Taub et al v. Marchesi Di Barolo S.P.A.
Filing
254
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER - Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to add to the verdict amount, post-verdict prejudgment interest in favor of the defendant Marchesi Di Barolo S.P.A., in the amount of $4,868.13. Ordered by Judge Arthur D. Spatt on 8/22/2012. Copy of "Decision" forwarded to the Judgment Clerk. (Coleman, Laurie)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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PALM BAY INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
FILED
CLERK
8/22/2012 3:36 pm
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER
CV 09-599 and CV 09-601 (ADS)
- against MARCHESI DI BAROLO S.P.A.,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.
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DAVID S. TAUB and MARC TAUB, as
Successor to MARTIN G. TAUB, deceased,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
- against MARCHESI DI BAROLO S.P.A.,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.
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A P P E A R A N C E S:
ETTELMAN & HOCHHEISER, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Suite 401
Garden City, NY 11530
BY: Gary Ettelman, Esq. Of Counsel
DUANE MORRIS LLP
Attorneys for Defendant
1540 Broadway
New York, NY 10036
BY: Rachel G. Pontikes, Esq.
Larry Selander, Esq.
John Dellaportas, Esq., Of Counsel
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SPATT, District Judge.
The saga goes on. Now that the issue of the taxable costs to Marchesi Di Barolo S.P.A.
(“Marchesi”) has been resolved, the Court will now address the issue of post-verdict
prejudgment interest. The defendant Marchesi requests that the Court correct its July 15, 2011
judgment to include an award of post-verdict prejudgment interest in the sum of $44,069.45.
In regard to the application by Marchesi for post-verdict prejudgment interest, the
relevant chronological data is as follows:
August 6, 2010 – The jury verdict.
September 13, 2010 – The initial judgment entered after the verdict.
July 11, 2011 – In response to a motion for a judgment as a matter of law by the plaintiff
Palm Bay International, Inc. and the Taubs (“Palm Bay” or the “Plaintiffs”), the Court granted
the Rule 50(b) motion as to Count VI of Marchesi’s counterclaim, reversing the jury verdict
against the Taubs, but denying the motion in all other respects.
July 15, 2011 – An amended judgment was entered with regard to the reversed jury
verdict on behalf of Marchesi against the Taubs as to Count VI of the counterclaims. This
amended judgment did not provide for post-verdict prejudgment interest for Marchesi.
On July 29, 2011, Marchesi filed this motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(a) (“Rule 60(a)”), or, in the alternative, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(c) (“Rule 59(c)”).
This motion was for an order correcting the July 15, 2011 amended judgment so as to include an
award of post-verdict prejudgment interest, pursuant to New York CPLR 5002, from the date of
the verdict to the entry of the amended judgment. On August 9, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a notice
of appeal with the Second Circuit. On October 25, 2011, the Court denied Marchesi’s motion on
two grounds. First, the Court held that the Rule 59(c) motion was untimely. Second, the Court
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ruled that it was barred by the plain language of the rule from deciding the motion while an
appeal was pending. The Court denied the motion by Marchesi to add an award of post-verdict
prejudgment interest from the date of the verdict to the entry of the amended judgment of July
15, 2011, “without prejudice to re-file following a decision by the Second Circuit to the
plaintiffs’ appeal . . ..”
On May 17, 2012, the Second Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and the Court’s decision.
Now, Marchesi asserts that its “Rule 60(a) motion is therefore ripe for disposition.”
I. DISCUSSION
A. The Contentions
Apparently, the plaintiffs do not dispute that, in this diversity case, the New York State
rules governing the award of post-verdict prejudgment interest apply. Also, it is undisputed that
the New York prejudgment interest rate is nine percent per annum. CPLR 5004. See also FCS
Advisors, Inc. v. Fair Finance Co., Inc., 605 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2010) (“. . . it was undisputed
that New York law governed the pre-judgment interest . . .”). In this latest motion, the defendant
Marchesi requests that the Court “correct” the amended judgment to include prejudgment
interest at nine percent per annum from August 6, 2010, the date of the verdict to July 15, 2011,
the date of the last amended judgment, a total of 344 days, in the sum of $44,069.45.
On the other hand, the Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Palm Bay opposes the Marchesi
motion to correct the judgment. Palm Bay contends that the prejudgment interest should run
from the date of the jury verdict on August 6, 2010 through the entry of the court’s initial
judgment dated September 13, 2010. Therefore, Palm Bay contends that the appropriate time
period for the post-verdict, prejudgment interest is 38 days, from August 6, 2010 to September
13, 2010, at the nine percent interest rate for the total amount of $4,868.13.
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B. The Applicable Time Rule on Post-Verdict Prejudgment Interest
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the initial September 13, 2010 judgment in favor of
Marchesi against Palm Bay remained unchanged by the amended judgment of July 15, 2011.
The amended final judgment only concerned the dismissal of the counterclaim verdict against the
Taubs. So that the only addition in the amended final judgment of July 15, 2011, was to
incorporate the Court’s July 11, 2011 ruling. It left the initial ruling set forth in the September
13, 2010 judgment intact with regard to the verdict against Palm Bay, and only dismissed the
counterclaim verdict against the Taubs. The Palm Bay and Taubs notice of appeal followed on
August 9, 2011.
Marchesi’s motion seeks post-verdict prejudgment interest from the date of the verdict,
August 6, 2010 to the entry of the amended final judgment on July 15, 2011, a period of 344
days. Based on that assumption, Marchesi contends that it is entitled to post-verdict prejudgment
interest of $44,069.45. Not so, says Palm Bay. It contends that the proper interest award is from
the date of the verdict on August 6, 2010 to the date of the initial final judgment on September
13 2010, a period of 38 days. Thus, according to Palm Bay, the appropriate post-verdict
prejudgment interest amount is $4,868.13.
In Adrian v. Town of Yorktown, 620 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2010), the Court resolved the
question of which date represents the “final judgment”; the date of the judgment entered
immediately following the jury’s verdict or the date of the later amended judgment. In Adrian,
the Court reviewed the case law which provided an answer to this question. Initially, the court
stated that, “(T)he judgment contemplated . . . is one that is ascertained in a meaningful way and
supported by the evidence.” Androlonis v. United States, 26 F.3d 1224, 1233 (2d Cir. 1994).
See also NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 435 Fed. Appx. 41, 2011 WL 3606092 (2d Cir.
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2011). (“In general, prejudgment interest ceases to accrue, and postjudgment interest begins to
accrue, as of the date that judgment first ‘is ascertained in a meaningful way and supported by
the evidence’”); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Arso, 371 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2004)
(observing that the date the judgment was meaningfully ascertained separates the computation of
interest in pre-judgment and post-judgment periods).
Viewed as determative in Adrian was the case of Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 87
F.3d 614 (2d Cir. 1996). In Indu Craft, a judgment for the plaintiff was entered following a jury
verdict. The defendant’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law was granted, only to
be reversed on appeal, leading to the entry of a subsequent judgment. The Court held that postjudgment interest accrued from the date of the original judgment because, “. . . the judgment was
ascertained in a meaningful sense on . . . the date on which the original judgment was entered
following the jury verdict.” Id. at 620. The Adrian Court therefore held that:
Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to post-verdict prejudgment
interest at the higher New York rate only for the one day
separating the January 15, 2008 jury verdict and the January 16,
2008 judgment, and are entitled to postjudgment interest at the
federal rate from that point forward.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the initial judgment entered by the Court on September
13, 2010, is the one “ascertained in a meaningful way and supported by the evidence.”
Therefore, Marchesi is awarded post-verdict prejudgment interest at the rate of nine percent from
August 6, 2010 to September 13, 2010, a period of 38 days, in the sum of $4,868.13.
II. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to
add to the verdict amount, post-verdict prejudgment interest in favor of the defendant Marchesi
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Di Barolo S.P.A., in the amount of $4,868.13.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
August 22, 2012
/s/ Arthur D. Spatt
ARTHUR D. SPATT
United States District Judge
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