Gray et al v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 33 Motion for Attorney Fees - For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for attorneys' fees is GRANTED. Within thirty days, Defendant shall file its fee application on ECF as a "motion for attorneys' fees." Plaintiffs shall have thirty days from the date of Defendant's application to make objections. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 9/17/12. C/ECF (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------X
WILLIAM S. GRAY, AUTO PARTNERS,
LLC, SUNRISE AUTOMOTIVE, LLC d/b/a
SUNRISE TOYOTA & SUNRISE SCION
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
10-CV-03081(JS)(ETB)

-againstTOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC.,

Defendant.
--------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiffs: David A. Rosenfeld, Esq.
Joseph Russello, Esq.
Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP
58 South Service Road, Suite 200
Melville, NY 11747
Jonathan Paul Whitcomb, Esq.
Diserio Martin O'Connor & Castiglioni LLP
One Atlantic Street, 8th Floor
Stamford, CT 06901
Scott M. Harrington, Esq.
Diserio, Martin, O'Conner & Castiglioni LLP
50 Main Street, Suite 1000
White Plains, NY 10606
For Defendant:

Carl J. Chiappa, Esq.
Nathaniel S. Boyer, Esq.
Hogan Lovells US LLP
875 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Pending

before

the

Court

is

Defendant

Toyota

Motor

Sales' (“Defendant” or “TMS”) motion for attorneys' fees, costs,

and

disbursements.

(Docket

Entry

33.)

For

the

following

reasons, this motion is GRANTED.
DISCUSSION
The facts of this case, with which the Court presumes
the reader’s familiarity, are detailed in the Court’s August 25,
2011 Memorandum and Order granting TMS' motion to dismiss.

See

Gray v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 806 F. Supp. 2d 619
(E.D.N.Y. 2011).

TMS now moves to recover its attorneys’ fees

incurred in defending (1) Plaintiffs’ claim under New York's
Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer Act
Plaintiffs’

seven

other

claims.

(the “Dealer Act”) and (2)
The

Court

addresses

these

requests in turn.
I. New York’s Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer Act
In Dealer Act cases, the Court may award “necessary
costs and disbursements plus a reasonable attorney’s fee to any
party.”

N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 469 (“Section 469”).

As an

initial matter, the parties dispute whether a fee award under
this

provision

discretionary,

is

mandatory

what

or

standard

discretionary
the

Court

and,

should

evaluating whether an award is appropriate.

if

it

apply

is
in

The Court rejects

TMS’ argument that it is automatically entitled to its fees
because it prevailed in this action.

(See Def. Br. 9.)

award under Section 469 is discretionary.

A fee

See Aspen Ford, Inc.

v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 99-CV-5978, 01-CV-4677, 2007 WL 777739,
2

at

*6

(E.D.N.Y.

Mar.

12,

2007).

If

New

York’s

legislature

intended to make fee awards mandatory, it could have easily made
them

so.

See,

e.g.,

N.Y.

C.P.L.R.

8601

(providing

that

in

certain actions against the state, “a court shall award” fees to
a

prevailing

party

(emphasis

added)).

Similarly,

the

Court

rejects Plaintiffs’ view that the Court find that their case was
frivolous before awarding TMS its legal fees.

The legislature

could have conditioned fees on a finding of frivolousness, but
Compare N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 469 with N.Y. EXEC. L.

it did not.
§ 297(10).

Having concluded that a fee award is neither mandatory
nor

dependent

on

a

finding

of

frivolousness,

the

remaining

question is whether an award is appropriate in this case.
is.

It

The few cases to consider fees under Section 469 have

either awarded them or, in one case, denied them for reasons not
present here.

See Sportique Motors, Ltd. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc.,

No. 00-CV-2037 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003) (available at Docket
Entry

35-3)

(granting

defendant

its

attorneys’

fees);

Gen.

Motors Corp. v. Villa Marin Chevrolet, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d
182, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (awarding counterclaim defendants their
attorneys’

fees);

Walters

Motorcars

v.

Mazda

Motors

of

Am.,

Inc., 169 Misc. 2d 737, 740, 647 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau Cnty. 1996); see also Aspen Ford, 2007 WL 777739, *6
(characterizing

Section

469

as
3

a

“prevailing

party”

fee

provision and declining to award fees where a final order had
not yet been entered).

Plaintiffs cite a line from Villa Marin

to argue that a defendant is only entitled to fees where the
plaintiff’s suit is “so plainly lacking in merit.”
(citing Villa Marin, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 184).)

(Pls. Opp. 8
This line is

dicta; the court there already concluded that the plaintiff had
waived the argument and that, in any event, it was based on
unpersuasive case law.
Although

the

Court

Villa Marin, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 184.

stops

short

of

finding

that

the

present

action was “plainly lacking in merit,” it notes that it was not
a particularly close case.

See, e.g.,

Gray, 806 F. Supp. 2d at

624 (finding that one of Plaintiffs’ arguments “border[ed] on
sophistry”).

The

weight

of

the

little

authority

there

is

supports a fee award here.
Plaintiffs’

remaining

arguments

are

unpersuasive.

Plaintiffs argue that their Dealer Act claim was brought in good
faith and the only reason that it was not successful was that
Plaintiffs could not obtain Consumer Satisfaction Index data in
discovery.

(See Pls. Opp. 10.)

But “[i]t is not permissible to

file suit and use discovery as the sole means of finding out
whether you have a case.

Discovery fills in the details, but

you must have the outline of a claim at the beginning.”

Gelfman

Int'l Enters. v. Miami Sun Int'l Corp., No. 05–CV–3826, 2009 WL
2957849, at *4 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009) (quoting Szabo Food
4

Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir.
1987)).

They also argue that a fee award would contravene the

purpose of the Dealer Act because the law “sought to level the
playing field” for car dealers.
logic

of

this

argument,

(Pls. Opp. 12.)

“[w]ell-established

Whatever the
principles

of

construction dictate that statutory analysis necessarily begins
with the ‘plain meaning’ of a law’s text and, absent ambiguity,
will generally end there.”

United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d

215, 255 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Venturella,
391 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2004)).
means just that.

In this case, “any party”

N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 469.
CONCLUSION

For

the

foregoing

attorneys’ fees is GRANTED.

reasons,

Defendant’s

motion

for

Within thirty days, Defendant shall

file its fee application on ECF as a “motion for attorneys’
fees.”

Plaintiffs

shall

have

thirty

days

from

the

date

of

Defendant’s application to make objections.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated:

September 17, 2012
Central Islip, New York

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