Esposito v. Francis et al
Filing
77
ORDER denying 58 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 72 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order defendant Fochtmann's and defendant Quatinez's motions for summary judgment are denied. Ordered by Judge Denis R. Hurley on 3/5/2014. (Kaley, Regina)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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AMEILA ESPOSITO,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
09 CV 0421 (DRH) (GRB)
- against LARA QUATINEZ, M.D., personally; LAURA
FOCHTMANN, M.D., personally; JUDITH ARNOLD,
R.N., personally; and SUFFOLK COUNTY,
Defendants.
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APPEARANCES:
BY:
Civil Rights Clinic
Touro College
Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center
Attorneys for Plaintiff
225 Eastview Drive
Central Islip, NY 11722
Michelle K. Caldera, Esq.
William M. Brooks, Esq.
Melissa Beth Greenberger, Esq.
BY:
NYS Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant Lara Quatinez
300 Motor Parkway
Suite 205
Happauge, NY 11788
Terrance K. DeRosa, Esq.
BY:
Simmons Jannace, LLP
Attorneys for Defendant Laura Fochtmann
75 Jackson Avenue
Syosset, NY 11791
Steven D. Jannace, Esq.
1
HURLEY, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiff Amelia Esposito (“plaintiff” or “Esposito”) was involuntarily committed the
psychiatric unit of Stony Brook University Hospital (“SBUH”) from February 2, 2008 to March
6, 2008 pursuant to New York State Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”).
During her
hospitalization, plaintiff received care from attending physician Dr. Laura Fochtmann
(“Fochtmann”) as well as Dr. Lara Quatinez (“Quatinez”), (collectively “defendants” 1).
On October 13, 2010, plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (“Amend. Compl.”), the
operative pleading in this action, bringing the following claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1)
that defendant Quatinez, M.D. violated the plaintiff’s right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “[b]y causing forcible restraint of the plaintiff without
considering less restrictive alternatives, and when the plaintiff was not causing an emergency;”
(2) that defendant Fochtmann violated the plaintiff’s right to religious freedom pursuant to the
First Amendment “[b]y refusing to transfer the plaintiff to a hospital where abortions were not
performed;” (3) that defendant Quatinez committed assault and battery on the plaintiff “[b]y
authorizing the forcible restraint of the plaintiff when plaintiff was not posing a danger to herself
or others, and was not creating an emergency within the hospital setting.”
Presently before the Court is defendant Fochtman’s motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 seeking to dismiss plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim and defendant Quatinez’s Rule 56 motion seeking to dismiss plaintiff’s Due
1
Although there were originally four defendants, Plaintiff’s claims against SBUH have
been settled, (Notice of Acceptance with Offer of Judgment, dated Mar. 13, 2012, D.E. 49), and
any claims originally brought against Judith Arnold, a nurse at SBUH, have been withdrawn.
(Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 2, n.1.)
2
Process and assault and battery claims.
For the reasons set forth below, both motions are
denied.
BACKGROUND 2
The following material facts are drawn from the parties’ Local Civil Rule 56.1
Statements and evidentiary submissions and are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
On February 1, 2008, Esposito had a dispute with Dawn Rizzo, the property manager of
the assisted living community3 where plaintiff resided, concerning plaintiff’s smoking in the
facility’s community room against property rules.
Following the dispute, which plaintiff
characterizes as verbal and “not at all” physical, (Esposito Dep. at 30-31), the Suffolk County
Police Department arrived on the scene and took plaintiff to Stony Brook University Hospital
(“SBUH”), where she was evaluated in the Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program
(“CPEP”) and involuntarily admitted that same day.
Unit on floor 10N for bipolar disorder.
Plaintiff was placed in the Acute Inpatient
Although the hospital records state that plaintiff
presented grandiose behavior, religious preoccupation and paranoia, plaintiff disputes that she
was in need of hospitalization.
Dr. Laura Fochtmann was plaintiff’s attending psychiatrist from
February 2, 2008 until February 22, 2008.
It is undisputed that throughout plaintiff’s hospitalization at SBUH, she stated that she
wanted to be released or transferred to a hospital that did not perform abortions. Defendant
2
While the facts presented in this Section are for purposes of the defendant Fochtmann’s
motion for summary judgment, there is overlap with those facts relevant to defendant Quatinez’s
motion for summary judgment. To the extent that additional facts are relied on in connection
with Quatinez’s motion, those facts will be addressed infra.
3
Plaintiff asserts that she resided in a “senior citizens’ housing complex.” (Esposito
Decl. ¶ 3.)
3
Fochtmann, however, disputes that plaintiff told her or Dr. Kuruvilla, a resident physician, that
the reason for her request for a transfer was rooted in her religious beliefs.
In addition,
defendant Fochtmann disputes that plaintiff had personal knowledge as to whether abortions
were being performed at SBUH, although plaintiff claims that she learned that abortions were
being performed at SBUH through her involvement with the Right to Life Committee.
(Esposito Decl. ¶ 9-10.)
It is SBUH policy that patients may request a transfer to another
hospital, and SBUH instructs patients to contact the hospital to which they wish to transfer to see
if the hospital has any available beds.
If the requested facility has an available bed, it can issue
an order of transfer that allows SBUH to transfer the patient to the requested facility.
In this case, Dr. Kuruvilla told plaintiff to contact St. Catherine’s Hospital to assure that
space was available to accommodate plaintiff’s transfer.
Hospital.
Plaintiff called St. Catherine’s
Initially, St Catherine’s told plaintiff that there were no beds available to
accommodate her.
Plaintiff claims, however, that later in the conversation the person she spoke
with told her that a bed was available if someone from SBUH called and requested one.
(Esposito Decl. ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff contends that she told Fochtmann’s associate about her
conversation and requested that she take steps to facilitate the transfer, however, nothing was
done.
(Id. at 18.)
It is undisputed that during plaintiff’s hospitalization, she was permitted to see visitors
from her church, and plaintiff prayed, discussed the Bible, and read scriptures with her friends.
In general, SBUH provides patients with opportunities to practice their chosen religions through
in-house or visiting clergy, religious ceremonies performed by those clergy, and Bibles provided
by the hospital.
4
DISCUSSION
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is only appropriate
where admissible evidence in the form of affidavits, deposition transcripts, or other
documentation demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and one party=s
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
712, 716 (2d Cir. 1994).
See Viola v. Philips Med. Sys. of N. Am., 42 F.3d
The relevant governing law in each case determines which facts are
material; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248.
No genuinely triable factual issue exists when the moving party
demonstrates, on the basis of the pleadings and submitted evidence, and after drawing all
inferences and resolving all ambiguities in favor of the non-movant, that no rational jury could
find in the non-movant’s favor. Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.
1996).
To defeat a summary judgment motion properly supported by affidavits, depositions, or
other documentation, the non-movant must offer similar materials setting forth specific facts that
show that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried.
1011 (2d Cir. 1996).
Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002,
The non-movant must present more than a “scintilla of evidence,” Del. &
Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252), or “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc.,
7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), and cannot rely on the allegations in his or her pleadings, on
5
conclusory statements, or on “mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not
credible.”
Gottlieb v. Cnty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
“When no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to
support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary
judgment is proper.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., LP, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.
1994).
The district court, in considering a summary judgment motion, must also be mindful of
the underlying burdens of proof because “the evidentiary burdens that the respective parties will
bear at trial guide district courts in their determination of summary judgment motions.” Brady
v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 1988).
Where the non-moving party will
bear the ultimate burden of proof on an issue at trial, “the moving party’s burden under Rule 56
will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the”
non-movant’s claim. Id. at 210-11.
Where a movant without the underlying burden of proof
offers evidence that the non-movant has failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his
claim, the burden shifts to the non-movant to offer “persuasive evidence that his claim is not
‘implausible.’ ” Id. at 211 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587).
II.
§ 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person who, under color of
[state law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within the jurisdiction [of the
United States] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law [or a] suit in
6
equity . . . .” To assert a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) the challenged conduct
was attributable at least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the
conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States.”
Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home
Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.2008). Neither defendant in this case asserts that
they did not act under color of state law, but both defendants challenge whether their conduct
deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right.
III.
Defendant Fochtmann’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Free Exercise
Claim
Plaintiff claims that “[r]equiring the plaintiff to remain hospitalized at Stony Brook
violated her right to the free exercise of religion” as her “religious beliefs dictated that she not
affiliate herself by means of the receipt of treatment with a hospital that performed abortions.”
(Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 5.) Defendant Fochtmann argues in response that “plaintiff has not
provided any testimony or evidence to support that Dr. Fochtmann infringed upon her free
exercise of her religious beliefs.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8.) The Court disagrees with
defendant.
“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ” Fifth Ave. Presbyterian
Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The amendment protects against “governmental compulsion either to do or
7
refrain from doing an act forbidden or required by one’s religion, or to affirm or disavow a belief
forbidden or required by one’s religion.” McChesney v. Hogan, 2012 WL 3686083, at *13
(N.D.N.Y. Jul. 30, 2012) (citing Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1066 (6th
Cir. 1987)).
“Because ‘[t]he free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires,’ courts are not permitted to inquire into the
centrality of a professed belief to the adherent’s religion or to question its validity in determining
whether a religious practice exists.” Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church, 293 F.3d at 573 (citing
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990)).
“An individual claiming violation of free exercise rights need only demonstrate that the beliefs
professed are sincerely held and in the individual’s own scheme of things, religious.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, plaintiff has raised a genuine question of fact as to whether her belief that “she not
affiliate herself by means of the receipt of treatment with a hospital that performed abortions”
was sincerely held.
(Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 5.)
In her declaration, Ms. Esposito states that
“[d]ue to [her] strong religious beliefs and pro-life views, [she] did not want to be admitted to, or
hospitalized at, Stony Brook because of the fact that abortions [were] performed there.”
(Esposito Decl. ¶ 14.)
She also states that she told Dr. Fochtmann that her “religious beliefs
dictated that [she] not receive treatment at a hospital that performed abortions” and told Dr.
Fochtmann that she wanted to be transferred to St. Catherine’s Hospital or a Catholic Hospital
that did not perform abortions.
(Id. ¶ 15.)
8
Furthermore, there is a genuine question of fact as to whether Dr. Fochtmann prevented
plaintiff from exercising her belief by failing to transfer her from SBUH to St. Catherine’s.
Viewing plaintiff’s deposition testimony and declaration in the light most favorable to her,
plaintiff has presented evidence that she did call St. Catherine’s Hospital inquiring about a
transfer and was told that there might be availability if someone from SBUH called to inquire.
(See Esposito Decl. ¶ 17 (“The person with whom I spoke [at St. Catherine’s] stated that a bed
was available if someone from Stony Brook called.”); Esposito Dep. at 139 (stating that the
person with whom plaintiff spoke told plaintiff, “we can’t give you availability because you’re
not the hospital, a hospital has to call, have the doctor call”)).
According to plaintiff, she
informed Dr. Fochtmann’s associate (presumably Dr. Kuruvilla) of her conversation and
requested that someone from SBUH call St. Catherine’s to initiate the transfer process, however,
no one from SBUH called St. Catherine’s and as a result, she was forced to stay at SBUH. 4
(See Esposito Decl. ¶¶ 18-19.)
Finally, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that plaintiff’s liberty interest outweighed
defendant Fochtmann’s interest in committing the alleged infringement.
“[T]he Supreme Court
has established that the individual liberties of [psychiatric patients] must be balanced against the
relevant interests of the institution in determining whether a constitutional violation has
occurred.” Samuels v. Stone, 1999 WL 624549, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1999).
4
For
Plaintiff has also presented information demonstrating that SBUH performs abortions
as she claims that she called the hospital inquiring about obtaining an abortion and that a
representative from SBUH asked her the type of insurance she carried and informed her that she
would be able to obtain an abortion. (See Esposito Dep. at 201-204; Esposito Decl. ¶ 10.)
Such information is presumably not hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D).
9
example, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, (1982), the Court ruled that involuntarily
committed psychiatric patients have a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment
to reasonably safe conditions of confinement and freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint.”
Id.
The Court stated that in order to determine whether a violation of that right occurred, it
must balance “the individual’s interest in liberty against the State’s asserted reasons for
restraining individual liberty.” Id. at 320-21.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit has stated that
“the dual goals of involuntary commitment [are] to provide care and treatment to those unable to
care for themselves and to protect the individual and society from those who pose a danger to
themselves and others because of mental illness.”
Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir.
1992).
Here, whether defendant’s interest in protecting both Ms. Esposito and the public
justified Dr. Fochtmann’s actions is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact.
Defendant has put forth evidence that a bed was available at St. Catherine’s and that Fochtmann
refused to transfer plaintiff despite knowing of that availability.
A reasonable fact finder could
conclude that plaintiff’s interest in religious liberty outweighed defendant’s interest in treating
her at SBUH despite there being a bed available at a hospital whose practices did not conflict
with plaintiff’s religious beliefs.
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court denies defendant Fochtmann’s motion for
summary judgment.
IV.
Defendant Quatinez’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Due Process
Claim
10
The facts relating to Quatinez’s motion for summary judgment concern an incident that
occurred while plaintiff was hospitalized at SBUH in the early morning hours of February 10,
2008 during which plaintiff got out of bed to seek a drink of water.
Although defendant asserts
that plaintiff kept getting out of bed and leaving her room, plaintiff claims that she simply left
her bed and went to the nurse’s desk to ask for water.
Hospital records state that plaintiff was
being intrusive, loud, refusing to use her walker which was necessary for her to ambulate safely,
going in and out of other patients’ rooms, and having “aggressive episodes.” Although plaintiff
does not dispute that the records contain these findings, she disputes this characterization of her
behavior.
(Def.’s Ex. D at 88-89.)
In addition, plaintiff’s behavior once at the nurse’s station is in dispute. Defendant
Quatinez claims that the medical staff repeatedly attempted to redirect plaintiff appropriately and
that at around 5:20 a.m. Quatinez was summoned to the floor to assess plaintiff and concluded
that restraints were appropriate because plaintiff was verbally threatening, intrusive, yelling and
cursing.
Although plaintiff admits to yelling into the room behind the nurse’s desk for water,
she contends that she “was not out of control when she yelled,” but yelled only so that staff
members who were in the room behind the nurse’s station could hear her.”
According to
plaintiff, she returned to her room and waited for someone to bring her water until three security
guards and a nurse entered and placed her in restraints on her bed.
Plaintiff contends that Dr.
Quatinez never examined her throughout this ordeal as required by MHL § 34.04(d) discussed
infra.
(Esposito Decl. ¶¶ 25-26.)
11
Plaintiff was released from restraint after two hours.
Although defendant Quatinez
asserts that plaintiff was monitored every fifteen minutes during her time in restraints, plaintiff
claims that she was left alone, restrained in the dark, and that the only time a person came into
her room was to check on her blood pressure alarm.
(Esposito Decl. ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff’s Claim
Count one of the Amended Complaint alleges that “[b]y causing the forcible restraint of
the plaintiff without considering less restrictive alternatives, and when the plaintiff was not
causing an emergency, and when she did not present a physical danger to herself or others, as
required by New York Mental Hygiene Law [(“MHL”)] § 33.04 and [New York Codes, Rules
and Regulations,]14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 27.7, defendants . . . violated the plaintiff’s right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Amend. Compl. ¶ 52.)
MHL § 33.04(b) provides that “restraint shall be employed only when necessary to
prevent a patient from seriously injuring himself or others,” and “[i]t may be applied only if less
restrictive techniques have been clinically determined to be inappropriate or insufficient to avoid
such injury.”
In addition, § 33.04(d) states that “[r]estraint shall be effected only by written
order of a physician after a personal examination of the patient except in an emergency
situation,” and “[t]he order shall set forth the facts justifying the restraint and shall specify the
nature of the restraint and any conditions for maintaining the restraint.”
Furthermore, §
33.04(f) provides that once the patient is restrained “[a]n assessment of the patient’s condition
shall be made at least once every thirty minutes” and “[t]he assessment shall be recorded and
placed in the patient’s file.”
12
In addition, 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 27.7 provides that restraint shall be employed only when
absolutely necessary to protect the patient from injuring himself or others and when less
restrictive techniques have been clinically determined to be inappropriate or insufficient.
In
addition, this section states that orders for restraint shall be rewritten daily and only after a
personal examination by a physician.
A.
Violation of Due Process 5
Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo proclaimed that an individual has a
substantive right to “freedom from bodily restraint.” 457 U.S. at 316; see also Soc’y for Good
Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1243 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing due
process rights of mentally retarded individuals in light of Youngberg).
In that case, the Court
stated that a state institution for the mentally retarded could “not restrain residents except when
and to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure . . . safety or to provide
needed training.” Id. at 324.
5
Plaintiff’s failure to explicitly state either in the complaint or in her brief whether she
claims a violation of procedural due process, substantive due process, or both complicates the
issues here. From a close reading of plaintiff’s papers, the Court infers that plaintiff asserts
both violations. As a result, the Court has asserted considerable effort in parsing out these two
claims from plaintiff’s submission and is guided by Demarco v. Sadiker et al., 897 F. Supp. 693
(E.D.N.Y. 1995), rev’d on other grounds 199 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999). In that case, involving
a due process violation in the involuntary commitment context, the court noted that “to have been
afforded procedural due process means to have been given the benefit of procedural safeguards to
reduce the chance of an erroneous commitment” and that “[t]o have been afforded substantive due
process means not to have been committed if one was not dangerous.” Id. at 699; see also
Rodriguez v. City of N.Y., 72 F.3d 1051, 1061 (“As a substantive matter, due process does not
permit the involuntary hospitalization of a person who is not a danger either to herself or to
others . . . .”)
13
Here, plaintiff claims that “questions of fact exist as to whether placement of the plaintiff in
restraint [was]necessary to keep the plaintiff from injuring herself or others.” (Pl’s Mem. in
Opp’n at 8.) According to defendant, the hospital medical records describing plaintiff as loud and
aggressive demonstrate that plaintiff posed a danger to herself and others. The Court concludes,
however, that viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude that plaintiff was not dangerous. According to plaintiff, after she communicated
with staff regarding her request for water, she “simply went back to her room and waited for staff
to bring her water,” and did not “threaten physical harm or act in a way that could cause harm to
others.” (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 8-9; See Esposito Decl. ¶ 25.) In addition, “she was a
debilitated sixty-year-old woman who needed a walker to ambulate.” (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n. at 9.)
Based on these disputed facts, defendant has not met its burden in demonstrating that “no
reasonable jury could conclude based upon the undisputed facts that this plaintiff did not pose a
threat of harm to [her]self or others.” Demarco v. Sadiker et al., 897 F. Supp. 693, 704
(E.D.N.Y. 1995), rev’d on other grounds 199 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999). As a result, plaintiff’s
substantive due process claim survives.
Despite defendant’s position, the Court’s holding in Youngberg does not compel a contrary
conclusion. Although Youngberg states that “decisions made by the appropriate professional are
entitled to a presumption of correctness,” Youngberg also makes clear that “liability may be
imposed” if the person responsible for the decision “did not base the decision” on “accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323-25. Here, the Court
cannot hold as a matter of law that Quatinez acted in accordance with professional standards when
14
he ordered plaintiff’s restraint, especially if as plaintiff alleges he did not examine her in
accordance with MHL. See M.H. v. Bristol Bd. Of Educ., 169 F. Supp. 2d 21, 32 (D. Conn. 2001)
(holding that drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving plaintiff court was unable to make
certain that professional judgment was in fact exercised, especially where court was without
evidence that defendants followed prescribed rules for using restraints).
Procedural Due Process
The basis of plaintiff’s procedural due process claim seems to be that Dr. Quatinez could
not have made a finding of dangerousness because she did not perform the required examination
before restraining the plaintiff as required by MHL § 33.04(d). That section states that “restraint
shall be effected only by written order of a physician after a personal examination of the patient
except in an emergency situation.” Defendant asserts that the Mental Hygiene Law is
constitutional and ensures that any curtailment on a patient’s liberty “complies with the standards
and procedures demanded by the Constitution.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 5 (citing Project
Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 971 (2d Cir. 1983)).) Defendant’s sole contention is that Dr.
Quatinez acted in conformance the MHL. 6
6
Neither party addresses whether New York’s MHL goes above and beyond what federal
procedural due process demands. Accordingly, the Court will assume that the procedural
protections afforded in the MHL, including a personal examination by a physician, are what is
required here for procedural due process. Furthermore, with respect to the MHL’s requirement
that a doctor personally examine the patient prior to her restraint, in Demarco, the court held that
procedural due process required that a doctor examine a patient prior to involuntary confinement
even though the MHL did not explicitly so require it. See Demarco, 897 F. Supp. at 703
(“Whether [doctor] performed an examination of plaintiff in which he made the required finding of
dangerousness is a critical, material fact, because if [doctor] confirmed the need for hospitalization
without performing the required examination of plaintiff, that failure to follow the [MHL] would
constitute a due process violation.”) The Court sees no reason why Ms. Esposito should be
15
Whether Dr. Quatinez performed the required examination is a material fact because Dr.
Quatinez’s failure to perform the examination prior to restraining plaintiff would violate MHL.
Moreover, whether Quatinez performed the examination is genuinely disputed. Although
defendants have offered the restraint order signed by doctor Quatinez, (Def.’s Ex. D at 54) as
evidence that Quatinez did examine plaintiff, this order does not state definitively that Quatinez
performed an examination. In fact, Quatinez herself does not recall her “role in placing restraints
on Ms. Esposito.” (Quatinez Dep. at 37.) Furthermore, plaintiff’s sworn statement denying
Quatinez’s examination is enough to withstand the motion for summary judgment. Although
defendant argues that plaintiff’s testimony is “too incredible to be accepted by reasonable minds,”
(Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 7), “it is not too incredible to believe that in the hectic atmosphere of a
busy mental health institution a doctor might ‘rubber-stamp,’ . . . the [restraint] of a patient based
upon the observations of others.” Demarco, 897 F. Supp. at 703.
B.
Qualified Immunity
The factual disputes at issue at this stage also prevent the Court from finding as a matter of
law that Quatinez is entitled to qualified immunity. “Government actors have qualified immunity
to § 1983 claims ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594
F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall–on–Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d
415, 432 (2d Cir.2009)). Thus, “[a] qualified immunity defense is established if (a) the
defendant's action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for
entitled to less procedural protections than a plaintiff who makes an involuntary confinement
challenge.
16
the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.” Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 89
(2d Cir.1996).
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages as a
result of their performance of discretionary functions, and serves to protect government officials
from the burdens of costly, but insubstantial, lawsuits.” Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d
Cir.1995). A court may grant summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds “if [the movant]
adduces sufficient facts such that no reasonable jury, looking at the evidence in the light most
favorable to, and drawing all inferences most favorable to, the plaintiffs, could conclude that it was
objectively unreasonable for the [movant] to believe that he was acting in a fashion that did not
clearly violate an established federally protected right.” Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 102 (2d
Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense. As such, the burden of proof rests on the defendants asserting the defense to demonstrate
that it was objectively reasonable to believe that their conduct did violate a federal right of
Plaintiffs. See Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 83 (2d Cir. 2006).
As discussed above, the Supreme Court made clear in Youngberg that mentally ill
individuals have a right to be free from bodily restraint except in situations where professional
judgment deems restraint necessary to assure the patient’s safety or the safety of others. Thus,
regarding plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, whether qualified immunity is appropriate
turns on whether it was objectively reasonable for Quatinez to believe at the time she ordered the
restraint that plaintiff was dangerous. See Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1993).
17
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there exist questions of fact as
to whether it was objectively reasonable for Quatinez to believe that plaintiff was dangerous. In
particular, plaintiff’s allegation that Quatinez did not examine her draws into the question whether
it was reasonable for him to conclude that restraints were necessary to prevent harm. See
Demarco, 897 F. Supp. at 709 (“The substantive due process claim also remains open because it
cannot be determined whether it was objectively reasonable for [the doctor] to conclude that
plaintiff was dangerous until it is known how [he] reached that conclusion.”); see also Demarco,
199 F.3d 1321 (holding that it would have been objectively unreasonable for doctor to admit
patient based on a grossly insufficient examination). Therefore, the Court cannot determine at
this stage whether Quatinez is entitled to qualified immunity and plaintiff’s substantive due
process claim survives.
Quatinez’s reliance on Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1993) does not compel a
contrary conclusion. There the Court found that defendants’ actions in confining plaintiff were
objectively reasonable because defendants relied on two reports labeling plaintiff as a threatening
individual with a gun and observations of strange behavior as well as an extensive psychiatric
history. In that case, however, there was no dispute as to whether the doctors had examined
plaintiff before determining that he was dangerous. Similarly, in Richardson v. Nassau Cnty.
Med. Ctr., 840 F. Supp 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), another case relied upon by defendant where the
court granted qualified immunity, the plaintiff was examined by two doctors before they
determined that he was dangerous and should be committed.
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Similarly, there is a question of fact as to whether Dr. Quatinez is entitled to qualified
immunity on the procedural due process claim. Given that there is a question of fact here as to
whether Quatinez examined plaintiff, the Court cannot determine whether it was objectively
reasonable for Quatinez to believe that she complied with MHL § 33.04. See Demarco, 897 F.
Supp. at 709. (“Because it remains a disputed fact whether [the doctor] complied with the statute
by personally examining plaintiff, it cannot be determined whether it was objectively reasonable
for him to believe that he complied with the statute.”)
C.
Mens Rea
Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional violation because
Quatinez’s actions amount to at most negligence, and “the due process clause is simply not
implicated by negligent acts.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 4.) In response, plaintiff relies on
Demarco in arguing that “the decision to authorize involuntary hospitalization constituted
intentional conduct that the Fourteenth Amendment protected.” (Pl.’s Mem in Opp’n at 9.) In
Demarco, the district court held that “where . . . a plaintiff alleges that he was intentionally
committed to a mental hospital without the requisite finding of dangerousness and/or without his
actually being dangerous, he has sufficiently plead the mens rea requirement of a § 1983 cause of
action based upon a due process violation, even if the alleged due process violation could be
construed as having occurred as the result of mere negligence.” 897 F. Supp. at 702. The Court
sees no reason to depart from this standard where a plaintiff claims that she was intentionally
restrained, especially where other courts in this circuit have allowed such claims. See M.H., 169
F. Supp. 2d at 30-32 (denying motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s substantive due process
19
claim based on the use of physical restraints); Astorino v. Lensink, 1993 WL 366513, at *11 ( D.
Conn. 1993) (denying motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s use of
restraint violated right to due process).
D.
Punitive Damages
In a Section 1983 action against individual defendants, punitive damages may be
awarded “when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or
when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
Here, plaintiff argues that “questions of fact exist as to
whether defendant Quatinez acted with callous indifference to the plaintiff’s rights” because
Quatinez “restrained plaintiff without waiting to see if the administration of medication would
address the concerns of the hospital staff,” and “never evaluated the plaintiff prior to authorizing
restraint.” (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 14.) Defendant offers no response to this argument other
than its assertion that Quatinez did in fact evaluate the plaintiff.
Viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant acted with
callous indifference to plaintiff’s rights in failing to examine plaintiff, and the Court will not
preclude plaintiff from seeking punitive damages at this stage.
V.
Quatinez’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Assault and Battery Claims
To succeed on an assault action under New York law, “a plaintiff must establish that a
defendant intentional[ly] plac[ed] ... another person in fear of imminent harmful or offensive
contact.” Sheikh v. City of New York, 2008 WL 5146645, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2008)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Physical injury is not required. See
20
Marriott Corp., 243 A.D.2d 406, 407 (1st Dep't 1997) (“[P]hysical injury need not be present for
an assault”).
“To recover damages for battery, a plaintiff must prove that there was bodily contact, that
the contact was offensive, i.e., wrongful under all of the circumstances, and intent to make the
contact without the plaintiff's consent.” Higgins v. Hamilton, 18 A.D.3d 436, 436 (2d Dep't 2005)
(citations omitted); see also Green v. City of N.Y., 465 F.3d 65, 86 (2d Cir. 2006) (“New York
defines ... ‘civil battery [as] an intentional wrongful physical contact with another person without
consent.”) (quoting Charkhy v. Altman, 252 A.D.2d 413, 414 (1st Dep't 1998)). “An offensive
contact is one which offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.” New York Pattern Jury
Instructions 2d 3:3 (2009) (citations omitted); see also Campoverde v. Sony Pictures Ent., 2002
WL 31163804, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002) (“The test is what an ordinary person not unduly
sensitive would find offensive.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “The intent
required for battery is intent to cause a bodily contact that a reasonable person would find
offensive.” Armstrong v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 425 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Jeffreys v. Griffin, 1 N.Y.3d 34, n.2 (2003) (quoting New York Pattern Jury Instructions
2d 3:3 (2003))).
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s “claim for assault and battery must be dismissed because
the record is devoid of any proof of intent with regard to State defendants in acting to place
plaintiff in restraints,” an essential element of the claim. (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 14.) Here,
however, it should be left to the trier of fact to determine whether in ordering the restraint
defendant intended to place plaintiff in fear of imminent offensive contact and as to whether
21
defendant intended to cause offensive contact in placing plaintiff in restraints. Moreover,
whether defendant’s conduct was privileged because it was effected pursuant to NY MHL is in
dispute. Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on these claims is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendant Fochtmann’s and defendant Quatinez’s
motions for summary judgment are denied.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
March 5, 2014
/s/
Denis R. Hurley
Unites States District Judge
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