Plummer v. Haggett
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Petitioner has failed to point to any state court ruling that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Thus, he has demonstrated no basis for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the Court finds this petition to be without merit. Therefore, the petition for a wri t of habeas corpus is denied. Because petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, no certificate of appealability shall issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bianco on 4/24/2015. (Moe, Alison)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
11-CV-1707 (JFB)
_____________________
ROBERT PLUMMER,
Petitioner,
VERSUS
SUPERINTENDENT WILLIAM T. HAGGETT,
Respondent.
___________________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
April 24, 2015
___________________
court’s preclusion of this evidence deprived
him of a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense to the crime charged.1 For
the reasons set forth herein, the Court
concludes that there is no basis for habeas
relief, and denies the petition in its entirety.
JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:
Robert Plummer (“petitioner”) petitions
this Court pro se for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging
his conviction entered on September 10,
2008, in the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, County of Nassau (the “trial
court”) for course of sexual conduct against
a child in the second degree. See N.Y. Penal
Law § 130.80(1)(a). Petitioner was
sentenced to a determinate term of seven
years’ imprisonment and three years’ postrelease supervision.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
The Court has adduced the following
facts from the instant petition and the
underlying record.
Petitioner was indicted for, and later
convicted of, one count of course of sexual
In the instant petition, petitioner seeks a
writ of habeas corpus claiming that the trial
court deprived him of a fair trial and due
process of law by precluding him from
introducing the third of a series of out-ofcourt statements for the purpose of
demonstrating that the first two statements,
which were admitted at trial, were given
involuntarily. Petitioner argues that the trial
1
At the outset, the Court notes that the central issue
in the instant petition is petitioner’s right to present a
complete defense to the crime charged. Although
factually relevant, the voluntariness of petitioner’s
confessions is not at issue in the instant petition
because, as is discussed infra, petitioner does not
challenge the trial court’s finding that the statements
were voluntary and admissible.
1
conduct against a child in the second degree.
See N.Y. Penal Law § 130.80(1)(a).
Petitioner’s conviction arose out of events
that took place between 1999 and 2003,
during which petitioner sexually abused his
niece, R.H.2, fifteen to twenty times when
she was between the ages of six and ten
years old. Petitioner’s conduct did not come
to light until 2006, when R.H.’s mother
discovered an old entry in R.H.’s diary,
indicating she had been abused by
petitioner.
voluntarily. I did read it. It is my
words and it is the truth.
(Resp. Ex. 17.)
The second statement (“statement two”)
was a handwritten letter of apology to the
victim, in which petitioner apologized to the
victim for his conduct:
Dear [R.H.], I am writing this letter
to you to try and explain what I had
done to you. I know there really is no
way for me to make this up to you
but I’ll try. Please try to forgive me
because I’m really sorry. I know that
it’s no excuse, but when I did those
things to you, I was on drugs, and for
some reason I was unable to control
myself. Again, I know that this is no
real reason or excuse for what I did.
But again, I’m sorry. You know that
I love you and would never do
anything to hurt you. I hope that one
day you will be able to forgive me. If
not, I’ll understand. Always, Robert.
On February 8, 2007, petitioner was
arrested and taken to the Nassau County
Police Headquarters in Mineola. (Tr.3 at
953, 956-58.) Following his arrest, petitioner
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and
gave three successive written statements to
the interrogating officers.4 The first
statement (“statement one”) was a
confession to sexually abusing the victim
fifteen to twenty times:
Between the years 2000 and 2003 . .
. I want to admit that, over the years
when [R.H.] was between the ages of
6 through 10, I did sexually abuse
her. I admit I did it. There were
about 15 to 20 times that I touched
her and rubbed myself on her. I
didn’t penetrate her vagina with my
fingers, but I did rub her vagina area.
There was one time when I put my
mouth on her vagina and kissed her
vagina. I am very sorry for what I
did. . . . I am now at Special Victims
Squad giving the statement to
Detective
Moran
freely
and
(Resp. Ex. 17.)
The third statement (“statement three”)
was a confession to sexually abusing another
individual, the victim’s cousin. Petitioner
was not charged with sexually abusing the
victim’s cousin, and his confessed abuse
was not at issue during petitioner’s trial. At
no point during the trial was the jury made
aware of the existence of statement three.
However, at the trial, statements one and
two were admitted into evidence.5
2
In the interest of maintaining the privacy of a minor,
the Court will refer to the victim as “R.H.”
3
“Tr.” refers to the transcript of petitioner’s trial.
4
Although arrested on February 8, 2007, petitioner
gave his statements after 12:00 a.m. that evening, and
thus all three statements were dated February 9,
2007.
5
In addition to statements one and two, the
prosecution offered other evidence at trial to establish
petitioner’s guilt of the abuse charge.
2
B. Procedural History
b. Trial and Sentencing
1. State Court Proceedings
On February 8, 2007, petitioner was
indicted on one count of course of sexual
conduct against a child in the second degree
in violation of Penal Law § 130.80(1)(a).
(Nassau County Indictment Number 2180N07.)
a. Huntley Hearing
On January 3, 2008, the Honorable
Joseph C. Calabrese held a Huntley hearing
to determine whether the three written
statements made by petitioner at the Nassau
County
Police
Headquarters
were
voluntarily and intelligently made. (PTR.6 at
3.)
The following details of petitioner’s trial
are relevant to the instant petition. Prior to
trial, counsel for petitioner informed the
court that he intended to introduce statement
three into evidence. (Tr. at 6.) Counsel
explained that petitioner had learned that the
victim’s cousin had denied ever being
sexually abused by petitioner. (Id. at 10-12.)
According to petitioner, this would
demonstrate that petitioner “would have
signed anything that night,” and that his will
was overborne at the time he signed
statements one and two, in which he
confessed to sexually abusing the victim.
(Id. at 10, 13-14.) However, counsel stated
that petitioner was not going to bring in the
victim’s cousin to testify that the sexual
abuse did not happen. (Id. at 17.) The trial
court refused to allow statement three into
evidence, finding that it was irrelevant and
self-serving hearsay. (Id. at 9-16.) Petitioner
maintained his objection to the court’s ruling
and preserved the matter for review on
appeal.
At the hearing, Detectives Edmond
Moran and James Crawford testified as to
the events surrounding petitioner’s arrest
and interrogation. (Id. at 10-37, 83-90.) At
issue was petitioner’s state of mind during
the time he was in police custody and
whether any promises were made to
petitioner in return for a confession. The
officers were also questioned about whether
petitioner was informed of his Miranda
rights and, if so, whether he was informed
before or after any statements were made.
The officers testified that no threats or
promises were made to induce petitioner to
confess. (Id. at 30, 89.) Moran testified that
petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights,
and that petitioner knowingly waived his
rights before offering his first statement. (Id.
at 21-22.) Moran further testified that
petitioner’s second and third statements
contained Miranda warnings, and that
petitioner read the statements before signing
them. (Id. at 30, 32.)
At trial, petitioner maintained his
innocence of the crime charged and sought
to establish that his confessions were
involuntarily obtained and, thus, unreliable.
By Decision and Order dated January
17, 2008 and entered on January 23, 2008,
the trial court held that all three statements
made by petitioner were voluntarily and
intelligently made.
On direct examination, petitioner
testified to the following. After arriving at
the police station, two plainclothes officers
took petitioner to a room, which contained a
desk and three chairs. (Id. at 958.) The
officers placed petitioner in a chair and
stood there for approximately ten minutes.
(Id.) At this point, Moran and Detective
6
“PTR.” refers to the transcript of petitioner’s
Huntley hearing.
3
Edwin Trujillo entered the room, removed
petitioner’s existing handcuffs, and, using
their own handcuffs, handcuffed petitioner
to the chair. (Id.) Trujillo then began to
interrogate petitioner. “He was asking me if
I sexually abused my niece. He asked me if I
had sex with my niece. He asked me if I
inserted my fingers into her vagina. He
asked me if I ever fondled her. He asked me
if I ever touched her in an inappropriate
manner, if I kissed her in an inappropriate
manner.” (Id.) Petitioner responded,
“Absolutely not.” (Id. at 959.) Although
petitioner did not have access to a clock, he
believed the interrogation lasted “a couple of
hours.”7 (Id.)
my groin on her . . . I touched her vagina . . .
I put my mouth on her vagina.” (Id.)
Petitioner then told them that he did this
“fifteen to twenty times.” (Id.) While Moran
was typing out the confession, Trujillo said,
“Okay, listen if you really want to get
sympathy from the judge . . . you need to
write an apology letter to [R.H.].” (Id. at
965.) Petitioner did not want to write the
apology letter; he agreed to write it after
Trujillo said, “If you want to get sympathy
from the judge, you have to show that you
are remorseful.” (Id. at 965-66.) Petitioner
wrote the apology letter by hand. (Id. at
966.) He stated that he tried to make the
letter vague, but also tried to satisfy the
detectives. (Id.)
Counsel
then
showed
petitioner
statement one and the accompanying
Miranda rights card. Petitioner testified that
he signed the rights card, and that he signed
it after he signed the written statement. (Id.
at 959-61.) When asked why he signed the
statement, petitioner testified that at first he
refused to confess to the crime. (Id. at 962.)
Once the detectives told him that the only
alternative was “to sit in jail until this thing
comes to trial,” petitioner came to think that
confessing was his best option in the hope
that the detectives would fulfill their
promise and he would get released from jail
and not lose his job. (Id.)
Counsel then asked petitioner why he
signed the statement and wrote the apology
letter. Petitioner, again, explained that he
confessed because he “believed the
detectives when they stated to me that they
would speak on my behalf and try to get me
released.” (Id. at 967.) Petitioner did not
testify that the officers mistreated him or
subjected him to any direct form of
coercion.
On May 22, 2008, the jury found
petitioner guilty of the aforementioned
charge. (Id. at 1365, 1371). Petitioner was
sentenced on August 28, 2008 to a
determinate sentence of seven years’
imprisonment. (8/28/08 Sent. Tr.8 at 13.) On
September 10, 2008, petitioner’s prior
sentence was vacated and he was
resentenced to a determinate term of seven
years’ imprisonment and three years’ postrelease supervision. (9/10/08 Sent. Tr.9 at 4.)
Petitioner then explained in detail to the
jury the process of how his first statement
was produced. The detectives questioned
petitioner and Moran typed petitioner’s
answers into a computer as he spoke. At
some point, the detectives stopped and said,
“If you are going to give a confession, it has
to be specific.” (Id. at 964.) Petitioner then
told the detectives, “I laid on her. I rubbed
8
“8/28/08 Sent. Tr.” refers to the transcript of the
petitioner’s sentencing proceeding, which took place
on August 28, 2008.
9
“9/10/08 Sent. Tr.” refers to the transcript of the
petitioner’s resentencing proceeding, which took
place on September 10, 2008.
7
On cross-examination, petitioner testified that the
interrogation lasted between two to three hours. (Id.
at 1050.)
4
2. The Instant Petition
Petitioner was resentenced because the trial
judge failed to impose a period of postrelease supervision, which is required by
law. (Id. at 2.)
Petitioner filed the instant habeas corpus
petition together with his pro se brief in
support of the petition on April 4, 2011.
Petitioner claims that the trial court deprived
him of a fair trial and due process of law by
precluding him from introducing into
evidence his third statement of admission,
and that the court’s preclusion of this
evidence deprived petitioner of a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense to
the crime charged. Respondent filed a
memorandum of law in opposition to the
petition on July 6, 2011. Petitioner filed a
reply to respondent’s opposition on August
15, 2011. The Court has fully considered the
arguments and submissions of the parties.
c. Direct Appeal
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, Second Department (“Appellate
Division”), on the following grounds: (1) the
trial court deprived petitioner of a fair trial
by precluding the defense from introducing
evidence showing petitioner’s will was overborn and his statements were involuntary;
(2) the evidence was legally insufficient and
the jury’s verdict was against the weight of
the evidence; and (3) the sentence imposed
was unduly harsh and excessive. (Def.Appellant Br. at 35, 39, 45.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On October 5, 2010, the Appellate
Division unanimously affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. People v. Plummer, 77
A.D.3d 688 (2d Dept. 2010). The court held:
(1) petitioner’s claim with respect to the trial
court’s preclusion of his out-of-court
statement was without merit; (2) the
evidence was legally sufficient to establish
petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and the verdict was not against the weight of
the evidence; and (3) the sentence imposed
was not excessive. Id.
To determine whether petitioner is
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, a federal
court must apply the standard of review set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which provides, in
relevant part:
(d) An application for a writ
of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the
claim—
Petitioner then filed an application with
the New York Court of Appeals for leave to
appeal the Appellate Division’s order.
Petitioner renewed his arguments with
respect to the legal sufficiency of the
evidence and the trial court’s preclusion of
his out-of-court statement. The New York
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
application for leave to appeal on December
3, 2010. People v. Plummer, 15 N.Y.3d 955
(2010). Petitioner did not petition the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
(1) resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United
States; or
5
far off the mark as to suggest judicial
incompetence.’” Id. (quoting Francis S. v.
Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Finally, “if the federal claim was not
adjudicated on the merits, ‘AEDPA
deference is not required, and conclusions of
law and mixed findings of fact . . . are
reviewed de novo.’” Dolphy v. Mantello,
552 F.3d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Spears v. Greiner, 459 F.3d 200, 203 (2d
Cir. 2006)).
(2) resulted in a decision that
was
based
on
an
unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “‘Clearly established
Federal law’” is comprised of “‘the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the
Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of
the relevant state-court decision.’” Green v.
Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 296 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412 (2000)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Right to Present a Complete Defense
A decision is “contrary to” clearly
established federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court, “if the state court arrives at
a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the
Supreme Court] on a question of law” or “if
the state court decides a case differently than
[the Supreme Court] has on a set of
materially
indistinguishable
facts.”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13. A decision is
an “unreasonable application” of clearly
established federal law if a state court
“identifies the correct governing legal
principle from [the Supreme Court’s]
decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of [a] prisoner’s case.”
Id. at 413.
Petitioner argues that the trial court’s
preclusion of statement three deprived him
of his right to a fair trial and to due process
of law under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. However, “[t]he power of
courts to exclude evidence through the
application of evidentiary rules that serve
the interests of fairness and reliability is
well-settled.” Wade v. Mantello, 333 F.3d
51, 58 (2d Cir. 2003). Even erroneous
evidentiary rulings warrant a writ of habeas
corpus only where the petitioner “can show
that the error deprived [him] of a
fundamentally fair trial.” Rosario v.
Kuhlman, 839 F.2d 918, 925 (2d Cir. 1988)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted)
(emphasis supplied).
AEDPA establishes a deferential
standard of review: “‘a federal habeas court
may not issue the writ simply because that
court concludes in its independent judgment
that the relevant state-court decision applied
clearly established federal law erroneously
or incorrectly. Rather, that application must
also be unreasonable.’” Gilchrist v. O’Keefe,
260 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Williams, 529 U.S. at 411). Additionally,
while “‘[s]ome increment of incorrectness
beyond error is required . . . the increment
need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief
would be limited to state court decisions so
In determining whether a state court’s
alleged evidentiary error deprived a
petitioner of a fair trial, federal habeas
courts engage in a two-part analysis,
examining (1) whether the trial court’s
evidentiary ruling was erroneous under state
law, and (2) whether the error amounted to
the denial of the constitutional right to a
fundamentally fair trial. See Taylor v.
Connelly, 14-CV-612 (ADS), 2014 WL
1814153, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014)
(citing Wade, 333 F.3d at 59 n. 7). The test
for “fundamental fairness” is whether the
6
excluded evidence, “‘evaluated in the
context of the entire record, create[d] a
reasonable doubt [regarding petitioner’s
guilt] that did not otherwise exist.’” Taylor
v. Curry, 708 F.2d 886, 891 (2d Cir. 1983)
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 112-13 (1976)).
relevant to petitioner’s claim is the decision
of the Supreme Court in Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683 (1986).
In Crane, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the general principle that criminal
defendants
have
a
“fundamental
constitutional right to a fair opportunity to
present a defense.” Crane, 476 U.S. at 687
(citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 485 (1984)). Specifically, the Court
held that refusing to allow a defendant to
present
evidence
concerning
the
circumstances
of
his
interrogation
and confession, after the trial judge had
ruled that the confession was voluntary,
deprived the defendant of his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 691.
In abundance of caution, the Court will
proceed directly to the question of whether
any possible error concerning the admission
of statement three under state law10 resulted
in a fundamentally unfair trial or deprived
petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense to the crime
charged. Ultimately, having reviewed the
entire record, the Court concludes that the
preclusion of statement three does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation
because the excluded evidence would not
have created a reasonable doubt as to
petitioner’s guilt that did not otherwise exist.
The Court explained that, if the
defendant is “stripped of the power to
describe to the jury the circumstances that
prompted his confession, [he] is effectively
disabled from answering the one question
every rational juror needs answered: If the
defendant is innocent, why did he previously
admit his guilt?” Id. at 689. Consequently,
the Court concluded that where the
prosecutor’s case is based on the defendant’s
confession, the defense must be permitted to
explore the circumstances under which the
confession was obtained. Id.
To be clear, the constitutional right at
issue is petitioner’s right to present a
complete defense to the crime charged, and
more specifically, to defend himself by
presenting evidence about the circumstances
surrounding his confession. As properly
recognized in petitioner’s brief, the strongest
source of clearly established federal law
10
This is not to suggest that the trial court’s
preclusion of statement three was erroneous under
New York law. As is suggested by the Court’s
conclusion infra that statement three would not have
created a reasonable doubt in petitioner’s trial, this
Court also considers petitioner’s self-serving claim—
that statement three (regarding a different victim)
also was coerced—to be irrelevant to the charges
involving R.H. Such a claim would only have
relevance if additional evidence was going to be
submitted to undermine statement three, which
petitioner did not intend to do. Moreover, any
probative value also could have been substantially
outweighed by a danger of confusion of the issues by
a jury regarding a mini-trial about the victim’s
cousin. In any event, even assuming arguendo there
was error, it did not deny petitioner a fundamentally
fair trial.
B. Analysis
At the outset, the Court notes that Crane
involved the blanket exclusion of any
testimony about the circumstances of the
confession at issue. See 476 U.S. at 690.
Petitioner’s case, in contrast, involves “one
of those ordinary evidentiary rulings by state
trial courts concerning the admissibility of
evidence, upon which the Court is
traditional[ly]
reluctan[t]
to
impose
constitutional constraints.” Wade, 333 F.3d
at 60 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The Crane Court itself recognized
7
me if I had sex with my niece. He asked me
if I inserted my fingers into her vagina. He
asked me if I ever fondled her. He asked me
if I ever touched her in an inappropriate
manner, if I kissed her in an inappropriate
manner.” (Id.) Petitioner further testified
that, at first, petitioner refused to confess.
(Id. at 959.) However, according to
petitioner, once the detectives told him that
the only alternative was “to sit in jail until
this thing comes to trial,” petitioner testified
that he believed confessing was his best
option in the hope that the detectives would
fulfill their promise and he would get
released from jail and not lose his job. (Id. at
962.)
that, short of a blanket exclusion, trial courts
retain “‘wide latitude’ to exclude evidence
that is ‘repetitive . . . , only marginally
relevant,’ or poses an undue risk of . . .
‘confusion of the issues.’” Id. (quoting
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679
(1986)).
Here, it is clear from the record that
petitioner was afforded the opportunity to
testify, and his counsel cross-examined the
detectives concerning the conditions under
which petitioner made statements one and
two. Relevant circumstances concerning the
voluntariness of statements one and two
include: (1) the conduct of the law
enforcement officers, (2) the conditions of
the interrogation, and (3) the background of
the accused. Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894,
901-02 (2d Cir. 1988). With regards to the
conduct of the officers, “facts bearing on
that conduct include the repeated and
prolonged nature of the questioning or the
failure to inform the accused of his
constitutional rights . . . whether there was
physical mistreatment . . . or long restraint in
handcuffs, and whether other physical
deprivations occurred. . . . In addition . . .
such police conduct might include
psychologically coercive techniques such as
brainwashing or promises of leniency or
other benefits.” Id.
Petitioner also testified that the officers
told him that if he was going to give a
confession, it needed to be specific. (Id. at
964.) Petitioner testified that, after he
confessed, Trujillo suggested he write an
apology letter to the victim “if he really
want[ed] to get sympathy from the judge.”
(Id. at 965.) Petitioner asserted that he
agreed and hand wrote a letter of apology to
the victim. (Id.) At trial, counsel asked
petitioner why he signed the statement and
wrote the apology letter. Petitioner again
explained that he confessed because he
“believed the detectives when they stated to
me that they would speak on my behalf and
try to get me released.” (Id. at 967.) This
was the extent of the coercion described by
petitioner. He did not allege any form of
physical mistreatment or deprivation (id. at
1095),11 and he estimated that the
interrogation lasted only two to three hours
(id. at 1050).
Much of the evidence in the record
concerning the conduct of the officers
emerged from petitioner’s own testimony.
He testified that, after arriving at the police
station, two plainclothes officers took him to
a room, which contained a desk and three
chairs. (Id. at 958.) When Moran and
Trujillo entered the room, they handcuffed
petitioner to a chair. (Id.) Trujillo then began
to interrogate petitioner, and the jury was
able to evaluate whether Trujillo’s conduct
was psychologically coercive. Petitioner
testified to the following. “He was asking
me if I sexually abused my niece. He asked
11
On direct examination, Moran added that neither
Moran nor Trujillo was armed when Moran began
questioning petitioner (id. at 636), and that petitioner
did not make any complaints, physical or
nonphysical, during the interrogation (id. at 650-51).
8
Petitioner’s counsel elicited other facts
concerning the interrogation when he crossexamined the detectives. Although none of
these facts were sufficient to exclude
petitioner’s statement as a matter of law, the
jury was permitted to consider that when
Moran first encountered petitioner, he was
(1) not read his Miranda rights immediately
upon arrest,12 (2) in handcuffs, and (3) not
free to go. (Id. at 688.) Counsel further
elicited the fact that petitioner did not ask to
write an apology letter to the victim, but that
one of the officers suggested the idea to
petitioner, and that it is not normal routine to
take an apology letter from a suspect. (Id. at
720.)
raise the exclusion of statement three to the
level of a constitutional error.
To begin with, there is no constitutional
requirement that courts admit every word of
every statement made by a defendant in the
course of his interrogation; instead, it is
erroneous to exclude a portion of a
defendant’s statement only if that portion is
necessary to explain the admitted portion,
place it in context, or avoid misleading the
jury. See, e.g., United States v. Laster, 313
F. App’x 369, 371-72 (2d Cir. 2009).
Petitioner has not shown that statement three
itself explains anything about the contents of
statements one and two, or that the jury was
misled as to the substance of petitioner’s
confession in the absence of statement three.
Thus, on its face, statement three does not
create a reasonable doubt about petitioner’s
other confessions or his overall guilt that
would not have otherwise existed.
Thus, the totality of the circumstances
indicates that petitioner was able to develop
a thorough record concerning his two-tothree-hour interrogation, and the trial court’s
exclusion of statement three hardly rises to
the level of the “blanket exclusion” of
evidence that the Supreme Court confronted
in Crane.
Instead, petitioner argues that the
purported falsity of statement three
demonstrates that statements one and two
were coerced. Thus, petitioner’s argument
goes beyond the face of statement three, and
requires the additional logical link that the
victim’s cousin had since denied being
abused, even though she never testified as
such and petitioner’s counsel did not plan to
call her as a witness. Thus, the only
circumstance that could render statement
three even marginally relevant would have
been the petitioner’s self-serving testimony
that statement three was also false
(regarding the victim’s cousin), the
exclusion of which did not affect the
fundamental fairness of petitioner’s trial.
Cf. Zarvela v. Artuz, 364 F.3d 415, 418 (2d
Cir. 2004) (denying petition alleging
improper exclusion of witness’ hearsay
testimony where declarant had motive to
fabricate and petitioner declined opportunity
to properly admit statement). In other words,
if the jury did not believe petitioner’s
Because this petition does not involve a
blanket exclusion, the question is whether
statement three could have created a
reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s guilt that
did not otherwise exist, such that its
exclusion was beyond the trial court’s “wide
latitude” to find it irrelevant under state law.
Wade, 333 F.3d at 60. As noted, statement
three was not offered for the truth of its
contents, but instead as evidence that
petitioner’s confession was involuntary, and
that therefore the jury should consider it, and
the other post-arrest statements, unreliable.
For several reasons, this argument does not
12
On cross-examination, however, petitioner
acknowledged that Trujillo had read him Miranda
warnings when petitioner first arrived at the police
station, before Trujillo began asking petitioner
questions pertaining to the allegation, and thus before
petitioner confessed. (Id. at 1068-71.)
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?