Nnakwe v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 16 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 20 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket Entry 20) is DENIED and the Commissioner's motion (Docket Entry 16) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of this Order and mark this case CLOSED. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 7/26/2012. C/M; C/ECF (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------X
WINIFRED NNAKWE,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
11-CV-2415(JS)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Winifred Nnakwe, pro se
190 Acorn Avenue
Central Islip, NY 11722
For Defendant:

Robert W. Schumacher, II, Esq.
U.S. Attorney's Office
Eastern District of New York
610 Federal Plaza
Central Islip, NY 11722

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Winifred Nnakwe (“Plaintiff”) appeals
the

decision

of

“Commissioner”)
overpayment

of

the
denying

Commissioner
her

disability

of

Social

application
benefits.

Security

for

a

Plaintiff

(the

waiver

of

and

the

Commissioner cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings (Docket
Entries 16, 20); for the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion
is DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a school teacher, applied for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) in August 2005, alleging a disability

arising out of her serious kidney disease.
__”) 12.)
DIB

in

Her application was granted, and she began receiving

December

2005.

returned to work.
not

(See Admin. R. (“R.

timely

In

the

meantime,

however,

Plaintiff

According to the Commissioner, Plaintiff did

notify

him

that

she

was

working

(R.

81),

in

contravention of Plaintiff’s award letter, which required her to
alert Social Security if she returned to the job (Docket Entry
20 at 133).

Plaintiff accepted DIB payments from December 2005

to November 2006 (R. 81), an overpayment of $12,628.
The

Commissioner

sought

repayment

of

the

DIB,

and

Plaintiff applied for a waiver, arguing that she timely notified
Social Security of her return to work and that she was told by a
Social Security employee that she was eligible for a trial work
period (during which she could work and receive benefits).
R.

70-71,

application
decision.

81.)

The

(R.

81),

Commissioner
and

denied

Plaintiff

Plaintiff’s

sought

review

(See
waiver

of

this

A hearing was held on August 5, 2009 (where Plaintiff

appeared pro se) and, in a subsequent written decision, the
Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) found that (1) Plaintiff
was not without fault in accepting the overpayment, and (2) it
would not be against equity and good conscience for Plaintiff to
return the money.
ALJ’s

findings,

(R. 14, 346.)
making

the

The Appeals Council upheld the

denial

Commissioner’s final decision.
2

of

Plaintiff’s

waiver

the

DISCUSSION
The Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed.
I. Legal Standard
In reviewing the ruling of the ALJ, this Court will
not determine de novo whether Plaintiff is in fact disabled.
Thus, even if the Court may have reached a different decision,
it must not substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ.
See Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1991).
this

Court

must

determine

whether

the

ALJ’s

Instead,

findings

are

supported by “substantial evidence in the record as a whole or
are based on an erroneous legal standard.”

Curry v. Apfel, 209

F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2000) superseded by statute on other
grounds, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560 (quoting Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d
496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998)).
evidence

exists

decision

will

exists.

See

to

be

If the Court finds that substantial

support

upheld,

Johnson

v.

the

even

Commissioner’s
if

Barnhart,

evidence
269

decision,

to

F.

the

Supp.

2d

the

contrary
82,

84

(E.D.N.Y. 2003).

“Substantial evidence is such evidence that a

reasonable

might

mind

conclusion.”

Id.

accept

as

adequate

to

support

a

The substantial evidence test applies not

only to the ALJ’s findings of fact, but also to any inferences
and conclusions of law drawn from such facts.

See id.

To determine if substantial evidence exists to support
the ALJ’s findings, this Court must “examine the entire record,
3

including

conflicting

evidence

and

evidence

from

which

conflicting inferences may be drawn when deciding whether the
findings are supported by substantial evidence.”

See Gonzalez

v. Barnhart, No. 01-CV-7449, 2003 WL 21204448, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
May 21, 2003) (quoting Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir.
1999)).

“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as

to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive

.

.

.

.”

42

U.S.C.

§

405(g).

Where

an

ALJ’s

decision is not supported by substantial evidence, however, or
where the Court is “‘unable to fathom the ALJ's rationale in
relation to the evidence in the record without further findings
or

clearer

explanation

appropriate.”

for

the

decision,’

remand

is

Hernandez v. Astrue, 814 F. Supp. 2d 168, 184

(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d
Cir. 1996)).
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Commissioner’s Decision
The

Commissioner

may

not

recover

overpayments

of

social security benefits where the claimant is without fault in
accepting the overpayments and the recovery would either (i)
defeat

the

purpose

of

the

Social

Security

Act,

or

(ii)

against equity and good conscience to require repayment.
U.S.C. § 404(b).

be
42

Whether a claimant is “without fault” may turn

on whether she failed “to furnish information which he knew or
should have known to be material,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.507(b), or
4

accepted a payment “which [s]he either knew or could have been
expected

to

Whether

repayment

Security
person

know

Act

of

expenses.”

was
would

depends

income

incorrect,”

on

required

defeat

the

whether
for

20

C.F.R.

purpose

repayment

ordinary

20 C.F.R. § 404.508(a).

and

§
of

would

404.507(c).
the

Social

“deprive

necessary

a

living

In turn, this determination

“depends upon whether the person has an income or financial
resources
needs,”

sufficient

taking

into

for

more

account

than

ordinary

expenses

rent, utilities, and insurance.

Id.

that

and

necessary

include

clothing,

Whether repayment would be

against equity and good conscience turns on whether a claimant
changed her position for the worse or “relinquished a valuable
right” in reliance on the benefits that were overpaid in error.
20 C.F.R. § 404.509(a)(1).
Here, the ALJ determined both that Plaintiff was not
without fault in accepting the overpaid DIB and that repayment
would not defeat the purpose of the Act.

On the latter point,

the ALJ used the phrase “against equity and good conscience,”
but it is clear from the context of his ruling that he also
considered whether repayment would defeat the purposes of the
Act.

As part of his decision, the ALJ detailed Plaintiff’s

salary and expenses (R. 12-13), factors that bear on the “defeat
the purpose” prong of the waiver inquiry, not the “equity and
good

conscience”

prong,

see

20
5

C.F.R.

§

404.509(b)

(“The

individual's
finding

of

financial
against

circumstances

equity

and

good

are

not

material

conscience.”).

to

a

Neither

decision was an abuse of the ALJ’s discretion.
As to the fault inquiry, Plaintiff maintains that she
timely

notified

Social

returned to work.

Security

administrators

(R. 358; Pl. Br. 5.)

that

she

had

Beyond Plaintiff’s

hearing testimony, though, there is no evidence to support this
view.

In

her

brief,

Plaintiff

application

was

denied

on

states

October

6,

that
2005

her

disability

because

she

had

returned to work and that this supports her position that she
notified

Social

Security

of

her

receiving DIB in December 2005.

employment

before

(Pl. Br. 5.)

she

began

Plaintiff does

not cite any evidence to show that she was denied benefits on
October 6, 2005.

This confusion may stem from language in the

Commissioner’s waiver decision stating that “Due to this return
to work, claimants [sic] disability claim was reversed to a
denial 10/06.”

(R. 81.)

Plaintiff describes similar language

in her brief to argue that the reversal occurred on October 6,
2005 (Pl. Br. 5), but it is clear that “10/06” in the waiver
decision means “October 2006,” not “October 6th.”

Plaintiff’s

own documents show that she informed Social Security of her
return to work on July 10, 2006.

(Docket Entry 20 at 143.)

The ALJ also properly determined that Plaintiff, whose
salary in 2007 was $86,688 (R. 39, 353), could afford to repay
6

the DIB at a rate of $125 per month.
waiver
careful

application
note

of

and

her

Plaintiff’s

hearing
salary

Drawing from Plaintiff’s
testimony,
and

decision was not an abuse of discretion.

the

expenses,

ALJ
and

took
his

See Valente, 733 F.2d

at 1041 (“[T]he issues of whether repayment would defeat the
purposes of the Act or be against equity or good conscience
implicate an exercise of informed judgment, and the Secretary
has considerable discretion in making these determinations.”).1
In sum, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and will not be overturned.

1

In her reply brief, Plaintiff hints that she bought a new car
in reliance on her benefits (see Pl. Reply 2), a point that,
under other circumstances, might go toward whether repayment
would be against equity or good conscience. Plaintiff did not
argue this in front of the Commissioner, though, and she
provides no details on when or why she bought the car, how much
it cost, or (other than her conclusory statement) why it was
purchased in “due to” her DIB. (Id.)
7

CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

Plaintiff’s

motion

for

judgment on the pleadings (Docket Entry 20) is DENIED and the
Commissioner’s motion (Docket Entry 16) is GRANTED.

The Clerk

of the Court is respectfully directed to mail Plaintiff a copy
of this Order and mark this case CLOSED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

July
26 , 2012
Central Islip, New York

8