McCaffery v. McCaffery

Filing 83

ORDER granting 79 Motion to Bifurcate. For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, the defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial is granted. The matter is referred back to Magistrate Judge Shields for all remaining pre-trial supervision. Ordered by Judge Denis R. Hurley on 4/21/2015. (Kaley, Regina)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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REGINA MCCAFFERY,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
11 CV 0703 (DRH) (AYS)

- against MARC MCCAFFERY,
Defendant.
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APPEARANCES:

BY:

Greenberg Traurig PA
Attorneys for Plaintiff
625 E. Twiggs Street, Suit 100
Tampa, FL 33602
Christopher Torres, Esq.
David Barnett Weinstein, Esq.
John A. Wirthlin, Esq.

BY:

Chalos & Co., P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
55 Hamilton Avenue
Oyster Bay, NY 11771
George M. Chalos, Esq.

BY:

Eaton & Van Winkle LLP
Attorneys for Defendant
3 Park Avenue, 16th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Robert N. Swetnick, Esq.

HURLEY, Senior District Judge:
Regina McCaffery (“plaintiff”) and Marc McCaffery (“defendant”) are adult siblings who
purchased a condominium at 27-1 Mitchell Road, Westhampton Beach, New York (“the
property”) in which their mother Barbara McCaffery (“Barbara”) currently resides. Plaintiff
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commenced this diversity action against defendant seeking partition, sale, and purchase of the
property. In the alternative, plaintiff asserts a cause of action for unjust enrichment and seeks
dissolution of an at-will partnership formed between her and defendant pursuant to N.Y. Gen.
Partnership Law §§ 10-11. On March 21, 2014, the Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment on its claims. Presently before the Court is defendant’s motion to bifurcate the trial
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b). For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s
motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the facts as contained in its Order of March 21, 2014.
DISCUSSION
I.

Bifurcation Standard
Bifurcation is governed by Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which

provides as follows:
For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize,
the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues,
claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims. When
ordering a separate trial, the court must preserve any federal right to
a jury trial.
“[W]hether to bifurcate a trial . . . is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Getty
Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 862 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1988). “To determine whether
bifurcation is warranted, courts generally consider the following three factors: ‘1) whether
significant resources would be saved by bifurcation, 2) whether bifurcation will increase juror
comprehension, and 3) whether bifurcation will lead to repeat presentations of the same evidence
and witnesses.’ ” WeddingChannel.Com Inc. v. The Knot, Inc., 2004 WL 2984305, at *1

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(S.D.N.Y. Dec 23, 2004) (quoting Gaus v. Conair Corp., 2000 WL 1277365, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
7, 2000)). “[T]he moving party bears the burden of establishing that bifurcation is warranted.”
Id. Generally, bifurcation “is the exception, not the rule.” Id.
II.

Whether Bifurcation is Warranted
As discussed in the Court’s Summary Judgment Order, plaintiff and defendant are tenants

in common of the property, and normally tenants in common share the proceeds of a partition sale
in direct proportion to their ownership interest, which for each is one half. Plaintiff, however,
claims that she is entitled to more than one half of the sale proceeds as reimbursement from the
defendant for payments she made on behalf of Barbara in excess of her one-half legal interest.
Defendant responds that no such adjustment is warranted because he and plaintiff verbally agreed
that his cash contribution to the property would be limited to a $10,275 down payment and Barbara
was to pay the monthly mortgage payment and homeowner’s association dues and other expenses
with any shortfall to be paid by the plaintiff.
“Defendant, Marc, proposes to try separately first the issue of whether there was an
agreement between Plaintiff, Regina, and Defendant, Marc, as to the responsibility to pay those
expenses of the Property which Barbara did not pay and, if so, its terms.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp.
at 1-2.) Defendant suggests that “[a]ll other issues, including what expenses were paid, the
amount of payment, and whether the payments were by the Plaintiff or by the Parties’ mother,
Barbara, would be deferred to a second trial, if needed.” (Id. at 2.) Presumably, this second trial
would not be needed if defendant succeeded in the first trial in convincing the trier of fact of the
existence of the aforementioned verbal agreement. As defendant describes, “if such an agreement

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were found to have been made, there would be no need to take evidence as to the source of funds or
Plaintiff’s alleged disproportionate expenditures or to determine what adjustment if any should be
made to the distribution of the sale price to the Parties.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 18.)
Additionally, defendant argues that bifurcation is necessary to avoid the prejudice that
“would occur if the Court were to allow the extensive and convoluted presentation of Plaintiff’s
unsupported allegations of her payment of expenses of the property to bleed into and confuse the
straightforward determination of whether the Parties had an agreement as to who would pay the
expenses.” (Id. at 19-20.) Moreover, defendant argues that “it is also economically fair not to
unnecessarily drag Defendant through the expensive and time-consuming arguments relating to
expenses.” (Id.) Furthermore, defendant argues that “[b]ifurcation would result in economy by
avoiding in the first trial extensive disputes and determination of the admissibility of the 488 pages
of exhibits that Plaintiff asserts support her claim for adjustment of the distribution of the sale price
proceeds, but which do no such thing.” (Id.) Finally, defendant states that “the proposed
separate trial would: (1) expedite, rather than delay, the proceedings; (2) will not result in the
duplication of evidence; (3) will not create the risk of inconsistent verdicts; and (4) would not
deprive a party of any right to a jury trial.” (Id.)
Plaintiff argues in response that “bifurcation prejudices Plaintiff by reversing the order of
trial presentation based solely on Defendant’s assertion that he entered into an oral agreement
when there is no such evidence of an oral agreement, only his argument.” (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at
7.) Additionally, plaintiff contends that “[b]ifurcation would confuse the jury by limiting
evidence at trial in a manner that results in the incompleteness of evidence before the jury” and it

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would “not result in judicial economy, particularly if – as the evidence will dictate – there is no
oral agreement and the trial must necessarily continue.” (Id.) Plaintiff also points out that
“[b]ifurcation would result in the duplication of evidence, as an area to be considered in
determining an oral agreement is the parties’ course of conduct, which would have to be addressed
at the two trials Defendant seeks.” (Id. at 8.)
The Court acknowledges that “bifurcation is . . . the exception, not the rule, and the movant
must justify bifurcation on the basis of the substantial benefits that it can be expected to produce.”
Lewis v. City of New York, 689 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). “Ordinarily, a jury is
entitled to hear all of the evidence and deliberate over all of the issues in the case at one time.” Id.
However, “Rule 42(b) is sweeping in its terms and allows the district court, in its discretion, to
grant a separate trial of any kind of issue in any kind of case.” Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.
Master Retirement Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 288 F.R.D. 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (emphasis added) (quoting 9A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil 3d § 2398, at 126 (2008)); see also 8–42 Moore's Federal Practice—Civil § 42.20[5][a] (“Not
only does the court have discretion to bifurcate claims or issues traditionally considered to be
divisible, such as liability and damages, but also, to separate for trial virtually any other issue that
it thinks proper.”). Specifically, the Second Circuit has stated that “bifurcation may be
appropriate where, for example, the litigation of the first issue might eliminate the need to litigate
the second issue . . . .” Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999).
The Court will bifurcate the trial as requested by defendant because it could potentially
eliminate the need for a trial on many of the disputed issues, for if the trier of fact were to find that

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there was an oral agreement between the parties as described by the defendant, there would be no
need for a trial to determine the amount of sale proceeds owed to plaintiff. Thus, bifurcation is
warranted because it would potentially expedite this litigation. See Jinro Am. Inc. v. Secure Invs.,
Inc., 266 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court’s decision that “before addressing
any of the parties’ claims, an initial determination should be made whether the parties had entered
into a valid agreement and, if so, what that agreement entailed” was “a reasonable way to promote
clarity and judicial economy, because the validity of the contract directly informed the resolution
of the other claims”). Moreover, as defendant points out, bifurcation could avoid “extensive
disputes and determination of the admissibility of the 488 pages of exhibits that Plaintiff asserts
support her claim for adjustment of the distribution of the sale price proceeds.” (Def.’s Mem. in
Supp. at 20.) Even if the second trial is necessary, the Court is not convinced that first trying the
question of whether there was an agreement would prejudice the plaintiff rather than simplify the
issues before the jury. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that any overlap in the presentation
of evidence as to the parties’ course of conduct, the extent of which plaintiff has not addressed,
outweighs the benefits of bifurcation. Furthermore, plaintiff has not provided any explanation
regarding or support for her claim that bifurcation would result in inconsistent verdicts and
deprivation of a right to a jury trial. As a result, the Court grants defendant’s motion to bifurcate
the trial.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion to bifurcate the trial is granted. This
matter is referred back to Magistrate Judge Shields for all remaining pre-trial supervision.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
April 21, 2015
/s/
Denis R. Hurley
United States District Judge

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