Johnson et al v. Myers et al

Filing 103

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 80 Motion for Reconsideration - For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and/or relief from judgment is DENIED. All claims against Defendants Donna Guarton, Nassau County Baldwin, U.S.F.D., and Cyrus R. Vance, Jr. remain dismissed with prejudice. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 6/22/11. C/M; C/ECF (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------X
JULIA JOHNSON and DJM,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
10-CV-1964 (JS)(WDW)

- against EDDIE JAMES MYERS, et al.,
Defendants.
-----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs:
Julia Johnson

DJM

For Defendants:
Eddie James Myers, Jr.

Julia Johnson, pro se
943 Wallace Avenue
Baldwin, NY 11510
Julia Johnson, pro se
943 Wallace Avenue
Baldwin, NY 11510

Danielle J. Seid, Esq.
Lance D. Simon, Esq.
Law Offices of Anthony A. Capetola
Two Hillside Avenue
Williston Park, NY 11596

Donna Guarton
Nassau County Baldwin

Lewis R. Silverman, Esq.
Christopher James Soverow, Esq.
Rutherford & Christie, LLP
369 Lexington Avenue, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10017-5947

Benjamin Malewicz
Jody Weitzman-Fisher
P.O. Patterson
John Ciapoli

Pablo A. Fernandez, Esq.
Donna A. Napolitano, Esq.
Liora M. Ben-Sorek, Esq.
Nassau County Attorney's Office
One West Street
Mineola, NY 11501

Justice Karen Murphy
Dr. Robert Barris
Dr. G. St. Victor

No appearances.
Roger B. Lawrence, Esq.
Lawrence, Worden & Rainis, P.C.

Arthur A. Gianella

225 Broad Hollow Road, Suite 105E
Melville, NY 11747

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr.

Rebecca Rachel Hirschklau, Esq.
New York City Law Department
100 Church Street, Room 2-183
New York, NY 10003

SEYBERT, District Judge:
On
(“February
dismiss.
with

February

23

Order”)

23,

2010,

addressing

See Docket No. 77.

prejudice

all

the

claims

Court

three

issued

separate

an

Order

motions

to

The February 23 Order dismissed

against

Defendants

Donna

Guarton,

Nassau County Baldwin, U.S.F.D., and Cyrus R. Vance, Jr.

It

also dismissed some of the claims asserted against Defendant
Eddie James Myers, Jr.
Plaintiffs Julia Johnson and DJM, pro se, have now
moved for reconsideration of the portion of the February 23
Order dismissing with prejudice the claims against Ms. Guarton,
Nassau County Baldwin, U.S.F.D., and Cyrus R. Vance, Jr.

For

the following reasons, that motion is DENIED.
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
Motions for reconsideration may be brought pursuant to

Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Local Rule 6.3.

See Wilson v. Pessah, 05–CV–3143, 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 17820, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. March 14, 2007).

Rule 59(e)

permits a party to move for reconsideration when it believes the
2

Court overlooked important “matters or controlling decisions”
that

would

have

influenced

the

prior

decision.

Shamis

v.

Ambassador Factors Corp., 187 F.R.D. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Reconsideration is not a proper tool to repackage and relitigate
arguments and issues already considered by the Court in deciding
the original motion.

See United States v. Gross, 98–CR–0159,

2002 WL 32096592, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2002) (“A party may
not use a motion to reconsider as an opportunity to reargue the
same points raised previously.”).
arguments

and

issues.

See

Nor is it proper to raise new

Lehmuller

v.

Inc.

Harbor, 982 F. Supp. 132, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

Vill.

of

Sag

Reconsideration

may only be granted when the Court did not evaluate decisions or
data that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion
reached by the Court.

Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., 186 F.

Supp. 2d 402, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides

relief

from

a

judgment

for,

inter

alia,

mistakes,

inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and
fraud.

FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).

Rule 60(b) provides “extraordinary

judicial relief” that may “only be granted upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances.”

Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61

(2d Cir. 1986).

3

II.

Application
Plaintiffs

identify

no

“matters

decisions” that the Court overlooked.
151.

or

controlling

Shamis, 187 F.R.D. at

Nor do Plaintiffs identify any mistakes, inadvertence,

excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud.
CIV. P. 60(b).

FED. R.

Instead, Plaintiffs seek to relitigate issues and

legal arguments the Court already decided against them, or raise
entirely new issues and claims.
what reconsideration is not for.

Such conduct is, precisely,
See Gross, 98–CR–0159, 2002 WL

32096592 at *4; Lehmuller, 982 F. Supp. at 135.

The Court

explains below, in more detail.
A.

Claims Against Mr. Vance
With respect to Mr. Vance, Plaintiffs contend that the

case should not be dismissed against him because Ms. Johnson was
supposedly illegally terminated on October 23, 2008.

This “new”

fact, which Plaintiffs neglected to plead (alleging only Ms.
Johnson’s

March

reconsideration.

2007

suspension)

does

not

warrant

To begin with, raising it now is procedurally

improper, because reconsideration is not the right vehicle for
raising new issues.

Lehmuller, 982 F. Supp. at 135.

And, in

any event, it would not have affected the Court’s decision.
Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim would still fail because-as Plaintiffs pled in the Complaint--Ms. Johnson failed to file
suit within ninety days of receiving her right to sue letter.
4

See Docket No. 77 at 15 (citing Compl. p. 5).

Thus, the claim

is time-barred.
And
better.

Plaintiffs’

42

U.S.C.

§

1983

claim

fairs

no

If, as Plaintiffs now allege, Ms. Johnson was not fired

until October 2008, the claim may be timely.

But it is neither

well-pled nor legally cognizable.
If
capacity,

Plaintiffs

they

involvement

in

allege
the

sue
no

Mr.
facts

alleged

improper termination.

Vance

in

suggesting

harassment,

his

individual

his

personal

discrimination,

or

And, because Mr. Vance did not become the

New York County District Attorney until January 2010, it is
unclear, at best, how he could have had such involvement.
Alternatively,

if

Plaintiffs

sue

Mr.

Vance

in

his

official capacity, they fail to allege facts supporting New York
County’s municipal liability.

Indeed, Plaintiffs allege nothing

to suggest that New York County maintained any policy, practice
or custom of committing any kind of Constitutional violation.
See Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)
(municipal

policy,

practice,

or

custom

needed

for

municipal

liability); Spear v. Town of W. Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 67 (2d
Cir. 1992) (a “plaintiff must make specific allegations of fact
that

indicate

allegations

which

a

deprivation
are

nothing

of
more

5

constitutional
than

broad,

rights;

simple

and

conclusory statements are insufficient”).

On the contrary, to

the

submissions

extent

that

Plaintiffs’

voluminous

contain

“facts” at all, they identify only petty intra-office feuds and
human resources difficulties that lack Constitutional import,
and

in

no

way

suggest

a

policy

or

custom

of

Constitutional

violations (e.g., a supervisor assigning too much work while
permitting “favorite employees” to “run errands” during the day;
fumes from a nearby printer causing discomfort; a six-week delay
in receiving certain compensation).

See generally Docket No. 1-

2 at pp. 5, 8, 10.
B.

Claims Against Ms. Guarton & Nassau County Baldwin,
U.S.F.D.
Plaintiffs also seek reconsideration of the Court’s

dismissal of the claims against Ms. Guarton and Nassau County
Baldwin, U.S.F.D.
In

But Plaintiffs’ arguments are not persuasive.

dismissing

the

claims

against

Ms.

Guarton,

the

Court held that: (i) even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not
entirely
Guarton

preclude
should

be

Plaintiffs’
considered

claims;

and

a

actor;

state

Guarton enjoyed qualified immunity.

(ii)

even

then

if

Ms.

(iii)

Ms.

This is because, “at most,

Plaintiffs appear to allege that Ms. Guarton learned of certain
allegations

that

Mr.

Myers

made,

and--believing

those

allegations--acted in good faith to fulfill her statutory duty
to report suspected child abuse and neglect.”

6

Docket No. 77 at

13

(citing

N.Y.

‘objectively

Soc.

Serv.

reasonable’

for

L.

§

Ms.

413).

Guarton

Thus,

was

assume

to

“it
that

her

conduct did not violate any clearly established statutory or
The Court then held that, for

constitutional rights.”

Id.

substantively

reasons,

the

same

Ms.

Guarton

also

immunity from Ms. Johnson’s state law claims.

enjoyed

Id. at 14-15

(citing N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. § 419).
In

seeking

reconsideration,

Plaintiffs

identify

no

“matters or controlling decisions” that the Court overlooked.
Shamis,

187

mistakes,

F.R.D.

at

151.

inadvertence,

evidence, or fraud.

Nor

do

excusable

Plaintiffs

neglect,

FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).

identify

newly

any

discovered

Instead, Plaintiffs

just repeat their allegations that: (i) Ms. Guarton was somehow
responsible for the “defamation” of her character; and (ii) Ms.
Guarton could not have observed any alleged abuse because her
son

did

not

anonymous

attend

school

complaint.

on

These

the
are

day
the

Plaintiffs already litigated, and lost.
not available.
In
merits.
that

when

she

precise

filed

issues

her
that

So reconsideration is

Shamis, 187 F.R.D. at 151.
any

event,

Plaintiffs’

argument

fails

on

its

Just as before, Plaintiffs identify no facts suggesting

Ms.

Guarton

inappropriately.

lacked

good

Instead,

even

faith

or

construed

behaved
in

the

remotely

light

most

favorable to Plaintiffs, the identified facts suggest--at worst7

-that Ms. Guarton made a good faith mistake in judgment when she
believed Defendant Eddie Myers’ supposedly false allegations of
abuse and/or mental instability.

This is exactly why the Court

held that Ms. Guarton enjoys immunity from suit.
Similarly,

the

Court

dismissed

the

claims

against

Nassau County Baldwin, U.S.F.D., because the Complaint “contains
no facts, or even conclusory allegations, that would permit the
imposition

of

municipal

liability.”

Plaintiffs “oppose” this dismissal.
to

identify

any

facts

(whether

Docket

No.

77

at

13.

But Plaintiffs still fail
pled

in

the

Complaint

or

contained in Plaintiffs’ various other submissions) suggesting
that this Defendant maintained a policy, custom or practice of
“slandering parents by making baseless allegations of abuse or
neglect.”

Id. at 14.

Nor do Plaintiffs cite any facts or law

suggesting that their state law claims are cognizable against
this Defendant.

It follows then that Plaintiffs provide nothing

to justify reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and/or relief
from judgment is DENIED.

All claims against Defendants Donna

Guarton, Nassau County Baldwin, U.S.F.D., and Cyrus R. Vance,
Jr. remain dismissed with prejudice.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
8

and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of
an appeal.

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82

S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Court also warns Plaintiffs not to file another
motion seeking reconsideration of the Court’s Order dismissing
these Defendants.

Plaintiffs’ pro se status does not exempt

them from the consequences of filing frivolous motions.

And, if

the Court deems a second motion seeking reconsideration to be
frivolous, the Court will not hesitate to impose appropriate
sanctions--such

as

ordering

reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Plaintiffs

to

pay

Defendants’

See FED. R. CIV. P. 11; Johl v. Johl,

788 F.2d 75, 75 (2d Cir. 1986).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

June
22 , 2011
Central Islip, New York

9