Greenaway et al v. County of Nassau et al
Filing
68
DECISION AND ORDER: On the basis of the record and law as set forth in the Order, the Court hereby DENIES the Hempstead Defendants' summary judgment motion in its entirety, without prejudice. Ordered by Judge William F. Kuntz, II on 4/29/2015. (Brucella, Michelle)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------){
SHUAY'B GREENAWAY, SHARON KNIGHT,
and AVERY KNIGHT,
DECISION AND ORDER
11-CV-2024 (WFK) (AKT)
Plaintiffs,
-againstCOUNTY OF NASSAU AND NASSAU
COUNTY POLICE OFFICERS SGT. VINCENT
PAPA, in his individual and official capacities,
P.O. RONALD SCHMITT, in his individual and
official capacities, P.O. CLARENCE HUDSON,
in his individual and official capacities, and
P.O. WILLIAM STIO, in his individual and
official capacities, IN CORPORATED VILLAGE
OF HEMPSTEAD AND VILLAGE OF
HEMPSTEAD POLICE OFFICERS P.O. FRANE
REDO, in his individual and official capacities,
and P.O. WALTER OHR, in his individual and
official capacities,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------){
WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs Shuay'b Greenaway, his mother Sharon Knight, and his stepfather Avery Knight
(collectively "Plaintiffs") bring this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and New York State common law,
against the County of Nassau ("Nassau County"), Nassau County Police Officers Vincent Papa,
Ronald Schmitt, Clarence Hudson, and William Stio, the Incorporated Village of Hempstead
("Hempstead"), and Hempstead Police Officers Frane Reado and Walter Ohr (collectively
"Defendants"). The Village of Hempstead ("Hempstead"), Frane Reado, and Walter Ohr
(collectively the "Hempstead Defendants") filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
claims of false imprisonment and excessive force. Additionally, the Hempstead Defendants
claim Reado and Ohr have qualified immunity. For the foregoing reasons, the Hempstead
Defendants' motion is hereby DENIED in its entirety without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The events recounted below are undisputed or described in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, the non-moving parties. See Capobianco v. City ofNew York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 n.1 (2d
Cir. 2005).
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On March 31, 2015, the Court denied the summary judgment motion filed in this case by
Nassau County and Nassau Police Officers Papa, Schmitt, Hudson, and Stio (the "Nassau
Defendants"). Greenaway v. Cnty. of Nassau, 11-CV-2024, 2015 WL 1509486 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 2015) (Kuntz, J. ). The Court presumes familiarity with the incident of April 25, 2010 and the
other facts of the instant case as described in that decision, and will not repeat them here. Id. at
*1-4.
Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on April 25, 2011, an amended complaint on January 17, 2012,
and a second amended complaint on January 8, 2013. Dkt. 1; Dkt. 15; Am. Complaint; Dkt. 18
("Second Am. Complaint"). Plaintiffs sue Reado and Ohr (the "Hempstead Police Officers")
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for, inter alia, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations including
false imprisonment and excessive force. Second Am. Complaint at~~ 117-138. Plaintiffs seek
damages, including punitive damages, in the amount of fifty million dollars ($50,000,000). Id. at
48.
The Hempstead Defendants filed an answer on September 15, 2011, an answer to the
amended complaint on February 29, 2012 (including a cross-claim against the Nassau
Defendants), and an answer to the second amended complaint on May 3, 2013. Dkt. 9; Dkt. 23;
Dkt. 44.
On September 20, 2013, the Hempstead Defendants filed their motion for summary
judgment, Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, and the Hempstead
Defendants' reply in support of summary judgment. Dkt. 50-15 ("SJ Motion"); Dkt. 53 ("Pl.
Opp."); Dkt. 54 ("Def. Reply"). In their summary judgment motion, the Hempstead Defendants
make the following claims: (1) the Hempstead Police Officers did not use excessive force on
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Greenaway; (2) the Hempstead Police Officers did not falsely imprison Greenaway; and (3) the
Hempstead Police Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. SJ Motion at 5-12.
DISCUSSION
I.
Summary Judgment Standard.
A court "shall grant summary judgment ifthe movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). "The role of the court is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there
are any factual issues to be tried. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, this
Court will construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must
resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Brod v. Omya,
Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). No
genuine issue of material fact exists "where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263
F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (citing Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
If the moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party must "make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of [each] element to that party's case ... since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Importantly, if the evidence produced by the non-moving party "is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
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A summary judgment motion may be denied without prejudice. See, e.g., Garnett-Bishop v.
NY Cmty. Bancorp., Inc., 49 F. Supp.3d 321, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Spatt, J.).
II.
Analysis
A. Parties Dispute Material Facts Regarding Plaintiffs' False Imprisonment
Claims.
The Court denied the Nassau Defendants' motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs' false imprisonment claims, since the parties disputed material facts regarding whether
the confinement of Plaintiff Greenaway was reasonable. Greenaway, 2015 WL 1509486 at *5-7.
As to the Hempstead Defendants, the parties also dispute whether the Hempstead Police Officers
confined Greenaway. The Hempstead Defendants claim they did not, and that only Schmitt,
Stio, Hudson, and Papa (the "Nassau Police Officers") confined Greenaway. SJ Motion at 9, 11.
Plaintiffs argue, citing Defendant Reado's deposition, that it was Defendant Reado who
determined Greenaway should be confined. Pl. Opp. at 5. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue, citing
their own testimony and Defendant Reado's deposition again, that the Hempstead Police Officers
were involved in physically restraining Greenaway and confining him to the bathroom, while
forcing Mrs. Knight and her husband Avery Knight aside. Dkt. 52 ("Pl. Counter-Statement") at
~~
95, 106, 127, 128; Pl. Opp. at 16-17. The Hempstead Defendants do not counter Plaintiffs'
claims. Accordingly, the Court finds genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the
Hempstead Police Officers confined Greenaway. The Court hereby DENIES the Hempstead
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' false imprisonment claims, without
prejudice.
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B. Parties Dispute Material Facts Regarding Plaintiffs' Excessive Force
Claims.
The Hempstead Police Officers did not tase Greenaway, a fact no party disputes. SJ Motion
at 5; Pl. Opp. at 17-18. As such, the Hempstead Police Officers can only be liable for
Greenaway' s tasing if (1) the tasing qualifies as use of excessive force in violation of
Greenaway's constitutional rights, and (2) the Hempstead Police Officers had a "realistic
opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring." Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 461 F.
App'x 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the instant case, the Court has found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether
Greenaway's tasing qualified as use of excessive force. Greenaway, 2015 WL 1509486 at *7-9.
Plaintiffs also argue, citing in support depositions from the Hempstead and Nassau Police
Officers, that the Hempstead Police Officers had realistic opportunities to intercede, but instead
facilitated the tasing. Pl. Opp. at 15-19; Dkt. 51-6 ("Hudson Dep.") at 67:8 to 69:22; Dkt. 51-10
("Arce Dep.") at 117-120. The Hempstead Defendants do not deny that the Hempstead Police
Officers had realistic opportunities to intercede. Instead, they argue the tasing was objectively
reasonable, an issue the Court has already found to be clouded with genuine disputes of material
fact. SJ Motion at 8; Greenaway, 2015 WL 1509486 at *7-9. Accordingly, the Court cannot, at
this time, find that the Hempstead Police Officers lacked a realistic opportunity to intercede. The
Court hereby DENIES the Hempstead Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
excessive force claims, without prejudice.
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C. The Hempstead Police Officers' Claim of Qualified Immunity is Hereby
Denied.
The Hempstead Police Officers claim they are entitled to qualified immunity, arguing there
was an objectively reasonable basis to confine and tase Greenaway. SJ Motion at 12. A
government official has qualified immunity "if his conduct did not violate clearly established
rights or if it would have been objectively reasonable for the official to believe his conduct did
not violate plaintiffs rights." Harris v. 0 'Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 239 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts evaluating qualified immunity engage in a "twopronged inquiry. The first prong asks whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the
party asserting the injury, show the officer's conduct violated a federal right. The second prong
of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right in question was clearly established at
the time of the violation." Garcia v. Dutchess Cnty., 43 F. Supp. 3d 281, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(Stein, J.) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
In the instant case, the Court denied the Nassau Police Officers' claim of qualified immunity.
Greenaway, 2015 WL 1509486 at *12-13. The Court found that if Greenaway posed no
immediate threat to himself or others, then the Nassau Police Officers' conduct violated federal
rights clearly established as of April 25, 2010. Id at *13. Furthermore, the Court found
significant factual disputes about whether Greenaway was a threat to anyone. Id
Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, there are significant disputes of fact as to
whether the Hempstead Police Officers were involved in Greenaway's confinement or
realistically could have intervened in his tasing. See Sections II.A and Il.B, supra. If the
Hempstead Police Officers were involved in Greenaway's confinement, or realistically could
have intervened in his tasing, their conduct violated federal rights clearly established as of April
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25, 2010. Greenaway, 2015 WL 1509486 at *12-13; see also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct 1861,
1866 (2014) (Courts evaluating qualified immunity must "draw[] inferences in favor of the
nonmovant, even when ... a court decides only the clearly-established prong of the standard"
and must "take care not to define a case's 'context' in a manner that imports genuinely disputed
factual propositions.") (internal citations omitted).
Therefore, the Hempstead Defendants' motion for summary judgment that the Hempstead
Police Officers have qualified immunity is hereby DENIED without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, on the basis of the record and law as set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES
the Hempstead Defendants' summary judgment motion in its entirety, without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
s/WFK
Dated:
1?.-: (>f
, 2015
Brooklyn, New York
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