Torres v. Nassau County Jail et al
Filing
7
ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and the Complaint is sua sponte dismissed with prejudice as against Defendant Na ssau County Jail and without prejudice and with leave to file an Amended Complaint against Defendant Nassau County. The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption of the Complaint to include Nassau County as a Defendant rather than Nassau Co unty Jail. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order, together with Plaintiff's authorization, to the Superintendent of the facility in which Plaintiff is incarcerated and to serve notice of entry of this Order in accordan ce with Rule 77(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of the Court is further ordered to forward to the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of New York copies of Plaintiff's Summons, Complaint, and this Order for service upon Defendants, set forth herein, without prepayment of fees. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 5/19/11. C/M (Valle, Christine)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------X
JOSE TORRES,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
11-CV-0264(JS)(AKT)
-againstNASSAU COUNTY JAIL,
SGT. KRUTE SHIELD #53,
CPL. SIKINGS SHIELD #315,
CO AQUILINA, CO CALIFANO,
CPL McCANN,
Defendants.
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APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff:
JOSE TORRES, Pro Se
11-A-0260
Franklin Correctional Facility
62 Bare Hill Road
P.O. Box 10
Malone, NY 12953
For Defendants:
No Appearances
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Pending before the Court is the civil rights Complaint of
incarcerated pro se plaintiff Jose Torres (“Plaintiff”) brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accompanied by an application to
proceed
in
forma
pauperis.
Upon
review
of
the
Plaintiff’s
financial declaration in support of the application, the Court
finds that Plaintiff’s financial status qualifies him to file this
action without prepayment of the filing fees.
Accordingly, the
application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
However, for
the reasons that follow, the Complaint is sua sponte dismissed with
prejudice as against defendant Nassau County Jail and with leave to
file an Amended Complaint against Nassau County.
BACKGROUND
According to the brief, handwritten Complaint submitted
on the Court’s civil rights complaint form, Plaintiff received a
“ticket”
from defendant Sikings for allegedly clogging his toilet,
an offense that Plaintiff denies.
(Compl. at ¶ IV).
Plaintiff
claims that Defendant Krute “did my hearing and I got 14 days on
1/6/11.”
(Id.).
Plaintiff was then “sent to M.O. on 1/9/11, where
I’m lock[ed] in the cell [that was] real dirty [and had] mice
droppings, spit on the walls, [and] smell[ed] like piss.”
(Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McCann did not allow Plaintiff to
clean the cell.
(Id.).
According to the Complaint, on January 10,
2011, Plaintiff was “called to mental health,” where Defendant
Aquilina broke Plaintiff’s glasses and kicked Plaintiff’s feet.
(Id.).
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Aquilina, McCann and
two unnamed officers have “threatened to hurt” him and Defendant
Califano called Plaintiff a “spic” over the loud speaker.
(Id.).
As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff claims that he
“fear[s] for his life.”
(Id.).
Plaintiff has left blank the
section on the Complaint that calls for a description of any
injuries suffered or medical treatment received arising from the
events complained of.
damages
for
Nevertheless, Plaintiff seeks $2 million in
unspecified
“pain
and
suffering”
as
“disciplinary action against all stated jail officers.”
2
well
as
(Id. at
¶ V.).
DISCUSSION
I.
In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of his
application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court determines that
the Plaintiff’s financial status qualifies him to commence this
action without prepayment of the filing fees.
§ 1915(a)(1).
See 28 U.S.C.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis is GRANTED.
II.
Application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)
The PLRA, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915, requires a
district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the
action is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
(i-iii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)&(b); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639
(2d Cir. 2007). The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon
as it makes such a determination.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
It is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less
stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys and the
Court is required to read the Plaintiff's pro se Complaint liberally
and interpret it raising the strongest arguments it suggests.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d
1081 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L.
3
Ed. 2d 163 (1980); Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir.
2006); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d. Cir. 2004)
(“[W]hen the plaintiff proceeds pro se, . . . a court is obliged to
construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege
civil
rights
violations.”).
Moreover,
at
this
stage
of
the
proceeding, the Court assumes the truth of the allegations in the
See Hughes, 449 U.S. at 10; Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 167
Complaint.
F.3d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 1999).
A.
Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States .
. . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff
must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at
least in part to a person acting under color of state law and (2)
the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the
Constitution of the United States.”
Rae v. County of Suffolk, No.
07-CV-2138 (RMM) (ARL), 2010 WL 768720, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Section 1983 does not create a substantive right; rather,
to
recover,
a
plaintiff
must
establish
the
deprivation
of
a
separate, federal right. See Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d
4
Cir. 1999).
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint is liberally construed by
the Court to allege an Eighth Amendment claim challenging the
conditions of his confinement.
B.
Eighth Amendment Claim
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel
and unusual punishment,” U.S. CONST.
AMEND.
VIII, and, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process clause, makes it applicable to the states.
Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758
(1962)).
Although it is clear that the Eighth Amendment “‘does not
mandate comfortable prisons,’” it does not permit inhumane treatment
of those in custody.
Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.
2001) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970,
1976, 128 L. Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 349, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2400, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981)).
To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, “an
inmate must show (1) a deprivation that is ‘objectively sufficiently
serious’ [such that the plaintiff] was denied ‘the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities,’ and (2) a ‘sufficiently culpable
state of mind’ on the part of the defendant official, such as
deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.”
Gaston, 249
F.3d at 164 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). With these standards
in mind, the Court considers the Plaintiff’s claims as against the
Defendants.
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C.
Defendant Nassau County Jail
As a threshold matter, the Plaintiff purports to allege
a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Nassau County Jail. However,
“under New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms
of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart
from the municipality and therefore, cannot sue or be sued.”
See
Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (dismissing claim against Lynbrook Police Department); see
also Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Because plaintiff has named the City of White
Plains
as
a
defendant,
any
claims
against
the
[White
Plains
Department of Public Safety] are redundant. WPDPS does not have its
own
legal
identity,
dismissed.).
and
therefore
the
claims
against
it
are
The Nassau County Jail is an administrative arm of
Nassau County without an independent legal identity.
Accordingly,
the Plaintiff’s claim against Nassau County Jail are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, see Burgos
v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994), the Court infers that
Plaintiff intended to bring this claim against Nassau County.
Accordingly, the Complaint is deemed amended to be brought
against Nassau County rather than Nassau County Jail and the Clerk
of the Court is directed to so amend the caption.
D.
Claims Against Nassau County
Insofar as Plaintiff seeks to assert a Section 1983 claim
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against Nassau County based on the misconduct of the Correction
Officer Defendants, it is insufficiently pled.
A municipal body,
such as a county, may not be held liable under Section 1983 for the
unconstitutional acts of its employees absent allegations that such
acts are attributable to a municipal custom, policy or practice.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94; see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 478-479, 108 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986); Jeffes
v.
Barnes,
208
F.3d
49,
57
(2d
Cir.
2000)
(noting
that
a
municipality “cannot properly be held liable . . . unless the injury
was inflicted by [its] lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may
fairly
be
said
to
represent
official
policy”),
(internal
citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 813,
121 S. Ct. 47, 148 L. Ed. 2d 16 (2000); Ricciuti v. N.Y. City., 941
F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991).
Even
affording
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
a
liberal
construction, the Court cannot reasonably interpret the Complaint
to contain allegations concerning an underlying municipal policy or
custom that deprived the Plaintiff of a constitutional right.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim against
Nassau County and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Nassau
County are dismissed with prejudice unless the Plaintiff files an
Amended Complaint in accordance with this Order within thirty (30)
days of the date that this Order is served with notice of entry upon
the Plaintiff.
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E.
Defendants Krute, Sikinas, Aquilina, Califano and McCann
As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected
to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
because he was harassed by correction officers and subjected to
unsanitary conditions during his confinement at the Nassau County
Correctional Center.
Though thin, the Court declines to find at
this stage that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against the
Correction Officers are implausible.
See, e.g., Gaston, 249 F.3d
156, 166 (“We are unwilling to adopt as a matter of law the
principle that it is not cruel and unusual punishment for prison
officials knowingly to allow an area to remain filled with sewage
and excrement for days on end.”).
Because Plaintiff’s claims against the Correction Officers
are not frivolous or malicious within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1915, the Court finds that Plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts
to withstand sua sponte dismissal of these claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and the Complaint is sua
sponte dismissed with prejudice as against Defendant Nassau County
Jail and without prejudice and with leave to file an Amended
Complaint against Defendant Nassau County.
The Clerk of the Court is directed amend the caption of
the Complaint to include Nassau County as a Defendant rather than
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Nassau County Jail.
The agency holding Plaintiff in custody must calculate the
amounts specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), deduct those amounts from
his prison trust fund account, and disburse them to the Clerk of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
The Warden or Superintendent shall not deduct more than twenty
percent from the prisoner’s trust fund account.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this
Order,
together
with
Plaintiff’s
authorization,
to
the
Superintendent of the facility in which Plaintiff is incarcerated
and to serve notice of entry of this Order in accordance with Rule
77(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including mailing
a copy of the Order to the Plaintiff at his last known address, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(c).
The Clerk of the Court is further ordered to forward to
the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of New York
copies of Plaintiff’s Summons, Complaint, and this Order for service
upon Defendants Krute, Sikings, Aquilina, Califano and McCann,
without prepayment of fees.
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The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and
therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any
appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82 S.
Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
May
19 , 2011
Central Islip, New York
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