Cadles of Grassy Meadows II, L.L.C v. St. Clair et al
MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 29 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion (Docket Entry 29) is GRANTED. Within thirty (30) days, Plaintiff shall file an accounting of its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, which to the extent appropriate will be added to the total recovery amount before the Clerk of the Court enters the judgment. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 3/15/12. C/ECF; C/M (Valle, Christine)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CADLES OF GRASSY MEADOWS II, L.L.C.,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
JEFFREY ST. CLAIR and
CATHLEEN ST. CLAIR,
Steven Giordano, Esq.
Vlock & Associates, P.C.
230 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10169
Jeffrey St. Clair, Esq.*
Cathleen St. Clair, pro se
3001 Ann Street
Baldwin, New York 11510
SEYBERT, District Judge:
(collectively, “Defendants”) to recover on a promissory note.
(Docket Entry 29).
For the following reasons, this
motion is GRANTED.
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Local
Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl. 56.1 Stmt.”).
Court deems Plaintiff’s facts admitted.
As discussed below, the
under West Virginia law with its principal place of business in
(Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.)
Defendants reside in Baldwin, New
(Id. ¶ 2.)
Defendants executed a promissory note (“the Note”) for
a second mortgage on their property located in Baldwin, New York
in the amount of $96,000.
(Id. ¶ 5; Pl. Ex. A.)
(Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5.)
The Note was
It was assigned to
Residential Funding Corporation, then to JP Morgan Chase Bank,
and finally to Plaintiff.
(Id. ¶ 6; Pl. Ex. A.)
required Plaintiffs to pay $721.22 on the first of each month.
(Id. ¶ 7; Pl. Ex. A.)
Plaintiff also agreed to pay 8.25 percent
(Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 7; Pl. Ex. A.)
entitled to accelerate Defendants’ outstanding balance and to
collect the amount of attorneys’ fees that Plaintiff reasonably
incurred in recovering on the Note.
(Pl. Ex. A.)
Defendants defaulted on the Note (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶
10), and Plaintiff accelerated the outstanding balance (id. ¶¶
As of March 30, 2011, Defendants owed $94,218.27 and
$27,831.68 in interest.
(Stacey Johnson Aff. ¶ 13.)
On January 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed its statement of
undisputed facts pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1.
Defendants filed their Rule 56.1 Counter-Statement
on March 21, 2011.
(Docket Entry 27.)
motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff then filed its
The Court will discuss the law
governing Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statements and then consider the
substance of Plaintiff’s motion.
I. Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 Statement
summary judgment “submit a statement of the allegedly undisputed
facts on which the moving party relies,” as well as citations
Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d
Cir. 2003) (citing LOCAL CIV. R. 56.1 (a), (d)).
The purpose of
Local Civil Rule 56.1 is “to streamline the consideration of
summary judgment motions by freeing district courts from the
need to hunt through voluminous records without guidance from
Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa
per Azioni, 585 F. Supp. 2d 520, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing
Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 292 (2d Cir.
Local Civil Rule 56.1 provides that where a nonmoving
party wishes to contest the assertions in the movant’s 56.1
paragraphs and include, if necessary, a statement of additional
LOCAL CIV. R. 56.1(b).
In order for a counter-statement “to serve
statement . . . and must cite admissible evidence in support of
the non-movant’s contention[s] . . . .”
Long Island R. Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d 478, 482. (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(internal citations omitted); see In re Rezulin Prods. Liab.
Litig., 390 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322, n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[M]erely
because one party denies a properly-supported assertion in the
other’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement does not create an issue of
dispute.”); see also Dusanenko v. Maloney, 726 F.2d 82, 84 (2d
respond or contest facts set forth in a movant’s Local Civil
Rule 56.1 statement constitutes an admission of those facts,
which will be accepted as being undisputed.
Giannullo, 322 F.3d
The foregoing is only true to the extent that the
moving party has supported its assertions of undisputed facts
with record evidence.
LeSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Merrill Lynch
Mortg. Lending, Inc., No. 04-CV-5452, 2007 WL 2324052, at *6
unsupported in the record.”) (citing Giannullo v. City of N.Y.,
322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2001)); see Holtz v. Rockefeller &
statement is not itself a vehicle for making factual assertions
that are otherwise unsupported in the record.”).
The Court has examined Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 Statement
relevant, Plaintiff’s facts are supported by admissible record
evidence and are not meaningfully disputed by anything contained
in Defendant’s Counter-Statement.
Accordingly, the Court treats
Plaintiff’s facts as undisputed.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is only appropriate where the moving
party can demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to
any material fact” and that the moving party is entitled to
FED. R. CIV. P.
considering this question, the Court considers “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with any other firsthand information including but not
limited to affidavits.”
Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 156 (2d
Cir. 2011); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 273 (1986); McLee
v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
“In assessing the record to determine
whether there is a genuine issue to be tried . . . the court is
required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought.”
McLee, 109 F.3d at 134.
The burden of
proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact rests
with the moving party.
Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs.,
L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Heyman v. Com. &
Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975)).
burden is met, the non-moving party must “come forward with
specific facts,” LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir.
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S. Ct. 2505,
allegations or denials will not suffice.”
781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1986).
Williams v. Smith,
And “unsupported allegations
do not create a material issue of fact.”
Weinstock v. Columbia
Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).
For the following reasons, Plaintiff is entitled to
Summary judgment is appropriate in an action
Merrill Lynch Commercial Fin. Corp. v. All State Envelopes Ltd.,
No. 09-CV-0785, 2010 WL 1177451, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010)
(internal citations omitted)).
In order to establish a prima
face case of default, a plaintiff “must provide proof of the
valid note and of defendant's failure, despite proper demand, to
Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Walji, No. 09-CV-
1995, 2011 WL 1842838, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2011).
“[o]nce a prima facie case has been established, the plaintiff
is entitled to summary judgment unless the defendant can assert
defenses that would raise a genuine issue of material fact.”
Valley Nat'l Bank v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 254 F. Supp. 2d 448,
454 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Plaintiff has met its initial summary judgment burden.
on June 5, 2005.
(See Pl. Ex. A.)
appear on the executed Note.
Defendants failed to
Defendants a demand for payment on March 29, 2010.
Aff. ¶ 8; Pl. Ex. B.)
Notwithstanding this demand, Defendants
did not make any additional payments.
(Johnson Aff. ¶ 8.)
Defendants’ defenses do not raise a genuine issue of
In Rule 56.1 Counter-Statement,1 Defendants argue
that (1) the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over this case; (2) Plaintiff failed to join a necessary party;
and (3) the document attached to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
is not the Note that Defendants signed.
These defenses are not
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
case by virtue of the parties’ diversity of citizenship.
U.S.C. § 1332.
Plaintiff is a West Virginia limited liability
(Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.)
Its principal place of business
is in Ohio and its sole member resides in Ohio.
(Am. Compl. ¶
Defendants, on the other hand, reside in Baldwin, New York,
and the amount in controversy, $114,255.36, exceeds the $75,000
GMAC is not a necessary party simply because it
holds the primary mortgage on the property that secures the
(See Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2.)
A party is required where (a)
relief among existing parties”; or (b) “that person claims an
Defendants’ opposition to summary judgment referred the Court
back to their Rule 56.1 Counter-Statement.
(Docket Entry 31 ¶
situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence
may: (i) “as a practical matter impair or impede the person's
ability to protect the interest”; or (ii) “leave an existing
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a); see also ConnTech Dev. Co v.
GMAC is not a required party here.
The Court can
provide complete relief without GMAC’s being joined because GMAC
is not a party to the Note and cannot assert an interest in the
right to recover on the Note.
See id. at 682 (“A nonparty to a
commercial contract ordinarily is not a necessary party to an
adjudication of rights under that contract.”).
The Court notes
that, in this action, Plaintiff is not seeking to foreclose on
the property securing the Note.
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff attached the wrong
Note to its Amended Complaint also does not raise a genuine
issue of fact.
Although the document attached to the Amended
Complaint omits paragraph five,2 the Note attached to Plaintiff’s
Rule 56.1 Statement is complete and contains both Defendants’
signatures, which Defendants do not contest.
Paragraph five states that the Note is secured by a mortgage.
(Pl. Ex. A.)
IV. Damages and Costs
principal balance was $94,218.27 and the unpaid interest was
interest on the outstanding principal, which comes to $21.30 per
Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to $94,218.27 plus $27,831.68
in interest through March 30, 2011 plus an additional $21.30 per
day from March 30, 2011 through the date of judgment.
is also entitled to its reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion (Docket
Entry 29) is GRANTED.
Within thirty (30) days, Plaintiff shall
file an accounting of its reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees,
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
15 , 2012
Central Islip, New York
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