Williams v. Rock
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM & ORDER denying 12 Motion for Reconsideration; Petitioner has not raised any matters or controlling decisions that this Court overlooked and that would have influenced the prior decision. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 8/6/2014. C/M; C/ECF (Valle, Christine)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------X
SHANE WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
09-CV-3576(JS)
-against–
SUPERINTENDENT DAVID ROCK,
Respondent.
---------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner:
Shane Williams, pro se
06A3334
Green Haven Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 4000
Stormville, NY 12582
For Respondent:
Grazia Divincenzo, Esq.
Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office
200 Center Drive
Riverhead, NY 11901
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Currently
petitioner
pending
Shane
before
Williams’
the
Court
(“Petitioner”)
is
pro
motion
se
for
reconsideration of the Court’s August 6, 2013 Memorandum and
Order (the “August 2013 Order,” Docket Entry 9) denying his
Petition
for
a
writ
of
habeas
corpus
pursuant
to
28
U.S.C.
§ 2254.
Specifically, Petitioner seeks reconsideration of that
portion of the August 2013 Order finding that Petitioner’s claim
of
ineffective
barred.
DENIED.
For
assistance
the
of
following
trial
counsel
reasons,
was
procedurally
Petitioner’s
motion
is
BACKGROUND
The
Court
presumes
familiarity
with
the
underlying
facts of this case, which are detailed in the Court’s August
2013 Order.
The Court will briefly set forth the background
relevant to the pending motion.
On May 26, 2006, Petitioner was convicted of three
counts of committing a Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree,
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.50; five counts of Sexual Abuse in the First
Degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.65; and one count of Robbery in the
Second Degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.10.
Return,
Docket
Entry
6
¶ 2.)
(Pet. ¶¶ 2-5; Resp’t’s
Petitioner
was
sentenced
to
determinate terms of imprisonment totaling twenty-six years with
five years of post-release supervision.
(Resp’t’s Return ¶ 2;
Sentencing Tr. May 26, 2006, at 8-11).
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the
New
York
grounds
State
that:
suppressed
Appellate
Division,
(1) Petitioner’s
because
the
Second
statements
police
Department
should
strategically
on
have
the
been
thwarted
his
arraignment on an unrelated, subsequent robbery charge in order
to keep Petitioner in custody and extract a confession on the
original criminal charges; (2) the evidence did not establish
Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence; and (3) the twenty-six year
determinate
sentence
imposed
for
2
Petitioner’s
first
felony
conviction was unduly harsh and excessive and should be modified
in the interests of justice.
(Pet. ¶¶ 8-9; Resp’t’s Return
¶ 17).
On July 15, 2008, the Appellate Division affirmed the
judgment of conviction.
People v. Williams, 53 A.D.3d 591, 861
N.Y.S.2d 420 (2d Dep’t 2008).
The court held that Petitioner
had not preserved for appellate review his contentions that his
statements to the police should have been suppressed and that
the
evidence
did
not
reasonable doubt.
found
these
establish
Petitioner’s
guilt
Id. at 592, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
arguments
unpreserved
for
appellate
beyond
a
Although it
review,
the
court reviewed the merits of Petitioner’s arguments nonetheless
and found that they both lacked merit.
Id.
On May 20, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to
Section
440.10
of
the
New
York
Criminal
Procedure
Law
(the
“440.10 Motion”) in the New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk
County,
claiming
that
his
trial
counsel
was
ineffective
for
failing to preserve the arguments that were raised on appeal.
Noting that Article 440 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law
“is not available to re-litigate matters already resolved,” the
court
denied
Petitioner
upon
440.10
presented
direct
Division.
the
appeal
Motion
arguments
from
on
that
his
July
were
conviction
1,
raised
to
2009
because
and
rejected
the
Appellate
People v. Williams, No. 2456-2005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
3
Suffolk Cnty. July 1, 2009).
in
the
Appellate
Division
Petitioner sought leave to appeal
and,
on
September
23,
Appellate Division denied Petitioner’s application.
2009,
the
People v.
Williams, No. 2006-07568 (2d Dep’t Sept. 23, 2009).
On August 13, 2009, Petitioner filed his Petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in this Court.
Petitioner raised four
grounds in support of the Petition, including, of relevance to
the present motion, that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to preserve for appellate review his claims concerning
suppression and the legal sufficiency of evidence.
found
that
the
ineffective
assistance
claim
was
The Court
procedurally
barred under New York state law (and thus, barred from federal
habeas
review)
given
that
the
Appellate
Division
denied
Petitioner’s application for leave to appeal from the Supreme
Court’s denial of his 440.10 Motion.
14.)
(August 2013 Order at 13-
Thus, the Court noted that the merits of the ineffective
assistance
claim
could
only
be
reached
“‘if
the
[Petitioner
could] first demonstrate either cause and actual prejudice, or
that he [was] actually innocent.’”
(August 2013 Order at 14
(quoting St. Helen v. Senkowski, 374 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir.
2004) (per curiam)).)
The Court found that Petitioner failed to
meet this standard because he offered no explanation for his
failure to raise the ineffective assistance claim in his direct
appeal and therefore did not show cause.
4
(August 2013 Order at
14-15.)
The Court also found that Petitioner did not claim that
he was actually innocent of any of the crimes of which he was
convicted.
(August 2013 Order at 15.)
Accordingly, the Court
denied Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
On
September 18, 2013, Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this
portion of the August 2013 Order.
(Docket Entry 12.)
This
motion is currently pending before the Court.
DISCUSSION
The
Court
will
first
address
the
applicable
legal
standard before turning to the merits of Petitioner’s motion.
I.
Legal Standard
Motions for reconsideration may be brought pursuant to
Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Local Rule 6.3.
WL
812999,
at
*2
See Wilson v. Pessah, No. 05-CV-3143, 2007
(E.D.N.Y.
Mar.
14,
2007).
A
motion
for
reconsideration is appropriate when the moving party believes
the
Court
overlooked
decisions”
that
Shamis
Ambassador
v.
(S.D.N.Y.
1999).
would
important
have
“matters
influenced
Factors
Corp.,
Reconsideration
is
the
187
not
or
controlling
prior
F.R.D.
a
proper
decision.
148,
tool
151
to
repackage and relitigate arguments and issues already considered
by the Court in deciding the original motion.
See United States
v. Gross, No. 98-CR-0159, 2002 WL 32096592, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 5, 2002) (“A party may not use a motion to reconsider as an
5
opportunity
to
Nor
proper
is
it
reargue
to
the
same
raise
new
points
raised
arguments
and
previously.”).
issues.
See
Lehmuller v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 982 F. Supp. 132, 135
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
Reconsideration may only be granted when the
Court did not evaluate decisions or data that might reasonably
be
expected
to
alter
the
conclusion
reached
by
the
Court.
Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., 186 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
II.
Petitioner’s Motion
Petitioner moves for reconsideration of the Court’s
determination that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
was
procedurally
barred
on
two
grounds:
(1) that
the
Court
overlooked the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez v. Ryan,
132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012) and Trevino v. Thaler,
133 S. Ct. 1911, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1044 (2013), which carved out an
exception for procedurally barred ineffective assistance claims
raised
in
an
initial-review
collateral
proceeding
where
no
attorney or an ineffective attorney was present; and (2) that
under Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123 S. Ct. 1690,
155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003), Petitioner’s ineffective assistance
claim
should
be
excused
from
procedural
default
because
his
trial attorney and his appellate attorney were both employed by
6
the Legal Aid Society.
(See Pet’r’s Mot. for Recon. at 2-5 1 .)
As
neither
discussed
below,
of
these
grounds
warrants
reconsideration.
First, the holdings of the Supreme Court in Martinez
and Trevino are not applicable here.
In Martinez, the Supreme
Court held that “a procedural default will not bar a federal
habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective
assistance
at
trial
if,
in
the
[state’s]
initial-review
collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that
proceeding was ineffective.”
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
This rule applies where the state’s procedural law provides that
“claims
of
ineffective
assistance
of
trial
counsel
raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding.”
must
be
Trevino,
133 S. Ct. at 1914-15 (emphasis added) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.
Ct. at 1320).
state
In Trevino, the Supreme Court, interpreting Texas
procedural
law,
expanded
the
holding
of
Martinez,
concluding that where a “state procedural framework, by reason
of
its
design
and
operation,
makes
it
highly
unlikely
in
a
typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity
to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on
direct appeal, [the] holding in Martinez applies.”
at 1921.
The page numbers are those supplied by the Case
Management/Electronic Case Filing system.
1
7
133 S. Ct.
Here,
does
not
Petitioner
have
an
argues
effective
that,
like
mechanism
Texas,
for
an
assistance claim to be raised on direct appeal.
Mot. for Recon. at 4.)
could
direct
have
raised
appeal
his
and,
in
New
York
ineffective
(See Pet’r’s
This is incorrect because Petitioner
ineffective
any
assistance
event,
the
of
counsel
Appellate
on
Division
addressed the claims Petitioner contends his counsel failed to
preserve and decided that they lacked merit.
Order
at
13.)
Therefore,
Martinez
and
(See August 2013
Trevino
are
not
applicable here.
However,
even
if
these
cases
were
applicable,
Petitioner has not demonstrated that the ineffective assistance
claim has merit.
Taken together, Martinez and Trevino provide
that the ineffective assistance of counsel or lack of counsel in
the collateral review proceeding only supplies “cause” to excuse
a procedural default and that “[t]o overcome the default, a
prisoner must also demonstrate that the underlying ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is
to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has
some merit.”
at 1913.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318; Trevino, 133 S. Ct.
Here, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is meritless because he has not demonstrated that the
arguments that were not preserved for appeal have merit.
See
Rosenfeld v. United States, 972 F. Supp. 137, 148 (E.D.N.Y.
8
1997)
(“Because
the
petitioner's
arguments
had
no
chance
of
success, his attorney's failure to explain these arguments to
him, to raise them at sentencing, or to file an appeal based on
them, was not unreasonable.”).
Second, Petitioner’s argument that his claim should be
excused from procedural default due to the fact both his trial
and appellate attorneys were employed by the Legal Aid Society
is not properly before the Court because new arguments cannot be
raised in a motion for reconsideration.
See Lehmuller v. Inc.
Vill. of Sag Harbor, 982 F. Supp. 132, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); see
e.g.,
Baumgarten
3973089,
at
*6
v.
Suffolk
(E.D.N.Y.
Cnty.,
2013);
No.
see
12-CV-0171,
also
Image
2013
WL
Processing
Techs., LLC v. Canon Inc., No. 10-CV-3867, 2012 WL 253097, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2012) (“[A] party may not, on a motion for
[reconsideration],
(internal
raise
quotation
an
marks
alteration in original).
argument
and
for
citations
the
first
omitted)
time.”
(second
In any event, as noted above, the
Appellative Division reviewed the arguments Petitioner claims
his counsel failed to preserve for appellate review and found
that they lacked merit.
Accordingly, Petitioner has not raised any matters or
controlling decisions that this Court overlooked and that would
have
influenced
the
prior
decision.
motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
9
Therefore,
Petitioner’s
CONCLUSION
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
Petitioner’s
motion
for
reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
DATED:
August
6 , 2014
Central Islip, New York
10
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