unjustly enriched
simply because he had access to his wife’s
misappropriated funds in the couple’s joint
bank account. 690 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999). Likewise, in Kaye, the Second
Circuit reversed an unjust enrichment verdict
against the wife of a lawyer, where the lawyer
borrowed $50,000 from the plaintiff and
spent most of it on business expenses. 202
F.3d at 616. Because “[the plaintiff] offered
no evidence demonstrating that [the wife]
actually received any portion of the loan, nor
did she show that the loan relieved [the wife]
of any financial obligations for which she
otherwise would have been responsible,”
there was insufficient proof that the wife
benefitted from the loan. Id. The Second
Circuit reached this conclusion despite an
alleged statement by the wife that her
daughter would not have been able to
continue in college without the loan. Id.
Even if that statement was true, the court
considered that benefit to be indirect. Id. In
other words, plaintiff did not demonstrate
that the loan directly enriched the wife, or
even affected her at all.
Here, in contrast, the evidence does not
establish a direct link between plaintiffs’
losses and Mrs. Adamo’s spending, or any
benefit to Mrs. Adamo. Thus, although Mrs.
Adamo may have had access to the fraud
proceeds, like in Zell, it is unclear that they
enriched her. Furthermore, Mrs. Adamo was
not enriched simply because her husband
was; unlike in Wheeler, plaintiffs have not
shown a separate benefit to her. Although
they argue that Mrs. Adamo “saved expense”
like the defendant in Wheeler, plaintiffs have
not proven that there was a single source of
funds in this case, equivalent to Blue Cross’s
payments in Wheeler. Instead, it appears that
Although plaintiffs cite two cases where,
unlike Kaye, a defendant was found to be
4
financial picture was as bleak as plaintiffs
contend.
Mrs. Adamo had a broader pool of nonMarini funds available to her, and thus
plaintiffs have not shown that she funded her
lifestyle “at plaintiff’s expense.” Universal
City Studios, 797 F.2d at 79.
The evidence of the Adamos’ overall
financial picture during the time period of the
fraud is just as unclear as the evidence of their
finances before it began, and that lack of
clarity is fatal to plaintiffs’ attempt to prove
unjust enrichment circumstantially. Simply
put, Adamo appears to have had ample
income from other sources besides the Marini
fraud, and thus plaintiffs have not proven that
it was the Marini fraud that enriched Mrs.
Adamo. Plaintiffs did not introduce the
couple’s complete bank records at trial, and
the records of the joint bank accounts on
which plaintiffs rely are incomplete. They
show certain months of certain years in the
broader period from 2002 to 2007, with
significant gaps in the records. (See, e.g., PX
41 at DEF 728-29 (record gap between
January and October 2003); id. at DEF 79293 (record gap from April to August 2005).)
As a result, the Court cannot conclude that
there were no funds available to Mrs. Adamo
besides the fraud proceeds.
Plaintiffs question how direct the link
must be between their loss and Mrs. Adamo’s
gain: in particular, they argue that they are
not required to trace their “specific” funds to
Mrs. Adamo, meaning that they do not have
to show that she spent the same money the
Marinis paid to Mr. Adamo. The Court
agrees that such a showing is not required,
but plaintiffs are required to show that Mrs.
Adamo specifically and directly benefitted
from the fraud, so evidence that Mrs. Adamo
spent the Marinis’ funds would have been a
strong form of proof. In the absence of such
evidence, plaintiffs have attempted to prove
Mrs. Adamo’s benefit circumstantially,
arguing that, absent the fraud, she would have
had no other money to spend.
In the Court’s view, plaintiffs’
circumstantial evidence to prove this point is
incomplete and insufficient to meet their
burden. To begin with, it is unclear how
much money the Adamos had when the
Marini fraud started, so there is no baseline
figure from which to measure any possible
benefit to Mrs. Adamo from the fraud.
Defendants cite numerous portions of the
record suggesting that the Adamos were
wealthy before the Marini fraud (Def. Mem.
at 6-7), and although plaintiffs argue that
their wealth was illusory (a front for the
fraud), the evidence supporting this point is
insufficient. Plaintiffs cite testimony that
Adamo bounced checks in the months before
the fraud, but it is unclear which accounts
those checks were drawn on. Given the
number of accounts available to the Adamos
and the high cash flow among them, the fact
that Adamo bounced checks from certain
accounts does not prove that his overall
The gaps in the bank records are
significant in light of the relatively small
examples of Mrs. Adamo’s spending cited by
plaintiffs. These examples, like the bank
records themselves, provide only a partial
view of her overall financial picture. For
example, plaintiffs point to evidence that
Mrs. Adamo spent cash on lunches and yoga
classes, and spent between $1,500 and $2,000
at multiple boutique sales. No dates are
identified for any of these transactions,
making it impossible to draw a connection
between them and the Marini fraud. In
addition, plaintiffs rely on checks that Mrs.
Adamo wrote for various minor expenses
totaling $7,356, but defendants compared the
checks to the bank records and showed that
the checks were not drawn at times when
funds from the Marinis had recently entered
5
the joint accounts. (Def. Mem. at 11-12
(citing PX 41).) Defendants also made a
similar showing with respect to plaintiffs’
contention that Adamo paid a $50,000 bill for
the couple’s vacation. The month before that
vacation occurred, Adamo’s business
account received more than $500,000 in
deposits, and plaintiffs have not traced any of
those deposits to the Marinis. (Id. at 9 (citing
PX 41 at DEF 900; PX 9).) Thus, it is entirely
plausible that these expenses could have been
funded by Adamo’s other business.
$881,038.09 in joint savings account in
October-November 2004); at 398 (ending
balance of $603,563.62 in joint money
market in May 2007).) Thus, at any given
time, Mrs. Adamo may have been spending
funds attributable to non-Marini business.1
The Court’s focus on the fact that Mrs.
Adamo had non-Marini funds available to her
at the time of her alleged expenditures stems
from the requirement described in Kaye that
an innocent party’s enrichment must be
“specific and direct.” 202 F.3d at 616. The
plain meaning of those terms suggests that
the benefit must have some degree of
immediacy, while an indirect benefit would
take time to realize. Plaintiffs describe an
indirect benefit when they look back over the
whole five-year period of the Marini fraud
and argue that, on balance, Adamo lost
money from his other business while
profiting from the Marinis. As the Court has
discussed, plaintiffs have not sufficiently
proven the extent of Adamo’s profits and
losses, but even if they had, the benefit to
Mrs. Adamo would be indirect. At the time
that she was actually spending her husband’s
money, the evidence shows that it was
coming from multiple sources, and plaintiffs
have not isolated the enriching effect, if any,
of the Marini fraud. Defendants, on the other
hand, have shown that the Marinis did not
make payments to Adamo close in time to the
examples of Mrs. Adamo’s spending cited by
plaintiffs, and thus the Court does not
conclude that her spending reflects a specific
and direct benefit from the Marini fraud.
Although plaintiffs attempt to foreclose
that possibility by arguing that Adamo was
not successful in his non-Marini business, the
evidence shows that there was enough of that
business at any one time to fund Ms.
Adamo’s living expenses. Plaintiffs concede
that Adamo may have earned more than
$400,000 in his transactions with third-party
coin sellers during the period of the Marini
fraud, which would have covered much of the
spending attributed to Mrs. Adamo. (Pl.
Reply at 4.) Plaintiffs also concede that
Adamo sold coins to three other individuals,
and that he received at least $195,000 in one
sale and $225,000 in another. (Id. at 3.)
Regardless of the ultimate profitability of
these transactions and Adamo’s steady
business with professional coin dealers, the
fact remains that Adamo’s non-Marini
activities generated a high amount of cash
flow. Certain accounts, including the joint
accounts, averaged balances in the hundreds
of thousands and even millions of dollars at
various times, and plaintiffs have not
attempted to trace all of these funds to the
Marini fraud. (See, e.g., PX 41 at DEF 693
(average daily balance of $1,361,949.00 in
joint money market account in May-June
2003); at 388 (average monthly balance of
In reaching this conclusion, the Court
notes that the facts of Kaye itself involved an
even more immediate and traceable benefit,
but the Second Circuit still overturned the
1
The fact that the Adamos enjoyed a consistently large
cash flow further clouds the issue of the source of Mrs.
Adamo’s living expenses because, as noted above,
plaintiffs did not attempt to date most instances they
cite of Mrs. Adamo’s spending.
6
unjust enrichment verdict against the
lawyer’s wife. There, testimony suggested
that the lawyer’s wife knew of the loan and
admitted that it helped her daughter remain in
college—admissions which are absent from
this case. Id. (“Laura ‘acknowledged that the
money was lent to the family’ and told Kaye
that ‘but for [Kaye’s] loan, her daughter
would not have been able to continue at Duke
University.’”). Still, the Second Circuit
considered the benefit to the lawyer’s wife to
be indirect. The most that the evidence of the
wife’s admissions showed was that the
family’s overall financial picture might have
been improved, not that the loan directly
funded a needed expense. Id.; cf. Nakamura,
677 N.Y.S.2d at 113 (finding sufficient
allegation that plaintiff directly paid
plaintiff’s children’s tuition). At least one
other court in this circuit, following Kaye, has
also rejected a theory of unjust enrichment
based on a defendant’s generally improved
financial situation. See M+J Savitt, Inc. v.
Savitt, No. 08 Civ. 8535(DLC), 2009 WL
691278, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2009)
(finding that plaintiff’s loan to corporation
was indirect benefit to co-owner, where coowner was never obligated to make similar
loan); cf. Wheeler, 461 N.Y.S.2d 624 (noting
that the defendant may have been obligated
to make the payment made by Blue Cross).
Similarly, in the instant case, the Court
concludes that plaintiffs have not shown that
the fraud against them provided any specific
and direct benefit to Mrs. Adamo, and failed
to produce sufficient evidence to meet their
burden on the unjust enrichment claim or the
money had and received claim.
the funds in question, but instead may be
liable simply for “hold[ing] property.”
Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d at 242. As the above
cases illustrate, however, who actually “held”
a plaintiff’s property is a more nuanced
question in cases involving innocent parties.
The “essential inquiry” is not the factual
question whether the funds came within the
innocent party’s grasp, but instead is one of
“equity and good conscience,” which
involves consideration of whether “there has
been otherwise a change of position by the
defendant, and whether the defendant’s
conduct was tortious or fraudulent.”
Paramount, 30 N.Y.2d at 421.
Although plaintiffs did not discuss Kaye
in their brief, they have emphasized the fact
that the Marini fraud proceeds reached the
accounts to which Mrs. Adamo had access,
which is a factual distinction from Kaye.
Plaintiffs also cite the principle that an
unjustly enriched defendant need not spend
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs have
not carried their burden to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the unjust
enrichment and money had and received
claims against Mrs. Adamo.
In Zell, for example, even though the
misappropriated funds were in the husband’s
joint bank account, the Second Department
noted that there was no evidence he
“exercise[d] dominion or control over the
misappropriated funds,” or that the funds
were “traceable” to him. 690 N.Y.S.2d at
721-22.
Put differently, there was no
evidence of a concrete connection between
any gain by the husband and the loss by the
plaintiff. Thus, although the Court agrees
with plaintiffs that the question is not whether
Mrs. Adamo spent or saved the funds, that
point has limited relevance for the question at
issue here:
whether plaintiffs have
established or “traced” a sufficient link
between the funds they lost, and a specific
and direct benefit to Mrs. Adamo. Having
reviewed the evidence, the Court concludes
that plaintiffs have not carried their burden.
IV.
7
CONCLUSION
With respect to the damages question on
the Exchange Act claims, having considered
the evidence and arguments, plaintiffs have
met their burden of proving $6,243,270 in
compensatory
damages,
reflecting
transactions occurring after September 30,
2003, and thus are entitled to that amount on
those claims.2
and 9% from April 5, 2006 to the date
of the judgment on the Exchange Act
claim. Plaintiffs are also entitled to
post-judgment interest on all claims,
to be calculated pursuant to the
federal rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
1961.
(3) The Court finds in Lisa Adamo’s
favor on the unjust enrichment and
money had and received claims.
Finally, defendants advised the Court that
the previous Memorandum and Order
included an award of post-judgment interest
of 9% on the state-law claims, while the
award for the Exchange Act claims reflected
the federal rate established under 28 U.S.C. §
1961. See Marini, 2014 WL 465036 at *45.
Defendants correctly observed that both sets
of claims should reflect the federal rate for
post-judgment interest, and plaintiffs have
conceded the point. See Cappiello v. ICD
Pubs., Inc., 720 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“[F]ederal district courts must apply the
federal rate of post-judgment interest to
judgments rendered in diversity actions, even
when those judgments have been docketed in
state court, and that such application does not
violate the Constitution.”)
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
JOSEPH F. BIANCO
United States District Judge
Dated: April 15, 2014
Central Islip, NY
***
Plaintiffs are represented by Michael H.
Schaalman, Quarles & Brady LLP, 411 E.
Wisconsin Ave, Milwaukee, WI 53202, Scott
A. Moss and Marianna Moss, Moss Law
Practice, 8053 East 24th Drive, Denver, CO
80238, and Paul A. Brancato, 106-43 157th
Street, Jamaica, NY 11433. Defendants are
represented by Richard Dolan, Robert
Begleiter, and Andrew Harris, Schlam Stone
& Dolan LLP, 26 Broadway, New York, NY
10004, as well as Bruce A. Barket and Donna
Aldea, Barket Marion Epstein & Kearon,
LLP, 666 Old Country Road, Garden City,
NY 11530.
Therefore, the Clerk of the Court shall
enter judgment as follows and close the case:
(1) The Court finds in plaintiffs’ favor on
all claims against Harold Adamo, H.
Edward Rare Coins & Collectibles,
Inc., and The Bolton Group, Inc., and
awards $11,304,079 in compensatory
damages.
(2) Plaintiffs are entitled to pre-judgment
interest calculated at a rate of 9%
from January 1, 2005 to the date of
the judgment on the state law claims,
2
Obviously, those compensatory damages are
subsumed within the $11,304,079 in compensatory
damages that the Court awarded on the other claims.
8
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