Cadles of Grassy Meadows II, L.L.C v. St. Clair et al

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 29 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion (Docket Entry 29) is GRANTED. Within thirty (30) days, Plaintiff shall file an accounting of its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, which to the extent appropriate will be added to the total recovery amount before the Clerk of the Court enters the judgment. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 3/15/12. C/ECF; C/M (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------X
CADLES OF GRASSY MEADOWS II, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
10-CV-1673(JS)(ETB)

JEFFREY ST. CLAIR and
CATHLEEN ST. CLAIR,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Steven Giordano, Esq.
Vlock & Associates, P.C.
230 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10169
For Defendants:

Jeffrey St. Clair, Esq.*
Cathleen St. Clair, pro se
3001 Ann Street
Baldwin, New York 11510
*representing himself

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff
(“Plaintiff”)

sued

Cadles

of

Defendants

Grassy

Cathleen

and

Meadows

II,

Jeffrey

LLC

St.

Clair

(collectively, “Defendants”) to recover on a promissory note.
Pending

before

judgment.

the

Court

is

(Docket Entry 29).

Plaintiff’s

motion

for

summary

For the following reasons, this

motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Local
Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl. 56.1 Stmt.”).
Court deems Plaintiff’s facts admitted.

As discussed below, the

Plaintiff

is

a

limited

liability

company

organized

under West Virginia law with its principal place of business in
Ohio.

(Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.)

York.

Defendants reside in Baldwin, New

(Id. ¶ 2.)
Defendants executed a promissory note (“the Note”) for

a second mortgage on their property located in Baldwin, New York
in the amount of $96,000.
initially

executed

and

Express Corporation.

(Id. ¶ 5; Pl. Ex. A.)
delivered

to

the

(Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5.)

The Note was

American

Mortgage

It was assigned to

Residential Funding Corporation, then to JP Morgan Chase Bank,
and finally to Plaintiff.

(Id. ¶ 6; Pl. Ex. A.)

The Note

required Plaintiffs to pay $721.22 on the first of each month.
(Id. ¶ 7; Pl. Ex. A.)
annual interest.
provides

that,

Plaintiff also agreed to pay 8.25 percent

(Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 7; Pl. Ex. A.)
in

the

event

a

default,

Plaintiff

The Note
would

be

entitled to accelerate Defendants’ outstanding balance and to
collect the amount of attorneys’ fees that Plaintiff reasonably
incurred in recovering on the Note.

(Pl. Ex. A.)

Defendants defaulted on the Note (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶
10), and Plaintiff accelerated the outstanding balance (id. ¶¶
9, 13).

As of March 30, 2011, Defendants owed $94,218.27 and

$27,831.68 in interest.

(Stacey Johnson Aff. ¶ 13.)

2

DISCUSSION
On January 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed its statement of
undisputed facts pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1.
Entry 24.)

(Docket

Defendants filed their Rule 56.1 Counter-Statement

on March 21, 2011.

(Docket Entry 27.)

motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff then filed its

The Court will discuss the law

governing Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statements and then consider the
substance of Plaintiff’s motion.
I. Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 Statement
Local

Rule

56.1

requires

that

a

party

moving

for

summary judgment “submit a statement of the allegedly undisputed
facts on which the moving party relies,” as well as citations
“to

the

fact.”

admissible

evidence

of

record

supporting

each

such

Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d

Cir. 2003) (citing LOCAL CIV. R. 56.1 (a), (d)).

The purpose of

Local Civil Rule 56.1 is “to streamline the consideration of
summary judgment motions by freeing district courts from the
need to hunt through voluminous records without guidance from
the parties.”

Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa

per Azioni, 585 F. Supp. 2d 520, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing
Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 292 (2d Cir.
2000)).
Local Civil Rule 56.1 provides that where a nonmoving
party wishes to contest the assertions in the movant’s 56.1

3

statement,

he

must

“respond

to

each

of

the

statement’s

paragraphs and include, if necessary, a statement of additional
material

facts

that

demonstrate

LOCAL CIV. R. 56.1(b).
its

purpose,

it

a

genuine

issue

for

trial.”

In order for a counter-statement “to serve

must

respond

appropriately

to

the

movant’s

statement . . . and must cite admissible evidence in support of
the non-movant’s contention[s] . . . .”

Gallimore-Wright v.

Long Island R. Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d 478, 482. (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(internal citations omitted); see In re Rezulin Prods. Liab.
Litig., 390 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322, n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[M]erely
because one party denies a properly-supported assertion in the
other’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement does not create an issue of
fact

if

the

cited

evidence

reveals

no

genuine

factual

dispute.”); see also Dusanenko v. Maloney, 726 F.2d 82, 84 (2d
Cir.

1984).

Thus,

generally,

a

party’s

failure

either

to

respond or contest facts set forth in a movant’s Local Civil
Rule 56.1 statement constitutes an admission of those facts,
which will be accepted as being undisputed.

Giannullo, 322 F.3d

at 140.
The foregoing is only true to the extent that the
moving party has supported its assertions of undisputed facts
with record evidence.

LeSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Merrill Lynch

Mortg. Lending, Inc., No. 04-CV-5452, 2007 WL 2324052, at *6
(S.D.N.Y.

Aug.

13,

2007)

(“Assertions

4

in

Local

Rule

56.1

statements

must

be

disregarded

to

the

extent

they

are

unsupported in the record.”) (citing Giannullo v. City of N.Y.,
322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2001)); see Holtz v. Rockefeller &
Co.,

Inc.,

258

F.3d

62,

74

(2d

Cir.

2001)

(“[A]

Rule

56.1

statement is not itself a vehicle for making factual assertions
that are otherwise unsupported in the record.”).
The Court has examined Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 Statement
and

Defendant’s

Rule

56.1

Counter-Statement.

To

the

extent

relevant, Plaintiff’s facts are supported by admissible record
evidence and are not meaningfully disputed by anything contained
in Defendant’s Counter-Statement.

Accordingly, the Court treats

Plaintiff’s facts as undisputed.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is only appropriate where the moving
party can demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to
any material fact” and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

FED. R. CIV. P.

56(a).

In

considering this question, the Court considers “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with any other firsthand information including but not
limited to affidavits.”

Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 156 (2d

Cir. 2011); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 273 (1986); McLee
v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997); see also

5

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

“In assessing the record to determine

whether there is a genuine issue to be tried . . . the court is
required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought.”

McLee, 109 F.3d at 134.

The burden of

proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact rests
with the moving party.

Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs.,

L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Heyman v. Com. &
Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975)).

Once that

burden is met, the non-moving party must “come forward with
specific facts,” LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir.
1998),

to

demonstrate

that

“the

evidence

is

such

that

a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S. Ct. 2505,
2514-15,

91

L.

Ed.

2d

202,

218

(1986).

allegations or denials will not suffice.”
781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1986).

“Mere

conclusory

Williams v. Smith,

And “unsupported allegations

do not create a material issue of fact.”

Weinstock v. Columbia

Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).
III. Application
For the following reasons, Plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment.
on

a

promissory

concerning

Summary judgment is appropriate in an action
note

execution

where
and

“there

default

6

of

is

no

the

material
note.”

question
Cohan

v.

Movtady,

751

F.

Supp.

2d

436,

439

(E.D.N.Y.

2010)

(quoting

Merrill Lynch Commercial Fin. Corp. v. All State Envelopes Ltd.,
No. 09-CV-0785, 2010 WL 1177451, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010)
(internal citations omitted)).

In order to establish a prima

face case of default, a plaintiff “must provide proof of the
valid note and of defendant's failure, despite proper demand, to
make payment.”

Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Walji, No. 09-CV-

1995, 2011 WL 1842838, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2011).

Further,

“[o]nce a prima facie case has been established, the plaintiff
is entitled to summary judgment unless the defendant can assert
defenses that would raise a genuine issue of material fact.”
Valley Nat'l Bank v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 254 F. Supp. 2d 448,
454 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Plaintiff has met its initial summary judgment burden.
Defendants

executed

and

predecessor-in-interest,
on June 5, 2005.

delivered
American

the

Note

Mortgage

(See Pl. Ex. A.)

to

Plaintiff’s

Express

Corporation

Defendants’ signatures

appear on the executed Note.

(See id.)

Defendants failed to

make

payments,

and

the

required

monthly

Plaintiff

Defendants a demand for payment on March 29, 2010.
Aff. ¶ 8; Pl. Ex. B.)

sent

(See Johnson

Notwithstanding this demand, Defendants

did not make any additional payments.

7

(Johnson Aff. ¶ 8.)

Defendants’ defenses do not raise a genuine issue of
material fact.

In Rule 56.1 Counter-Statement,1 Defendants argue

that (1) the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over this case; (2) Plaintiff failed to join a necessary party;
and (3) the document attached to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
is not the Note that Defendants signed.

These defenses are not

meritorious.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
case by virtue of the parties’ diversity of citizenship.
U.S.C. § 1332.
company.

Plaintiff is a West Virginia limited liability

(Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.)

Its principal place of business

is in Ohio and its sole member resides in Ohio.
1.)

See 28

(Am. Compl. ¶

Defendants, on the other hand, reside in Baldwin, New York,

and the amount in controversy, $114,255.36, exceeds the $75,000
threshold.
Defendants’
unavailing.

necessary

party

defense

is

also

GMAC is not a necessary party simply because it

holds the primary mortgage on the property that secures the
Note.
“in

(See Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2.)

that

person’s

absence,

the

A party is required where (a)
court

cannot

accord

complete

relief among existing parties”; or (b) “that person claims an
interest

relating

to

the

subject

1

of

the

action

and

is

so

Defendants’ opposition to summary judgment referred the Court
back to their Rule 56.1 Counter-Statement.
(Docket Entry 31 ¶
2.)
8

situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence
may: (i) “as a practical matter impair or impede the person's
ability to protect the interest”; or (ii) “leave an existing
party

subject

to

a

substantial

risk

of

incurring

double,

multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the
interest.”
Univ.

of

1996).

FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a); see also ConnTech Dev. Co v.
Conn.

Educ.

Prosp.,

102

F.3d

677,

GMAC is not a required party here.

681-82

(2d

Cir.

The Court can

provide complete relief without GMAC’s being joined because GMAC
is not a party to the Note and cannot assert an interest in the
subject

matter

of

the

action--i.e.,

right to recover on the Note.

Plaintiff’s

contractual

See id. at 682 (“A nonparty to a

commercial contract ordinarily is not a necessary party to an
adjudication of rights under that contract.”).

The Court notes

that, in this action, Plaintiff is not seeking to foreclose on
the property securing the Note.
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff attached the wrong
Note to its Amended Complaint also does not raise a genuine
issue of fact.

Although the document attached to the Amended

Complaint omits paragraph five,2 the Note attached to Plaintiff’s
Rule 56.1 Statement is complete and contains both Defendants’
signatures, which Defendants do not contest.

2

Paragraph five states that the Note is secured by a mortgage.
(Pl. Ex. A.)
9

IV. Damages and Costs
As

of

March

30,

2011,

Defendants’

outstanding

principal balance was $94,218.27 and the unpaid interest was
$27,831.68.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

8.25

percent

annual

interest on the outstanding principal, which comes to $21.30 per
day.

Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to $94,218.27 plus $27,831.68

in interest through March 30, 2011 plus an additional $21.30 per
day from March 30, 2011 through the date of judgment.

Plaintiff

is also entitled to its reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion (Docket
Entry 29) is GRANTED.

Within thirty (30) days, Plaintiff shall

file an accounting of its reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees,
which

to

recovery

the

extent

amount

appropriate

before

the

will

Clerk

of

be

added

the

to

Court

the

enters

judgment.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

March
15 , 2012
Central Islip, New York

10

total
the