Gonzalez et al v. County of Suffolk et al
Filing
105
ORDER granting 102 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b). So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Steven Tiscione on 9/30/2022. (Mistry-Sehgal, Nikita)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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PATRICIA GONZALEZ and JENNIFER
GONZALEZ, individually and as co-administrators
of the Estate of KENNY LAZO,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
09-CV-1023 (ST)
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, SUFFOLK POLICE
DEPARTMENT, POLICE COMMISSIONER
RICHARD DORMER, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY, POLICE OFFICER JOHN NEWTON, IN
HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY, POLICE
OFFICER JAMES SCIMONE, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, POLICE OFFICER WILLIAM
JUDGE, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
POLICE OFFICER CHRISTOPHER TALT, IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY, POLICE OFFICER
JOSEPH LINK, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY, COUNTY OF SUFFOLK OFFICE OF
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SUFFOLK COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY THOMAS SPOT A, IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY, ASST. DISTRICT
ATTORNEY JOHN B. COLLINS, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL
AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND "JOHN AND JANE DOES
1-1 O" REPRESENTING AS YET UNKNOWN AND UNIDENTIFIED
MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY ( ALL IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES AS EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF SUFFOLK
COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY),
Defendants,
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TISCIONE, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiffs Patricia Gonzalez and Jennifer Gonzalez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”),
individually and as co-administrators of the estate of Kenny Lazo, commenced this action
alleging false arrest, excessive use of force, municipal liability, deprivation of due process rights,
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failure to intervene, abuse of process, and pendente state law claims including wrongful death,
negligence, assault and battery. Plaintiffs bring this action against County of Suffolk; Suffolk
County Police Department; Police Commissioner Richard Dormer (“Dormer”), in his individual
and official capacity; Police Officers John Newton (“Newton”), James Scimone (“Scimone”),
William Judge (“Judeg”), Christopher Talt (“Talt”), Joseph Link (“Link”) (collectively, “Police
Officers”) – in their individual and official capacities; Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office;
Suffolk County District Attorney Thomas Spota (“Spota”), and Assistant District Attorney John
B. Collins (“Collins”) – in their individual and official capacities; and “John And Jane Does 110” members of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office.
The Honorable Joanna Seybert granted a summary judgment in favor of Defendants
Spota and Collins on grounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Now before this Court is
Defendants Spota and Collins’ Motion to enter a partial final judgment pursuant to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 54(b).
For the reasons stated below, this Court GRANTS Defendants Spota and Collins’ Motion
for a partial final judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
This is a civil rights action arising out of the death of Kenny Lazo (“Lazo”) while in the
custody of the Suffolk County Police Department in April 2008. See FAC at 9-10. Lazo, a
Hispanic male individual, was born on December 30, 1983. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff Patricia Gonzales,
as Lazo’s mother, and Plaintiff Jennifer Gonzales, as mother and guardian of Lazo's child,
collectively bring this action as co-administrators of Lazo's estate. Id. ¶¶ 13-15.
Plaintiffs allege that Lazo was wrongfully arrested during a traffic stop that led to his
brutal beating and eventual death while in police custody. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Specifically, Plaintiffs
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allege that Defendants Suffolk County, Suffolk Police Department and its Police Officers caused
Lazo’s death by, inter alia, wrongfully arresting, assaulting, using excessive force against him,
and failing to take him to the hospital for medical evaluation afterwards. Id. at 13-14. As to
Defendants Suffolk County District Attorneys Spota and Collins, Plaintiffs argue that Spota and
Collins failed to properly investigate and present their case against the Police Officers before the
grand jury. Id. at 19, 23, 26. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint also sets forth municipal liability
claims against Defendants Suffolk County and Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office. Id. at
15.
Plaintiffs commenced this action in March 2009. DE 1. Defendants Spota and Collins
initially filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims against them on November 17, 2014.
DE 59, 60, and 61. However, this case was administratively closed on April 8, 2015. See Order
dated Apr. 8, 2015. More than three years later, upon Plaintiffs’ motion, the Court reopened the
case on December 11, 2018. DE 65 and 66. Spota and Collins promptly filed an updated motion
for summary judgment on December 24, 2018. DE 67, 70, and 71.
On February 6, 2019, the Court granted Spota's and Collins's motion for summary
judgment on grounds of prosecutorial immunity and dismissed all claims against them with
prejudice. DE 72; Pl.’s Opp., Hr’g Tr., Ex. A, DE 103. On October 27, 2021, Spota and Collins
filed the instant motion for the entry of a partial final judgment in their favor pursuant to FRCP
54(b). DE 102.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 54(b) states in relevant part:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief ... or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines
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that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be
revised at any time before entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the
parties’ rights and liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). It is well settled that, “in the federal district courts, the entry of a
final judgment is generally appropriate only after all claims have been adjudicated.” Novick v.
AXA Network, LLC, 642 F.3d 304, 310 (2d Cir. 2011). The certification of a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b) is a “permissive, not mandatory, mechanism.” Crespo v. Carvajal, No.
17-CV-6329 (MKB) (PK), 17-CV-6329 (MKB) (PK), 2021 WL 4237002 at 2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept
14, 2021). The Second Circuit has instructed district courts that Rule 54(b) relief should be used
"sparingly". Alix v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., 470 F. Supp. 3d 310, 317- 18 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
Rule 54(b) “authorizes a district court to enter partial final judgment when three
requirements have been satisfied: (1) there are multiple claims or parties, (2) at least one claim or
the rights and liabilities of at least one party has been finally determined, and (3) the court makes
an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882
F.3d 314, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2018).
Here, Defendants Spota and Collins satisfy the first two Rule 54(b) requirements, as there
are multiple claims and parties, and all the claims against them have been finally determined.
Thus, the availability of Rule 54(b) certification turns on whether there is no just reason for
delay.
III.
DISCUSSION
To determine whether there is no just reason for delay, the courts consider two principles:
(i) judicial administrative interests so as to maintain efficiency and avoid piecemeal appeals on
interrelated issues, and (ii) the equities involved, specifically whether “postponing appeal until
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after a final judgment ... will cause unusual hardship or work an injustice.” See Novick, 642 F.3d
at 310; Hogan v. Consol. Rail Corp., 961 F.2d 1021, 1026 (2d Cir. 1992); Pearson Educ., Inc. v.
Heliosbooks, Inc., No. 17-CV-203 (KMW), 2022 WL 970454, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022);
Crespo, 2021 WL 4237002, at 4; Lankier Siffert & Wohl, LLP v. Rossi, No. 02-CV-10055
(RWS), 2004 WL 541842, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2004), aff'd, 125 F. App'x 371 (2d Cir. 2005)
(summary order). A court must “provide a reasoned, even if brief, explanation of its
considerations” and “must take account of both the policy against piecemeal appeals and the
equities between or among the parties.” Novick, 642 F.3d at 310 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
A. Judicial Interests and Equity Warrant the Entry of a Partial Final Judgment in
Favor of Defendants Spota and Collins
Defendants Spota and Collins request for a partial final judgment based on the dismissal
of all claims against them in the summary judgment decision. Plaintiffs oppose. Pl.’s Opp. at 6.
Generally, “Courts ‘should avoid the possibility that the ultimate dispositions of the
claims remaining in the district court could either moot [a] decision on the appealed claim or
require [the appellate court] to decide issues twice.’” Richardson v. City of N.Y., No. 04 Civ.
05314, 2007 WL 1732424, 1 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2007) (quoting Ginett, 962 F.2d at 1095).
“District courts within the Second Circuit have refused to reflexively enter partial judgment
whenever dismissing claims against one party on immunity grounds.” Jennifer Jorgensen v.
County of Suffolk et. al., 11-CV-02588 (HG) (AYS), 2022 WL 4468231 at 3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,
2022). They have instead inquired whether accelerating the appeal process for the immune
defendant would leave behind, in the district court, claims that “would involve many of the same
law and facts.” Pierce v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-5703, 2018 WL 679459, at 2 (E.D.N.Y.
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Feb. 1, 2018); see also Baumgarten v. Suffolk Cnty., No. 12-cv-171, 2014 WL 4175793, at 4
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2014) (claims against immune town attorney not reduced to partial judgment
because of the “overlap in allegations” with claims against un-dismissed defendants). Placing
those claims on two separate tracks could lead to the “extremely inefficient outcome” of having
“two separate appeals before two different panels based on the same set of facts.” Pierce, 2018
WL 679459, at 2.
However, a partial judgment in favor of the immune defendants has been warranted when
the claims against them have been based on “factual allegations” that are “separable and
extricable” from the remaining defendants. Rivers v. Dagnello, No. 99-cv-2774, 2000 WL
798631, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2000) (ordering partial judgment in favor of state court judge);
Barboza v. Village of Liberty, 13-CV-4067 (CS), 2016 WL 8653502 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2016)
(ordering partial judgment in favor of immune police officers because their claims were “easily
separable” from those of the Village/ County). Partial judgment becomes more advisable when
there is sufficient time left in the district court litigation for the Second Circuit to consider the
issue of immunity before trial. Capone v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 04-cv2947, 2007 WL 9723874, at 2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2007) (granting partial final judgment in favor
of the immune defendants because that would “promote “judicial economy” and is fair to all
parties in the action”); McDonough v. Smith, No. 15-cv-1505, 2017 WL 1901962, at 3 (N.D.N.Y.
May 8, 2017). Under such circumstances, accelerated appellate reversal, if at all, of the district
court's immunity ruling can save the district court from “repeat[ing] the entire process” of trial
for the initially-dismissed defendants after the other defendants have already gone to trial.
Capone, 2007 WL 9723874, at 2.
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Accordingly, we consider “whether the claims under review [are] separable from the
others remaining to be adjudicated.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8
(1980). Defendants Spota and Collins request a partial final judgment based on the dismissal of
all claims against them in the summary judgment decision. Plaintiffs oppose and argue that
although the issue of prosecutorial immunity is different from other claims like municipal
liability pending before this Court, “these claims still arise from the same core nucleus of facts
and circumstances as the remaining claims.” Pl.’s Opp. at 6. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that
their municipal liability claim against Suffolk County addresses its failure to appropriately
respond to an ongoing pattern of police officers' improper and excessive use of force. Id. The
Suffolk County District Attorney's Office contributed to this pattern by failing to appropriately
investigate and prosecute the Police Officers involved. Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs intend to
present evidence of the District Attorney's Office’s failure to investigate the circumstances of
Lazo's death, including failure to conduct interviews of the officers, and failure to ensure that the
implicated agency was not the one investigating the misconduct of its own officers. Id.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial record will be relevant to their appeal of the Court’s summary
judgment decision. Id.
Although it may appear at first glance that the claims are inherently inseparable, the
Court finds that the claims on appeal are sufficiently separable and unrelated to the claims
remaining to be adjudicated against remaining Defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims against the
prosecutors are easily separable from the issues remaining to be tried as against the
municipalities including Defendants Suffolk County and Suffolk County District Attorney’s
Office. Upon a review of the Amended Complaint, it is clear that Plaintiffs claim that
Defendants Suffolk County, Suffolk Police Department and its Police Officers caused Lazo’s
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death by falsely arresting, using excessive force against him, depriving him of his due process
rights, failing to intervene and abusing the process. Id. at 13-14. With regards to Defendants
Spota and Collins, in their official and individual capacities, Plaintiff, however, relies on separate
factual allegations to show that they engaged in abuse of process and deprived Lazo of his rights
by failing to properly investigate their case against the police officers. Id. at 19, 23, 26.
Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants Spota and Collins, as prosecutors, are separate from their
claims for municipal liability against Defendant Suffolk County and District Attorney’s Office.
Id. at 15. The entitlement of the individual municipal actors to qualified immunity is irrelevant
to the liability of the municipality. See Askins v. Doe No. 1, 727 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 2013).
Qualified immunity is a defense available only to individuals sued in their “individual capacity.”
Id. Further, if on appeal, the court could address the question of immunity sooner rather than
later, we could easily join Spota and Collins as additional parties before the trial against the
remaining Defendants begins. Accordingly, granting certification now would promote “judicial
economy” and is fair to all parties in the action. Capone, 2007 WL 9723874, at 2-3.
Further, as per Judge Seybert’s summary judgment decision, it is clear that Defendants
Spota and Collins’ “performed their advocacy role before the grand jury in a reasonable
manner." DE 72; Pls.’ Opp., Hr’g Tr. at 3-5, Ex. A, DE 103. More specifically, as to actions
taken before the grand jury, Judge Seybert held that Defendants Spota and Collins are entitled to
absolute immunity for conduct in front of the grand jury. Id. “In reviewing the documentary
evidence, including the Rule 56.1 statements, depositions, exhibits, and grand jury minutes, the
court [found] that these defendants performed their advocacy role before the grand jury in a
reasonable manner. Id. Any delay in presenting the matter is adequately explained by the
documented involvement of and communication with the US Attorneys office.” Id. As to the
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actions taken before the grand jury was convened, the court held that Defendants Spota and
Collins’ “actions [were…also] protected by absolute immunity.” Id. “Plaintiffs attempt to paint
[D]efendants [Spota and Collins] as corrupt investigators seeking to participate in a cover-up
with the police. The court does not find this to be the case. In any event, a prosecutor is also
entitled to immunity for actions taken in preparation for grand jury.” “Alternatively, were this
court to apply only qualified immunity to all of [D]efendants’ [Spota and Collins] actions here, it
would still find them shielded.” Id.
In a factually similar case, the court certified partial final judgment under FRCP 54(b)
based on immunity grounds. Barboza, 2016 WL 8653502 at 3. In Barboza, the plaintiff had
brought a lawsuit after he was pulled over and issued a speeding ticket against police officers,
the assistant district attorneys and several others. Id. The court issued a bench ruling granting
summary judgment for the police officers. Id. Following this ruling, the plaintiff filed a Rule
54(b) motion asking the Court to enter judgment against the police officers so he could file an
appeal. The court issued a partial final judgment and held, inter alia, that that the qualified
immunity inquiry is not the same for officers as it is for lawyers, and that there was no just
reason to delay. Id.
Further, two and one-half years after Judge Seybert granted summary judgment to Spota
and Collins on all claims against them on the purely legal ground of absolute immunity and/or
qualified immunity, and 12½ years after this suit was initially brought, the remaining claims
against the remaining parties do not appear to be any closer to resolution. This matter was
recently further delayed by Plaintiffs' need to retain a new expert pathologist. DE 87. To date,
there is no scheduled trial date. DE 101. Even though the discovery is complete, but further
dispositive motion practice increases the likelihood of the case not being fully resolved in the
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near future. Defendants Spota and Collins understandably seek to have their names cleared from
this lawsuit, and it has already been many years since the operative events occurred. Further
delay would serve little purpose and simply perpetuate the cloud of uncertainty regarding Spota
and Collins’ liability despite the District Court’s unequivocal dismissal of the claims against
them. As such, there is no just reason to delay the entry of partial final judgment as to
Defendants Spota and Collins.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants Spota and Collins’ Motion for
Entry of Judgment under FRCP 54(b). The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to enter
final judgment on the District Court’s February 6, 2019 decision granting summary judgment to
Defendants Spota and Collins on grounds of qualified immunity.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
Steven L. Tiscione
United States Magistrate Judge
Eastern District of New York
Dated: Central Islip, New York
September 30, 2022
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